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ABSTRACT

The History Division section of the proceedings contains the following 13 papers: "William G. Brownlow and The Knoxville 'Whig': A Career of Personal Journalism or Partisan Press?" (Alisa White Coleman); "Covering the Century: How Four New York Dailies Reported the End of the 19th Century" (Randall S. Sumpter); "Science, Journalism and the Construction of News: How Print Media Framed the 1918 Influenza Pandemic" (Meg Spratt); "The Klan and Press in Atlanta, 1919-1921: A Tale of Public Relations and Newspaper Opposition" (Hanna E. Norton and Karen S. Miller); "The Confederate Press Association: A Revolutionary Experience in Southern Journalism?" (Ford Risley); "Selling the National Pastime: The Start of Major League Baseball Public Relations" (Bill Anderson); "Czars, Presidents, Philosophers, and Miscegenation: The Cultural Power of Early Motion Pictures" (Elaine Walls Reed); "'Pounding Brass' for the Associated Press: A Press Telegrapher Recalls His Craft" (J. Steven Smethers); "American Press Coverage of Sociologist Herbert Spencer During His 1882 Visit to America" (Jack Breslin); "Strange Bedfellows, or a Marriage Made in Heaven? Advertising, the Federal Government, and the Second World War" (Inger L. Stole); "The U.S. Military and War Correspondents in World War II: Roles and Relationships" (Alan Armitage); "The Creation of the 'Free' Press in Japanese American Internment Camps: The War Relocation Authority's Planning and Making of the Camp Newspaper Policy" (Takeya Mizuno); and "Chicago Newspaper Theater Critics of the Early 20th Century: Mediating Ibsen, the Syndicate and the Little Theaters" (Scott Fosdick). (RS)

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J. McGill

CS 510 452

History

William G. Brownlow and The Knoxville *Whig*: A Career of Personal Journalism or Partisan Press?

Alisa White Coleman
University of Texas at Arlington
Box 19107
Arlington, TX 76019-0107
817-272-5185
acoleman@uta.edu

Abstract

An example of personal journalism was *The Knoxville Whig*, edited by William Gannoway Brownlow, Tennessee's first Reconstruction governor. Brownlow used his newspaper as a tool for the Whig party, his own religious beliefs, and to further the interests of himself and his friends.

This paper takes a historiographical approach to examine Brownlow's editorial stand on the issues concentrating on the period from 1849, when he moved to Knoxville, to 1865, when he was elected governor.

I

Few today would dispute that the function of the press is to present news of interest to the public. Contemporary newspaper readers are encouraged to believe in the objectivity of the press. Schudson contends that this belief assumes the ability to separate facts from values, and he describes facts as open to independent validation.[1] Values, on the other hand, are subjective preferences for what should be.

Objectivity was not an issue for newspapers before the Jacksonian era.[2] Newspapers were expected to serve some special interest, some party or ideology. Rather than to disseminate news as we know it today, newspapers delivered values held by the editors. According to Brockway, newspapers were to be used for "personal and political ends."[3] Early journalists have been characterized as either personal or partisan journalists.

Sloan identifies eight categories into which goals of partisan or party papers fell. They were to "(1) promote political ideals, (2) support party principles, (3) defend the party and its politicians, (4) provide a medium for expression of party views, (5) provide 'information,' (6) preach the party line to the party faithful, (7) attack opponents and (8) provide a method of electioneering."[4]

If newspaper content was obviously subjective, values and how they were relayed, along with the personalities and reputation of the editors, most likely had significant impact on the popularity and therefore the circulation of the newspapers. This emphasis on the personal prestige of the editor and newspapers as individual organs has been called "personal journalism." [5]

The Knoxville *Whig*, edited and published by William Gannoway Brownlow for more than 25 years in the 19th century, exemplified subjective journalism. Brownlow, a former circuit-riding Methodist preacher, used his newspaper as a tool for the Whig party, his religious beliefs and to further the interests of himself and his friends. In so doing, he often both verbally and physically attacked those holding opposing viewpoints.

This paper examines Brownlow's presentation of issues in his newspaper and other publications, and his discussion of issues in various speeches. The newspaper's content will be compared with the goals of the Whig Party to note whether or not the newspaper consistently followed the party line, or rather represented Brownlow's personal ideology that might not have always followed the party line. Inconsistencies will support the assumption that Brownlow's publications were examples of personal journalism, while content consistent with the Whig Party will support the assumption that his publications fit better into the category of "party press."

II

Personal journalism flourished when newspapers were small enough to allow one person to dominate all phases of their activity.[6] As has already been established, an editor could use the paper to promote his own values and beliefs. It is not always clear if the presented values were those held internally because of moral convictions or if they served some other purpose of the editor such as the promotion of a political party.

Brownlow was a proponent of the Whig party. Opposition to Andrew Jackson was a primary factor in the consolidation of the Whig party in Tennessee.[7] Although the party's tenets were not clearly articulated during the formulation of the party in the 1830s, tenets eventually centered on (1) support for internal improvements, (2) a central bank, (3) a protective tariff, and (4) strengthening of the national government along with reducing the power of the presidency.[8]

According to U. B. Phillips, many southern Whigs were state's rights cotton producers who joined the party "from a sense of outrage at Jackson's threat of coercing South Carolina."[9] Sellers posits that the Whigs' support in 1832 of the Force Bill, designed to throttle the nullifiers, disputes this assumption.[10] Perhaps a more central concern was for a strong national banking system.

In addition to merchants and bankers who were naturally interested in financial policies, other business and professional men had stakes in the banking issue. Attorneys received most of their fees from merchants, and newspaper editors were dependent upon the same merchants for advertising revenues.[11]

East Tennessee farmers raised corn, grains, hay, and livestock.[12] To realize sufficient returns, they had to have some means of delivering their goods to their southeastern market, chiefly South Carolina. The mountains between east Tennessee and South Carolina precluded easy methods of transporting these goods. Internal improvements such as the construction of transportation systems, particularly the railroads, were supported by Brownlow as well as many other east Tennesseans.

The factors leading to Brownlow's support of the Whig party are not clear. He wrote in 1862 that he had voted for John Quincy Adams in 1828, a Federalist who shared many of Brownlow's political opinions.[13] Brownlow declared that he had been a Federal Whig of the Washington and Alexander Hamilton school all of his life. In actuality, he had declared himself a Jeffersonian Republican in 1834.[14] Bonnyman suggests that Brownlow voted for Adams in 1828 because of Adam's personality, and that the election did not center on issues or principles, but on personalities.[15]

III

Brownlow's first experience as newspaper editor began in 1839 in Elizabethton, Tennessee, where he edited the Tennessee *Whig*. Although published by someone else, Brownlow retained full editorial control.[16] Armed with the motto on page one, "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness," he stated his purposes and objectives thusly: to fight the threat of national despotism--namely Martin Van Buren--and to advance the interests of the Whig party by electing Henry Clay to the presidency.[17] He considered Whiggery not merely a political organization, but a cause.[18]

Brownlow's 1844 book, A Political Register, had as its objective, the "defence [sic] of sound principles," the "refutation of certain destructive errors," and the "advocacy of Henry Clay," whom Brownlow considered the greatest living man.[19] He used this book to identify for his readers true Whigs, Democrats, Republicans, Democratic-Republicans, Federalists, Nullifiers and Conservatives.[20]

When Brownlow moved to Knoxville in 1849, he reiterated the purpose of his paper as one of serving himself (the Whigs), the public and the interests of his friends.[21] He often used abusive communication and political vituperation to make his point. According to Sloan, personal abuse and political vituperation are characteristics common to party papers.[22] Brownlow made no secret of his subjectivity, contending that he would print that which he thought most suitable. He went so far as to direct those seeking two sides of the issues to other papers.[23]

Through the years, his position on certain issues changed or at least the slant of his presentation of the issues changed. For instance, in 1841 Brownlow denounced Daniel Webster as not being worth "one dollar in the world;"[24] however, when the Whig National Convention in 1852 nominated Winfield Scott for the presidency, Brownlow showed his displeasure by voting for the deceased Daniel Webster. He claimed that Scott was an abolitionist whose election would result in sectional strife and the overthrow of slavery. And in 1862, he described himself an ardent Whig, stating that "CLAY and WEBSTER have ever been my standards of political orthodoxy."[25]

Another confusing inconsistency is that concerning his treatment of the temperance issue. He was, for a time, one of the editors of The Sons of Temperance, a semi-monthly published in Knoxville.[26] He wrote and delivered many speeches in favor of temperance throughout his publishing career and continued his advocacy when he was governor of Tennessee during the Reconstruction. He often published accounts of the evils of strong drink, frequently using the Biblical book of Proverbs to make his point.[27] He wrote, "…the indiscriminate sale of poison, no matter in what shape, should be prohibited."[28] Concurrently, he published wine-making recipes in his newspaper and accepted advertisements for various wines. He also opposed the American Temperance Society because he saw it as a tool for "Jacksonian America."[29] Brownlow blamed Jackson for sectionalism, party factions, and ruining commerce and currency in the country.[30] In an 1858 editorial, Brownlow answered critics who asked why he published advertisements that contradicted his editorials: "The publisher of this paper has a contract with Swan & Co. [lottery company], by the year, to advertise his schemes, and to change them as instructed. He complies with his contract…they comply with theirs, and pay him…It is proper to remark, that when we were Publisher, we inserted lottery advertisements,…then, editorially, warned readers against lotteries, as swindling shops. This may look a little inconsistent as a [business man]--we denounced the lotteries as an [independent editor]."[31] The same response could apply to the wine issue.

Brownlow encouraged voters to vote the Whig ticket. He wrote, "Don't stripe your ticket! Your candidates have been deemed worthy of a nomination, and as such, they are entitled to your support, and to an honorable election."[32] Yet, Brownlow himself did not support all of the Whig candidates for public office. When Col. Josiah Anderson, a U.S. congressman from Bledsoe County, visited Knoxville Whigs to garner support for his reelection, Brownlow used his newspaper to stir opposition of him. He accused Anderson of promising to divide government printing between the Knoxville *Whig* and the Knoxville Tribune, and instead forming a new "Printing and Editing Organization" to handle government printing.[33] He further stated that Anderson had effectively mortgaged the editor, facilities, equipment, and subscription lists, and thus had placed his personal interests above those of the party.

Brownlow had yet another personal reason to oppose Anderson. When Brownlow moved to Knoxville, he sent his presses and fixtures ahead and consigned them to a Knoxville company in which Anderson had a financial interest. This company was to receive, pay for, and store the goods until

Brownlow arrived in Knoxville, at which time he would reimburse the company. Brownlow reported that the company did not receive or pay for the goods, and that if his friends had not intervened, his goods would have been dumped in the Holston River.[34] Brownlow said that although he knew the district supported Anderson, he could not because Anderson was opposed to him and his newspaper.[35]

Another candidate scorned by Brownlow was Thomas D. Arnold, the first prominent east Tennessee politician to join the Whig cause.[36] After Brownlow voiced this scorn, T. A. R. Nelson, who was later to become president of the Knoxville Convention, was urged to try to make Brownlow conform to party interests.

An example of Brownlow putting friendship above the party was when he published an address written by O. P. Temple in the newspaper. Temple had sought the office of Attorney General for east Tennessee, but was not appointed. Temple considered the appointment that was made to be the result of political machinations. Brownlow wrote, "Some may reflect upon us for admitting into our columns, an address of the kind, affecting the interests of Whig candidates, and reflecting upon other Whigs in private life. Be it so…We are the friend of Temple…we have battled together, side by side, for years, in the same glorious cause…When he wishes to be heard thro' the columns of our paper, in self defense, he shall be heard, let consequences be what they may."[37]

Although Brownlow spent much of his time and effort attacking opposing political parties, especially the Democratic Party, he supported John B. Floyd in 1852 for President Pierce's cabinet.[38] Floyd was a popular democrat who was a former governor of Virginia. Brownlow claimed that Floyd would well represent Virginian democracy and true Southern interests. This deviation is even more significant when one considers Brownlow's admonition for people to join almost any party on earth rather than the "thieving" Democratic Party.[39]

IV

The mastheads of some of the issues of Brownlow's paper carried the motto "devoted to politics, religion, internal improvements, news, agriculture, literature and general intelligence."[40] He used a great proportion of space extolling the virtues of the railroad as a needed internal improvement. He published a letter written by a northern man, which said how much better trading in the north was after the construction of facilities that allowed companies to reach their markets. He printed letters to railroad committee members that expressed appreciation for an upcoming railroad jubilee. He reassured stockholders that their rights would be secured; and he reported proceedings of the railroad board. Brownlow supported the construction of the railroad and claimed its opponents were selfish traders and property owners. But in 1840, he wrote, "It is quite impossible that the 'signs of the times' can be misconstrued. Such is to be the fairest portion of God's earth, if some man is not sent to the Legislature, who will keep railroads from passing through the country, and perpetuate the existence of (stern-wheel-dugouts), which now ply upon the dark green bosom of our waters, so smoothly!"[41] He still appeared enamored with inland marine vessels in 1854 when he wrote about the Steamer Tennessee: "…light, fast, and safe, with splendid machinery…"[42]

Earlier in his career, Brownlow supported the east Tennessee internal improvements' movement. Brownlow's interest in internal improvements perhaps stemmed from interests of his wife's family. When Brownlow married Eliza O'Brien, he ended his ten-year circuit-riding ministry in the Methodist church and settled down to work in the O'Brien family's ironworks. His father-in-law, James O'Brien, in 1830 was elected to a board concerned with improving Tennessee's transportation system. Eliza's great uncle, General Edmund Pendleton Gaines, conducted one of the state's earliest river improvement surveys. This special interest in internal improvements placed the O'Brien family among the state's early proponents of Clay's American System[43].

One issue with which Brownlow dealt consistently was the slavery issue. Although he did not personally own any slaves, he supported slavery as a God-given right. He attacked abolitionists with enormous fury. He attempted to justify slavery by claiming that it was sanctioned in the Bible. Brownlow frequently published ads offering rewards for runaway slaves, such as the following: "$100 Reward! Runaway from the Subscriber on 13th, my negro man Joe, a bright-blue eye."[44] He did, however, publish the resolutions of the New York State Convention, one of which was that American slavery was a crime against God and man.

As much as Brownlow supported slavery, he loved the Union more. In a Brooklyn speech he said that if he had to choose between the Christian religion and the Union, he would choose the Christian religion, but that if he had to choose between the Union and slavery, he would choose the Union. Patton said Brownlow was not an advocate either of emancipation or of Negro suffrage, but as governor, he adopted both policies of emancipation and Negro suffrage to save "the state from the disasters of congressional military reconstruction that other Southern states experienced."[45] (p. viii).

Brownlow wrote in a June 9, 1960 editorial:

> "We are for the constitutional Union party, and we shall fight to the bitter end the thieving, lying, all pervading corruption and wasteful extravagance of the Buchanan wing of Democracy; the fire-eating, union dissolving, political charlatanism of the Southern extremists; the squatter-sovereignty and disguised abolitionism of the Douglass wing, and the treacherous adherents who have traded alone upon the political capital of a petty demagogue, and last, but not least, we shall fight the

> sectionalism of the Northern Republicans as a band of outlaws, menacing the integrity of the Union."[46]

Brownlow's August 10, 1865 editorial shows support for the Union over his support for the South:

> "If we had the power, we would arm and uniform in Federal habiliments all the fowls of the air and the fishes of the sea--every wolf, panther, catamount, and bear in the mountains of America--every tiger, elephant, and lion in Europe--every rattlesnake and crocodile in the swamps of Florida and South Carolina--every negro in the Southern Confederacy, and every devil in Hell, and turn them loose upon the Confederacy. Nay, we would poison the very air they breathe, the water they drink, and the food they eat. We would convert Hell itself into one great torpedo, and have it exploded under the very center of the Confederacy. Aye, we say put down the rebellion, and force rebels to lay down their arms, if, in so doing, we have to exterminate from God's green earth every living human being South of the Mason and Dixon's Line."[47]

Another example of picturesque speech he directed toward the Confederates was published in 1864:

> "Had we our wish, we would throw Hell wide open, and place all such beastlike men and officers upon an inclined plane, at an angle of forty-five degrees, grease the plane with hog's lard six

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> inches thick, with a wicket at the bottom, and send them, as one stream of traitors, robbers, and assassins, into the hottest part of the infernal regions."[48]

Clearly, Brownlow's speaking and writing style was combative. Arnell[49] said Brownlow's "picturesque and fearless vocabulary…gained for him the sobriquet of 'The Fighting Parson.'" Several incidents may have led to Brownlow's nickname. In 1840, an unknown person shot at Brownlow as he sat at the window of his Elizabethton home. The shots barely missed his head, and hit the ceiling and fireplace instead. Brownlow pursued the attacker and fired his own shots, but did not stop the assailant.[50] Also in 1840, Brownlow engaged in a fight with a rival newspaper editor in Jonesboro, and while Brownlow pounded him with a pistol butt, his rival shot him in the thigh.[51]

V

Brownlow continued to publish the *Whig* until October 1861 when he closed it down to await imprisonment by Confederate soldiers. Operations were suspended until November 1863. Brownlow believed Lincoln had been too lenient with the Confederates and swore vengeance on the rebels. He published his paper under the new title, Brownlow's *Whig and Rebel Ventilator*.

To Brownlow came a powerful opportunity for vengeance: in 1865 he was elected Tennessee's first Reconstruction governor. Coulter describes him as a "master in whipping up hate and revenge."[52] Upon his election, he gave editorial control of the *Whig* to his son John. He later sold the paper to an independent company. Brownlow did not publish again until 1875 when he formed a partnership with William Rule and began the *Weekly Whig and Chronicle*. He continued in this endeavor until his death in 1877.

Brownlow had devoted his journalism career to personal encounters, national and state politics, neighborhood fights, and religious disputes. Although according to Hudson, Brownlow's *Whig* had been "a vigorous political journal, and nothing else,"[53] evidence indicates otherwise. Brownlow does not fit into a well-defined mold of a partisan publisher, although he never deserted the Whig Party. He does, however, fit the description of the personal journalist, never quite separating facts from personal values or beliefs. He used his voice, his paper and his power to express his views to the American public. He did not attempt to be objective and did not claim to be. He stated his goals and spent his life to further those goals. Samuel Arnell, in his rather favorably biased biography of Brownlow, wrote, "the partisan press of a hostile people cannot be a safe guide in arriving at a just conclusion as to the facts of history."[54] Arnell thought more highly of Brownlow's efforts. Readers never had to wonder where Brownlow stood on the issues, although he was no more objective than "the partisan press of a hostile people." His Knoxville *Whig* was a powerful tool for the Whigs, the Union, Brownlow himself and his friends.

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[1] Michael Schudson, *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1967), 5.

[2] Schudson, Ibid., 6.

[3] Beman Brockway, *Fifty years in journalism embracing recollections and personal experiences with an autobiography.* (Watertown, New York: Daily Times Printing and Publishing House, 1891) 423.

[4] Wm. David Sloan, "The Early Party Press: The Newspaper Role in American Politics, 1788-1812," *Journalism History* 9, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 19.

[5] Frank Luther Mott, *American Journalism, A History of Newspapers in the United States through 260 Years: 1690 to 1950* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1950), 547.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Thomas B. Alexander, "Whiggery and Reconstruction in Tennessee," *The Journal of Southern History*, 16 (1850): 291.

[8] E. Merton Coulter, *William G. Brownlow: Fighting Parson of the Southern Highlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 111.

[9] Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., "Who Were the Southern Whigs?" *The American Historical Review*, 19 (1953): 337.

[10] Ibid., 338.

[11] Ibid., 340.

[12] Coulter, 85.

[13] Charles B. Collar, *…Sketch of Parson Brownlow, and His Speeches at the Academy of Music and Cooper Institute* (New York: E.D. Barker, 1862), 6.

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[14] G. Gordon Bonnyman, Jr. "Some Themes in the Early Life of William G. Brownlow," unpublished paper, 1969, 68, University of Tennessee Knoxville Special Collections, William Gannoway Brownlow Collection.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Steve Humphrey, *That D----d Brownlow, Being a Saucy and Malicious Description of William Gannoway Brownlow* (Boone, NC: Appalachian Consortium Press, 1978), 12.

[17] Ibid., 13.

[18] Bonnyman, 79.

[19] William G. Brownlow, *A Political Register, Setting Forth the Principles of the Whig and Locofoco Parties in the United States, with the Life and Public Services of Henry Clay. Also an Appendix Personal to the Author; and a General Index.* (Jonesborough, Tenn.: Jonesborough Whig, 1844), v.

[20] Ibid., 13.

[21] Brownlow's Knoxville *Whig and Independent Journal*, 28 July 1849, p. 2.

[22] Sloan, 18.

[23] Humphrey, 16.

[24] Bonnyman, 20.

[25] Brownlow, 20.

[26] Coulter, 120.

[27] Knoxville *Whig and Chronicle*, 18 December 1852, p. 1.

[28] Knoxville *Whig*, 19 June 1858, p. 2.

[29] Bonnyman, 86.

[30] Knoxville *Whig*, 19 June 1858, 2.

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[31] Knoxville *Whig*, 19 June 1858, 1.

[32] Knoxville *Whig and Independent Journal*, 28 July 1849, 2.

[33] Ibid., 1.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Bonnyman, 77.

[37] Knoxville *Whig and Independent Journal*, 18 July 1849, 2.

[38] Knoxville *Whig and Independent Journal*, 18 December 1852, 1.

[39] Knoxville *Whig*, 19 June 1858, 2.

[40] Brownlow's *Whig and Independent Journal*, 30 March 1850, 1.

[41] *Whig*, 28 July 1840, 1.

[42] Knoxville *Whig and Independent Journal*, 28 January 1854, 2.

[43] Clay's American System began as system that promoted a protective tariff aimed largely at Great Britain after the War of 1812 and evolved over time to include a central banking system and internal improvements.

[44] Ibid.

[45] James Welch Patton. *Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee: 1860-1869* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1934), viii.

[46] Knoxville *Whig*, 9 June 1860, 1.

[47] Knoxville *Whig and Rebel Ventilator*, 10 August 1865, 1.

[48] Knoxville *Whig and Rebel Ventilator*, 30 January 1864, 1.

[49] Samuel Mayes Arnell, *The Southern Unionist*, n.d., n.d., foreward.

[50] Coulter, 37.

[51] Ibid., 39.

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Frederic Hudson, *Journalism in the United States, from 1690 to 1872* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 574.

[54] Arnell, n.p.

History

Covering the Century: How Four New York Dailies Reported the End of the 19th Century

Randall S. Sumpter, Ph.D.

Randall S. Sumpter is an assistant professor of journalism at Texas A&M University. Address correspondence to the Department of Journalism, 230 Reed McDonald Building, College Station, Texas, 77843-4111. Office number: (409) 845-4029; e-mail: r-sumpter@tamu.edu.

Abstract

This study compares how two groups of New York dailies covered the end of the 19th century. The "yellow" press linked the century's end to jingoistic predictions, self-promoting scoops and coverage of sensational topics. Other editors, seeking reader and advertiser niches not yet dominated by the yellow journals, avoided sensation and tempered optimistic predictions with stories about possible shortages. Their efforts furnish another example of how market competition nourished the development of "objective" news practices.

Covering the Century: How Four New York Dailies Reported the End of the 19th Century

Introduction

The end of the 19th century was a competitive period not only among social classes, political parties, and nations, but also among newspapers. Publishers in the crowded New York City market and elsewhere responded by pursuing either one of two broad news ideologies. In a contemporary account, J. Lincoln Steffens divided the competitors into either "commercial" newspapers or "serious" journals. The commercial or "yellow" newspapers offered daily sensations to working class and immigrant readers who wanted something to "talk" about, and the serious journals offered "editorials, essays, and important facts" to professional and middle-class readers who wanted something to "think" about.[1]

The yellow dailies and their imitators dominated most American newspaper markets at the end of the century, but their influence had neared its crest.[2] Joseph Pulitzer's *World* and William Randolph Hearst's *Journal & Advertiser*, the chief yellow journals in New York City, sold for a penny on weekdays; a nickel on Sundays. Each claimed a daily circulation in 1899 exceeding half a million.[3] Their news managers believed "beats," exclusive stories obtained by scooping competitors, and self-promotion were the most effective means of boosting and maintaining circulation.[4] For the yellow dailies, the best beats relied upon sensational exploitation of crime, scandal, or shocking circumstances to attract readers.[5]

To survive in the same market as the *World* and the *Journal*, other publishers tried to attract a more exclusive readership valued at a premium by advertisers.[6] Their news practices relied less on sensational scoops and more on the fair and accurate reporting techniques later associated with an objective press ideology. The origins of press objectivity are uncertain. As a philosophy to guide the work of editors and reporters, it developed in the 90-year period between the 1830s and the 1920s and is not necessarily correlated with the influence of the New York City press or the development of wire services.[7] Nineteenth century reporters and editors did not use the term to refer to their work. They preferred instead to write about impartiality[8] and unbiased or "uncolored" reporting.[9] Accuracy, fairness, and a proportionate approach to the news that avoided emphasizing salacious topics differentiated their work from the yellow journals.[10] By the time that editors and reporters began using the term "objectivity" in the 1920s, it had been refined further to mean "a journalistic system the [sic] subjected itself to the rigors of the scientific method."[11]

Among the late 19th century incubators of an objective press were Adolph Ochs' *New York Times* and Edwin L. Godkin's *New York Evening Post*, which had miniscule circulations compared with the *World* and *Journal* but reputations for the sort of reporting later associated with objectivity.[12] They used their reputations as non-sensational dailies to target audiences and advertisers different from those pursued by the yellow journals, and they promoted those differences in trade press stories and advertisements. For example, *The Fourth Estate*, a trade weekly, noted the *Evening Post's* scholarly and "dignified" editorials and news columns were a place where:

> Sensational articles find no market. ... The news stories are written without spread-eagleism, tersely and with a view of giving accurate information. You will find no two or three-column spread heads, no pictures, no fancy display type in the *Evening Post*, but you will find what most refined and educated people like — all the news presented in simple, understandable English.[13]

The three-penny *Evening Post*, the story observed, was prized by the business and financial community, even though it published no Sunday edition.[14] With its reputation for accuracy, political news, and thoughtful editorials, the *Evening Post* also appealed to the city's college-educated, professional class[15] and exerted an influence on opinion and policy leaders far beyond its 25,000 daily circulation.[16] Ochs edited the *Times*, whose circulation grew from about 76,000 per day in September 1899 to 100,000 in 1901,[17] more as an impartial newspaper of record for middle-class readers and less as a vehicle of opinion for financial and policy elites. When the *Times* sliced its weekday price from three cents to a penny in late 1898, the newspaper's management explained it intended to serve readers for whom both price and quality were considerations[18] and not to follow the "yellow" journalism formula.

This study compared the four newspapers' coverage of a single story, the end of the 19th century, to answer two questions: How did the publications report and explain the turn of the century story in their news columns and on their editorial pages? Were there differences that could be explained by the newspapers' opposing press philosophies?

The analysis included stories printed by the four newspapers in December 1899, January 1900, December 1900, and January 1901.[19] The study found that while the newspapers used some of the same types of stories, the "yellow" dailies linked the century's end to jingoistic predictions, self-promoting scoops and coverage of sensational news topics. The *Times* and *Evening Post* avoided the sensational topics and tempered optimistic predictions about the future with stories about possible shortages. The four newspapers' editorialists also interpreted the century's accomplishments differently. *Times* and *Evening Post* writers believed the century's material and scientific progress would make nobler social and moral achievements possible; the *World* and *Journal* did not. All counted the mass produced daily newspaper among the 19th century's technological marvels and claimed these newspapers had made achievements in other fields possible.

The format of the coverage also varied. The *World* and *Journal* reported "end of the century" events in their news columns and in special supplements. The *Evening Post* and the *Times* devoted few of their routine news columns to the century story. The *Times* mostly covered the end of the century on its editorial page, including a 10-column, unsigned editorial that reviewed the century's accomplishments.[20] The *Evening Post* summarized the century in two, 14-page sections added to one of its Saturday editions.

"Scooping" the Century

All the dailies found it necessary to answer the same question that had troubled their predecessors 100 years earlier — when does the new century begin, Jan. 1, 1900, or Jan. 1, 1901? This dispute stretched back to the introduction in 1582 of the Gregorian calendar. The drafters of the calendar provided no "zero" year in the transition between B.C. and A.D. so the first millennium began with 1 A.D. and ended on New Year's Day 1001.[21] *Times* editorialists branded this issue the "Century Dispute"[22] and complained that since the fall of 1898 they had received "almost daily letters asking for information about when the twentieth century begins."[23] The issue was one that "people insist on talking about, and that is enough to show they find in it a mysterious uncertainty."[24] To resolve this problem for its readers, the *Times* appealed to authority and to historical precedent. The newspaper's editorialists reviewed partisan press era newspapers from 1799 and concluded that even at the height of the Jefferson-Burr presidential campaign, editors had been troubled by readers seeking a resolution of the same issue. After a fruitless effort to banish the "Century Dispute" from its letters to the editor column, the *Times* asked Capt. C. H. Davis, superintendent of the U.S. Naval Observatory, for a definitive ruling.[25] Davis wrote:

> The twentieth century commences with the 1st day of January 1901. An "opinion" that it commences with the 1st day of January, 1900, if logically sustained, must rest upon the assumption that the enumeration of the years of the Christian era, unlike any other arithmetical series to which serial numbers are, have been, or can be assigned, commences with zero instead of one … an assumption which is manifestly untenable … .[26]

The *Evening Post* disposed of the "Century Dispute" with a short, page 15 item in its last Saturday edition of 1899. The story noted that the 19th century would end at midnight, Dec. 31, 1900, and that the 20th century would have 24 leap years, contain 36,525 days and reach its midpoint on Jan. 1, 1951.[27]

In both editorials and stories, the *World* and *Journal* agreed that Jan. 1, 1901, theoretically marked the beginning of a new century, but for the purposes of their working-class readers, the new century would begin Jan. 1, 1900:

> It really doesn't make a bit of difference whether the twentieth century begins to-morrow or not. New York proposes to celebrate to-night and to-morrow just as if it did. Any way, we pass from the 1800's [sic] to the 1900's [sic] — for most people that is change enough.[28]

Having embraced the "theoretically" correct position of the *Times* and the *Evening Post*, the *World* and *Journal* "scooped" their competitors by publishing end-of-the-century supplements in their Sunday, Dec. 31, 1899, editions.

To fill their century supplements, the *World* and *Journal* recruited experts from a variety of fields to assess the century's achievements and, in some cases, to forecast developments in the 20th century. Local officials and academics from New York universities dominated the *World's* panel of experts, but the *Journal* cast a wider net. John P. Holland, inventor of the Holland submarine torpedo boat, wrote about the future of submarine navigation, and Professor S. P. Langley, director of the Smithsonian Institute, predicted manned flight within the next 10 years. Holland and Langley believed submarines and airplanes would be employed first as weapons of war. E. A. Kinnelly, president of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, believed engineers would need another 50 years to exhaust the practical applications of electrical power. "Electro-mobile" vehicles certainly would be employed for transportation within cities. Explorer Henry M. Stanley assessed the status of African exploration and concluded that little was left to discover. Other contributors included Susan B. Anthony, who also was enlisted for the *World's* effort. *World* contributors included bandmaster John Phillip Sousa, ex-mayor William L. Strong and ex-police chief Thomas Byrnes. Suffragist Julia Ward Howe contributed to both the *World's* and *Evening Post's* supplements.

The *Evening Post* devoted huge chunks of its Jan. 12, 1901, supplement to analyzing the country's economic infrastructure. Andrew Carnegie wrote on the development of steel manufacturing; Eugene T. Chamberlain, U.S. Commissioner of Navigation, described similar developments in the U.S. merchant marine. Two features described the railway system; another evaluated the country's gold production, which was expected to tick upward as the deposits around Nome, Alaska, were exploited. Besides the inevitable stories on the fine and performing arts and the wonders of electricity, the supplement included long essays on England, Canada, Russia, China and Japan.

In both the special supplements and routine news columns, the *World* and *Journal* predicted that American enterprise and ingenuity would make the nation the 20th century's dominant power. The *Journal* explained that justification for imperialism, especially "dollar" imperialism, was rooted in the country's past:

> They [the Pilgrims] were neither much better nor much worse than the average American citizen to-day. No doubt they wanted the right to worship God according to the dictates of their own conscience, but six days in the week they had an incredibly keen eye for the main chance.[29]

What the Pilgrims' descendants should inherit was evident to the *Journal*. Illustrations in the newspaper's century supplement showed a United States stretching from the North to the South poles. Henry P. Johnston, professor of history at the College of the City of New York, wrote that a United States dominating the entire Western Hemisphere was not "unthinkable" as long as the nation consolidated its colonial possessions by swapping the Philippines for the British West Indies.[30] Earlier *Journal* contributors had worked out the logistics of administering the hemispheric United States. The final configuration required 85 states, a navy with 85 battleships and 395 other vessels and a fleet of "express aerodomes" based on Professor Langley's flight experiments to connect the new capital, Mexico City, with the rest of the nation.[31] Elsewhere, evil Spain would be partitioned by other world powers; Germany would swallow up France, and the pope would move to Rio de Janeiro. Anglo-Saxons would rule the world with America first among nations and Great Britain a distant second. America's future, according to *Journal* editorialists, was unlimited: "We are colossal in area, colossal in commercial growth, colossal in strength, wealth and influence and colossal in potentialities."[32]

End-of-The-Century Crime Wave

Readers of the *World* and *Journal* were accustomed to a diet of sensational crime news, but the end of the 19th century provided the newspapers with an opportunity to explain the violence in New York City's streets and tenements as systematic "waves," not random acts. The *Journal* launched the end of the century "crime wave" with a story in its *American Magazine* on Dec. 17, 1899. Topped with a "Murder Epidemic In This Locality" scare head, the story noted that in the past 12 years 400 New Yorkers had been murdered including "eight dissolute women" thought to be victims of "Jack the Strangler."[33] Sixty of the homicides remained unsolved. The *Journal* offered two theories to explain the murder rate:

> Physicians are inclined to ascribe it to the high pressure of end of the century civilization, which drains the vitality and saps the nerve force of the strongest men. Practical observers, on the other hand, declare that the increase of all forms

> of homicide is due to the inefficiency of the police in tracking murderers to earth.[34]

The *Journal* reporter favored the latter theory because murder by poisoning, a difficult crime for 19th century investigators to detect, had increased to an "unprecedented extent" in the last two years of the century. The *World*, however, believed the crime problem was robbery, not murder. The *World* summarized 32 muggings and robberies that had occurred in the city during December 1899.[35] The story noted that bold thieves victimized both men and women at all hours of the day. A week later, the *World*, working from statistics provided by government and business agencies, explored the probabilities that the average New Yorker would meet a violent death in the new century, provided they did not fall victim first to the city's 25-percent infant mortality rate.[36] The *World* calculated a reader's chances of committing a murder and escaping punishment at 1 in 3 and of being a murder victim at 1 in 66,666. The same reader's chances of committing a murder and being sent to the electric chair were 1 in 1,466,652, according to the *World's* math. The probability of dying in a fire, the *World* reported, was greater at 1 in 25,000.

Besides the eye-popping crime stories, *World* and *Journal* reporters competed to interview centenarians who had been born in the 18th century and who had reasonable prospects of living until the official beginning of the 20th century. Some of these stories surely strained the credulity of even the "yellow" journals' readers. Former slaves who reportedly had met George Washington and Irish and Italian immigrants often were interview subjects. The *World* began the scramble for these stories by interviewing a 111-year-old former slave. Although the ex-slave said he had not met Washington, the

World story speculated that "it is not at all impossible that he actually did see the great man."[37] In the same issue that contained its end of the century supplement, the *Journal* published a feature illustrated with photographs of the "Seven Oldest People in America."[38] The story included an interview with 129-year-old Mary MacDonald, the oldest person in the country for which there is "an authentic record." A former slave and resident of a Philadelphia retirement home, Mrs. MacDonald recollected meeting Washington in 1777 at Valley Forge. Mrs. Sarah Doran Terry, 108, also recalled seeing Washington in Philadelphia. Isaac Brock, 111, had not met Washington, but he told the *Journal* he had fought in four wars — the War of 1812, the Republic of Texas's war of independence, the Mexican War, and the Civil War, in which he served in the artillery. The *Journal's* story also included interviews with 107-year-old Irish immigrant Michael Mooney and 110-year-old Italian immigrant Mrs. Celestina Nigro. The *World* responded a week later by publishing interviews with another collection of centenarians, but it also included Mrs. Nigro, Mrs. MacDonald and Mooney.[39]

Numberless enumerations

The four newspapers agreed that the 19th century's scientific and business strides had been vast; the *Times* even referred to it as a "century of marvels." Generally, they summarized the closing century's achievements in what the *Times* referred to as "numberless current enumerations" either on editorial pages or in news columns or both. These lists generally split into two parts, one devoted to scientific discoveries including exploration and the other, to great inventions. Besides the obvious steam- and electric-powered transportation and communication inventions, most lists included Wilhelm Roentgen's "invention" of X-rays and the use of anesthesia during surgery. In the category of scientific discoveries, all the newspapers included Charles Darwin's theory of evolution and John Dalton's atomic theory of chemical combinations.

While the newspapers agreed that scientific progress was the 19th century's crowning achievement, they disagreed about why this progress was important and whether it was unlimited. For the *Journal*, science had merely set "nature's treasure vault ajar" for exploitation by industry.[40] The 20th century would open a "practical millennium more glorious than the visions of the Apostle [Paul]",[41] and industrial invention and efficiency would speed the "good life" to all who wanted it.[42]

While the *Journal* and *World* saw infinite prosperity and an America dominating the world political stage, the *Evening Post* and the *Times* interpreted the future differently. Both believed some of the country's resources were finite. The *Times* predicted a shortage within 50 years of structural lumber, which was being consumed for firewood, for charcoal needed in iron production, for the paper industry, and for the clearing of farmland.[43] An *Evening Post* reporter speculated natural gas production would fail to meet demand within a generation.[44] Its editorialists argued that the 19th century was not a "Golden Age," only a "tolerable companion."[45] Scientists, they wrote, were not to be valued for the useful discoveries that they made, but for their strict adherence to a method that valued truth above all else. The lead article in the *Evening Post's* century review echoed these sentiments, noting that in the 18th century, science had meant systematizing knowledge while in the 19th century it meant "a mode of life; not knowledge, but the devoted, well-considered life pursuit of knowledge."[46] A single, most important 19th century scientist could not be named, the story claimed, because two or more individuals independently pursuing similar research agendas usually made the same significant discoveries. More than half of the *Times'* century review editorial published on Jan. 1, 1901, was devoted to how freedom had evolved and had advanced around the globe during the 19th century. The *Times* declared: "The onward march of freedom has been the 19th century's noblest achievement" because without personal liberty and tolerance, most of the "inventors and discoverers of the nineteenth century would have been publicly hanged had they burst untimely upon the world." [47]

The four newspapers did agree that developments in printing and newsgathering were among the century's significant achievements. Some editorials and stories drew an even broader conclusion — the press deserved credit for whatever progress mankind in general and the printed word in particular had made in the 19th century because it had made knowledge cheaper.[48] A Jan. 3, 1901, *Topics of the Times* observed that the just completed century should get credit for producing the only printing press "really deserving of the name, the only printing press that meets the demands of modern civilization, and to no inconsiderable degree makes the civilization possible."[49] While the editorial noted that presses built from iron debuted at the end of the 18th century, it explained that for another generation after that development the press remained hand powered. Inexpensive, mass produced books and newspapers were not possible until steam or electricity were harnessed to a "power press":

> Now the newspaper of to-day, despite all criticisms, deserved and undeserved, is the most influential, and therefore the most important, product of the time. Without the power press, the newspaper would have remained an utterly different and practically another, thing, and what the reader of *The Times*, for instance, gets this morning for a cent he could not get at any price.[50]

The telegraph, telephone, steamship, and locomotive also had improved the newsgathering arts by making timely publication of the news possible. A hundred years earlier, the New York press often had published two-month old or older foreign news. Those journals also had depended upon "private letters that thoughtful merchants would kindly turn over to the editor"[51] for week-old news from neighboring cities.

If the 19th century produced the only press worthy of the name, the *Journal*, which already had claimed to be 'The 20th Century Newspaper,'"[52] boasted it owned the most advanced and most profitable examples. In a Dec. 10, 1899, feature, the newspaper promoted its R. Hoe & Co. presses as the largest and most complex in the world. These presses, "more intricate than any locomotive, a wonderful complication of wheels, levers, rollers and strange metal shape,"[53] were capable of producing 912,000, eight-page, four-color papers per hour. A few weeks later, a *Journal* editorial claimed that profitable newspapers were a bellwether for the economy. "The good times that prevail in the newspaper offices indicate good times outside," the editorialist wrote.[54]

The wealth of newspapers, their technical virtuosity, and the wisdom of their publishers suggested to Hearst that other changes in the national order should be made. In a signed, page one editorial on the last Sunday of 1899, he predicted that "government by newspapers" would be achieved in the 20th century:

> This does not mean government by newspaper men, but government under the guidance of great newspapers --- government by the people through popular organs, than which nothing more accurately expresses the popular will. … As newspapers improve, the leadership of the press will be accentuated. An honest,

> earnest, able press will become in fact the people's voice, with the elected representatives merely executors of its dicta.[55]

While editors at the four newspapers agreed that the mass-produced daily was one of the technological marvels of the 19th century, they pointedly disagreed over what philosophy should guide its content in the new century. Godkin, who retired Jan. 1, 1900, after 16 years as the *Evening Post's* editor-in-chief, observed that the "yellow journals" were the direct heirs to James Gordon Bennett's "penny press" *Herald.* They edited their newspapers for the "uninstructed, or slenderly instructed masses" and found "more journalistic money to be made in recording the gossip that interested barrooms, work-shops, race-courses, and tenement houses, than in consulting the tastes of drawing-rooms or libraries."[56] Unfortunately, the *World's* and *Journal's* popularity was the product of the "ordinary working of supply and demand." *Times* editorialists disagreed with Godkin's pessimistic outlook, pointing out that the "turn-of –the-century" issues produced by the *Evening Post*, the *New York Sun*, and others typified the improvement in newspaper content the century had produced. While heaping praise on the *Evening Post's* efforts, the *Times* ignored the *World's* and the *Journal's* earlier efforts:

> Page after page [of the *Evening Post*] was filled by articles dealing with every phase of the century's progress, and these articles were not the products of hasty compilation from the encyclopedias by hack writers, but the work of well-known, indeed the best-known men of the day, speaking with authority on subjects directly and deeply studied. … There may be some question as to what newspaper readers want from newspapers, but there is none at all that they are getting it,

> whatever it is, and for prices amazingly cheap. Yet how often we hear about the vices of modern journalism, and how rarely of its virtues.[57]

For the *Journal*, the *Time's* and *Evening Post's* critiques of the yellow press represented the sour grapes ranting of circulation pipsqueaks. Afterall, the yellow press had national and international imitators, according to a *Journal* editorial, that suffered from the same criticism: "Wherever a newspaper is alive in gathering facts, and especially where it exposes good works, its discredited rivals call it 'yellow'."[58]

Discussion

Although "commercial" or "yellow" journals dominated the late 19th century newspaper market in New York City, some newspapers pursued a different press philosophy embracing fairness, proportion, and accuracy. The "end of the century" coverage produced by the *Times* and *Evening Post* illustrates that they employed these basic components of press objectivity to shape the news in 1899. For the two newspapers' editors, publishing news untainted by sensationalism also made good business sense. Their news product reached audience and advertiser niches not exploited by the *World* and the *Journal*.

The *Times* provided its readers with minimalistic coverage and interpretation of the story — mostly, the end of the 19th century was editorial page fodder, and it mostly was devoted to haggling over accuracy issues. For the *Times*, the turn of the century was not worth an extraordinary editorial effort that would fill a special supplement or would require recruiting and paying contributors. The *Times* did not offer a Sunday magazine supplement, the vehicle used most by the *World* and the *Journal* to tell the story of the century, until mid-1901. *Times* editors, however, had experience producing equivalent products like the newspaper's weekly book review section and its lengthy, annual review of business. For the *Times*, the 19th century was notable not for scientific achievement, but for political change. The editors of the *Evening Post* perceived the turn of the century as a business story worth 28 pages of additional coverage. They shrewdly published their effort a year after the larger *World* and *Journal* had carved up the advertising dollar pie for their century supplements. When the *Evening Post* examined the century's record of achievement, it took care to present the 19th century in historical context: The past 100 years had been a "tolerable companion" as century's went, and science should not be credited for producing discoveries but for regenerating the intellectual pursuit of truth. For *World* and *Journal* editors, the turn of the century story was another chance to promote their respective newspapers by "scooping" competitors. The stories they produced were a reiteration of press sensationalism and jingoism.

By the mid-1800s, scientific discoveries and technical achievements had injected both fiction and non-fiction publications with what I. F. Clarke called a pattern of expectations for the future. In the New York City market, the different newsgathering strategies in play at the end of the century had constructed two different "expectations" of the future that often were emphasized on the editorial page. The message for readers of the *World* and *Journal* was "the idea of progress, and at its most simple it was no more than the universal agreement that things had changed for the better and would go on changing."[59] For Hearst and Pulitzer, material progress aided by science was unstoppable like a locomotive. In the 20th century, the locomotive certainly would be operated by an American engineer and financed by American gold. The *Times* and *Evening Post* shared a different set of expectations with their readers: Progress may not be certain, and science is not a panacea.

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[1] J. Lincoln Steffens, *The Business of a Newspaper (The Conduct of Great Businesses — Sixth Paper),* **Scribner's Magazine**, October 1897, pp. 447-467.

[2] Andie Tucher, **Froth and Scum: Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and the Ax Murder in America's First Mass Medium**, Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1994, pp. 197, 205. Tucher suggests the yellow journals became less popular after their treatment of President William McKinley was linked to his assassination in 1901. History texts usually cite a combination of reasons, including market saturation. See, for instance, William D. Sloan and James D. Startt, **The Media in America: A History** (4th ed.), Vision Press: Northport, AL, pp. 221-246. See John D. Stevens, **Sensationalism and the New York Press**, NY: Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 100, for an assessment of the *World's* and *Journal's* influence with imitators.

[3] This estimate is based on the newspapers' unaudited, self-reports of circulation. The *World* claimed a weekly circulation of 5,234,221 for 1899; the *Journal*, a monthly circulation of 21,224,298 for December 1899. See *The World's Greatest Year*, **New York World**, Dec. 23, 1899, p. 6, and *The Record of 1899*, **New York Journal & Advertiser**, Jan. 2, 1900, p. 8.

[4] Randall S. Sumpter, *"Censorship liberally administered": Press, U.S. military relations in the Spanish-American War*, **Communication Law & Policy**, Fall 1999, pp. 465-483.

[5] Brooke Kroeger, **Nellie Bly: Daredevil, Reporter, Feminist**. NY: Time Books, 1994, p. 87.

[6] Gerald Baldasty, **The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Century**, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992. Baldasty illustrates this point by comparing the ad rates of the three-penny *Evening Post* and the *World*.

[7] Harlan S. Stensaas, *Development of the Objectivity Ethic in U.S. Daily Newspapers*, **Journal of Mass Media Ethics**, 1986-1987, pp. 50-60.

[8] Hazel Dicken-Garcia, **Journalistic Standards in Nineteenth Century America**, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, 1989.

[9] Streckfuss, *op. cit.*

[10] Michael Schudson, *In All Fairness*, **Media Studies Journal**, Spring/Summer 1998, pp. 34-41; Dicken-Garcia, *op. cit.*; Tucher, *op. cit.*

[11] Richard Streckfuss, *Objectivity in Journalism: A Search and a Reassessment*, **Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly**, Winter 1990, pp. 973-983.

[12] Tucher, *op. cit.*; Allan Nevins, **The Evening Post: A Century of Journalism**, NY: Russell & Russell, 1968; Gay Talese, **The Kingdom and the Power**, NY: Bantam Books, 1969.

[13] *The Evening Post's Editor Horace White Now Editor-In-Chief Of the Powerful New York Paper*, **The Fourth Estate**, Jan. 6, 1900, p. 4.

[14] The *Evening Post* claimed that the 573,555 agate lines of financial ads that it published in its 309 issues for 1899 represented a higher total than any other single newspaper, including those that published Sunday and holiday editions, could claim. See *Evening Post Claims*, **The Fourth Estate**, Jan. 13, 1900, p. 3.

[15] Nevins, *op. cit.*

[16] This circulation estimate is found in Baldasty, *op. cit.*, p. 115. Nevins, *op. cit.*, p. 530, says the newspaper's circulation varied between 14,000 and 20,000.

[17] Talese, *op. cit.*, pp. 199, 200.

[18] *New York Times Reduces Price From Three To One Cent*, **The Fourth Estate**, Oct. 13, 1898, p. 2.

[19] Comparative analyses of the content of 19th century New York City newspapers is difficult because consistent, published indices do not exist for most of the dailies with the exception of the *New York Times*. The *Times* often proves a reliable guide to other newspapers' coverage because its editorialists frequently commented on the work of competitors. For this study, the *Times'* editorial and news indices between Jan. 1, 1899, and June 30, 1901, were used to locate its turn-of-the-century coverage and to serve as a guide to coverage in the other three newspapers. Two periods were indicated: December 1899 and January 1900, which included the newspapers' debate over when the new century began, and December 1900 and January 1901.

[20] Other newspapers tried different approaches. The *New York Herald* published several features in its 68-page, Dec. 31, 1899, edition summarizing the 19th century's advances, but these stories were not compiled

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in a single section. The *New York Sun* covered the end of the century in a piecemeal approach involving special Sunday features in its late 1900 and 1901 editions.

[21] David W. Chen, *Another Countdown to the Millennium Begins*, **New York Times**, April 10, 1999, p. 1.

[22] The *Sun* referred to the controversy as the "1900 Delusion" and noted that press improvements permitted spread of the debate beyond the oral circles it had been confined to in earlier centuries. See *New Century Debate In London*, **New York Sun**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 1, and *Some Calendar Facts*, **New York Sun**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 5. The *Herald* called the dispute the "endless controversy." See *The Endless End of the Century Controversy*, **New York Herald**, Dec. 31, 1899, Sixth Section, p. 11.

[23] *Topics of the Times*, **New York Times**, Jan. 11, 1899, p. 6.

[24] *Topics of the Times*, **New York Times**, Dec. 20, 1899, p. 6.

[25] The *Herald* and the *Sun* sought a similar ruling from French astronomer Camille Flammarion.

[26] *Topics of the Times*, **New York Times**, Jan. 12, 1900, p. 6.

[27] *Facts About The Twentieth Century*, **New York Evening Post**, Dec. 30, 1899, p. 15.

[28] *Ring Out the 1800's; Ring In The New 1900*, **New York World**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 12.

[29] John J. Ingalls, *The United States — A Review and a Forecast*, **New York Journal & Advertiser, End of the Century Supplement**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 24.

[30] Henry P. Johnston, *How the World Has Changed*, **New York Journal & Advertiser, End of the Century Supplement**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 26.

[31] Arthur Bird, *A Glance Ahead At Things on This Earth 100 Years From Now*, **New York Journal & Advertiser, American Magazine**, Dec. 17, 1899, p. 12.

[32] *Our Increasing National Glory*, **New York Journal & Advertiser**, Jan. 2, 1900, p. 8.

[33] *Murder Epidemic In This Locality*, **New York Journal & Advertiser, American Magazine**, Dec. 17, 1899, p. 34.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] *City At The Mercy of Highwaymen*, **New York World**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 8E.

[36] The *World* based its calculations on an estimated 4 million readers in its circulation area. See *Your Chances of Fortune or Disaster This Year and This Century*, **New York World**, Jan. 7, 1900, p. 7. The actual population within Greater New York City at this time was about 3.5 million.

[37] *Prine Likely to Live In Three Centuries*, **New York World**, Dec. 24, 1899, p. 7.

[38] *Seven Oldest People in America*, **New York Journal & Advertiser**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 24.

[39] *These Old People Have Lived In Three Centuries*, **New York World, Sunday Magazine**, p. 6.

[40] *The Last Year of the Century*, **New York Journal & Advertiser**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 30.

[41] *A New Year's Sermon*, **New York World**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 1E.

[42] Rev. Dr. Heber Newton, *The Task of The New Century*, **New York Journal & Advertiser, American Magazine**, Dec. 24, 1899, p. 39.

[43] *The End of the Lumber Supply*, **New York Times**, Dec. 31, 1900, p. 6.

[44] H.T.W., *A Diminishing Fuel*, **New York Evening Post**, Jan. 6, 1900, p. 14.

[45] *The Evening Post's Century Number*, **New York Evening Post**, Jan. 12, 1901, p. 4.

[46] Charles S. Peirce, *The Century's Great Men In Science*, **New York Evening Post**, Jan. 12, 1901, Section 3, p. 1.

[47] *The XIX Century*, **New York Times**, Jan. 1, 1901, p. 8.

[48] Theodore L. De Vinne, *Printing in the Nineteenth Century*, **New York Evening Post**, Jan. 12, 1901, Section 3, p. 8.

[49] *Topics of the Times*, **New York Times**, Jan. 3, 1901, p. 8.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *Local Newspapers In 1800*, **New York Times**, Jan. 7, 1900, p. 8.

[52] See the front page "ears" of the *New York Journal & Advertiser's* Dec. 20, 1899, edition. The same claim appeared in subsequent editions.

[53] *Christmas Journal Chief Triumph of Printing Art*, **New York Journal & Advertiser**, Dec. 10, 1899, p. 58.

[54] *The Record of 1899*, **New York Journal & Advertiser**, Jan. 2, 1900, p. 8.

[55] William Randolph Hearst, *The Newspaper of the Twentieth Century*, **New York Journal & Advertiser**, Dec. 31, 1899, p. 1.

[56] Edwin L. Godkin, *Random Recollections*, **New York Evening Post**, Dec. 29, 1899, p. 5.

[57] *Topics of the Times*, **New York Times**, Jan. 14, 1901, p. 6.

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[58] *About Yellow Journalism,* **New York Journal & Advertiser**, Dec. 21, 1899, p. 8.
[59] I. F. Clarke, **The Pattern of Expectation, 1644-2001**, London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1979, p. 90.

History

Science, Journalism and the Construction of News: How Print Media Framed the 1918 Influenza Pandemic

Meg Spratt
Ph.D. Student
School of Communications
University of Washington
mspratt@u.washington.edu

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Science, Journalism and the Construction of News: How Print Media Framed the 1918 Influenza Pandemic.

In 1918, the deadliest pandemic of the 20th century killed millions of people worldwide. America's relatively young professions of medical science and modern journalism were faced with the challenge of relaying crucial health information in a way the general public could understand. Through a content analysis of two scientific and two mainstream publications, this paper considers how scientific and journalistic dependence on objectivity, facticity, empirical observation and expert sources shaped the way the influenza story was told during the height of the pandemic. Emphasis on facticity and empirical data did far more than relay medical "truths" to the public -- it constructed a journalistic reality which supported existing power structures and conferred status on scientific and governmental authorities while taking for granted the subordinate positions of average citizens.

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Meg Spratt
University of Washington

In 1918 and 1919, the deadliest pandemic of the 20th century infected more than 25 percent of the United States population and killed millions of people world wide (Crosby 1989, 206; Kolata 1999, 6). Unlike previous influenzas, the Spanish Flu hit young, healthy populations hard. The first wave of the flu began in spring of 1918 as World War I raged. The second, and most deadly, wave hit in fall not long before the war's end. By the end of the year, influenza casualties had surpassed war casualties, and the third of three waves was still ahead.

This devastating pandemic presented new challenges to America's relatively young professions of medical science and modern journalism. These two professions, which shared similar histories in the 19th century as well as a dependence on scientific method and explanation, were faced with the challenge of relaying crucial health-related information in a way the general public could understand. For the first time, modern journalism's emphases on fact-finding, objectivity, and observable truth were tested by an international health crisis.

By examining journalistic coverage of the 1918 pandemic in two scientific and two mainstream publications, this paper considers how journalistic dependence on scientific explanations and method -- including elements such as objectivity, empirical observation, and reliance on expert sources -- shaped the way in which journalists told the influenza story. How does acceptance of, and reliance upon, scientific fact impact the framing of news? Do news frames built on scientific concepts and method limit the voices being heard or marginalize certain segments of the population? Do scientific publications offer significantly different coverage of the pandemic than the mainstream press? In short, how did this new journalistic dependence upon objective method fare in covering a major health crisis?

Science and Journalism -- Conflicts and Similarities

An ongoing debate between scientists and journalists has involved the efficacy of mainstream publications in relaying vital health information to the public. In a 1998 JAMA essay, Scott Eggener of the Stanford University School of Medicine noted that increased biomedical knowledge and the proliferation of media outlets have not necessarily led to better public awareness of health issues. "Unfortunately," he wrote, "there is a gap between the wealth of expanding information and the quality of public health, partly because of the difficulty of dispensing this information to the lay public" (Eggener, 1998, p. 1400).

This gap between scientific knowledge and public understanding of health and medicine has been blamed, by some, on practices and biases of the mainstream media. However, many media critics ignore the relationship between scientific method and journalistic practices and themes. Parallels in the development of medicine and journalism as professions in the late 19th century led to important similarities between reporting of information by the scientific community, and reporting by mainstream journalists. It is not enough to compare differences between the two professions; researchers must also consider the similarities when assessing the relative quality of information disseminated by scientists and by journalists. Both professions value observable facts as keys to truth, and this shared belief in an empirical reality is bound to result in common themes and structures within scientific and journalistic communication.

Elihu Katz addresses some of these similarities in a 1989 essay arguing that journalists have much in common with scientists. Katz disputes Epstein's (1975) argument that journalists, as opposed to medical professionals, are ill equipped to identify and relay truthful information. Katz points out that Epstein is guilty of idealizing science and underestimating journalism. "Doctors too, are often incompetent to make diagnoses without the aid of informed colleagues," writes Katz. "They are often as pressured by time and by scooping their colleagues as are journalists. Indeed the sense of urgency is one of the characteristics of the professional culture, and the scoop is one of the defining characteristics of the culture of science" (p. 245).

By the beginning of the 1900s, modern norms and practices in American journalism were already well developed. Health and medical news was quickly becoming established as a staple in mainstream print media. Empirical research methods, including first-hand observation and reliance upon "expert" sources, were central to both medical science and mainstream journalism. By the time the deadly 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic spread across the world, journalistic practices were closely related to scientific philosophy and journalists had appropriated empirical reporting methods from science.

The occurrence of a devastating pandemic at a time when American journalism and science had become closely intertwined offers a unique research opportunity. By comparing mainstream media coverage of the Spanish Flu to coverage by scientific journals, conclusions may be drawn regarding similarities and limitations of both types of media in reporting scientific information to the public. Through a case study of the most deadly (and strangely forgotten) pandemic of the 20th century, this paper examines how journalistic acceptance and appropriations of scientific method impacted the framing of news during a time of crisis and uncertainty. Particularly, this analysis considers how the selection of sources, facts, and figures shaped news messages about the Spanish Influenza.

The issue of framing within both mainstream news stories and scientific reports is crucial to the examination of media messages and the social construction of reality. Within health and medicine news, mediated reality construction may have especially profound impacts on both individuals and groups. Personalized health choices and public policy decisions are at stake. Understanding how journalistic and scientific practices have historically shaped medical news reports is a first step in finding ways to improve contemporary coverage of health care. In a broader sense, journalistic frames influenced by objective method may, in fact, limit the variety of viewpoints represented in the news and reinforce societal power structures.

Literature Review

Two areas of research contribute to the conceptualization of this study. First, the interwoven histories of 19th and early 20th century American journalism and science are crucial to understanding the relationships and tensions between the two fields. Second is the idea that journalists use repeated frames, or themes, in constructing stories that may have an important impact on audience perceptions and even actions.

A Marriage of Science and Journalism: During the last part of the 19th century, journalism practices changed significantly, shaping patterns and norms for the 20th century. The late 1800s saw the rise of the professional reporter, dependence on "official" sources, inverted pyramid format, and objectivity as a central journalistic norm. At the same time, western medicine was changing rapidly, also due to an increased emphasis on scientific method and objectivity as well as a number of medical breakthroughs (perhaps most importantly Pasteur's germ theory and Lister's development of antiseptic surgery). Changes in journalism and medicine intersected around the beginning of the 20th century as more scientific journals were founded and mainstream publications carried more health and medical news.

The century preceding the Spanish Flu outbreak was pivotal in the development of both modern medical and journalistic practices. The scientific, social, and economic aspects of medicine were rapidly changing. The medical workplace was evolving, moving from the patient's home to the doctor's office. At the same time, more acutely ill patients were being treated in hospitals. Rosenberg (1964) traced social changes in medicine through a study of cholera epidemics in 1832, 1849, and 1866. "Cholera in 1866 was a social problem," Rosenberg writes. "In 1832, it had still been, to many Americans, a primarily moral dilemma." Likewise, accepted cures no longer had a religious basis by 1866. "Chloride of lime, not fasting, brought deliverance from cholera; the cure for pauperism lay in education and housing, not prayers and exhortation," reports Rosenberg (p. 228).

In a review of the social history of medicine, Grob (1977) offers a succinct summation of the nineteenth century medical revolution: "The changing structure of medicine itself undoubtedly was related to a variety of determinants, including new theories of disease, a technology that altered traditional medical practice, changing social perceptions of the role of physicians, new avenues of recruitment, and the creation of a novel system of medical education" (pp. 400-401). Meanwhile, practices in journalism were also changing rapidly. Carey (1969) traces the rise of the "professional communicator" in the late 19th century. This new type of journalist was charged with reporting neutral and objective information.

Baldasty (1992) chronicles commercial developments in journalism, including the trend toward packaging news, a trend that become evident in the presentation of health and medical information. Dan Schiller (1981) directly ties changes in journalism practice to increased dependence on scientific method. Schudson (1978) dubs the new journalistic belief in factual evidence to describe an observable world "naive empiricism."

Several historians have dealt with 19th century health communication issues by focusing on the development of scientific publications. Mott (1964) estimates that between 300 and 400 science journals were published in between 1865 and 1885 alone. The development, classification and content of these publications have been carefully studied. Horrocks (1990) traced the development of medical journals from the *Medical Repository*, founded in New York City in 1797, through an explosion of journals in the mid and late 1800s. This increase in medical publications was due in part to the same forces that created the popular mass print media. "The proliferation of medical journals during the middle decades of the nineteenth century was the result not only of the growing professionalization of American medicine, but also of the advances in printing and improved modes of communication and transportation," Horrocks explains (p. 608). Cassedy (1983) analyzed the content of early American medical journals and traced their influence on the institution of medicine. Cassedy credited the journals with disseminating medical information in a timely manner for the first time and accelerating changes in medicine.

By the time the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic began, trends in 20th century medicine and journalism were established and the two fields were becoming increasingly intertwined. The muckraking era had resulted in a number of medical-related exposes, including Samuel Hopkins Adams' exposure of the patent medicine fraud in a 1905-06 series of articles appearing in *Collier's Weekly*. Cassedy (1964) credits Adams' work as one catalyst leading to the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act. Adams went on to write about a number of public health issues, including typhoid fever, common colds and cancer.

Mainstream media were increasingly interested in packaging and marketing science news, an interest that led to the first medical columnist, and eventually, E.W. Scripps' Science Service in 1921 (Weiner, 1997; Foust, 1995). For a relatively short period of time, this increased interest in medical news was focused on the 1918 influenza pandemic.

Framing of Science News: The selection and identification of limited themes within news stories has been a focus of communication researchers for several decades. Tuchman (1978) observed that news media present information in narrow frames, which, in turn, limit public discourse. Entman (1991) explained that "analysis of frames illuminates the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information" (p. 51). Scheufele (1999) further explicates the concept of framing by distinguishing between media frames and individual frames. Media frames, he explains, refer to construction of a news story, while individual frames refer to audience interpretations.

Pan and Kosicki (1993) identify specific ways in which news frames are constructed, including syntactical structures, script structures, thematic structures and rhetorical structures. Elements within each of these are useful in examining frames within health and medical news. Within syntactical structures, for instance, objectivity (or the absence of obviously opinionated wording) and reliance upon authoritative sources are central to news composition. Thematic structures in news stories include "hypothesis testing features" which identify causes and solutions to issues. Rhetorical structures depend upon stylistic choices, including use of metaphor.

Many science historians have pointed to particular frames as they criticize mainstream newspaper and magazine medical reporting. Some, like Burnham (1987), see today's main themes in popular science reporting rooted in the sensationalism of Yellow Journalism. Burnham suggests that cultural mythology, rather than pure science, has been a theme throughout health reporting. The Yellow Journalism wars in the late 1800s deeply influenced twentieth century medical reporting, contends Burnham, stating that the media "all continued the main bias of yellow journalism: sensationalism" (p. 75).

Montgomery (1996) also examines the origins and evolution of science communication, treating medical journalism as a subtopic. Science stories in the mass media, he contends, have historically featured "marvels, breakthroughs, geniuses, (and) mysteries" (pp. 48-49). As for medical reporting, Montgomery characterizes writing as carrying a "biomilitarism" theme, using imagery borrowed from military warfare to describe disease. This imagery can be traced back to Pasteur's work in the 1860s and 70s, Montgomery says. "War came into medicine and the human body thanks to the full institutionalization of the germ theory of disease, with its axial concepts of microbial 'invasion' and bodily 'resistance' " (p. 148).

Three content analyses dealing specifically with popular media and medical news are worth noting. First, Andrew McClary (1980) offers a complete examination of germ theory as reported in American magazines between 1890 and 1920. American magazines became increasingly concerned with the spread of germs during this time, focusing on carriers and disinfectants. Frenzied attempts by magazines to find solutions to this germ threat sometimes resulted in dangerous advice. "A variety of chemical disinfectants were suggested for household use," writes McClary. "Formaldehyde was perhaps the commonest. Potassium permaganate was suggested, as were sulfur, chlorinated lime and carbolic acid" (p. 148).

Second, David Mindich (1998) draws from Rosenberg's history of American cholera epidemics to examine the treatment of disease in nineteenth century journalism. Mindich examines cholera reports in New York newspapers during three epidemics. By 1866, medical reporting had obviously shifted from a religious base to a reliance on scientific facts as derived from medical experts. "The newspapers' chief concern shifted from God to outhouses," writes Mindich, "Column after column in the three major New York dailies discussed, usually without the least mention of sin or God, the best ways to disinfect privies" (p. 111).

Finally, historian Terra Ziporyn (1988) successfully brings much of the medical and communication historical literature together in a comprehensive book-length content analysis, "Disease in the Popular Press." Focusing on the five decades between 1870 and 1920, Ziporyn analyzes magazine article about diphtheria, typhoid fever, and syphilis. She sets the context for her study through a careful discussion of the popularization of medicine, including germ theory, preventive health and the changing role of physicians. Ziporyn's research into medical reporting in the mainstream press is unique in its thoroughness. As a result, she is able to draw a number of specific conclusions while other historians deal with generalizations. She finds, for instance that "the accuracy and perspective of the (diphtheria) articles depended more on the author's writing abilities than either his scientific credentials or the magazine's genre, the reader's account of diphtheria and its antitoxin depended more than anything on the luck of the draw" (p. 61). Coverage of typhoid between 1880 to 1920 "illustrates a full circle in science writing: from textbook-style articles, based on contemporary medical beliefs, to event inspired articles, and then back to textbook style articles, based on the newer medical beliefs" (p. 104).

The burgeoning relationship between science and media created not only new endeavors in relaying medical news to the public, but also a natural tension between the scientific community and the popular media. This tension persisted throughout the 20th century. Medical researchers express frustration with media superficialities and inaccuracies, while editors and reporters in the popular press struggle to make scientific language understandable and relevant to the general public. While the communication ideals of both the scientific community and popular press have remained the same -- to accurately report scientific information -- representatives from the two communities argue that norms, practices, language, and values differ substantially between the professions (Nelkin, 1995).

Methods

When the Spanish Flu pandemic spread throughout most of the world, U.S. cities were hard hit. In New York alone, more than 46,000 people died from influenza and pneumonia in the last four months of 1918 (Crosby, 1989). Despite the vast mortality rates, communications scholars have paid little attention to how the pandemic was covered. Mott, for example, devotes one short sentence to the Spanish Flu in his classic *History of American Journalism.* (1964) A recent flurry of articles in the popular media about the 1918 pandemic resulted from two events: the advent of the Hong Kong flu pandemic in 1998 and attempts by scientists to recover DNA from Spanish Flu victims buried near the arctic circle (Kolata 1999).

Still, with the exception of a few notable studies, researchers have offered only superficial analysis of the historical development of medical and health reporting in popular American news media, and almost no scholarly attention has been paid to reporting of the

Spanish Influenza. Communication and medical historians have found certain themes in health reporting, indicating that health news formats did not develop as a reflection of objective scientific fact. Instead, analyses indicate repeated individual and cultural biases in reporting, including sensationalism, militaristic framing, and a preference for stories of "breakthroughs" and "cures." This study is designed to examine these themes and others in a mainstream American newspaper (*The New York Times*), a mainstream magazine covering social issues (*Survey*) and two scientific publications (*Scientific American* and *Science*). For the purposes of this study, "mainstream publication" is defined as a print medium with a large and heterogeneous audience. Both publications classified as "scientific" indicate in their mastheads that they are published by the scientific community, for the scientific community. *Science* describes itself as "A Weekly Journal devoted to the Advancement of Science, publishing the official notices and proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science." *Scientific American* and *Scientific American Supplement* articles are written by members of the scientific and medical communities and, according to the *Supplement* masthead "reflect the most advanced thought in science and industry throughout the world."

The content analysis studies a census of *Scientific American, Science, and Survey* articles on the Spanish Flu in October, November and December of 1918, and a sample of *New York Times* articles for the same time period. This time period corresponds with the peak of Spanish Flu mortality rates within the United States (Crosby, 1989). This leap in mortality rates prompted a sharp increase in news reports about the flu, as evidenced by listings in both the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* and *The New York Times Index* for 1918.

For the three weekly magazines, all articles listed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* during this time period were coded. *Scientific American* articles included reprints from other publications, which appeared in *Scientific American Supplement*. Every third issue of *The New York Times,* beginning with Oct. 1, 1918, was sampled for this three-month period. All articles pertaining to the Spanish Flu within each of these editions were coded. The number of articles coded totaled 65 from *The New York Times*, eight from *Survey*, six from *Scientific American*, and four from *Science*.

Items within the coding instrument were designed to identify specific news framing devices discussed in previous literature. These include story content, use of mortality figures, reliance on authoritative sources, use of biomilitaristic metaphor, and mention of preventions or cures. Pre-tests showed inter-coder reliability to range from 90 to 100 percent on all variables. In addition to the quantitative portion of the analysis, all stories in the sample were analyzed for general themes, or frames. The dominant frames in each publication were compared.

This content analysis was designed to determine whether, and if so how, the acceptance of scientific concepts and method -- such as objective observation of empirical data, use of statistics, and reliance upon expert sources -- influenced news frames. In addition, specific story elements were analyzed and compared to see whether significant differences existed between news frames in the two scientific publications and frames in the mainstream publications.

Results

Traditional 20th century news norms appropriated from scientific method clearly shaped the nature and structure of influenza news in all four publications. However, specific elements of story content differed from publication to publication. *Scientific American* and *Survey* articles, for instance, offered the most detailed accounts of suspected origins of the flu, and of the toll the epidemic took on individuals and society. *The New York Times* and *Science* offered shorter updates often based on information released by governmental agencies.

More striking, though, are the similarities found between the four publications. All four rely almost exclusively on expert sources from either the government or scientific communities to tell the influenza story. All four publications tell stories of conflict, though the nature of the conflict differed from one publication to another. And all relied on facts and numbers to track progress of scientific experts and governmental officials in controlling the pandemic. Neither sensationalism nor medical breakthroughs were predominant elements in the influenza stories. In fact, rather than being sensationalized, the intense human suffering caused by the pandemic in the last quarter of 1918 rarely was explicitly addressed in news reports. When influenza deaths surpassed war deaths in Fall of 1918, *The New York Times* ran the news as a small story on an inside page ("Influenza deaths", 18 Nov. 1918, p. 8).

Table 1: Comparison of story components

	Articles suggesting public policy regulations as a means to control pandemic	**Articles citing mortality figures**	**Articles naming individual influenza victims**
New York Times	50.8 percent (33 of 65 articles)	55.4 percent (36 of 65 articles)	12.3 percent (8 articles)
Survey	87.5 percent (7 of 8 articles)	50 percent (4 of 8 articles)	25 percent (2 articles)
Scientific American	16.7 percent (1 of six articles)	16.7 percent (1 of six articles)	none
Science	25 percent (1 of 4 articles)	75 percent (3 of 4 articles)	none

Story content:

The New York Times: The short news reports in the *Times* construct a government vs. plague scenario, often featuring New York Health Commissioner Royal Copeland as the key actor. Throughout October, the *Times* printed multiple short articles about the influenza on an almost daily basis. These stories were often packaged together on a back page, with World War I news dominating the front page and most of the front section. In November, the number of influenza stories dropped dramatically, with a slight rise once again in December.

Early in Autumn, Copeland announced that the epidemic had been checked ("Influenza is halted," 1 Oct. 1918, p. 24). Subsequent stories, however, offer quotes and statistics from Copeland's office showing a rise in cases. Copeland and other health officials explain and debate the closure of schools and businesses, and offer advice on how to avoid the flu. In an Oct. 19 editorial, the *Times* offers a reprint of previously published "suggestions." The first is "obey all the orders of the Health Department" ("Here is the best of advice," 19 Oct. 1918, p. 14).

A few *Times* articles dealt with reported scientific breakthroughs, including a three-paragraph report on of a test cure developed by a Pittsburgh doctor ("Test cure," 13 Oct. 1918, p. 23), and a one-paragraph item of the isolation of the flu microbe in Paris ("Identify influenza," 16 Oct. 1918, p. 24). These reports of specific scientific breakthroughs (which turned out to be spurious) were short and few in *The Times*. Also present but rare were stories about individual victims. These individuals were invariably high-profile male authority figures, including King Alfonzo of Spain ("King Alfonzo," 4 Oct. 1918, p. 24) and Madison Peters, a well-known New York minister and author ("Madison C. Peters," 13, Oct. 1918, p. 23).

Far more common were stories reporting on the efforts and actions of government in attempting to curb infection, and stories focusing on trends of mortality and infection. Half of *Times* stories dealt with governmental policies designed to control the pandemic. Typically, these stories focused on closures of schools and places of business, or ordinances dealing with sanitation or overcrowding. More than 55 percent of *Times* stories included numbers illustrating infection and mortality trends in specific geographic areas or army camps.

Survey. During the three-month period studied, *Survey* printed eight articles about the influenza. These stories were typically longer and dealt with more complex social issues than the *Times* articles. *Survey* correspondents discussed at length efforts not just by governmental agencies, but also social agencies and volunteers in offering relief for victims. Unique among all the articles examined in this study is a Nov. 9 feature in *Survey*. "A Brotherhood of Misericordia" is the only article in the four publications carrying the byline of a woman correspondent, and includes detailed descriptions of flu victims, including people of various ethnicities and nationalities (9 Nov. 1918, pp. 148-49). The article, a first-person account of conditions at local hospitals, uses description of suffering rather than facts and numbers to explain the disease. "Frequently a delirious patient would pull at the coverings hanging from the bed above him until they fell to the floor," wrote the correspondent. "...coarse blankets lay heavy over gasping lungs" (p. 149).

However, *Survey* articles also share common themes with the other publications. Most notably, half of the articles include infection and mortality figures. Seven of the eight stories focus on governmental and public policy actions as responses to the influenza.

Science: Despite its scientific focus and audience, *Science* framed the Spanish flu story as a governmental problem. Of the four publications analyzed, *Science* published the fewest influenza-related stories in the last quarter of 1918. Only four stories appeared, two of them consisting almost entirely of tables containing Bureau of Census mortality figures for cities across the country. A third story described the outbreak and spreading of the pandemic in American army camps ("Influenza Pneumonia," 8 Nov. 1918), while the fourth summarized actions of the United States Public Health Service ("United States Public Health Service," 15 Nov. 1918.). All four items in *Science* feature information supplied by United States agencies.

***Scientific American**:* The six stories published in *Scientific American* or *Scientific American* supplement offer the most detailed scientific theories for the inception and spread of the flu. Theories regarding specific bacteria, the influence of weather patterns, and even the possibility that insects carry the disease are all present. On Nov. 2, *Scientific American* published its longest Spanish Influenza story of the quarter. A full page and a quarter, including four photographs of people wearing masks for protection, outlines the history of influenza pandemics, describes the course of the disease, gives advice for prevention and treatment, and discusses the behavior of a specific suspected cause -- the Pfeiffer bacillus ("Spanish Influenza," 2 Nov. 1918, p. 356). Unlike the other three publications, governmental policies and figures representing trends in infection only appear in one article. But like *The New York Times* and *Science*, only authoritative sources appear as key actors.

Summary: All four publications focused on efforts by either the medical science community or the government to explain and control the pandemic. Few articles focus on the plights of individual victims and their families (two notable exceptions occur: A special *New York Times* Christmas feature soliciting donations to the poor ("New York's," 15 Dec. 1918, sect. 7, 1), and the previously mentioned first-person report in *Survey* from a female correspondent on conditions at a care home for the sick). *Scientific American* describes the symptoms of the disease, the specific viruses suspected of causing the pandemic, the history of past epidemics, and current research by scientists. These articles explore a variety of possible conditions leading to the severity of the pandemic.

While relying on the scientific model of germ theory as an explanation for the flu's spread, *The New York Times, Survey, and Science* focus much more on specific events, casualty figures, or public policy decisions connected with the pandemic. The vast majority of stories in the *Times*, for instance, tell of public health decisions to close businesses and schools, to stagger business hours, or to cancel sporting and cultural events in an attempt to control overcrowding and contact with infected persons. Emphasis is placed on the pandemic's impact on business and industry. This heavy reliance on government-supplied facts and solutions is also apparent in *Survey* and *Science*.

Sources:

As Mindich and others have suggested, any journalistic focus on faith or fate as causes or cures of disease seems to have evaporated by 1918. None of the four periodicals uses religious authorities as sources, and none suggests a link between a religious power and the devastating pandemic. Likewise, none of the publications used influenza victims as sources of information.

Instead, a few accepted expert sources appear again and again in stories about the flu. *Science* rarely identifies individual people as sources, but rather builds its articles on information supplied by governmental agencies, again indicating parallels between science journalism and mainstream journalism when it comes to construction of reality. *Scientific American* cites members of the medical science community as sources in the majority of its influenza stories. In *The New York Times*, governmental officials, mostly public health officials, are the primary sources of information. The commissioner of the New York Health Department was the most frequently cited individual source in the *Times*. In *Survey*, 75 percent of all stories used public health sources while 50 percent use medical science sources. *Survey* alone features the actions and comments of individual women in its stories.

Table 2: Use of Identified Individuals as Sources

	Articles using medical/scientific sources	**Articles using public health sources**	**Articles using military sources**	**Articles using flu victims as sources**
New York Times	13.8 percent (9 of 65 articles)	43.1 percent (28 articles)	10.8 percent (7 articles)	none
Survey	50 percent (4 of 8 articles)	75 percent (6 articles)	none	none
Scientific American	66.7 percent (4 of six articles)	none	none	none
Science	none	25 percent (1 of four articles)	25 percent (1 article)	none

Framing

Militaristic language is used in all four publications to frame this story as a battle between man and the disease (interestingly, *The New York Times* relies on the military metaphor least often, with militaristic language appearing in only 19 percent of all stories). *Scientific American*, however, is the only publication to frame this conflict as one between men of science and biological forces. The other three publications frame the conflict as a fight by governmental officials to control the spread of disease. One of the most obvious examples of biomilitaristic framing appears in *Science* on Nov. 8, 1918. The pandemic is described in terms of "violence" and "attack." The story, credited to Major George A. Soper of the U.S.A. Sanitary Corps, constructs a scenario in which military officials battle the outbreak of influenza in army camps ("Influenza Pneumonia," 8 Nov. 1918, p. 451).

In all four publications, the principle players in these conflicts are high-profile males who have been designated as having specialized knowledge, which allows them to speak with authority. If women are mentioned within stories, it is usually through a call for more nurses or Red Cross volunteers. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are rarely a part of the influenza story.

Discussion and Conclusion

Spanish flu coverage in all four publications indicates that both mainstream journalists and correspondents for scientific publications shared a dependence on scientific philosophy, methodology, and explanation. This relationship manifested itself in two ways. First, both the scientific and mainstream publications accepted scientific models of explanation as basic truth. No where in the data exist appeals to faith or higher powers as causes or cures for the influenza. Instead, the model of infection through direct contact with germs goes unquestioned in news accounts, even if not explicitly stated.

Second, all four publications used similar reporting practices, and those practices clearly appropriated scientific method, particularly objective observation and use of empirical data. Expert sources and the element of conflict were present in all the publications. However, though the four publications shared similar reporting methods and general frames, details and subframes within the stories differed. By appealing to medical and science experts, *Scientific American* constructed stories focusing on man's struggle to understand and control nature through science. *The New York Times, Survey,* and *Science* also used expert sources and empirical data, but constructed stories about governmental conflict and intervention. This similarity between *Science* and the two mainstream publications indicates that the publication's connection to the scientific community alone did not necessarily impact framing.

Emphasis on objective method and empirical data did far more than relay medical "truths" to the public -- it constructed a journalistic reality which supported existing power structures without question. By focusing on expert sources, scientific explanation, and government-released casualty reports, both scientists and mainstream journalists constructed stories in which elite groups of men were the important players. Scientific figures and facts (or in many cases, guesses) supplanted information about the toll on individuals or families. Reliance on an elite group of expert sources supplanted the voices of those who suffered through the disease. The overwhelming number of stories examined in this study perpetuate the conferral of status on these medical and governmental authorities, while often taking for granted the subordinate positions of average citizens.

This study is designed to provide historical context to current debates regarding the quality and effects of health and medical reporting. By examining news frames in 1918 health and medical reporting, we can better understand how scientific method combined with journalistic norms and practices may continue to shape coverage of news, particularly important public health issues. Content analysis, however, has certain limitations. First, motives of reporters and editors in framing new stories may be implied, but not determined. Perhaps more importantly, content analysis can only identify the existence of frames, not their influence on readers or policy makers. While this study serves as an initial attempt to approach questions regarding social construction of health news by media outlets, more work needs to be done on effects of framing on audience perceptions and behavior. Determining audience effects 80 years after the Spanish Flu outbreak poses obvious difficulties. However, these issues could be further explored through a historical study of personal letters and memoirs, letters to the editor, and through an examination of public health policy decisions and debates. Content analyses, like this one, will help identify how journalistic norms have shaped news reports -- specifically medical and health information -- received by both the general public and scientific communities. Studies on audience responses, however, must also be conducted to fully understand how the relationship between science and journalism impacts mediated construction of reality.

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The Klan and Press in Atlanta, 1919-1921:
A Tale of Public Relations and Newspaper Opposition

Hanna E. Norton,
Doctoral Student
Department of Advertising and Public Relations
Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication
The University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602
(706) 369-9148
hnorton@arches.uga.edu

Karen S. Miller,
Associate Professor
Department of Advertising and Public Relations
Henry W. Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication
The University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602
(706) 542-5035
karenm@arches.uga.edu

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Introduction:

The Ku Klux Klan is the most notorious hate group in U.S. history. "The traditional image of the Klan," the historian Kenneth T. Jackson writes, "is that of hooded nightriders preserving white supremacy in the rural South." While this image was true of the original, post-Civil War Klan, he continues, it carries little validity to the largest and most significant Klan movement, which took place during the 1920s. The reincarnated Klan saw itself as the defender of Americanism and protector of Christian ideals, and with its opposition to black Americans, immigrants, communism, Catholics, Jews, and others, the Klan recruited somewhere between one and five million dues-paying members between 1920 and 1926.[1]

Despite the significance of this movement, most people are unaware of public relations' role in the Klan's rebirth during the 1920s. This paper analyzes press coverage of the Klan in three Atlanta newspapers before, during and after its Imperial Wizard hired a public relations firm in June 1920. This analysis indicates that the Klan's increased membership was better and more safely promoted among its own publications and grass roots efforts than through the press's traditional gatekeeper function. In fact, it was the press's intervention and investigations which led to a Congressional investigation of the organization in 1921 and was the beginning of the end for the hired public relations team.

Literature Review:

To date only John M. Shotwell's unpublished master's thesis, reported in Scott M. Cutlip's The Unseen Power, documents how the Southern Publicity Association helped the 1920s Klan grow from about 3,000 members in Georgia and Alabama to a national movement with millions of members within a few years.[2] According to Shotwell, the Klan initially eschewed press coverage, preferring internal communication through newsletters. But publicity helped recruit members, who brought in more money to the financially strapped Klan, so greater promotion became not only tolerable but preferred.[3] While many scholars of the Klan note the publicists' presence,[4] only Shotwell describes their approach to public relations. The Southern Publicity Association, headquartered like the Klan in Atlanta, was headed by Edward Y. Clarke and Elizabeth Tyler. Generally, the two appear in the literature as energetic organizers who were bright enough to see the financial opportunity the Klan offered, yet immoral or greedy enough to cause their own downfall.

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[1] Kenneth T. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), xi-xii; Nancy Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry: The Making of the Second Ku Klux Klan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), xi.

History of the Revived Klan:

William Simmons's revived Ku Klux Klan made its presence known in 1915 with a cross burning atop Stone Mountain, just east of Atlanta. The revitalized Klan drew inspiration from the original, which spread rapidly during post-Civil War Reconstruction. Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbade denying suffrage on the basis of race, and another law to enforce it in 1870; the following year an anti-Klan law led to the Invisible Empire's downfall.[5] The new Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc. received its official charter from the state of Georgia on July 1, 1916. Its first 34 members were respectable citizens, not the lunatic fringe or nightriders one might imagine. While some scholars suggest the Klan exacerbated class differences in some Southern towns, in Athens, Georgia, it included ministers, pharmacists, farm owners, clerks, managers, carpenters, mill workers and small business owners.[6] However, the Klan was not particularly successful before 1920, experiencing frequent financial difficulties. Then Elizabeth Tyler's son-in-law joined, and Tyler and Clarke met Simmons, the Imperial Wizard, who hired them to promote his organization.

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[2] John Mack Shotwell, Crystallizing Public Hatred: Ku Klux Klan Public Relations in the Early 1920s. Unpublished master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1974. Scott M. Cutlip, The Unseen Power: Public Relations, A History (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1994), 372-413.

[3] Shotwell, Crystallizing Public Hatred, 11.

[4] See for example, Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 9; Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry, 5; Kathleen M. Blee, Women of the Klan: Racism and Gender in the 1920s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 20; David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), 31; and Wyn Craig Wade, The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 153-54.

[5] Wade, The Fiery Cross, 82, 92

The Southern Publicity Association had directed campaigns for several notable clients, including the Red Cross, the YMCA, the Anti-Saloon League, and the Salvation Army. Using the same skills they honed for their mainstream clients, the pair changed the Klan's fortunes. They were hired as publicity agents, with Clarke given the title of "Imperial Kleagle," head of the propagation department. However, their success granted them additional power. Clarke and Tyler hired "kleages," recruiters who worked on commission to draw new members--solid, or at least ordinary citizens. Each kleagle kept $4 of the $10 new member initiation fee; Tyler and Clarke received $2.50. By 1921 more than 200 kleagles were in the field, targeting first their own friends and Protestant ministers, and then bringing in lecturers (at one point two-thirds of the lecturers and as many as 40,000 members were said to be ministers) or showing films to promote the Klan to a larger audience. Most kleagles were Masons, and many Klan meetings were held in the lodges of such fraternal organizations as the Masons and the Elks.[7]

The Klan was successful with ordinary citizens for several reasons, foremost racism and nativism. Historians like Kathleen Blee are quick to point out that "racist, nativist, and antiradical sentiments long predated--and would long outlive--the second Klan."[8] Attacking not just black

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[6] Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry, 55; John T. Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists and the Issue of Race, 1920-1944 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 27.
[7] Jackson, The Klu Klux Klan in the City, 5, 10; Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry, 7-8; Wade, The Fiery Cross, 171.
[8] Blee, Women of the Klan, 17.

Americans, but Catholics, Jews, Bolsheviks and immigrants, the Klan gained favor in the North and West, as kleages focused on local minorities as targets.[9] Moreover, the Klan disciplined poor whites, such as one Georgia man who had an affair with a married woman, was warned to stay away and flogged when he refused.[10] One historian argues that Clarke, who had studied for the Southern Presbyterian ministry, realized that Klansmen and fundamentalist Christians shared intolerance for different lifestyles and frustration with postwar change; the Klan's stated commitment to uphold Christian ideals, which Clarke repeated frequently in the Klan press, appealed to these fundamentalists, as did Simmons's Klan rituals, which were loaded with fundamentalist thought.[11] A third reason for the Klan's widespread success was fraternalism's popularity in the United States;[12] the Klan was just one of many organizations that banned Jews, criticized Catholics, and discriminated against black Americans. While its vigilante violence eventually turned people away, at first blush the Klan was not very different from other fraternal groups of the time.

Scholars have not reached a consensus on the national press's importance to the rise or destruction of the Klan. They have most often condemned the press for not undertaking active opposition to the Klan. The historian David Chalmers, for instance, argues that "on the whole, the press explained [the KKK] partially and poorly, and often not at all."[13] Jackson calls Atlanta's newspapers "noticeably silent,"[14] and Nancy Maclean agrees, asserting that, aside from papers in Columbus and Macon, "no Georgia newspapers condemned the Klan until the second half of the decade, when its power had begun to wane."[15] However, our own research found that all three Atlanta daily newspapers did comment negatively on the organization during the two week period surrounding the 1921 Congressional investigation.

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[9] Blee, Women of the Klan, 21.

[10] Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry, 152-153.

[11] Wade, The Fiery Cross, 170; Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists, 28.

[12] Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 292.

[13] Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 295.

[14] Jackson, Ku Klux Klan in the City, 35.

Moreover historians have generally failed to consider ways the press might have actually promoted the Klan, an oversight that should be corrected especially given the public relations expertise of Tyler and Clarke. Chalmers writes that "the news value of the Klan initially caught them all by surprise."[16] This seems unlikely, however, given that Edward Clarke's brother, Francis, was the managing editor of the Atlanta Constitution and the publicists had worked with the press for previous clients.[17] In fact, Shotwell argues that "the growth of the Klan...was greatly enhanced by the process of public relations."[18] In addition, even when papers did oppose the KKK, they did not necessarily hurt it. The newspaper most vehemently attacking the Klan, The New York World, began a series of expose articles on September 6, 1921. The series was syndicated throughout the U.S. (in Georgia it appeared only in Julia and Julian Harris's Columbus Enquirer-Sun). But, Simmons later said, "It wasn't until the newspapers began to attack the Klan that it really grew."[19] Again, our analysis provides contradictory results. Hence, it is clear that a closer examination of the relationship between the Klan and the press is needed.

Methods:

To examine Klan coverage in the Atlanta press, three dates and three papers were chosen. The selected dates reflect three significant periods in the Klan's history during the 1920s. First, the period before Clarke and Tyler took over pubic relations for the Klan (1919). Second, the period after Clarke and Tyler assumed propagation responsibilities in 1920. Finally, when Congressional investigations of the Klan were occurring in Washington, D.C. during 1921. For each of these years, two week periods were selected to provide an in-depth immersion into the culture and events of the time. The two week period during July 7-20, 1920 was selected because this was approximately one month after Clarke and Tyler assumed responsibilities, giving them a chance to furnish press releases or editorial stories. October 5-18, 1921 was the two weeks surrounding the Congressional investigation which began on October 11 and finished on October 18, 1921. The time span between 1920 and 1921 was then calculated at fifteen months and then applied retrospectively from 1920 to obtain the April 4-17, 1919 observation date. The middle of the month was selected for 1919 because the other two years provided mid-month observation dates.

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[15] Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry, 19.
[16] Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 32.
[17] Jackson, Ku Klux Klan in the City, 30; Robert L. Duffus, "Salesmen of Hate: The Ku Klux Klan," *The World's Work* 51 (May-October 1923): 34.
[18] Shotwell, Crystallizing Public Hatred, x.
[19] Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 38.

The three papers, The Atlanta Georgian, The Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta Constitution, were selected because they were centered in Atlanta, the Klan's headquarters, and because they were the only Atlanta papers providing daily coverage.[20] The Atlanta Georgian was a tabloid publication which produced anywhere from four to seven editions for each publication day, including First Editions, Evening Editions, and Final Home Editions. The editorial content was generally presented in columns containing short paragraphs with headlines stretching across the front page as found in other sectioned newspapers. Advertisements were often pushed to the page's outer columns and larger advertisements spread across several columns surrounded by editorial content. The paper's length ran approximately fifteen pages per edition. Each edition carried primarily the same editorial content with most variations appearing in page layout. As part of the Hearst chain of newspapers (along with The New York World), the Georgian could afford to be more critical of the Klan than the other Atlanta daily papers. Our evidence shows the Georgian often utilized this position.

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[20] Shotwell, Crystallizing Public Hatred, 152.

The Atlanta Journal's editorial and advertising content was also organized into columns. Stories followed to the bottom of columns or stretched across multiple columns depending on the remainder of page contents. Advertisements were usually confined to the first and eighth columns, except on front pages of a section where priority was given to editorial content. Some advertisements did extend beyond one column, but even larger ads were positioned at page extremities. The paper's average length was eighteen to twenty pages.

Finally, The Atlanta Constitution carried a similar layout to the Journal, with long columns of editorial content and advertisements placed at the pages' edge. The Constitution, however, was a shorter paper averaging fourteen pages per edition. Of all three papers, the Constitution paid the most attention to women's issues and society pages-- thus they might be viewed as the most liberal and/or least serious of the three papers at that time.

Analysis:

1919: The Klan before the PR Agency

During the period of April 4-17, 1919, the country was involved in its first World War effort, President Wilson was attempting to get world leaders to agree on his fourteen points while fighting off a cold, the 17th Squadron of Engineers from Georgia returned to Atlanta amidst much fanfare, and the Klu Klux Klan did not exist in the Atlanta newspaper press. The lack of attention paid to the Klan in the Atlanta press does not mean that sentiments toward the black community were favorable, or that they were openly accepted in the Atlanta and national communities. All three papers carried criminal reports for both blacks and whites, but the papers also reported negroes not welcomed into work or recreational areas,[21] posses and/or law enforcement which sought various criminals,[22] law enforcement's efforts to contain angry mobs,[23] and reward notices for "negroes" who had allegedly broken laws.[24]

The only coverage of racial issues carried in multiple papers (Journal and Constitution) described a confrontation between white officers and black citizens of Millen, Georgia which left five black men and two officers dead.[25] A black man named Edmond Scott was bringing a preacher from nearby Waynesboro approximately fifteen miles away when his car was stopped by the two officers. The officers found a pistol on Scott and placed him under arrest. Joe Ruffin, another black man, drove up and began shooting at the two officers.[26] Details never clarified why Ruffin opened fire on the policeman, but it was clearly stated in the April 17th article from Millen that such behavior would not be tolerated. The report also attempted to establish that treatment was equally given between whites and blacks, "These men [the dead officers] had been as active in running down crime among the whites as among the negroes, and the records will show that the white lawbreakers suffered at the hands of the officers quite as much as the negroes."[27] The article relays the events in a didactic manner to highlight the black citizens' involvement in shooting and beating the officers, but it does not offer the same "preachy" tone regarding the white citizens attempts to impart their own justice. "It is simply fair to state that, if Joe Ruffin had not been gotten out of the way he would not have lived two hours and that if Lewis Ruffin is caught by any except officers he will not likely go to trial, buy beyond that there is nothing more to anticipate in the way of trouble."[28] This passage demonstrates that private citizens hunting and killing suspects was not "trouble"; it might save the police officers and justice system time and hassle in bringing suspects to trial.

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[21] "Shipworkers Refuse to Work With Negroes," *The Atlanta Journal*, 12 April 1919, p. 2.; "Negro Soldier, Back from France, Beaten in Soda Water Stand," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 16 April 1919, p. 3.

[22] "Posses Seek Negro for Killing Officer," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 11 April 1919, p. 5.; "Decatur Officers and Blacks Battle," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 14 April 1919, p. 3.

[23] "Armed Deputies Check Mob Seeking a Negro For Attack on Woman," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 9 April 1919, p. 18.

[24] "Reward For Negro," *The Atlanta Journal*, 11 April 1919, p. 24.; "Reward Is Offered For Negroes Arrest," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 12 April 1919, p. 2.

[25] "Six Persons Dead from Race Clash at Negro Church Near Millen, GA," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 14 April 1919, p. 1.; "Five Negroes Die After Shooting of Two Officers," *The Atlanta Journal*, 14 April 1919, p. 3.; "Gives Millen Account of Recent Disorders," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 17 April 1919, p. 5.

[26] Ibid.

[27] "Gives Millen Account," *The Atlanta Constitution*, p. 5.

These trends in the April 4-17, 1919 Atlanta newspapers show that while the Klan might not have been covered in the press, sentiments causing Klan memberships to rise dramatically during this period were already established and observed by citizens and reported by the papers. Negroes were not considered equals with white Americans and efforts to privately take justice were not admonished by local officials or the press. By contrast, these papers openly covered Jewish meetings, holidays, and events. Jews might not have been viewed as equals with white Southern Protestants, but this sentiment was never apparent in press coverage. Therefore, it can be assumed that Jews were seen as higher in the social hierarchy than blacks.

1920: The Klan Hires the Agency

During July 7-20, 1920 the country was in an election year and editorial coverage centered on Republican, Democrat, and third party candidates. Local politicians garnered support for their own party's candidate and rumors surfaced of Georgia Governor Cox winning his party's nomination. Yet, amidst these political discourses was an increased incidence and coverage of violent acts against African Americans. During this two week period there was actually only one news story on the Klan, discussing its rising membership.[29]

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[28] Ibid.

The story appeared in the Georgian a little over one month after Clarke and Tyler assumed responsibilities. The article does not describe the rising membership as troublesome, but does provide evidence of the Georgian's intentions to warn the public of a possible future threat from the Klan. The story already indicated increasing membership numbers when Clarke and Tyler had only a one month opportunity to raise membership. Therefore, the story might have been a news release sent by Clarke and Tyler to initially test Klan coverage in mainstream media. The rising numbers the article cites were provided by Simmons, who was listed as a faculty member of Lanier University first and Imperial Wizard of the Klan second. Simmons did not disclose actual membership figures, but he did report that Klan membership reached into nineteen states.[30]

This seemingly innocuous information is troubling news, however, because newspaper coverage showed a rising Klan participation and violence against African Americans. During this two week period, nine different violent acts were attempted or committed and later reported in the three newspapers. Other articles detail a far less overt violence committed against black citizens. Both the Journal and Constitution reported on a black Republican leader testifying to a U.S. Senate committee investigating campaign expenditures. His testimony spanned a variety of topics, including the dangerous implications for Southern blacks attempting to vote.[31] The titles of these two articles, "Negro GOP Chief Uses Imagination" and "Negro Republican's Lynched, Johnson's Ridiculous Charge" capture the papers' negative opinions regarding Johnson's remarks.[32] Understandably, the period these two articles appeared was before objectivity became crucial to newspaper reporting, but only the headlines appear to judge Johnson's words. The articles, beyond the controversial titles, described Johnson's but did not disclose how his comments were false (as stated in the headlines).

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[29] "Order of Ku Klux Klan Shows Rapid Growth," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 11 July 1920, sec. A, p. 5.

[30] Ibid.

[31] "Negro GOP Chief Uses Imagination," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 9 July 1920, p. 6.; "Negro Republican's Lynched, Johnson's Ridiculous Charge," *The Atlanta Journal*, 8 July, p. 1, 3.

All other press coverage during this period informed the public about atrocities taking place and law enforcement's attempt to bring posses to justice. The Constitution and Georgian, for instance, describe the burning to death of two black men suspected of killing a farmer and his son.[33] While neither story appeared as front page news, the Constitution continued its coverage over the following week; three additional stories described efforts by the townspeople to maintain peace and law enforcement to catch the individuals who committed the lynchings.[34] The Constitution also covered three separate hangings resulting from black men allegedly attacking white girls and women.[35] The Journal focused its press coverage on the murder of a black taxi driver, Levi Williams, killed in his cab outside a restaurant. Of the eight stories in the Journal over the two week period discussing violence against blacks and measures by the black community to improve their situation, half were devoted to coverage of Williams's murder and legal steps taken against his killers.[36]

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[32] Ibid.

[33] "Burn Negroes in Paris, Texas," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 8 July 1920, p. 6.; "Mob in Texas Burns 2 Negroes at Stake," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 7 July 1920, p. 13.

[34] "Armed Volunteers Patroling [sic] Paris Following Lynching," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 8 July 1920, p. 6.; "Grand Jury to Probe Lynchings in Texas," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 10 July 1920, p. 16; "Lynchers Sought by Texas Rangers, "*The Atlanta Constitution*, 17 July 1920, p. 7.

[35] "Negro Who Attacked White Girl Lynched," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 8 July 1920, p. 8; "Negro Who Attacked White Girl Killed," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 9 July 1920, p. 6; "Negro Who Attacked White Woman Hanged," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 10 July 1920, p. 14.

[36] "Four Held for Slaying Negro Taxi Cab Driver," *The Atlanta Journal*, 9 July 1920, p. 7.; "Ed Nichols Held on Charge of Killing Negro Taxi Driver," *The Atlanta Journal*, 13 July 1920, p. 3.; "Two Men Committed in Connection With Shooting of a Negro," *The Atlanta Journal*, 15 July 1920, p. 22.; Three Men Indicted Following Shooting of Negro Driver," *The Atlanta Journal*, 17 July 1920, p. 9.

Collectively, these three papers in July of 1920 appeared to provide coverage of the atrocities associated with the Ku Klux Klan. Yet, the papers were sending two messages to their audience. The papers convey at theme that vigilante activities were not going to be tolerated. However, their stories never specifically or indirectly mention Klan involvement, which essentially helped conceal Klan activities. Furthermore, the Georgian published an article discussing rising Klan membership, which could also be read as condoning Klan behavior. Beyond the one potential press release, there appears to be no correlation between Clarke and Tyler's efforts and increased Klan coverage.

These findings appear to match Shotwell's argument that after Clarke and Tyler assumed control "the order's propaganda change[d] in flavor," assuming a "gladiatorial" stance.[37] But as we found, change in propaganda does not necessarily mean change in press coverage. This is particularly true because, as Shotwell also noted, Clarke and Tyler initially "kept external publicity to a minimum, concentrating mostly on an undercover campaign."[38]

1921: The Congressional Hearings

In October of 1921 Atlanta was buzzing with the opening Southeastern exposition and fair, while workers in downtown buildings pleaded to have their heat turned on during an unusually cool October month. In both Atlanta and across the nation all eyes were fixed on the Congressional investigating committee. Committee members would determine if the mail system had been fraudulently used and lawless acts perpetrated with members disguised in white robes. These Congressional hearings were a direct result of the New York World's expose series on the Klan. The newspaper documented more than 150 cases of vigilante violence committed by the

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[37] Shotwell, Crystallizing Public Hatred, 33.
[38] Shotwell, Crystallizing Public Hatred, 74.

Klan, prompting the investigation.[39] As part of this Klan coverage, all three Atlanta newspapers discussed the events occurring in Washington and Atlanta. The most consistent trend in their coverage was the multiple and conflicting stories told by those associated with the K.K.K. However, each paper also took its own political and moral stance regarding the events disclosed in the Congressional hearings.

Reading the coverage of events between October 5th-18th, 1921, it becomes clear (although not openly discussed by the papers) that many conflicting stories existed for aspects under investigation and even events occurring during the investigation. One obvious and never clarified example was the actual Klan membership. Klan officials did cooperate and opened files and financial records for the post office inspector, O. B. Williamson, but the financial figures and actual Klan membership never reconciled. The Atlanta Constitution's October 12th issue had an article presenting potential membership figures ranging from 126,000 to 500,000.[40] According to Representative Tague of Massachusetts, author of one investigating resolution, the membership was as high as 500,000.[41] By examining Klan files and financial records, Williams concluded that Klan membership was closer to 126,000.[42] Yet, in an article published on the same day by the Georgian, Williamson was apparently unable to reconcile financial holdings and actual Klan membership.[43] "Williamson laid stress on the claims of Klan officials that the Klan had 126,000 members, while the books show receipt of entrance fees equivalent to only 85,126 members."[44] Actual monetary collections of the organization also was a number that appeared to change according to who was speaking. According to Representative Tague, the Klan had collected $30,000,000 from 500,000 members--numbers which Tague claimed to receive from Klan officials.[45] The following day, the Journal reported that the committee determined "...the organization had taken in $1,488,710 since its foundation."[46] The Constitution on the same day reported that Inspector Williamson had found "...collections amounting to $860, 393 from June 1, 1920, to September 24, 1921."[47] Yet, during the final days of Simmons's testimony additional figures were discussed and covered by all three papers.[48] According to Simmons, Clarke received eight of every ten dollar membership fee and Clarke had collected $225,568 during the last fiscal year, of which the organization received $171,432.[49] Clarke repudiated these figures and said he personally only received $16,000 during the last year.[50] These numbers were also in conflict with those presented by Jackson, Maclean and Wade, who found Clarke and Tyler only received $2.50 of the $10 initiation fee.[51] This finger pointing was not limited to financial discussions in the Klan probe, for Clarke and Tyler's positions were presented in various forms.

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[39] Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry, 5.
[40] "Financial Status of Order is Told By P.O. Inspector," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 12 October 1921, p. 1.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] "Simmons Loses Sneer As Ex-Kleagle Talks," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 12 October 1921, p 13.
[44] Ibid.

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[45] "About $30,000,000 Paid to Officials, Says Congressman," *The Atlanta Journal*, 11 October 1921, p. 1.

[46] "Simmons Moves to Refute Charges Against Ku Klux," *The Atlanta Journal*, 12 October 1921, p. 2.

[47] "Financial Status," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 12 October 1921, p. 2.

[48] "Klan Hearing Is Resumed," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 17 October 1921, p. 3.; "Imperial Kleagle Gets $8 of Every $10, Wizard Says," *The Atlanta Journal*, 17 October 1921, p. 1.; "Congressional Probe of Klan Not Expected As Hearing is Ended," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 18 October 1921, p. 13.; "Clarke Insists He Will Leave Kleagle Post, " *The Atlanta Georgian*, 18 October 1921, p. 3.; "Congressional Klan Probe Does Not Appear Likely," *The Atlanta Journal*, 18 October 1921, p. 3.

[49] "Congressional Klan Probe," *The Atlanta Journal*, 18 October 1921, p. 3.

[50] "Clarke Insists He Will Leave Kleagle Post, " *The Atlanta Georgian*, 18 October 1921, p. 3.; "Earnings $16,000 Declares Clarke," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 18 October 1921, p. 1.; "Earnings $16,000 Say E.Y. Clarke," *The Atlanta Journal*, 18 October 1921, p. 7.

[51] Jackson, The Klu Klux Klan in the City, 5, 10; Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry, 7-8; Wade, The Fiery Cross, 171.

Clarke and Tyler were initially hired by the Ku Klux Klan in June 1920 to assist with promotional efforts. By the Congressional hearings, they had control of the entire organization by some accounts or were barely introduced to important Klan members by other accounts. One initial voice heard during the investigation was Anderson Wright, a former New York king kleagle. According to Wright, Tyler was the "woman behind the throne" and she and Clarke were involved with the organization as a money making venture.[52] Wright also claimed Tyler lived in a $75,000 palace.[53] Wright, however, proved not to be the most competent witness; it was learned he grossed a total of $5,000 to expose the Klan's inside workings and rituals in a series of articles and he had been in trouble for a number of unhonored checks.[54] Furthermore, Wright's account of Tyler's "palace" was not confirmed by Williamson. The Post Office Inspector visited her house and said the "modest country home" was not worth more than $10,000.[55]

In another initial account of the inquiry, The Atlanta Constitution reported Simmons was forced to listen to several accounts saying he was not the leader of the Klan and instead "...that all powers seemed vested in Edward Young Clarke, head of the publicity, or propagating bureau, and Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler, his assistant."[56] According to this Constitution report, Tyler was merely Clarke's assistant. However, the most conflicting information came from the Klan's supreme attorney. Paul S. Etheridge, an active member for at least four years, said he had only meet Tyler three months prior at a Fourth of July picnic. "If she has ever exercised any control over the organization I have never heard of it and I think I would know...I have never known her to be called upon for an opinion, nor has she offered them regarding the workings of the organization."[57] Yet, Shotwell found that Mrs. Tyler did appear before a closed Klan meeting (the first woman to do so) on September 22, 1921; Tyler offered her resignation which was denied "spontaneously and enthusiastically" by the attending Klan members.[58] Several conflicting accounts of Klan activities and personnel existed, yet newspapers failed to recognize and acknowledge inconsistencies.

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[52] "About $30,000,000 Paid," *The Atlanta Journal*, 11 October 1921, p. 1, 14.
[53] "Imperial Wizard Declares Order Stands for Laws," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 13 October 1921, p. 1.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] "Financial Status," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 12 October 1921, p. 1.

Similar inconsistencies appeared in coverage of shots fired at Tyler's home on October 11, 1921. The Journal said the paper learned of the shooting from Clarke, who phoned a reporter.[59] "The kleagle said he was conversing over the phone with Mrs. Tyler when she suddenly exclaimed: 'Somebody is shooting into my house,' and hung up the receiver."[60] According to Tyler's version of events, recorded in the Journal and Constitution, she was entertaining a friend when the shots were fired.[61] "...[W]e were sitting in my bedroom and keeping a close watch on my daughter, Doris, who was ill in an adjoining room. Miss Benton wanted to see a Klan book I had, and I crossed in front of my bedroom window and went over to the bed to get it. In a second the shots began to ring out from just outside the window. The panes were shattered, and the bullets struck the walls with a dull thud. Naturally, we were badly frightened, but I retained sufficient self-possession to cut out my lights and phone the county police and Klan officials."[62] Tyler never mentioned Clarke, or the unlikely event that she was on the telephone with him while simultaneously entertaining her guest. The Journal article carrying both accounts never addressed the conflicting stories. Yet, the story stands as another example of confused details in Atlanta's Klan coverage during October 1921.

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[57] "Paul S. Etheridge Defends Ku Klux," *The Atlanta Journal*, 13 October 1921, p. 10.
[58] Shotwell, Crystallizing Public Hatred, 159.
[59] "Klan Sees Effort to Slay Mrs. Tyler," *The Atlanta Journal*, 12 October 1921, p. 3.
[60] Ibid.
[61] "Klan Sees Effort," *The Atlanta Journal*, 12 October 1921, p. 3.; "Five Shots Fired at Ku Klux Klan Woman Official," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 12 October 1921, p. 1.
[62] "Klan Sees Effort," *The Atlanta Journal*, 12 October 1921, p. 3.

Despite inconsistencies, each paper's political stance toward Klan events became more apparent. When Simmons fell ill during his Congressional testimony, the Journal and Constitution wrote more sympathetic accounts than the Georgian. In the Georgian's article, "Simmons Stages Dramatic Climax," the paper establishes a dramatic scene and equally dramatic response by the Congressional investigating committee. "As the last word left his lips, the wizard fell to his knees, spread his arms across the committee table, buried his face in them and wept aloud...Chairman Campbell of the committee shouted sternly to Simmons: 'Please refrain from any such demonstrations as that.'"[63] According to the Journal, "The physical collapse of Colonel Simmons came while the big audience was applauding his concluding statements. Chairman Campbell checked the applause, shouting, 'We cannot have any demonstration in this room.' The committee then looked around and found that Colonel Simmons's head had dropped on the committee table and nausea had seized him."[64] What the Georgian reported as words of reprimand towards Simmons was reported by the Journal as an admonishment towards the audience. The Constitution provided a similarly sympathetic position although it did not offer Campbell's admonition.[65]

Simmons's illness was not the only occasion when the Georgian reported a differing interpretation of events. On October 15th, one day after reporting on Simmons's illness, the Georgian reported a further Klan inquiry was expected. "Whether or not Simmons turns up for examination there is little doubt the Rules Committee will report in favor of an investigation of the Klan. A majority of the committeemen have expressed themselves privately as favoring such a report."[66] The Journal and Constitution reported they did not think a further investigation would occur. On October 18th, the Constitution reported Simmons's testimony was concluded and no further witnesses were to be called, drawing the matter to a close because. "[I]t is not regarded as probable that the rules committee will direct a special Congressional inquiry."[67] On the same day, the Journal presented a similar point of view as the Constitution. "Both Republican and Democratic members of the committee are reliably believed to be satisfied with the preliminary inquiry. There are certain things connected with the Klan they would criticize, and others they would comment [on], but the testimony to date is not thought to justify any extended inquiry by congress."[68] The October 16th-18th editions of the Georgian showed no change in opinion, and instead additional Klan news was provided. These examples demonstrate that coverage by the three Atlanta papers was correlated to their opinions of the organization and its Congressional investigation.

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[63] "Simmons Stages Dramatic Climax," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 14 October 1921, p. 1.
[64] "Doubt of Federal Probe Into Order Voiced in Capital," *The Atlanta Journal*, 14 October 1921, p. 1, 32.
[65] "Hearers Applaud As 'Wizard' Ends Long Statement," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 14 October 1921, p. 1.

The articles above do not indicate, however, that the Journal and Constitution were Klan advocates. One common element among the three papers in October 1921 were national stories on lynchings and anti-Klan attitudes and behaviors. All papers provided daily content on their news and editorial pages acknowledging the frightening results of groups such as the Klan. The Journal and Constitution may have accepted Simmons, but they did not condone lawless activity akin to the Klan's vigilantism. Stories by these papers beyond Congressional Klan coverage included black and white citizens' accounts of being frightened and/or assaulted by unknown masked assailants or Klan members,[69] African-American citizens being burned or shot to death,[70] miners, judges, religious leaders, and government bodies denouncing and/or barring Klan membership,[71] people dying in efforts to stop Klan events,[72] and mobs attempting lynching efforts.[73] The number and variety of stories indicates that the papers felt obliged to report events beyond the Congressional Klan hearings to include national sentiment regarding vigilante activities.

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[66] "Klan Inquiry Now Expected," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 15 October 1921, p. 3.
[67] "Congressional Probe of Klan Not Expected As Hearing Is Ended," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 18 October 1921, p. 1.
[68] "Congressional Klan Probe Does Not Appear Likely," *The Atlanta Journal*, 18 October 1921, p. 3.

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[69] Citizens Are Warned to Leave This Town," *The Atlanta Journal*, 5 October 1921, p. 4.; "Fear of Ku Klux Made Daughter Marry, Father's Suit Claims," *The Atlanta Journal*, 14 October 1921, p. 8.; "152 Cases of Lawlessness Reported Since October 1920," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 5 October 1921, p. 1.; Men and Women Are Beaten and Tarred and Feathered," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 5 October 1921, p. 1.; "Criminal Acts By Men in Masks and White Robes," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 5 October 1921, p. 2.; "Charges Klan Threat Used to Win Bride," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 13 October 1921, p. 1.; "'Night Riders' Whip Citizen of Girard," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 9 October 1921, sec. A, p. 8.; "Negro Is Whipped and Told to Leave," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 13 October 1921, p. 4.

[70] "Negro Woman Found Burned to Death," *The Atlanta Journal*, 11 October 1921, p. 6.; "Negro Woman Found Dead From Burns," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 11 October 1921, p. 5.; "Negro Is Burned At Stake in Texas," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 12 October 1921, p. 2.; "Negro Witness Shot Before Gaming Trial," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 14 October 1921, p. 9.

[71] "Atlanta's True Spirit Speaks Against All Intolerance," *The Atlanta Journal*, 5 October 1921, p. 6.; "Charter For Klan Refused by Official At West Virginia," *The Atlanta Journal*, 6 October 1921, p. 12.; "Chief of Norfolk Police Denies He Is A Member," *The Atlanta Journal*, 12 October 1921, p. 2.; "Klan Operations Held Unlawful in Texas," *The Atlanta Journal*, 16 October 1921, p. 1.; "Methodists Oppose Ku Klux Klan," *The Atlanta Journal*, 16 October 1921, p. 5.; "Union Puts Ban on Ku-Klux," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 5 October 1921, p. 2.; "Penal Codes Violated by Klan, Rules State Attorney," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 16 October 1921, sec. A, p. 1.; "Tenn. Methodists Hit Ku-Klux," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 16 October 1921, sec. A., p. 1.; "Ku-Klux Hit in Texas Law," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 16 October 1921, sec. A., p. 4.; "Miners Bar Ku Klux Klansmen," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 5 October 1921, p. 1.; "Six Judges Denounce Klan," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 5 October 1921, p. 1.; "Secret Meeting Scored by Judge," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 6 October 1921, p. 6.; "Secret Societies Scored by Stuchell," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 13 October 1921, p. 6.

[72] "Texas Grand Jury Probes Klan Shooting," *The Atlanta Journal*, 12 October 1921, p. 2.; "One Dies in Effort to Halt Klansmen," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 6 October 1921, p. 6.

[73] "Mob Abandons Lynching Plan Without Effort," *The Atlanta Constitution*, 8 October 1921, p. 7.

Unlike the previous periods, the papers during 1921 allowed their editorial articles to speak (and even show) concerns regarding Klan activities. Humorous titles included a series of snippets gathered by the Georgian from papers around the country called "Kraks at Klu-Kluxism,"[74] a Journal 's editorial and picture on an organization called the "Ku Ku Klan" which required its members "prove that he was more or less Ku Ku."[75] The Georgian chose to print editorials on its front page including a poignant example called, "Klan or Shrine---Which Are You Prouder Of?"[76] The editorial detailed accomplishments and goals of each organization and let readers decide which they would rather have in their community. The Constitution did not include any anti-Klan editorials during the two week period in 1921. This exclusion may be a favor passed from one brother to another; Clarke's brother, Francis, was the managing editor of the paper. These editorials (or lack of editorials) serve as further historical markers of each paper's sentiments directly contrasts the secondary literature which found negligible anti-Klan response in newspapers.[77]

Exposure did not mean death to the Klan. To the general public, Wyn Craig Wade writes, the Klan and Simmons were exonerated by the Congressional hearing. "Simmons's ultimate vindication came when President Warren G. Harding agreed to be sworn in as a member of the Ku Klux Klan--he was sworn in at the White House.[78] Additionally, the national headquarters in Atlanta received signed membership applications that were facsimiles printed in the World and its syndicates.[79]

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[74] "Kraks At Ku-Kluxism," *The Atlanta Georgian*, 6 October 1921, p. 4.
[75] "Lardner to Organize the Ku Ku Klan," *The Atlanta Journal*, 9 October 1921, Sunday magazine.
[76] "Klan or Shrine---Which Are You Prouder Of?" *The Atlanta Georgian*, 6 October 1921, pg. 1.
[77] See Jackson, Chalmers and Maclean.
[78] Wade, Fiery Cross, 165.
[79] Jackson, Ku Klux Klan in the City, 12.

Conclusion:

The basis for examining the three year periods was to determine what effect (if any) Clarke and Tyler had in their public relations efforts with the Atlanta daily newspaper press. Of these three periods and publications, only one article published in the Georgian can potentially be linked to Clarke and Tyler. Their efforts appear more organized in a grass roots campaign with press inclusions predominantly in Klan newsletters and newspapers. Yet, Clarke and Tyler were successful in their promotional campaign; Klan membership increased significantly during their tenure and the organization was financially stable for the first time since its rebirth.

As other researchers have found, the Georgia press did not comment negatively on official Klan activities until prompted by other national papers and a Congressional investigation. Unlike other research, we found negative Klan stories and editorials as early as 1921 and not in the mid 1920s. Additionally, we found the press coverage did attack the vigilante activities associated with the Klan before the 1921 Congressional investigation. During earlier press coverage, the three daily Atlanta papers bordered between denouncing vigilante activities and criticizing the Klan. These Georgia newspapers (along with the World) in 1921, struck a major blow against the Klan by disclosing financial improprieties within the organization. This information would later bring repercussions for all three major players--Simmons, Clarke, and Tyler.

Another important effect of the World's expose series was its contribution to Clarke and Tyler's downfall. Not only did the paper reveal financial improprieties, but it disclosed that in 1919 the pair were arrested for disorderly conduct, allegedly found drunk and at least partially undressed together in a hotel room. Clarke dismissed the charge, saying it was instigated by his wife May.[80] But the paper was not the only problem for the Southern Publicity associates.

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[80] Blee, Women of the Klan, 21.

Clarke's aide, Z. R. Upchurch, quit the Klan and charged Clarke with raiding the Imperial Treasury; several kleagles also quit because, they said, the KKK was a get-rich scheme for its leaders.[81]

Tyler and Clarke's position only got worse. After they helped Hiram Evans, a Dallas Klan member, overthrow Simmons, Evans demanded that they return Tyler's half of their profits when she left her position to marry Stephen Grow, a prominent Atlanta businessman. When they refused, the Klan banished Clarke along with Simmons on January 11, 1924.[82] The Klan's publicity did not improve with their departure: Evans' PR man, Phil Fox, created another scandal when he shot Simmons's lawyer.[83]

The 1920s Klan collapsed just as rapidly as it had grown. By 1930 it had fewer than 50,000 members. Scholars have cited many reasons for the Klan's downfall including the decrease in immigration and economic growth of the second half of the 1920s which brought decreases in class conflict.[84] Then, too, fundamentalism had been undermined by the Scopes trial in 1925, and Klan violence was ultimately discredited--in fact, Imperial Wizard Evans tried to curb it as impolitic (rather than immoral). But Wade argues, "what weakened the Klan more than anything was its own hypocrisy and negativism."[85] The Klan was forced to sell its Imperial Palace on Peachtree Street in Atlanta in 1936, and it finally folded during the 1940s because it was unable to pay taxes;[86] new versions emerged again in the 1950s and 1980s, but the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan never again attained the mainstream support it had during the 1920s.[87]

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[81] Wade, Fiery Cross, 186-187.
[82] Blee, Women of the Klan, 23; Wade, Fiery Cross, 190-91.
[83] Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 73.
[84] Blee, Women of the Klan, 175; Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry, 184.
[85] Wade, Fiery Cross, 194-195, 248, 254.
[86] Maclean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry, 177.
[87] Blee, Women of the Klan, 176.

History

The Confederate Press Association:
A Revolutionary Experience in Southern Journalism?

A research paper presented at the
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Ford Risley, Assistant Professor
College of Communications
Penn State University
211 Carnegie Building
University Park, PA 16802
(814) 865-2181 / jfr4@psu.edu

The Confederate Press Association:
A Revolutionary Experience in Southern Journalism?

This study examines the guidelines for telegraphic reporting established by the Confederate Press Association during the Civil War. The association's superintendent liked to say the practices, which stressed concise, timely, and factual news reporting, represented a "complete revolution" in Southern journalism. Indeed, they were a major change in a region where timely news reporting traditionally had taken a backseat to editorial opinion. Although the work of the association was not the revolutionary experience claimed, the standards it sought to live up to clearly raised the bar for Southern journalism. The expectations of the association revealed that reporting had gained a more prominent role in the newsrooms of Southern newspapers. Due largely to the tremendous demand for news from the battlefield, a more modern, news-oriented press had emerged. The Confederate Press Association deserves some of the credit for that.

The Confederate Press Association:
A Revolutionary Experience in Southern Journalism?

By Ford Risley, Assistant Professor
College of Communications, Penn State University

As the second year of the Civil War was drawing to a close, John S. Thrasher faced the biggest challenge of his already exciting journalistic career. The 46-year-old Thrasher had just been named superintendent of the newly created Press Association of the Confederate States of America. Since the beginning of the war, editors of the South's newspapers had struggled to find an effective means for gathering and distributing telegraphic news. The wide-ranging fighting taking place, coupled with the fact that few Southern journals employed full-time correspondents, had made reporting the war difficult ever since the loss of the old Associated Press. Yet by March of 1863, Confederate editors seemed to finally have settled on an effective system -- and in Thrasher they apparently found the man with the energy and experience to direct the organization.[1]

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[1] *The Press Association of the Confederate States of America* (Griffin, Ga.: Hill & Swayze's Printing House, 1863), 6. Thrasher was born in Portland, Maine, but had moved to Cuba with his parents as a youth. After working as a clerk, he joined a group of revolutionary agitators and helped edit an anti-Spanish newspaper. He was court martialed for his activity and briefly imprisoned off the coast of Africa. After his release, he moved to New Orleans and worked for Cuban annexation by the United States. He later was hired by the New York *Herald* as a correspondent, traveling in Mexico and South America before the war began. What prompted Thrasher to move to the Confederacy or how he came to the attention of the association's board is not clear. "John

The superintendent immediately determined that the P.A., as it came to be known, needed a set of guidelines for the reporting and writing of reports to be sent over the wires. Thrasher instructed that all telegraphic reports should be written clearly and concisely and that they should be free of opinion and comment. He ordered correspondents to transmit news immediately, and, in the event of a developing event such as a battle, to send updates throughout the day. Reporters should take care not to reveal military secrets, he instructed, but to try and cultivate sources within the army to ensure that the P.A. was always the first to get a story.[2]

Thrasher liked to say that the association's newsgathering practices represented a "complete revolution" in southern journalism. And, in fact, they were a major change for journalists in a region of the country where timely news reporting traditionally had taken a backseat to leisurely and partisan editorial opinion, even among the largest daily newspapers.[3] Yet a close reading of the telegraphic reports provided by the Press Association reveals that while correspondents successfully followed some of the superintendent's guidelines, others proved to be more problematic. This was hardly surprising considering the shortage of experienced correspondents, the difficulties they faced in

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Sydney Thrasher," *Dictionary of American Biography*, Vol. 18 (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1936), 509-510.

[2] "Report of the Superintendent," *The Press Association of the Confederate States of America* (Griffin, Ga.: Hill & Swayze's Printing House, 1863), 29, 41, 55.

[3] Carl R. Osthaus, *Partisans of the Southern Press: Editorial Spokesman of the Nineteenth Century* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 69-94; Avery Craven, *The Growth of Southern Nationalism*, 1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), 303-311; and Clement Eaton, *The Growth of Southern Civilization: 1790-1860* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 265-270.

reporting the war, and the fact that true objectivity in reporting was not yet a widely accepted practice.

This study traces the development of cooperative news gathering in the Confederacy during the war, a subject largely overlooked by historians. It also examines the Press Association's attempt to introduce new standards for news reporting and writing, something that heretofore has been entirely ignored.[4] A study of the news gathering practices in the Confederacy provides insight into the developing standards of journalism in America at mid-century. Moreover, the persistence of Southern editors in securing a mutual arrangement for telegraphic news -- and the attempt to develop guidelines for reporting -- was a clear signal that the journalism practiced in the region was beginning to change from the old partisan practices that had dominated newspapers for so long.

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Six days after the surrender of Fort Sumter, a detachment of United States Army soldiers marched into the office of the American Telegraph Company office in Washington, D.C. and quietly took possession of the office. Although most Southern editors still were dizzy with excitement over the exciting victory at Charleston, it did not take them long to recognize the impact of the event: The South's main source of vital telegraphic news -- the Associated Press -- had been lost.[5] Confederate editors realized that a reliable Southern replacement for the AP would be needed if newspapers were going to receive timely and trustworthy news of the fighting.

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[4] Mutual newsgathering in the South, particularly the Confederate Press Association, has been the subject of two earlier, but generally incomplete studies, Quintus C. Wilson, "Confederate Press Association: A Pioneer News Agency," *Journalism Quarterly* 26 (June 1949): 160-166; and Ruby F. Tucker, "The Press Association of the Confederate States of America in Georgia," M.A. thesis (University of Georgia, 1950). As their titles indicate, both studies examined only the organization of the P.A. The Wilson study focused exclusively of the organizational structure of the P.A., while the Tucker study examined the P.A. from the perspective of Georgia newspapers exclusively. Neither study examined other attempts to establish telegraphic news gathering in the South. Moreover, neither study addressed the kinds of stories provided by the P.A. or how well it lived up to the standards established. Richard A. Schwarzlose's comprehensive study of cooperative newsgathering in the United States during the nineteenth century, *The Nation's Newsbrokers* Vol. 1 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), gives brief attention to the Confederate Press Association in the context of the entire Civil War. Other histories of mutual newsgathering, such as Victor Rosewater, *History of Cooperative News-Gathering in the United States* (New York: D. Appleton, 1936), completely ignore efforts in the South during the war.

Cooperative newsgathering in the South dated back to 1847 when a group of editors banded together to pay the cost of receiving telegraphic news. On the eve of the war, two telegraphic lines served the South. The American Telegraph Company's trunk line extended from New York through Washington and down to Richmond, Raleigh, Columbia, Macon, Montgomery, and Mobile. The Southwestern Telegraph Company's line extended from Louisville through Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi to New Orleans. William H. Pritchard operated the principal telegraphic news agency in the South. The editor of the Augusta *Constitutionalist*, Pritchard also had served as the AP's agent in Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama since 1856, coordinating the distribution of news to members in those states.[6]

For the most part, however, Southern papers had been recipients -- not originators -- of telegraphic news in the decades prior to the Civil War. The South's antebelium press had remained largely partisan throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, emphasizing opinion as opposed to news. Very few of the region's newspapers employed reporters or editors to gather news on a regular basis. In fact, stories and editorials clipped from newspaper "exchanges" still comprised the bulk of reading material found in most Southern papers right up to the eve of the war.[7]

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[5] J. Cutler Andrews, "The Southern Telegraph Company, 1861-1865: A Chapter in the History of Wartime Communication," *Journal of Southern History* 30 (1964): 320-321.

[6] Robert L. Thompson, *Wiring a Continent: The History of the Telegraph Industry in the United States, 1832-1866* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 373-376; J. Cutler Andrews, *The South Reports the Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 55-56.

Soon after the American Telegraph Company's line to the South was severed in April 1861, the southern section of the line was reorganized as the Southern Telegraph Company. Around the same time, the lines of the Southwestern Telegraph Company, which extended from Louisville south through Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, were severed. A separate Confederate headquarters was set up in Nashville.[8] Recognizing that vital news would be emanating from the new Confederate government, Pritchard, the former AP agent, had set up an office in Montgomery early in 1861. When the government was relocated to Richmond, he moved his office there. However, Pritchard contracted diphtheria and died in Richmond on March 24, 1862. His son, William H. Pritchard Jr., took over the operation that had become known as the Southern Associated Press.[9]

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[7] Carl R. Osthaus, *Partisans of the Southern Press: Editorial Spokesman of the Nineteenth Century* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 69-94; Avery Craven, *The Growth of Southern Nationalism*, 1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), 303-311; and Clement Eaton, *The Growth of Southern Civilization: 1790-1860* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 265-270. On the exchange system, see Richard B. Kielbowicz, *News in the Mail: The Press, Post Office, and Public Information, 1700s-1860s* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).

[8] Thompson, *Wiring a Continent: The History of the Telegraph Industry in the United States, 1832-1866*, 373-376; Andrews, "The Southern Telegraph Company, 1861-1865," 319-344. The telegraph lines from the north to the states of the new Confederacy were severed in large part to prevent any sensitive military information from getting into the hands of Confederate leaders. Richard B. Kielbowicz, "The Telegraph, Censorship and Politics at the Outset of the Civil War," *Civil War History* 30 (1994): 97.

[9] "Death of Wm H. Pritchard," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, March 25, 1862, p. 2; Andrews, *The South Reports the Civil War*, 55-56.

Even before the elder Pritchard's death, editors had expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the high cost and poor quality of the dispatches sent by the Confederacy's newsgathering agency. The Memphis *Appeal* said there was "universal complaint" with "the present unorganized and imbecile arrangement." The telegraphic news reports were "vague and unsatisfactory, unmeaning, unreliable, and, in many instances, flagitiously false," the newspaper claimed. "They come to us in a roundabout way, after two or three repetitions by as many agents, thus securing exaggeration as well as additional expense."[10] The Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel* declared that, "The present 'associated press' as a vehicle of news, has become nearly useless. If, by chance, any thing of importance is transmitted, we, in many cases, find that it has been anticipated by mail. We often received news from Richmond by the papers within an hour or two after we have received the same by telegraph, and the dispatches from the West, via Nashville are generally utterly useless . . . ."[11]

The Charleston *Mercury* joined several other Confederate newspapers in calling for a meeting of editors to discuss setting up an alternative service. "It is high time for the journals of the South to be making arrangement for a permanent, extended, better organized, and, at the same time, more economic agency," the *Mercury* noted. In January of 1862, the editors of six daily papers met in Atlanta to discuss setting up a new mutual association. The editors agreed that a more systematic arrangement was needed to secure reliable service and they agreed to meet in March. Although that meeting took place, the editors apparently made little progress toward securing suitable arrangements.[12]

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[10] As quoted in the Boston *Advertiser*, Jan. 20, 1862, p. 2.

[11] Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Jan. 21, 1862, p. 2.

In the meantime, problems continued with the telegraphic reports, and Confederate editors became increasingly impatient and angry. Wild rumors regularly found their way into news reports.[13] Moreover, when a press association story from the battlefield was sent to members, more often than not it was days late. The first reliable report on the Confederate victory at Second Manassas on August 29 and 30, for example, was not published in the Richmond *Daily Dispatch* until September 5.[14] And more than a week after the Confederacy was defeated at the Battle of Antietam, press association reports did not know the whereabouts of the Army of Northern Virginia.[15] The telegraphic reporting provided from the Battle of Seven Pines so outraged James R. Sneed, editor of the Savannah *Republican*, that he expressed his anger in the columns of his newspaper. "Whilst private individuals are telegraphing important information from Richmond concerning the late battles," he wrote, "we would be glad to know what the individual is doing who has set himself up at the capital as the agent of the Press and regularly comes forward with a bill for his services. . . ."[16]

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[12] As quoted in Brantley, *Georgia Journalism*, 91. The newspapers represented were the Memphis *Appeal*, Atlanta *Southern Confederacy*, Savannah *Republican*, Augusta *Constitutionalist*, Nashville *Republican Banner*, and Charleston *Mercury*.

[13] A press association story from Chattanooga quoted a gentleman who had read an account of the Battle of Perrysville in a Louisville paper, which claimed that the Federals had lost 25,000 men in the fighting. "Bloody Battle in Kentucky," Charleston *Courier*, Oct. 15, 1862, p. 1.

[14] "The Seat of War," Richmond *Daily Dispatch*, Sept. 5, 1862, p. 1.

[15] "From Our Army--The Victory of Saturday," Richmond *Daily Dispatch*, Sept. 25, 1862, p. 2. Editors regularly complained about the lack of news coming from key news centers. See, for example, "The Want of News," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, May 29, 1862, p. 2.

[16] Savannah *Republican*, June 5, 1862, p. 2.

Apparently frustrated at the lack of progress toward a cooperative arrangement, the editors of four Richmond newspapers -- the *Dispatch, Enquirer, Examiner,* and *Whig* -- established their own mutual news agency in November 1862. Known as the Richmond Associated Press, the agency had its headquarters in the Confederate capital and was headed by John Graeme, editor of the *Dispatch*. A notice in the *Dispatch* said that all the resources of the association would be used to appoint news correspondents "at every important point in the Confederacy." Moreover, special arrangements would be made to obtain news from the Confederate army as well as the North. The notice claimed that a "large majority of the daily journals" in the Confederacy had united to form the new Associated Press.[17]

Despite the claims of the *Dispatch*, there seemed to be little agreement that the Richmond arrangement was going to serve the needs of the Confederate press any better. Moreover, the news reports distributed by the Richmond Associated Press differed little from those provided by the old system. The telegraphic stories from Fredericksburg provided by the Richmond Associated Press were more timely than many other major battles fought during the year, but still were generally incomplete. There also was little in the way of follow-up reporting from the battlefield as later accounts of Fredericksburg depended almost entirely on Northern papers.[18] Recognizing the problems, the editor of the Atlanta *Southern Confederacy* lamented that "the persons employed by the press and well paid to send us news, have proven themselves incompetent to the task."[19]

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[17] "The Associated Press Telegraphic Agency," Richmond *Disptach*, Nov. 5, 1862, 1. A story in the Richmond *Enquirer* praised the new organization and said it was a welcome improvement over Pritchard's system. That press association only employed "five or six" correspondents, the *Enquirer* contended, and was "more profitable" to Pritchard than "advantageous to the press." "The Telegraph News System," Richmond *Enquirer*, Nov. 26, 1862, p. 1.

[18] "Details of the Great Battle," Charleston *Courier*, Dec. 17, 1862, p. 1.

Apparently resolved to finally set up an effective newsgathering arrangement, a group of Southern editors met again on January 5, 1863, this time in Macon, Georgia. The group sent out a notice to every daily newspaper in the Confederacy asking editors to meet the following month in Augusta. Editors of twelve papers came to the meeting on February 4 and 5; three more were represented by proxy. The editors approved a constitution, elected officers, agreed to hire a superintendent, and settled on a name: the Press Association of the Confederate States of America.[20]

The editors elected R. W. Gibbes of the Columbia *South Carolinian* as president and Nathan S. Morse of the Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel* as secretary/treasurer. According to its constitution, the Press Association's purpose was "to arrange, put in operation, and keep up an efficient system of reporting news by telegraph . . . under the exclusive control and employed for the exclusive benefit of the members." Any daily newspaper published in the Confederacy could become a member upon paying an initiation fee of fifty dollars. Each member newspaper had one vote in the election of president, secretary /treasurer, and board of directors. The board would establish policy of the association as well as hire a superintendent and correspondents. The board also would assess members "fairly and equitably" for the cost of operating the association.[21]

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[19] Atlanta *Southern Confederacy*, Dec. 17, 1862, p. 2.

[20] *The Press Association of the Confederate States of America* (Griffin, Ga.: Hill & Swayze's Printing House, 1863), 6.

The board hired Thrasher as superintendent and he took over the post on March 9. Thrasher apparently plunged into his new job with great enthusiasm and worked diligently to set up the association. During a six-week period, he traveled to many of the Confederacy's key news centers, including Charleston, Atlanta, Montgomery, Mobile, Jackson, and Vicksburg. He hired correspondents to report from Richmond and Charleston, as well as from some of the Confederacy's largest armies, including those of Robert E. Lee and Braxton Bragg. To secure reporters, who were paid twenty-five dollars a week, Thrasher ran notices such as one that appeared in the *Atlanta Southern Confederacy:* "Desiring to extend the connections of the Press Association, gentlemen having experience as reporters or correspondents for newspapers, may contribute by sending me by mail information of their previous experience, present residence, customary terms for business and whether short hand writers or not."[22] By the summer, the P.A. had about twenty correspondents scattered from Virginia to Mississippi, men whom one paper described as being "for the most part men of intelligence, judgment, and well acquainted with the wants of the press."[23]

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[21] Ibid., 8-10.

[22] "Report of the Superintendent," *The Press Association of the Confederate States of America* (Griffin, Ga.: Hill & Swayze's Printing House, 1863), 44. Thrasher made an initial favorable impression on at least one newspaper. The Atlanta *Southern Confederacy* commented that he "comprehends the duties of the business which he assumed and has taken hold with a will. He has untiring energy and the most extensive experience in journalism--thoroughly comprehending the wants of the Press in the telegraphic line." Atlanta *Southern Confederacy*, March 26,1863, p. 2; "Press Reporters and Correspondents," Atlanta *Southern Confederacy*, May 6, 1863, p. 2.

[23] Savannah *Republican*, May 6, 1863, p. 2. Since PA correspondents did not attach their names to stories, it is often difficult to identify them. Among the reporters who have been identified are: Jonathan W. Albertson, who reported from the Army of Northern Virginia; J. Henley Smith, who

Thrasher admonished his reporters in the importance of "securing early, full, and reliable" telegraphic news. P.A. correspondents were instructed to write clearly and concisely, using short sentences and avoiding ambiguous words. The superintendent also ordered that all reports should be free of opinion and comment. He urged correspondents "to sift reports" and "to not send unfounded rumors as news." Finally, he warned correspondents to "see that you are not beaten" by reporters from other journals. Thrasher took great pride in his orders, calling them a "complete revolution" in the work practices of Southern journalism. "It has been left to our young Confederation, to exhibit to the world the first instance of the entire Press of a people combining in one body to prosecute the labors of its high mission. . . ." he wrote.[24]

In later instructions, Thrasher instructed P.A. correspondents that they represented the "whole daily press" of the Confederacy and that they should request "early intelligence of events." Correspondents were to transmit all news, which in their judgment, was publishable without harming the military effort of the Confederate Army. Thrasher warned that the "greatest caution" should be exercised in reporting troop movements and, in all cases, commanding generals should be consulted about information that was appropriate for transmission. In the event censors refused to approve a story, Thrasher told reporters to send him

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covered Congress; A. J. Wagner, who served as the correspondent in Jackson, Mississippi; and Will O. Woodson, who reported on the Confederate Army in Tennessee and Kentucky. Andrews, *The South Reports the Civil War*, 57.

[24] "Report of the Superintendent," *The Press Association of the Confederate States of America* (Griffin, Ga.: Hill & Swayze's Printing House, 1863), 29, 41. Unlike the AP in the North, which often served as a semi-official medium for the government, especially the Lincoln administration, news gathering was the only mission of the Confederate Press Association. It never had any formal or informal relationship with the Confederate government. See Menahem Blondheim, *News Over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of Public Information in America, 1844-1897* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994): 129-140.

a copy of the story, along with the name and rank of the person prohibiting the transmission and the reason given. When news of "absorbing public interest" was occurring, correspondents were to transmit "four or five reports" during the course of a day. Finally, to maintain good relations with their sources, correspondents were expected to visit them "twice daily" and "freely exchange news" in order that the reporters might get information in return. To create good will with sources, Thrasher instructed correspondents to supply governors of the states where they were working with any information of interest to them that was being transmitted to association members.[25]

An important aspect of the association was the insistence of organizers that it be a truly cooperative news organization. Although the superintendent hired correspondents to be stationed at "points of interest," P.A. members were expected to send "all news of interest occurring in their vicinity" at times when no correspondent was available. Terms of the association did not prohibit "individual enterprise" if a member wanted to make arrangements with another paper to receive special news dispatches. However, members could not exclude other member papers from joint participation on equal terms.[26]

In March, telegraphic service began to thirty-one daily newspapers in the Confederacy, the majority of which had subscribed to the old Richmond Associated Press. By May, the number of member papers had grown to forty-four, including four dailies in Richmond and two in Charleston. In a report to the P.A.'s board, Thrasher declared that the list comprised "every daily journal in the Confederacy." With the approval of the association's board, Thrasher moved his office to Atlanta, a city that he said, combined "the advantages of a central geographic position" and also allowed "communication by telegraph and rail with all parts of the country.[27]

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[25] Ibid., 54.

[26] Ibid., 9-10. Schwarzlose concludes that requiring members to transmit news in their locale had never been tried by the Associated Press, yet it would become "widely adopted" by the AP after the war. Schwarzlose, *The Nation's Newsbrokers*, 269.

Thrasher and the association were immediately confronted with major challenges to the South's telegraphic news coverage during the spring and summer of 1863. It soon became clear that in spite of the superintendent's organizational efforts, telegraphic reporting in the Confederacy had plenty of hurdles to overcome. The P.A.'s stories on the battle of Chancellorsville drew heavily from the news columns of the Richmond newspapers, which in turn, had taken much of their information from the Northern press. For his part, the editor of the Augusta *Constitutionalist* expressed his outrage at the "ridiculously and pitifully false accounts" of the battle that he received from the Press Association and refused to print them in his newspaper.[28]

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[27] Ibid., 39. The number of member newspapers gradually decreased as the Union Army occupied more of the Confederacy and as other newspapers ceased publishing for economic reasons. The original members of the Association were: Mobile (Ala.) *Advertiser & Register*, Montgomery (Ala.) *Advertiser*, Jackson (Miss.) *Appeal*, Charlotte (N.C.) *Bulletin*, Winchester (Tenn.) *Bulletin*, Augusta (Ga.) *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Vicksburg (Miss.) *Citizen*, Atlanta (Ga.) *Commonwealth*, Macon (Ga.) *Confederate*, Augusta (Ga.) *Constitutionalist*, Charleston (S.C.) *Courier*, Natchez (Miss.) *Courier*, Richmond (Va.) *Dispatch*, Columbus (Ga.) *Enquirer*, Richmond (Va.) *Enquirer*, Richmond (Va.) *Examiner*, Petersburg (Va.) *Express*, Columbia (S.C.) *Guardian*, Wilmington (N.C.) *Journal*, Montgomery (Ala.) *Mail*, Charleston (S.C.) *Mercury*, Jackson (Miss.) *Mississippian*, Port Hudson (La.) *News*, Savannah (Ga.) *News*, Raleigh (N.C.) *Progress*, Chattanooga (Tenn.) *Rebel*, Knoxville (Tenn.) *Register*, Selma (Ala.) *Reporter*, Lynchburg (Va.) *Republican*, Savannah (Ga.) *Republican*, Richmond (Va.) *Sentinel*, Selma (Ala.) *Sentinel*, Columbia (S.C.) *South Carolinian*, Atlanta (Ga.) *Southern Confederacy*, Raleigh State (N.C.) *Journal*, Columbus *Sun*, Macon (Ga.) *Telegraph*, Columbus (Ga.) *Times*, Mobile (Ala.) *Tribune*, Lynchburg (Va.) *Virginian*, Richmond (Va.) *Whig*, and Vicksburg (Va.) *Whig*. Ibid., 37.

[28] Augusta *Constitutionalist*, May 14, 1863, p. 2. The editor of the Savannah *Republican* complained that during a period of three weeks after the battle, "We have not seen the casualties of a single Georgia Regiment in a Virginia paper." Savannah *Republican*, May 25, 1863, p. 2.

To its credit, the P.A. provided almost daily reports during the long siege of Vicksburg. Still, there were numerous problems with the stories. Most of the telegraphic dispatches never gave an accurate picture of the seriousness of the Union threat to the so-called "Gibraltar of the South." By the spring of 1863, civilians and troops in the city were suffering tremendously from the Federal stranglehold. Yet reports repeatedly told of how "plenty" of provisions existed for everyone. Moreover, stories of the fighting around Vicksburg variously reported the wholly unfounded reports that 10,000 Union troops had been killed, and that 40,000 more had been captured.[29] No doubt a major reason for the problems was that many of the reports on Vicksburg came from the Press Association reporter in Jackson, who was cut off from regular communication with the city and had to depend on the accounts of people who had left. The *Vicksburg Citizen* provided some news of the fighting, but the paper had its own problems to deal with.[30] Nonetheless, the Richmond *Examiner's* editor referred to the P.A. reports from Jackson as "an unintelligible compound of gas, braggadocio, blunder, absurdity and impossibility." He also accused the P.A. correspondent of wild exaggeration in reporting enemy losses.[31] The news that the city had surrendered on July 4 reached Jackson three days later and opened with the simple sentence: "Vicksburg has fallen."[32]

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[29] "Late from Mississippi," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, May 24, 1863, p. 3; "Interesting from Mississippi," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, May 26, 1863, p. 1.

[30] In late June, a shell passed through the newspaper office. Cases and types were scattered, but no one was injured. By this point, the *Citizen* also had run out of paper and was forced to print on the back of wallpaper. "Late and Interesting from Virginia," *Chronicle & Sentinel*, July 1, 1863, p. 2.

[31] Richmond *Daily Examiner*, June 6, 25, 1863. The editor of the Savannah *Republican* complained bitterly about the tendency of the press to accept reports at face value, noting, "there is a heavy weight of responsibility resting on somebody's shoulders for the regular and systematic lying that has been put upon the public regarding the ability of this place to hold out the western press in the vicinity of the unfortunate city have been quite badly imposed on as anybody else." Savannah *Republican*, July 10, 1863, p. 2.

At the same time, the siege of Vicksburg was drawing to a climax, the association was trying to report on the Confederacy's invasion of the North. To be sure, reporting the fighting was made difficult by the fact that once across the Potomac, Southern correspondents did not have access to friendly telegraphic lines. Moreover, only one Press Association reporter accompanied the Army of Northern Virginia as it marched into Pennsylvania and fought at Gettysburg July 1-3. Early telegraphic accounts of the battle were not distributed until July 5 and then were taken from Northern newspapers. The following day's report gave some sense of the pivotal battle, referring to it as "the bloodiest fight of the war." But the same account also credited Lee's army with capturing 40,000 Union troops.[33] Over the next two days, the P.A. provided sketchy information about the outcome of Gettysburg, but one dispatch also acknowledged that, "Everything is so indefinite that it is impossible to form a correct idea of the fight."[34] By July 9, the Press Association was quoting Northern newspapers that Lee had been "badly defeated" at Gettyburg. A later story that same day acknowledged that the news of Vicksburg and Gettysburg had a "depressing effect" on the residents of Richmond. However, the same accounts contended there was "no excitement" over the defeat, adding, "The citizens are hopeful and confident."[35]

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[32] "Capitulation of Vicksburg," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, July 9, 1863, p. 3.

[33] "From the North. Desperate Fight at Gettyburg," *Chronicle & Sentinel* , July 7, 1863, p. 1; Glorious News From Lee," *Chronicle & Sentinel*, July 8, 1863, p. 1. For accurate casualty figures at Gettysburg, see James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Ballantine, 1988): 664.

[34] "Our Victories in Pennsylvania," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, July 10, 1863, p. 1.

During the rest of July, a more complete picture of what happened at Vicksburg and Gettysburg gradually emerged in Press Association dispatches. One story told of how Rebel troops at Vicksburg were eating little more than bread and mule meat in the final days of the siege.[36] And a story from Richmond described the devastating effect that the fighting at Gettysburg had on not only the army's enlisted soldiers, but officers as well.[37]

Despite the problems with many reports, Press Association reporters seemed to heed Thrasher's warning about sifting truth from fact. Correspondents, on the whole, did not write the kind of atrocity stories about the Union Army often found in Confederate newspapers during the war. As they were instructed, P.A. reporters avoided using the first person in their telegraphic accounts. They also were generally successful at following Thrasher's instructions to keep their opinions out of stories and stick to the facts.[38]

But while some of Thrasher's ideas for the Press Association were successful, others did not work as well. The superintendent had become concerned about the cost of transmitting stories over the telegraph and sought various means to save money. He believed that "several classes of words" could be deleted from stories without unduly changing their meaning. Articles, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and auxiliary verbs constituted about two-fifths of the words used by good writers, he claimed, and more than one-half of the words used by bad and careless writers. Thrasher instructed correspondents to, "Read every message over after writing it out, and purge it of every word not required to convey your meaning; and see where you can use one word to express what you have put in two or three. Omit articles, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and auxiliary [sic] verbs, when by so doing the plain sense of your meaning will not be lost." He offered several examples, including the following (the italicized words would be those omitted):

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[35] "From the North," and "The Feeling in Richmond," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, July 10, 1863, p. 3.

[36] "The Surrender of Vicksburg," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, July 14, 1863, p. 1.

[37] List of Casualties in Davis' Brigade," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, July 14, 1863, p. 1.

> OKALONA, April 25—Our cavalry engaged *the* enemy yesterday at Birmingham. *The* fight lasted 2 1/2 hours. *The* enemy *were* completed routed, *with* 15 killed *and a* large number wounded. Col. Hatch *of the* 2d Iowa cavalry was seen *to* fall from his horse, which ran into *our* lines and was captured. Our loss *was* one killed and twenty wounded. *The* destruction of *the* bridge prevented pursuit.

By eliminating the italicized words it, Thrasher said 54 words would be used as compared to 69, savings that would lower costs to members if the system was practiced regularly by reporters.[39] Criticism from association members, however, forced Thrasher to soon abandon his idea.[40]

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[38] On the use of atrocity stories in newspapers during the war, see James W. Silver, "Propaganda in the Confederacy," *Journal of Southern History* 11 (1945): 499-501.

[39] Ibid., 46-48.

[40] Ibid., 45-46. The Savannah *Morning News* published an example of one Press Association dispatch from Jackson:

> Eight boats passed Vicksburg last night; one burnt two disabled five succeeded. Rumor canal Miliken's Bend reach Mississippi near New Carthage believed construction Batteries opposite Vicksburg Jew paid burn bridge Big Black Vicksburg attached within ten 10 days all officers absent ordered report opposite Vicksburg sixty-four 64 steamers left Memphis for Vicksburg soldiers niggers no papers allowed below Cairo Yankees fortifying Rolla RR north Memphis Bulletin argus suppressed editors arrested.

Certainly, Southern editors certainly made great use of the daily telegraphic news items they received from the Press Association. On many days, subscribing papers used a dozen or more telegraphic dispatches in a single issue. Because of layout considerations, several items might be nothing more than updated dispatches from the same locale. The old, outdated stories were never removed. In fact, some issues would have a series of dispatches with headlines like, "News from the Front," "Good News from the Front," and "Latest News from the Front." The vast majority of dispatches provided by the P.A. concerned news of the war, but mixed in occasionally was news from Richmond such as congressional action or a speech by the president. News items not related to the war were rare, but sometimes member papers would provide news of a calamity, such as a major fire, or the death of a prominent citizen.

Some of the most complete reporting by the Press Association was done during the series of naval battles in Charleston harbor in the summer and fall of 1863. The association's correspondent, B. R. Riordan, provided daily accounts of the Federal shelling of Fort Sumter, Battery Wagner, and later Charleston itself. In some cases, Riordan filed as many as three telegraphic reports in a single day.[41] The correspondent spared few details in describing the fighting, often mentioning the number of Union shells fired at one of the harbor's various defenses. He reported that Fort Sumter's flagstaff had been destroyed six times during shelling in August, and, as a result, the Confederate flag was flying from the ruins of one wall.[42] In September, he reported the news that Battery Wagner in the harbor was being garrisoned by the 54th Massachusetts (Negro) Regiment and that the Massachusetts state flag was flying over it.[43]

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[41] See, for example, "Siege of Charleston," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Nov. 24, 1863, p. 1

[42] "From Charleston," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, August 23, 1863, p. 1.

By September, the focus increasingly was on eastern Tennessee and north Georgia. At the same time, the Press Association was confronted with a new obstacle: an uncooperative Confederate command. General Braxton Bragg, who commanded the Army of Tennessee, had a long-running feud with reporters and earlier in the summer had imposed strict censorship after a series of defeats. By the time Bragg's army had been forced to retreat again and evacuate Chattanooga, relations with the press had reached the breaking point. Press Association reporter Will O. Woodson was one of the first reporters to feel the general's wrath and was barred from reporting from the army. The opening line of the P.A.'s dispatch on September 16 told the story: "There is no communication allowed the Bragg's army. . . ." Three days later, the battle of Chickamauga began with one full-time correspondent on hand to report the fighting.[44] Superintendent Thrasher, who was back in Atlanta, had to compile stories about the Confederate victory based on information gleaned from wounded soldiers and others who had returned from the fighting. Not surprisingly, the dispatches were incomplete and reported erroneous information, including the fact that General John B. Hood had been killed.[45]

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[43] "From Charleston," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, September 9, 1863, p. 1.

[44] *Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Press Association, Embracing the Quarterly Reports of the Superintendent* (Atlanta: Franklin Steam Publishing House, 1864), 10, 23-24. The reason given for refusing to grant press access to the army was "the indiscretion of special correspondents in regards to army matters." Fore more on Bragg's feud with the press, see Andrews, *The South Reports the Civil War*, p. 337-357.

[45] See for example, "Glorious News from Bragg's Army," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Sept. 23, 1863, p. 1.

The Rebel triumph at Chickamaugau did not ease Bragg's feud with the press. The Confederate commander still refused to admit a Press Association reporter to the army, and so Thrasher was forced to continue compiling incomplete telegraphic reports from Atlanta. In the days following the battle, as both sides faced off in Chattanooga, the PA corrected some erroneously reported information, including the rumor of General Hood's death.[46] The P.A. reported the visit of President Davis to Atlanta in early October, but was unable to cover his visit to Bragg's army a few days later. Likewise, the P.A. was unable to learn the main purpose of the president's visit to the army, which was to investigate complaints about Bragg's leadership and whether he should be removed from command. Without its own correspondent in Chattanooga, most of the reporting provided to association members was taken from correspondent Samuel Chester Reid's dispatches to the *Atlanta Intelligencer*. However, Reid had experienced his own problems with Bragg in the past and had his own problems in reporting from the army.[47]

The Press Association's report on the battle of Missionary Ridge, which was written by Reid, downplayed the seriousness of the devastating Confederate defeat during the two day of fighting at Chattanooga. The account gave no indication of the tremendous geographic advantage Southern troops enjoyed on the ridge or the fact that once Union troops reached the top of Missionary Ridge, the Southern army turned and fled panic-striken. Reid noted that the Confederate casualties were "severe," but that the "enemy's loss was unusually great."[48] A follow-up story the next day, written from the reports of officers who had traveled to Atlanta, likewise gave little indication of the seriousness of the defeat. It claimed that the loss of Missionary Ridge was the result of the "sheer force of numbers." Moreover, the report made the startling claim that the Union Army had suffered 20,000 casualties during the two days of fighting, compared to only 1,000 for the South.[49] Less than a week after the loss at Chattanooga, the Press Association reported that General Bragg, at his own request, had been relieved as commander of the Army of Tennessee. The army, which had been forced to abandon Chattanooga, was now headquartered near Dalton, Georgia.[50]

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[46] "From the Front," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, September 30, 1863, p. 2.

[47] Andrews, *The South Reports the Civil War*, p. 364-365.

Despite the problems in reporting, as 1864 opened Thrasher was buoyed by the success of the Press Association, claiming that it was "the first known instance of an union of the whole press of a country for the purpose of collecting and diffusing intelligence of general interest to the people." The superintendent contended that the work of the association had done much to ensure the "preservation of journalism" in the Confederate states.[51] Yet it was becoming clear that 1864 was going to be a difficult year for the P.A. and also for the Confederacy. At the group's first annual meeting, held on April 6 in Augusta, the turning tide of the war clearly was on everyone's mind. President Gibbes welcomed members by noting that the press could greatly help the South's cause by maintaining unanimity in support of the Confederate government and reminding readers of the sacrifices required. Members changed their minds and voted to permit weekly and semi-weekly newspapers in the Confederacy to join the association. The non-daily papers would be permitted to print all telegraphic reports provided by the PA at a rate of one-fifth that assessed to the daily press. Superintendent Thrasher reported that eleven weekly and semi-weekly newspapers had applied for membership.[52] Of greater significance was the absence of the Richmond press from the annual meeting. Thrasher reported that the publishers of the city's newspapers had announced their intention to leave the association and set up a separate cooperative news arrangement. The Richmond papers cited the cost of membership in the association and the overall quality of telegraphic news as the chief reasons for wanting to quit the organization.[53]

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[48] "Latest from Bragg's Army," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, November 28, 1863, p. 3.

[49] "Latest from Bragg's Army," *Chronicle & Sentinel*, November 27, 1863, p. 3. For accurate figures on the loss at Chattanooga, see Clifford Dowdey, *Storming the Gateway: Chattanooga, 1863* (New York: David McKay, 1960), 156-195.

[50] "Latest from North Georgia," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, December 4, 1863, p. 1

[51] *Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Press Association, Embracing the Quarterly Reports of the Superintendent* (Atlanta: Franklin Steam Publishing House, 1864), 41-42 and 51-52.

Since January, the Press Association had been carrying almost daily reports from north Georgia where the two armies were settled into their winter quarters and occasionally skirmished. As spring approached, there was increasing conjecture in the telegraphic reports about a campaign against Atlanta. Then, in April, the P.A. reported the fighting at Fort Pillow in Tennessee. The Press Association reported the alleged massacre of black and white Union troops in a straight-forward manner and did not try to hide the "indiscriminate slaughter" that took place. The story, for example, noted that "[t]he fort ran with blood."[54] On the other hand, the P.A. printed the unfounded rumor from the that Nathaniel Banks had lost 14,000 men in a "great battle" with Confederate troops near Shreveport, Louisiana. No additional battle details were ever provided. And the P.A. never corrected the greatly exaggerated Union losses initially reported.[55]

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[52] *Minutes of the Board of Directors of the Press Association, Embracing the Quarterly Reports of the Superintendent* (Atlanta: Franklin Steam Publishing House, 1864), 24.

[53] *First Annual Meeting of the Press Association* (Montgomery: Memphis Appeal Job Printing, 1864), 30-31.

The long-awaited campaigns against Atlanta began on May 7, and it soon became clear that Confederate reporters, including the P.A., were going to have more problems reporting the fighting. Bragg's successor, General Joseph E. Johnston, imposed strict censorship on all news from the army. Military authorities ordered that control of censorship be taken away from the provost marshal and given to the inspector general, who was far stricter in what he allowed through.[56] In May, Thrasher traveled to the army's headquarters in an attempt to get daily press service restored. But the trip apparently accomplished little because most of the P.A.'s dispatches over the next several weeks originated from Atlanta. Many of the stories used information taken from second-hand sources. The superintendent also apparently was having difficulty with his correspondents because in late May he sent two "competent" men on horseback to report from either wing of the army.[57]

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[54] "Storming of Fort Pillow by Gen. Forrest," *Chronicle & Sentinel*, April 17, 1864. The massacre at Fort Pillow is described in Albert Castel, "The Fort Pillow Massacre: A Fresh Examination of the Evidence," *Civil War History* 4 (1958), 37-50.

[55] "Reported Victory of Kirby Smith," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, April 16, 1864. Although it was never clearly identified, the battle described in the story probably took place at Sabine Crossroads. During the fighting, the Union Army suffered approximately 2,200 casualties out of a force of about 12,000.

[56] Andrews, *The South Reports the Civil War*, 439.

[57] "Latest from Gen. Johnston's Command," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, May 19, 1864, p. 1.

Despite Thrasher's admonition that correspondents stick to the facts, a clear sense of morale building was evident in many of the Press Association accounts as the fighting got closer to Atlanta. P.A. correspondents seemed increasingly sensitive to the criticisms that Johnston's army was retreating. A telegraphic story in mid-May took pains to note, "We are prepared at all points to meet the enemy. Our forces in front of Dalton are intact. The rumors of our falling back are false. . . . Our army is confident, hopeful and buoyant."[58] Three weeks later, another Press Association dispatch said the "army is not and has not been retreating, as reported, but follows the enemy on the arc of a circle, as he moves from left to right."[59]

In the three weeks prior to the battle of Kennesaw Mountain, the P.A. correspondents sent back daily reports on the fighting, often several reports a day. The story of General Leonidus K. Polk's death from a Federal shell was transmitted immediately and contained important details.[60] Likewise, the P.A. report on Kennesaw Mountain, the largest battle of the campaign thus far and a setback for the Union Army, vividly described the intense fighting that took place, as well as individual acts of heroism and compassion.[61]

Despite the Rebel victory, the Union Army's constant flanking forced Johnston's army to continue falling back toward Atlanta. Although the P.A.

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[58] "From North Georgia," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*," May 14, 1864, p. 3.

[59] "Latest from Johnston's Army," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, June 9, 1864, p. 3.

[60] "Further From Johnston's Army. A Hero Fallen!" Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, June 15, 1864, p. 3.

[61] "From the Georgia Front. Monday's Engagement," *Chronicle & Sentinel*, June 29, 1864, p. 3. The heroism and compassion of the troops at Kennesaw also is described in Albert Castel, *Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 306-321.

correspondents avoided outright comment, they seemed compelled to make sure that readers did not get discouraged from the news. A July 12 story that described the Union Army crossing the Chattahoochee River just north of the city nonetheless ended by noting, "Everything is working right. The highest confidence prevails."[62] The news that President Davis replaced Johnston with Hood was reported the day it happened in a brief, straight-forward report.

Three weeks later, after the Confederacy had suffered a series of defeats around the city, the Press association dispatch went so far as to proclaim, "Atlanta is safe. All are hopeful and in the best of spirits."[63] Probably due to telegraph difficulties, news of the fall of Atlanta did not appear over the P.A. wires until September 4 and then only with a brief, incomplete story. A slightly longer story the following day told how the Confederate Army had exploded its extra ammunition and unneeded burned supplies in the city not needed by troops. Despite the gloomy news, the Press Association story ended by saying, "While the fall of Atlanta is regretted, the army and people are not at all discouraged."[64]

More problems appeared the following month when the P.A. transmitted a widely published story claiming that the town of Allatoona, Georgia, with 4,000 Union troops had been captured by Hood's army. The story also stated that Sherman's supply line had been destroyed and the general was cut off from the main portion of his army. The story was completely false. In fact, Hood had been checked at Allatoona, the Confederate army's first setback since evacuating Atlanta.[65] With Georgia's press in disarray, by mid-October the Press Association was depending almost entirely on Northern papers for news from the fighting in the state. Among the favorite newspapers quoted in P.A. dispatches to members were the *New York Herald*, *Washington Chronicle*, and *Baltimore American*. The first clue of Sherman's plans after capturing Atlanta appeared in the Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel* on November 19. The P.A. account was taken from the Chicago *Times* and said the 75,000-man army planned to sweep through Georgia and South Carolina. The story also gave an indication of how Sherman planned to conduct his march, noting that the army would live off the land before destroying anything of value.[66]

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[62] "From the Georgia Front," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, July 12, 1864, p. 1.

[63] "Good News From Atlanta," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Aug. 10, 1864, p. 3.

[64] "From Hood's Army," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Sept. 6, 1864, p. 3.

Meanwhile in August, four of Richmond's five daily newspapers -- the *Dispatch*, *Enquirer*, *Examiner*, and *Sentinel* -- carried out their threat to leave the Confederate Press Association. A month later, they announced the formation of the Mutual Press Association with James W. Lewellen of the *Dispatch* as president. Organizers apparently wanted to reduce newsgathering costs by having member papers report news on a reciprocal basis. Member newspapers would agree to pay five dollars a month in advance and to provide to the association's Richmond agent all the important news from their vicinity.[67]

The impact of the Richmond newspapers leaving the Press Association is difficult to determine. The P.A. still had a correspondent in the capital to report on the Congress and Administration. Moreover, members of the Confederate press had repeatedly complained about the unwillingness of the Richmond press to cooperate with the P.A.[68] The Macon *Telegraph & Confederate's* editor dismissed the plan of the Richmond papers and noted that the four had never provided much news from the capital to the Press Association anyway. If the newspapers were successful in forming their own mutual association, he wrote, "the public will have to thank" those papers if the Confederate press contained "only the meagre [sic] and semi-occasional dispatches which are to be found in the Enquirer, Examiner, Dispatch, and Sentinel."[69]

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[65] "Glorious News From the Front," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Oct. 12, 1864, p. 2.

[66] "Northern News," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Nov. 19 1864, p. 1.

[67] "Mutual Press Association," Richmond *Dispatch*, Oct. 20, 1864. p. 2.

While Thasher contended with a rebellious Richmond press, the superintendent also was on the move. Threatened by Sherman's army, he and the rest of Atlanta's press fled south to the safety of Macon. With travel and communications to the North blocked from Atlanta, Thrasher decided in September to visit the Trans-Mississippi area. In his absence, Graeme, the P.A.'s Richmond agent, directed the association business affairs.

By the time of Thrasher's return in January of 1865, a significant portion of the Confederate press had been silenced, making the work of the Press Association all the more difficult. Adding to the problems was the fact that the Union Army had destroyed many miles of telegraphic lines in the South.[70] Most of the news the P.A. managed to send over the telegraph centered on the work of the Confederate Congress. The news that a Confederate delegation discussed peace negotiations was reported in several brief and incomplete stories as was the case with the news that the negotiations had failed.[71] The Press Association reports largely depended on Northern newspapers like the *New York Times*.[72] Inaccuracy also still plagued some of the reporting by the P.A. For example, a dispatch published in March erroneously reported that 6,000 Union troops had been killed during fighting in North Carolina.[73]

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[68] Writing to Vice President Alexander Stephens early in 1864, Atlanta editor J. Henley Smith noted, "I am astonished at the Richmond Press. They regard themselves as metropolitan, and ignore anything from any other quarter of the Confederacy. They have all the while been an impediment in the proper working [of] the Press Association." Alexander H. Stephens Papers, Library of Congress.

[69] Macon *Telegraph & Confederate*, Oct. 27, 1864, p. 2.

[70] So little telegraphic news was getting through to the press, in fact, that a Virginia newspaper published a rhyme copied by other Confederate papers: "The wires that once through Dixie's

The news that Richmond was evacuated on April 2 was not transmitted for two days.[74] The story originated from Danville, Virginia, the temporary capital of the Confederacy, and for the next week, Danville became the main source of news from the fighting in Virginia. But there were still problems in learning the results of the fighting and transmitting dispatches. On April 9, the day General Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox Courthouse, the P.A. sent a story saying there had been heavy fighting in the area a day earlier.[75] The Confederacy had collapsed and so had its newspapers as well as the Press Association. The news of Lee's surrender -- taken from Northern accounts -- did not appear in many Southern newspapers for more than a week. It mattered

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land / The 'notes' of 'press' men spread / Now on their posts as mutely stand / As if the Press was dead." Atlanta *Southern Confederacy*, Feb. 7, 1865, p. 2.

[71] See, for example, "A Gleam of Peace," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Jan. 29, 1865, p. 3.

[72] See, for example, "Late from the North," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, Feb. 12, 1865, p. 1.

[73] "Press Agents Dispatch," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, March 21, 1865, p. 3.

[74] For unknown reasons, the account of Richmond's evacuation was not published in the Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel* until April 6.

[75] "From Lee's Army," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, April 11, 1865, p. 1.

little, however, because by that point, few newspapers in the South were even publishing.[76]

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With the war over, the Confederate Press Association came to an abrupt end. For various reasons, including the destruction of so many telegraph lines in the South, Associated Press service was not immediately resumed to most of the old Confederate journals. That did not pose a major problem because even before the war ended, many Southern newspapers had suspended publishing either because of damaged equipment or Federal occupation. The Associated Press restored service to most newspapers in the South by autumn and, in a few cases by the end of the year.[77]

The Confederate press clearly had struggled to find a suitable mutual arrangement for gathering and transmitting telegraphic news. The most ambitious and longest lasting system, the Press Association of the Confederacy, dealt with a host of problems in reporting news of the war. Although the quality of news reports provided by the P.A. suffered from numerous shortcomings and often came under repeated criticism from editors, the organizational effort put forth to create a mutual newsgathering association generally drew strong praise.

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[76] "Press Association's Dispatch," Augusta *Chronicle & Sentinel*, April 21, 1865, p. 3. The whereabouts of superintendent Thrasher during the final days before the surrender or immediately afterwards is not known. On April 16, the Augusta *Constitutionalist* reported that superintendent Thrasher had made a "flying visit" to the city. There is no record of the Press Association's annual meeting, scheduled to take place in Augusta in April, ever taking place. Likewise, there is also no record of the superintendent's first-quarter report for 1865 being compiled.

[77] The Richmond *Whig*, for example, suspended publishing from April 1 to December 9. When it resumed operations, the paper was again subscribing to the Associated Press. During the post-war fragmentation that plagued the Associated Press, the Southern Associated Press was reorganized in 1866 as a branch of the New York AP. Growing conflicts among regional APs led

Moreover, there is little question that without the telegraphic reports provided by the Press Association, most Southern newspapers would have had little timely news of the war and been forced to rely mainly on Northern accounts.

The record of the P.A. in following the principles established by Superintendent Thrasher clearly was mixed. As instructed, most reports were written in the clear, concise style that was becoming popular in telegraphic stories. In many instances, especially during major campaigns, correspondents filed stories in a timely fashion and updated them regularly. Reporters generally kept their opinion out of stories, except during the Atlanta campaign where a clear sense of morale building was evident. For the most part, they also avoided the kind of atrocity story often written by less experienced correspondents. On the other hand, many important battles and campaigns were reported incompletely. In most cases, correspondents also did little in the way of follow-up reporting. Additionally, numerous mistakes found their way into Press Association stories. And, except with the most egregious errors, the P.A. did not correct the mistakes.

For these reasons, the Press Association was not the "revolutionary experience" that Thrasher liked to claim. Yet, the standards that the Press Association sought to live up to in its reporting of the war clearly raised the bar for journalism in the South. In his insistence on conciseness and objectivity in P.A. reports, superintendent Thrasher portended the emphasis on succinct, factual writing that was to become one of the hallmarks of twentieth-century journalism. Likewise, his emphasis on timely, updated news became one of the

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the Southern Associated Press to incorporate in 1892. Richard A. Schwarzlose, *The Nation's Newsbrokers, Volume 2* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 36.

guiding principles of modern wire-service reporting. Certainly, the Press Association had to overcome numerous obstacles in reporting the war, most notably intractable generals and uncooperative member newspapers in Richmond. This mattered little to Southern editors who were always quick to point out when the P.A.'s correspondents did not live up to the standards established for them. Here again, however, the expectations of the association revealed that reporting had gained a more prominent role in the newsrooms of Southern newspapers. Due largely to the tremendous demand for information from the battlefield, a more modern, news-oriented press had emerged throughout much of the South. And the Confederate Press Association deserves some credit for that.

History

Selling the National Pastime: The Start of Major League Baseball Public Relations

Bill Anderson
Assistant Professor
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-7202
banders1@lsu.edu

Selling the National Pastime: The Start of Major League Baseball Public Relations

William Hulbert drew the curtain to block out any distractions, explaining to the other men in the room that he wished "to make it impossible for any of you to go out until I have finished what I have to say to you." Hulbert, owner of the Chicago White Stockings, then proceeded to outline to the owners of the other major clubs of professional baseball players how they could turn the game of baseball into a business from which they could profit. As they formed the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs (NL) on 2 February 1876, Hulbert and the other owners set the course for the administration of the business of Major League Baseball (MLB) and its public relations.[1]

While some scholars have delved into MLB's business operations, few have extensively studied one of the critical factors for its financial success: its publicity efforts. This study will discuss the major factors that contributed to the advent of public relations in major league baseball: the social-cultural environment, the organizational relationship with the journalism industry, the organizational response to crises, and strong leadership committed to publicity.

Public Relations Historiography

Few histories have been developed on corporate public relations, and those that do tend to dwell on a progressive, "Great Man or Woman" biographical view of the field or attempt to utilize business history's dominant paradigm. Historians such as Richard Tedlow and Stuart Ewen have explained corporate public relations history based on business historian Alfred Chandler's paradigm. To explain the rise of the large corporate enterprise in America, Chandler analyzed a large number of case studies to determine trends in the corporate system's growth. However, the public relations field lacks the studies necessary to complete such a decisive work. As one public relations historian noted, "a definitive history of corporate public relations cannot be written without studies of more people, more agencies, and more companies."[2]

Some of these studies have already been done. For instance, a few practitioners have written their autobiographies, yet most are self-serving in nature. Published biographies also add to the foundation of corporate public relations history, but they too are limited in number and are often apologetic or ignore the practitioner's faults. The field lacks institutional histories, with only a few public relations departments in large corporations or agencies representing such clients being analyzed. Of the thousands of corporate entities available for study, scholars have usually focused on the railroads in the nineteenth century, AT&T, and Colorado Fuel and Iron for close examination. In sum, while some work has been done, a plethora of subjects, both on a personal and organizational level, need to be examined before using Chandler's paradigm to explain the development of corporate public relations. The study of MLB public relations will provide one piece of the data required to properly apply this framework.[3]

Major League Baseball Background

During the last half of the nineteenth century many facets of American life changed, including the increasing industrialization and urbanization of the country. By 1860, one out of every six Americans lived in cities or towns, and this influx of people helped foster the development of commercialized spectator sport as industrialization gradually provided the standard of living and sufficient free time necessary to support it.[4]

One of these commercial sports, baseball or its antecedents, had existed before the nineteenth century, but the industrialization and urbanization of the post Civil War years helped the game grow from a gentleman's club diversion to a sport driven by commercialism and played by professionals. Although at first player-managers ran the clubs, in 1876 the owners of eight professional baseball teams organized into a cartel called the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs (NL) designed to monopolize the game. Specialization, increasingly a characteristic of American life and industry, would now be applied to the game. Hereafter, players could concentrate on their skills relevant to the game, while the owners would focus on the business affairs and promotion.

The failed players' revolt of 1890, otherwise known as the Brotherhood War, helped cement this economic system of baseball governance. Labor organizations, which had been relatively insignificant before the Civil War, established themselves as a major voice in the late nineteenth century business world, including in professional baseball. When the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players rebelled against but eventually lost to the monopoly of the magnates, no longer would its participants run professional baseball; it would be a business ruled by the club owners.[5]

Although this business grew during the latter nineteenth century, it still was not large enough at this time to separate the publicity function into a department as other larger, more embattled organizations of this era did. Yet the owners during this time did learn how to ensure favorable treatment from baseball writers. As the game turned into a business the owners discovered that a monopoly over the top player talent ensured favorable newspaper coverage. To guarantee the league had the best players, the owners responded harshly and abruptly to competition, absorbing or crushing it as soon as possible.

Selling the National Pastime: The Start of Major League Baseball Public Relations

Demarcation of Labor and Management: Creation of the National League (1876)

The increasing professionalism and commercialization in baseball after the Civil War helped lead to the development of the National League. Increasingly after the war, civic leaders began hiring working-class laborers to replace the upper class members of the teams that represented their city. Since these workers could not afford to just play the game organizers split game proceeds with them. Soon, a breed of professional ballplayers with little loyalty to the home team emerged; this player began a pattern of "revolving" from one team to another based entirely on the highest bidder.

In recognition of the increasing professionalism of the sport, the first professional baseball league, the National Association of Professional Baseball Players (NAPBP), replaced the amateur National Association of Base Ball Players in 1871. The player-organized NAPBP had little if any labor strife because players moved from team to team at will. Players set salaries based upon their own skills. Abuse of this early free agency, however, soon began to occur. Between 1871 and 1875, the public became disgusted and turned against baseball because players so frequently switched teams. Matters came to a head in 1875 when Chicago team owner William Hulbert signed four of the association's best players away from the Boston club.[6]

One of these players, pitcher Albert G. Spalding, believed that baseball was a business as well as a sport and should be managed accordingly. William Hulbert, one of the first owners who did not grow up a player, shared Spalding's view. He sensed that the eastern owners would retaliate against his raiding of the Boston club. Instead of awaiting their actions, he and Spalding took the initiative, drafted a constitution and, with support from the Midwestern cities of St. Louis, Louisville and Cincinnati, created the National

League of Professional Base Ball Clubs (NL), which also included teams from New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Hartford.[7]

The eight soon-to-be NL owners met on 2 February 1876. Hulbert suggested that they should run the clubs for profit with the players becoming employees who would play the game for "commensurate pay." None of the owners disagreed with his proposal. "A Quaker prayer meeting could not have been more decorous," Spalding said. This was a time when trusts such as Standard Oil dominated business, and magnates such as James J. Hill, Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and John D. Rockefeller had helped the United States become a world industrial power. The NL owners mirrored this movement by creating their own cartel.[8]

In keeping with its title, the league would emphasize the interests of member clubs over those of the players. Each club received a monopoly over its geographic area. Adopting a high moral stance, NL leaders ordered member clubs to ban gambling, liquor sales, and Sunday games, and offer contracts that prevented players from revolving.[9]

As they formed the National League, Hulbert and the others agreed that news of their cartel would have to be managed as to minimize criticism. Hulbert and Spalding had kept the meeting secret from the press, with the exception of their friend and associate, Lewis Meachem, an editor with the Chicago Tribune. The one reporter at the meeting, from the Tribune, immediately wired Meachem its results. Meachem had, in fact, helped call the current state of player-run baseball in question when he had asserted in an article the previous year that player-managers could not control players who wanted to drink, fight and gamble.[10]

In his article on February 4 describing the new league, the NL seemed to solve every problem Meachem had pointed out the preceding October. Meachem predicted that the owners would end "drunken behavior" and start a new era of "honest play." Confining the league to eight "productive" teams would also help the game. Players would gain substantially under the new league, which "assures them lucrative employment as long as they are honest and work hard." Finally, to preempt a negative report on the league from the period's most influential baseball writer, the Clipper's Henry Chadwick, Meachem portrayed him as an old-fashioned, "dead weight on the neck of the game."[11]

One of the most prolific early writers on baseball, Chadwick did seem conservative to his contemporaries because he advocated that the game be played according to the good sportsmanship of cricket, a value contrary to competitive American ideals. Nevertheless, Chadwick remained a highly respected writer in baseball circles, and his weekly column in the Clipper carried great weight.[12]

Chadwick struck back against the Tribune charges eight days later, saying he also wanted to stop the "growing abuses connected with the baseball fraternity." However, he asked, if the owners wanted to make the game more honest, "what was there to prevent this work from being entered upon boldly, manfully, consistently and openly" instead of "this secret meeting with closed doors and a star-chamber method of attaining the ostensible objects in view?" Chadwick labeled the exclusion of other teams from the baseball world an "anti-American method of doing business" and objected to the "secret and sudden coup d'etat."[13]

Meachem defended the league, proclaiming it the "most important reform since the history of the game," but he and Spalding realized that the Tribune alone could not counter general media criticism. Therefore, Spalding launched his own journal titled Spalding's Official Base Ball Guide from which he could speak directly to baseball fans.[14]

Yet, Spalding and Meachem may not have needed to criticize Chadwick. Although he resented the way the league formed, and its subsequent attack on him, the owners soon discovered that Chadwick and other baseball writers had to cover the NL favorably since it represented, in Chadwick's own words, the "best professional talent of the country." During this time, other industries used press agents to "endeavor to keep the name and business of their employers continually in the public eye." Baseball owners, on the other hand, did not have to try as hard for publicity because they learned that an unsavory presentation of the product by the press would not only hurt the baseball industry but newspaper circulation as well.[15]

Creation of the First Players' Union: The Brotherhood (1885)

Although the National League brought a more centralized organization to the game, it initially failed to achieve stability or profits for most of its members. For the remainder of the 1870s the league went through several problems such as lagging profits, gambling and teams failing to play a full schedule. In response, the owners decided to exert even more control over the game by awarding themselves in 1879 the right to "reserve" players' services for as long as they desired. Basically, the reserve rule prevented players from moving to a new club in search of higher pay. This new rule, in addition to the national economic and social climate and increasing newspaper coverage, helped the game flourish in the 1880s.[16]

Newspaper coverage – creation of heroes

The baseball industry needed the newspapers because the number of papers had risen from 2,526 in 1850 to 11,314 in 1880. This increase in newspapers heightened competition among them. By the 1890s, to set themselves apart many newspapers copied the success of Joseph Pulitzer's New York World. Pulitzer provided readers topics of interest, and for many male readers this meant sports. To meet this need, Pulitzer organized the first separate sports department and by the end of the 1880s most major dailies had sports editors with trained staffs. This focus on sports coverage combined with newspapers' increased circulation meant that even those who could not attend baseball games could follow the sport.[17]

In addition to the dailies, sporting weeklies such as The Sporting News and Sporting Life played an important part in expanding coverage of the game. In 1884, after only one year of existence, Sporting Life boasted twenty thousand readers, and within three years the circulation rose to forty thousand. By 1887, The Sporting News claimed sixty thousand readers.[18]

The importance of the weekly and daily press could be seen in the owners' attitudes toward the sports reporters. Owners provided press passes and areas designated for them. In 1887, the NL officially directed its secretary to furnish certain writers with "all official communication intended for publication." Before long owners sometimes asked reporters for counsel on difficult problems. Meanwhile, the writers themselves developed an esprit de corps, demonstrated with the organization of the Base Ball Reporters of America in December 1887.[19]

Competition

The increased newspaper coverage and resultant profits not only allowed NL owners to recover from the losses of the previous decade but also attracted the attention of a competitor: the American Association of Base Ball Clubs (AA). To entice good players, the AA promoters rejected the NL's reserve clause, and a bidding war ensued. The AA's success at the gate prompted the NL to accommodate its rival, negotiating the National Agreement of 1883, which recognized the AA as a major league and instituted World Series play between the two leagues. For its part, the AA adopted the reserve clause, placing the power over player movement back with the owners.[20]

The players

Buoyed by press coverage that turned them into heroes and the AA's initial courting of their services, the players began to rebel against the power of the NL owners. This was a time of business arrogance toward employee and citizen alike; a day when railroad magnate E. H. Harriman boasted, "I don't want anything on this railroad that I cannot control"; a day when merchant Marshall Field made six hundred dollars an hour each day while his clerks earned a maximum of twelve dollars a week for a sixty-hour week. As urban workers tried to organize themselves to cope with this corporate system, so NL players formed a union, the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players, in 1885 to combat the owners' attempts to control their financial and social lives. Although the Brotherhood's leader, John M. Ward, declined to affiliate the union with the Knights of Labor, the foremost labor organization in the 1880s, the spirit of the Brotherhood was akin to the Knights whose motto was, "An injury to one is a concern to all."[21]

This attitude was tested when players in Chicago beat up an undercover detective they discovered spying on them, trying to catch them breaking the league rules against drinking. After the 1886 season Spalding sold two players involved in the fight, Mike Kelly and Jim McCormick, to other clubs. As players and some members of the press railed against what they considered a high-handed response by the owners, the labor debate widened further when union head John Ward wrote an article about the current work environment. Ward described the reserve rule as an "inherent wrong, for by it one set of men seized absolute control over the labor of another."[22]

The owners initially refused to recognize the new union. However, after media pressure forced the owners to meet with the Brotherhood, they gave ground on a range of issues, abandoning a two thousand-dollar salary ceiling introduced in 1885, for instance. This success helped the Brotherhood grow to more than one hundred members with a separate chapter in each NL city by 1887.[23]

The owners responded to their loss of absolute authority over the game, in part, with the Spalding-led exhibition tour of foreign lands. While Spalding and his White Stockings and a team comprised of players from other NL teams were overseas, league officials enacted a series of harsh rules, including a reinstated salary ceiling. The union realized that the touring players included almost all of the Brotherhood's elected officials, including Ward.[24]

Before the players could attack the tour, Spalding had turned to his own cadre of journalists. In 1881, he had obtained Henry Chadwick's favor by hiring him to edit

Spalding's Guide. Chadwick called the tour the "best handled, best equipped and most important ever gotten up and taken so far from home in the interest of our national game." Sporting Life writer Harry Palmer, who toured with the exhibition team, called it the "triumphant tour of Australia." Stories in the Chicago Times, Boston Herald, New York Press, Chicago Evening News, and Outing also showed the tour in a positive light.[25]

The Brotherhood War (1891)

The players were obviously not as enthusiastic about the tour, but did not feel they had the press or fan support to strike. The animosity between the players and owners festered and eventually came to a head when, after being sold by the Detroit owner to Pittsburgh, players Deacon White and Jack Rowe refused to show in their new city. The owners blacklisted the pair; that is, every player who competed against or with White and Rowe would be faced with expulsion. This treatment infuriated the players' Brotherhood companions, many of whom suggested a strike to protest. Ward counseled White and Rowe to show up in Pittsburgh, for he other ideas besides a strike.

Ward unveiled his response at a Brotherhood meeting on 14 July 1889. Ward suggested that the players leave the NL and start their own cooperative league, with every player having a share of the profits and a voice in how the league operated. The players agreed that a representative from each of the Brotherhood chapters would "look up the feasibility of securing capital in his own city, and report at an early date." The cooperative venture found ready support. The players reported back to Ward that they had found backers "willing to advance money to start a new league and upon terms most liberal to the players."[26]

Recognizing the importance of fan support, the Brotherhood released a "card to the public" explaining their stand. They argued that they could no longer play for men who "have come into the business for no other motive than to exploit it for every dollar in sight.[27]

On November 30, the owners issued their own "address to the public" in the New York Clipper. The address stated "The National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs has no apology to make for its existence or for its untarnished record of fourteen years" because it "rescued the National Game from destruction threatened by the dishonesty and dissipation of the players." The owners argued that they gained little in serving as the ethical wardens of baseball, while, thanks to the reserve rule, the "salaries of players have more then trebled." The owners asked the public to reject the "overpaid players" who wanted to "again control [baseball] for their own aggrandizement, but to [the game's] ultimate dishonor and disintegration."[28]

The New York Clipper published the players' responses alongside the NL statement. One said, "if the poor League magnates are making such a puny profit, why are they making such desperate efforts to continue at the game?" The Brotherhood leadership argued, "If anything further were necessary to show the desperate state of mind into which the old League magnates have fallen, this last appeal to the public has furnished it."[29]

In addition to being angry with the Clipper for presenting both sides, the owners were also upset about the "prejudiced abuse of the National League" seen in other papers. A Spalding's Guide writer accused those attacking the league of being "entirely ignorant of the true position" of baseball and thus distorting history. These "writers should bear in mind the fact that a decade ago professional base ball had reached its lowest point," the Guide writer scolded.[30]

The owners were particularly angry at The Sporting News and Sporting Life because the two openly endorsed the Players League. The Sporting News publishers Will and Al Spink remembered that Spalding had denied St. Louis a franchise in the NL earlier in the 1880s because he felt the city's immigrant population drank too much and did not behave properly. When the Players League arrived the publishers reveled in the prospect of Spalding being conquered by new competition. Sporting Life, established in 1887, was more cautious. Editor Francis Richter sympathized with the players' desire to be treated as more than "mere machines," but refused to denigrate Spalding and the NL as The Sporting News did. Yet both journals opened their pages to Ward and other Players League spokesmen.[31]

When the owners claimed many of the players were having second thoughts about the new league, Sporting News editor Al Spink interviewed more than fifty players "with a view to finding the truth." He concluded that support for the Players League was "firm as a rock." One player said, "I am with the gang, my boy. I have signed a Brotherhood contract." Another added, "My motto is no surrender."[32]

In addition to putting forward the players' views, the newspapers and sporting press revealed broad support for the Players League from other workers. The Boston chapter of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) resolved to "condemn the buying and selling of players by the National League" and to support the "brotherhood's contemplated organization." AFL leader Samuel Gompers said that "laboring men all over the country are in sympathy with the players in this fight," and he promised that the players would have the union's "moral and financial support."[33]

Spalding answered the support of the players by saying, "The public are very apt to take sides with the popular favorites, without regard to the justness or fairness of the questions at issue." He reasoned that after the "popular excitement" of the Brotherhood's action had "died away, the thinking patrons of base ball will" return to the NL.[34]

Despite Spalding's assurances that the fans would eventually support the NL, the owners tried to break the union's league. After attempts to sign the new league's star players had failed to stop the rebel circuit, the NL owners turned to the courts to prevent players from performing elsewhere. However, victories in New York State courts in January and March 1890 paved the way for the Players League to proceed.[35]

Although things looked good for the Players League, Spalding was a fearsome adversary. He took over unofficial leadership of the owners when William Hulbert died in 1882, and as a reward for his loyal support, Spalding's fledgling sporting goods company had received the contract to supply the league with baseballs. By 1890 Spalding had built a vast sporting-goods empire with offices in twenty-five American cities and many countries of the world.[36]

Spalding and the other owners could not allow the players to win the "war" because the Players League was not a commercial competitor with whom the NL could eventually form an alliance with, like it could with the American Association. Being run by players, not entrepreneurs, the Players League challenged the legitimacy of the owners' claims that the game needed them to protect it from the irresponsible and frivolous people who played it. Accordingly, the owners formed a "war committee," headed by Spalding, who vowed that the battle with the Brotherhood would be a "fight to the death." Spalding knew the battle with the players would be fought in the newspapers. "In place of powder and shell," he explained, "printers' ink and bluff formed the ammunition used by both sides."[37]

To conduct this war, Spalding installed sportswriter O.P. Caylor as the head of a new weekly, The New York Sporting Times. Caylor gave his readers tales of the wasteful living of the Brotherhood players, living it up with the security of long-term contracts provided by the new league. Henry Chadwick went even further, decrying the Brotherhood as a "secret terrorist organization" that had forced many unwilling players into joining the new league. Journalist Harry C. Palmer also sided with the NL. Why should the players complain, asked Palmer, when they are engaged in a "business that is really a pastime and unquestionably a pleasure?"[38]

Amongst all the rhetoric, attendance remained the only precise measure of the popularity of each league, and in this battle the players had the edge. In covering the Players League's first game, one New York World headline read "Brotherhood Park Too Small for the Rush of People." According to the newspaper, twenty thousand fans watched the game, with another ten thousand turned away at the gate. In contrast, the "National League club drew 3,500, and possibly 1,500 of these went only after seeing it was impossible to get admittance to the Brotherhood Park."[39]

NL clubs tried to give away tickets to increase attendance. According to the Sporting Life, tickets to the NL Chicago team games were left in barbershops and saloons, and were "as free as air." The NL clubs still could not match the attendance of the Players League. Spalding then tried a different approach. He stationed "inspectors" at

Brotherhood games to count crowds, then paid a syndicated Chicago reporter to promote the "faked attendance at Brotherhood games." Spalding's ruse worked as the figures hurt the "integrity" of the Brotherhood's reports and placed the players on the "defensive."[40]

The sporting press took the figures as accurate until August when a Sporting Life reporter discovered that the "inspectors" were in Spalding's employ. The writer confronted Spalding, who admitted, "We have done some lying ourselves, but nowhere near as strong as the other fellows." The Sporting Life then exposed that one National League team calculated attendance by first learning how many people attended the neighboring Brotherhood game, then inventing a larger figure. After these discoveries no one believed the NL numbers, but the damage had been done. As Spalding explained later, "attention was diverted from the pitifully small number of patrons who through all the struggle remained loyal to the [National] League."[41]

Though attendance figures from 1890 are unreliable, the Players League clearly outdrew the National League throughout the season. One estimate found the final attendance to be 913,000 to 853,000 – thus making Spalding's strategy even more important and necessary to the NL's fight.[42]

Lying about attendance was only one example of the NL owners' approach to media. The Sporting News discovered the Cincinnati NL owner bribed local newspaper reporters. "These are the same fellows who laughed last fall at the suggestion of a Brotherhood," a News writer said. "Well, you cannot blame them. They are paid to laugh the way they are laughing now just as they were paid to laugh anti-Brotherhood last fall."[43]

The owners were possibly just following the trends of the day; magnates in other industries used similar tactics with the press. Mutual Life Insurance Company, which established a "species of literary bureau" in 1888, and the Standard Oil Company both purchased news coverage to defend their companies from strong newspaper attacks. As one historian noted, "When the policies of prominent newspapers conflicted or threatened to conflict with those of Standard Oil, either top managers or their friends tried to learn the facts and to persuade editors and owners to adopt a more reasonable course." Both Mutual and Equitable life insurance companies paid a correspondent for several New York, Boston, and Washington newspapers, more than two thousand dollars a year to suppress unfavorable articles.[44]

In addition to bribing the press, the baseball owners tried to use the growing importance of advertising revenue to the newspaper industry during this era to control editorial content. For instance, the AA magnate in St. Louis tried to convince businesses to stop advertising in the Sporting News because it supported the Brotherhood. The editor replied to the pressure by writing that he was "supreme in his position." This mirrored the words of a Railroad Gazette editor who would "entertain no proposition to publish anything in its journal for pay, except in the advertising columns." The owner's campaign, rather than discouraging advertisers, "created sympathy" for the Sporting News, and in the following month the paper's advertising revenue actually increased.[45]

Besides attempting to bully and bribe the press, the NL owners tried the same tactics on the players. For instance, the owners devised a scheme to discredit the players in which they would write a letter to the press under star player William "Buck" Ewing's signature stating that he realized the Players League could not be successful. The scheme fell through when Ewing backed out because other players refused to join him. In another example, Spalding offered player Mike Kelly ten thousand dollars to rejoin the NL, but Kelly refused.[46]

The longer the 1890 season went on, the worse the situation seemed for the NL. In their determination to "fight to the death," the owners scheduled their games opposite the Brotherhood games. With the public favoring the Players League, NL revenues fell.[47]

With the Players League in a commanding position, it made the continuation of the war another season seem unlikely. The union scheduled a meeting for early November to discuss a potential compromise, but before it could occur, Spalding suggested an informal meeting with Players League backers. When his opponents revealed how much money they had lost the past year, Spalding remained quiet about the NL's own financial troubles. The Players League financiers, new to the business of baseball and unaware of what constituted acceptable losses for a season, felt in jeopardy. Suddenly, the Players League backers, having failed to earn expected profits, believed that they were the only ones losing money. They immediately began looking for a way to salvage their investment and instituted negotiations with NL owners.[48]

"We had been playing two games all through - Base Ball and bluff," according to Spalding. "I informed the bearers of the truce that 'unconditional surrender' was the only possible solution. … To my surprise, the terms were greedily accepted." Considering the months of negotiations between the NL owners and the Players League backers that followed this initial meeting, it is doubtful that the players' financiers "greedily accepted" NL terms as Spalding suggested; however, the die had been cast in favor of Spalding and the NL.[49]

Spalding set up meetings between the Players League backers and the NL owners. The owners of the New York Giants and the backers of the Players League New York club decided to merge on October 14. A week later, on October 21, three representatives each from the NL and AA, and three backers of the Players League met in New York for "peace negotiations."[50]

When one Players League backer tried to include some of the players in on a truce conclave scheduled for October 22, Spalding adjourned the meeting, claiming that the informal composition of the group, which had met earlier in the month, could not be changed. This move told the players that from this point on there would be a distinction between players and owners.[51]

On October 29, the owner of the Brooklyn NL club and the backers of the Brooklyn Players League club met privately regarding a plan of "consolidation." Union leader Ward said that the his league had the "call when the season closed, but the ridiculous and needless weakening by the local backers has placed it in an embarrassing position, while the National League magnates have benefited."[52]

Despite such protests from the players, their backers' "weakening" continued. On November 11 at the Players League meeting, the players' Pittsburgh backers walked out, joining New York and Brooklyn in consolidating with the NL. To stave off any more defections, Players League secretary Frank Brunell was "directed to give out any information he had to the press" in the hopes of raising public ire.[53]

Brunell did as he was asked, but it failed to stop the backers from leaving the Players League as the financiers refused to join the players in losing money for principle's sake. The backers had agreed to split profits with the players; they had not expected losses. Even though those losses were only one-fifth as large as those of the National League were, they made the backers lose their nerve. With each defection the remaining Players League patrons wondered if they would be left in an extinct league. Two days after the November 11 Players League meeting the players' Chicago club had also merged with its NL equivalent.[54]

As the fight dragged on, newspapers reported that fans were upset at both sides. The fans grew weary of the "senseless wrangling of the club-owners" and would no longer "tolerate the bickering and baseball politics recently introduced into the sport." The owners learned that fans do not want to know the business of baseball; they just want to know about the game on the field.[55]

In the end, Spalding allowed the players to rejoin the National League, perhaps on the theory that vanquished players would be subservient ones and perhaps more realistically because there were few stars of merit in the NL of 1890. The Players League was officially dissolved and all players were returned to the clubs for which they originally played. The NL owners instituted major salary reductions – as much as fifty percent in some cases. They also virtually eliminated salary advances as many of the players returned to their former teams.[56]

Lessons Learned

On their end, the players learned that in a capitalist system any business enterprise needed financing. The inevitable early losses, when competition was most fierce, made the Players League backers nervous. They panicked, and in the end the Players League, regardless of its worker-empowered ideals, became part of the capitalist system. The Gilded Age was a time when capitalism tightened its grip on America, but this vision did not go unchallenged. As farmers joined cooperative Granges, so too did the players try to establish a cooperative baseball structure with the support of many in the media and the consuming public. However, as the Carnegie-Frick Steel Company workers of the Homestead, Penn. plant learned in 1892, the players discovered that the owners would go to any lengths to prevent a union.[57]

As for the owners, the Brotherhood War, a "mistake from every standpoint," according to Spalding, accomplished two things: It "established the absolute integrity of professional Base Ball, for in such a fierce conflict… if there had been any previous connivance for the selling of games … it would certainly have come to the surface during those strenuous times." This established the game as an American – that is, clean and wholesome – product, which helped the owners marketing efforts. It also "settled forever the theory that professional ball players can at the same time direct both the business and the playing ends of the game." This reinforced the owners' contention that they were necessary to the administration of the game.[58]

Conclusion

As commercialization of entertainment began in earnest in the late nineteenth century, entertainment oligopolies displaced local leisure entrepreneurs. Two factors especially helped baseball become part of this cartel movement: the ability of newspapers to carry messages to large cross-class audiences and the owners' quick end to any threat to their monopoly. The owners had to crush the player rebellion as well as manage the way the media represented their actions to maintain their control over the game's image and operations.[59]

Spalding summarized the owners' attitude toward the media when he noted that if anyone on "either side should now appear laying claim to the lonesome honor of telling the truth in those days, I could convict him … of having been guilty of disobeying 'general orders.'" While the owners learned during the NL's creation that baseball writers had to write favorably about their operation as long as they fielded the best product, the Brotherhood War cemented this lesson. Media such as the Sporting Life and The Sporting News could write negative articles about the NL when it experienced competition, but they had to cover the league favorably without this opposition. One historian noted that during the Gilded Age Standard Oil officials began to show more appreciation of the power of the press and attempted to utilize it. Similarly, baseball owners grew to appreciate the power of the press, but they also discovered that they could treat the press as they willed as long as they controlled the business of the nation's favorite sport.[60]

After 1890 the sporting press developed a working relationship with the NL that one historian has described as "intellectual prostitution." This is not to suggest that the owners continued to bribe or threaten the journalists. Rather the sportswriters knew what to print: baseball is the American pastime – which it learned a long time before 1890 – and that the best way to organize the game was with a system of owners that ruled its business aspects – which it learned with the Brotherhood War. Never again would the sporting press question the owner-controlled system of organized baseball, and it was almost one hundred years before the players would challenge the owners as strongly as they did with the Players League.[61]

In some ways MLB public relations mirrored the development of the function in other for-profit organizations. According to business historian Richard Tedlow, corporate public relations developed as an institutional response to the increasing size and specialization of the organization, as well as external forces such as the social-cultural environment, a government-business rapprochement, and advances in the journalism-communications industry. Tedlow argued that the corporation as an entity grew rapidly during the latter half of the nineteenth century, in part, due to a government that encouraged and blessed this evolution. As the corporation continued to expand, important functions became departmentalized. Management deemed public relations vital to the corporate system because they had to contend with a social-cultural-political environment that supported the power of public opinion. To influence public attitudes, corporate leaders needed public relations' ability to work with the mass media to counter the distance between management and their audiences.[62]

While all four factors cited by Tedlow apply to the development of public relations in MLB, two issues not specified by Tedlow, the organizational response to crises and strong leadership committed to publicity, affected the function's inception in organized baseball. Although Tedlow's provides a useful guideline for the study of public relations' history, his work should serve as a starting point, not the end, in the search for explanations for the field's maturity. Historians must continue to explore how public relations developed in specific industries and circumstances before attempting to provide a comprehensive overview of its development. Reviewing just one industry, Major League Baseball, added two new insights, the impact of a crisis (the Brotherhood War) and the influence of leadership (Spalding), to Tedlow's four-pronged rationale for the function's development. Historians should consider the influence of a crisis and strong leadership on the evolution of public relations when examining other industries to determine if these factors were indigenous to MLB. Studying MLB also demonstrated how certain circumstances – such as the sport being both a corporate enterprise and a form of entertainment that became an integral part of American culture –hindered the growth of public relations and impacted how the function developed in the organizational hierarchy. Historians should consider how the nature of industries and organizations – that is, the type of product or service produced – might impact the administrative structure and use of public relations.

Endnotes

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[1] Albert Spalding, America's National Game: Historic Facts Concerning the Beginning, Evolution, Development and Popularity of Base Ball (New York: American Sports Publishing, 1911), 210.

[2] Tedlow, Keeping the Corporate Image; and Stuart Ewen, PR!: A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996). Alfred Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1990).

Karen S. Miller, "U.S. Public Relations History: Knowledge and Limitations," manuscript prepared for Communications Yearbook 23 (November 1998). See also David Paul Nord, who said, to lay an adequate foundation for the cultural history of mass communication, the field needed more "subtle and critical business histories." In Nord, "Intellectual History, Social History, Cultural History … And Our History," Journalism Quarterly 67 no. 4 (Winter 1990): 645.

[3] *Autobiographies*: Edward Bernays, Biography of an Idea: Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel Edward L. Bernays (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); John W. Hill, The Making of a Public Relations Man (New York: David McKay, 1963); Paul Macnamara, Those Were the Days, My Friend: My Life in Hollywood with David O. Selznick and Others (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1993); Thomas P. McMann edited by Henry Scammell, An American Company: The Tragedy of United Fruit (New York: Crown, 1976); Henry C. Rogers, Walking the Tightrope: The Private Confessions of a Public Relations Man (New York: William Morrow, 1980); John E. Sattler, Fifty Years Ahead of the News: A Lifetime of Practical Public Relations (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Sattler International, 1993).

Biographies: B.E. Hainsworth, "Retrospective: Ivy Lee and the German dye Trust," Public Relations Review 13 (1987): 35-44; S. Henry, "Anonymous in Her Own Name: Public Relations Pioneer Doris E. Fleschman," Journalism History 23, no. 2 (1997): 51-62; Ray E. Hiebert, Courtier To The Crowd: The Story of Ivy Lee And The Development of Public Relations (Iowa State University Press, 1966); Larry Tye, The Father Of Spin: Edward L. Bernays & The Birth Of Public Relations (New York : Crown Publishers, 1998).

Agency/corporate public relations departments: Scott Cutlip, The Unseen Power: Public Relations, A History (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1994); L.L.L. Golden, Only By Public Consent: American Corporations Search for Favorable Opinion (New York: Basic Books, 1968); L. Jarvik, "PBS and the Politics of Quality: Mobil Oil's 'Masterpiece Theater,'" Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 12 (1992): 253-74; Irwin Ross, Image Merchants: The Fabulous World of Public Relations (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1959).

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[4] John Rumbarger, *Profits, Power and Prohibition: Alcohol Reform and the Industrializing of America, 1800-1930* (State University of New York Press, 1989), xix.

[5] Harold Seymour, "The Rise of Major League Baseball to 1891," (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1956), 162-63.

[6] Voigt, *American Baseball*, 33-37; Robert M. Smith, *Pioneers of Baseball* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 26.

One historian noted, "Uneven competition, collapsing franchises, numerous instances of gambling and game throwing, and rowdy, drunken behavior by ballplayers had rapidly diminished baseball's status as a 'gentlemen's game' and marked the professional version as a poor investment and as questionable fare for reputable people to enjoy." As a result, marketers such as Hulbert and Spalding knew that to make money off the sport, it needed organization. This mirrored the thoughts of middle-class America in the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the increasingly complex nature of American life required careful organization of every phase of human activity. Peter Levine, *A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball: The Promise of American Sport* (Oxford University Press, 1985), 23, 26.

[7] Hulbert sent a letter to four National Association clubs, the Bostons, the Hartfords, the Athletics, and the Mutuals of New York, proposing a "new association." For a reprint of this letter, see *Spalding's Official Base Ball Guide*, 1886 (reprint, St. Louis: Horton, 1987), 8-9.

[8] Spalding, *America's National Game*, 210.

[9] Harold Seymour, *Baseball: The Early Years* (Oxford University Press, 1960), 129; Lee Lowenfish, *The Imperfect Diamond: A History of Baseball's Labor Wars* rev. ed. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1991), 28.

[10] Lewis Meachem, "The Professional Base Ball Association, What It Must Do To be Saved," *Chicago Tribune*, October 24, 1875, 12.

[11] Lewis Meachem, "Some Further Account of the Formation of the National League of Base Ball Clubs," *Chicago Tribune*, February 7, 1876, 7.

[12] Before the Civil War, Chadwick was a one-man press association, promoting the game throughout New York, frequently writing for the *New York World*, the *New York Evening Telegraph*, the *New York Herald*, the *Brooklyn Eagle*, and other eastern dailies. In 1858 Chadwick became the first baseball editor of a newspaper, the *New York Clipper*. From the Clipper he moved to the editorial staff of the *Brooklyn Eagle* where he stayed for more than 45 years, chiefly as a baseball writer. In 1859, he developed the box score for baseball games and became the game's first statistician. For a bio on Chadwick see "Henry Chadwick, the 'Father of Baseball,' Also Grand Dad of Diamond Chroncilers," *The Sporting News*, May 21, 1936. To see Chadwick's view of how the players should conduct themselves while playing baseball, see "Model Base Ball Player," *Ball Players' Chronicle*, October 31, 1867, Henry Chadwick File, National Baseball Hall of Fame Library (hereafter referred to as NBHFL), Cooperstown, N.Y. (NOTE: many of the press clippings in the NBHFL collections do not have page numbers and some do not have titles or authors.).

[13] Henry Chadwick, "A Startling Coup d'Etat," *New York Clipper*, February 12, 1876, Henry Chadwick File, NBHFL.

[14] Lewis Meachem, "Further Facts Concerning the New Baseball League," *Chicago Tribune*, February 13, 1876, 12.

In addition to defending his new league, Spalding started the *Guide* as a venue in which to advertise the products he sold in his new retail store in Chicago. See Stephen Hardy, "'Adopted By All the Leading Clubs': Sporting Goods and the Shaping of Leisure, 1800-1900," in Richard Butsch, ed., *For Fun and Profit: The Transformation of Leisure into Consumption* (Temple University Press, 1990), 71-101; and Levine, *A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball*.

Spalding wrote Chadwick to apologize for the attacks but stressed that he thought the "future of baseball" depended on the new league. Ever the businessman, he closed the letter by saying that he was opening a new store in Chicago and hoped that Chadwick's newspaper would accept his advertisements. Spalding to Henry Chadwick, 27 February 1876, reprinted in *Spalding's Official Base Ball Guide for 1908*, 19-20.

[15] Henry Chadwick, "Baseball," *New York Clipper*, December 29, 1888, 602. *The Fourth Estate*, December 22, 1898 as quoted in Scott Cutlip, *Public Relations History: From the 17th to the 20th Century: The Antecedents* (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1995), 179.

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[16] Of eight original NL teams, only Chicago and Boston still fielded teams in 1890. Between 1877 and 1890, twenty-three different cities held NL franchises although the league never had more than eight teams in one season. Levine, A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 56. "The National League Adopts a Player Reservation System," Buffalo Commercial Advertiser, October 3, 1879, 8. The 1880s brought peace, relative prosperity, and expanded public space to go along with the forty-plus year call for more physical activity. Also, leisure prospered as higher wages and shorter hours permitted workers to increase consumption of commercially-produced leisure. Richard Butsch, ed., For Fun and Profit: The Transformation of Leisure into Consumption (Temple University Press, 1990), 14. Also, the efforts of promoters such as Spalding helped the game's popularity. Spalding gave complimentary passes to Chicago city officials, such as the mayor, the city alderman, city clerk, commissioner of public works, and chief of police. Spalding to Mr. White, 22 April 1884, Spalding Papers, NBHFL. He also asked NL president Mills to allow his team to play a game "in the evening under electric lights." Spalding to A.G. Mills, 30 June 1883, Mills Correspondence, NBHFL.

[17] Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism: 1690 to 1960 (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

[18] Sporting Life, May 28, 1884; The Sporting News, February 7, 1887, Sports Journalism File, NBHFL. Voigt, American Baseball, 194.

[19] Reach Guide for 1887, 122-23; Reach Guide for 1890, 119; New York Mercury, March 9, 1878; Sporting Life, February 13, 1884; Henry Chadwick, "Baseball," New York Clipper, April 1, 1882, 25, Sports Journalism File, NBHFL. Meeting of the National League, March 9, 1887, minutes bound with Constitution of the National League for 1887, 60. This relationship also helped the owners. Spalding wrote to NL president A.G. Mills, "I am desirous that you get this paper [the Chicago Herald] regularly for it is disposed to make a specialty of baseball and is friendly to us." Spalding to A.G. Mills, 5 January 1884, Mills Correspondence, NBHFL. Perhaps the paper was so friendly because John R. Walsh - a Chicago White Stocking's investor - owned the Chicago Herald. Much remained to be done in the area of owner-reporter relations, however. Some owners lagged in providing reporters with decent facilities and treatment. Boston was criticized for inadequate facilities; Cleveland for being stingy with press passes; and a few clubs for allowing owners' friends to take over the press box. See Henry Chadwick, "Boston Baseball Gossip," New York Clipper, February 23, 1884, 826; Cleveland Leader, July 16, 1882, Sports Journalism File, NBHFL; Frederick Lieb, The Story of the World Series, An Informal History (New York, 1949), 51.

[20] "Born, And Its Name Is the American Association of Base Ball Clubs," Cincinnati Enquirer, November 3, 1881, American Association File, NBHFL; Francis Richter, Richter's History and Records of Base Ball (Philadelphia: Dando, 1914), 209-10.

[21] Cutlip, Public Relations History, 188. Glenn Moore, "The Great Baseball Tour of 1888-89," International Journal of the History of Sport 11, no. 3 (December 1994): 431-456.

[22] Spalding, America's National Game, 210. John Montgomery Ward, "Is the Base Ball Player A Chattel?" Lippincott's Monthly Magazine, August 1887.

[23] Steven A. Riess, Sport in Industrial America, 1850-1920 (Wheeling, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1995), 171.

[24] Spalding also conducted the tour to boost the sales of his baseball-related equipment. Many of his business activities were designed to increase sales of his goods. For instance, he donated "Play Ball" trophies to school leagues around the country. Associated with the Paris Olympics of 1900, his firm designed the stadium, organized the athletic competitions, and provided equipment for the St. Louis Olympics games of 1904. Levine, A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, 88-89, 97-121.

[25] Henry Chadwick, "The Spalding Tourists," New York Clipper, December 29, 1888, 673. Sporting Life, January 2, 1889, Albert Spalding File, NBHFL; Glenn Moore, "The Great Baseball Tour of 1888-89," International Journal of the History of Sport 11, no. 3 (December 1994): 431-456.

[26] Players National League Guide for 1890, 7, Players League File, NBHFL.

[27] "The Brotherhood Takes the Great Players," Sporting Life, November 13, 1889, 1. See also Henry Chadwick, "The Players National League," New York Clipper, November 16, 1889; "Big Strike Imminent," The Sporting News, June 22, 1889; "The Ball Players Meet," New York Times, December 17, 1889, Players League File, NBHFL, Cooperstown, New York.

[28] Henry Chadwick, "The League Defines Its Position in the Controversy with the Brotherhood," New York Clipper, November 30, 1889, 634.

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[29] Henry Chadwick, "Comments by Brotherhood Supporters," New York Clipper, November 30, 1889, 635.

[30] "The League Players Revolt," Spalding's Official Base Ball Guide for 1890 (reprint, St. Louis: Horton, 1889), 24.

[31] "The Sporting News is the only sporting paper in America not controlled by the League bosses," the paper boasted, "Quite naturally, then, it is the only one to stand by the players in their fight for right and liberty." in "Caught on the Fly," The Sporting News, October 6, 1889. Sporting Life, November 13, 1889, Players League File, NBHFL.

[32] "Firm As A Rock," The Sporting News, November 30, 1889, 3.

[33] Henry Chadwick, "Players' National League," New York Clipper, December 21, 1889, 681. Henry Chadwick, "Stray Sparks From the Diamond," New York Clipper, January 25, 1890, 763.

[34] "President Spalding's Confidence," unidentified newspaper, November 27, 1889, Henry Chadwick Scrapbooks Reel One, NBHFL. Although publicly Spalding scoffed at the strength of the Players League, internally, he moved to rally support around the NL. He wrote Mills to ask him not to accept the presidency of any league the players might form. Spalding to A.G. Mills, 1 August and 25 September 1889, Mills Correspondence, NBHFL.

[35] Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 NYS 779 (NY Sup. Ct. 1890); "Ward Wins Fight," New York Times, January 29, 1890, Players League File, NBHFL.

[36] Seymour, Baseball: The Golden Age, 355-56. Spalding and brother J. Walter had opened a retail store in Chicago in 1876 with capitalization of about $2,500. Two years later, the value had risen to $12,000. By 1882, Spalding had acquired most of his sporting goods competition, including Reach, Wright & Ditson, Peck & Snyder, the St. Lawrence River Skiff, Canoe & Steam Launch Co., and George Barnard & Co. Butsch, For Fun and Profit, 80, 84-85

[37] Spalding, America's National Game, 285. "…in shaping a policy that established baseball as a stable business enterprise and a national form of entertainment, A.G. was not above crushing potential business competitors and controlling the marketplace in a manner that a John D. Rockefeller or an Andrew Carnegie would have admired. … [He] knew from his own experience as a player that holding on to good talent was just as important as finding it." Levine, A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball, xiii, 40. Late nineteenth century business leaders in industries as diverse as meat packing and railroads worried that unregulated competition, particularly from competition that did not conform to the standards of the largest firms in the industry, would destroy both the quality of the product and the stability of the marketplace. Responses to such competition ranged from conciliation to destruction of rivals. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Re-Interpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

[38] Henry Chadwick, "Reserve Rule Benefits," Chicago Tribune, March 23, 1890. See also O.P. Caylor, "Baseball's Contribution to the Economy," Harper's Weekly, May 31, 1890, Players League File, NBHFL; Lowenfish, The Imperfect Diamond, 44-45.

[39] New York World, April 4, 1890. For more on NL's low attendance see "Caught on the Fly," The Sporting News, April 26, 1890, Players League File, NBHFL.

[40] "Figures Will Lie: And So Will Magnates to Serve a Purpose," Sporting Life, August 9, 1890, 1. Spalding, America's National Game, 286, 287.

[41] Sporting Life, August 9, 1890, Players League File, NBHFL. "Players' League Important Special Meeting Held in New York," Sporting Life, August 30, 1890, 5. Spalding, America's National Game, 287.

[42] Lowenfish, The Imperfect Diamond, 45.

[43] Sporting News, May 10, 1890, 4, Players League File, NBHFL. Quote from Ralph W. and Muriel E. Hidy, History of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) Pioneering in Big Business 1882-1911 (New York: Harper, 1955), 201, 213. See also Cutlip, Public Relations History, 184-196 and Burton J. Hendrick, "The Story of Life Insurance," McClure's 27 (1906), 665.

[44] Quote from Hidy and Hidy, History of the Standard Oil Company, 201, 213. See also Cutlip, Public Relations History, 184-196 and Burton J. Hendrick, "The Story of Life Insurance," McClure's 27 (1906), 665. The reporter on the companies' payroll was Joe Howard Jr.

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[45] Sporting News, May 10, 1890, 4, Players League File, NBHFL. Railroad Gazette vol. 15 (1883): 8, as quoted in Cutlip, Public Relations History, 196.

[46] A.G. Mills to J. Walter Spalding, July 18, 1890, Mills Correspondence, NBHFL. Henry Chadwick, "Stray Sparks From the Diamond," New York Clipper, January 10, 1891, 697. Spalding, America's National Game.

[47] "The Schedules Compared," Chicago Tribune, March 24, 1890, Players League File, NBHFL. In Philadelphia, where there were three teams (National League, Players' League, and American Association) involved, the conflict was even greater; on thirty-two occasions all three clubs were playing at once; on sixty occasions, the Phillies (NL) and "Buffinton's Beauties" (PL) conflicted, including twenty six dates in May alone. The Athletics (AA) and Phillies conflicted on thirty-seven dates and the Athletics and Beauties conflicted on thirty-five occasions. in "Conflicting Dates," The Sporting News, March 29, 1890. See also Henry Chadwick, "National League Meeting," New York Clipper, March 15, 1890, 9. Spalding intimated that he would "conflict with the Players' …in every way possible." in "A Fight To The Finish," The Sporting News, March 29, 1890, Players League File, NBHFL.

[48] Spalding, America's National Game.

[49] "Compromise Talk," Sporting Life, October 4, 1890, 1. The Sporting News, November 22, 1890 also thought the war would soon be over in favor of the players, Players League File, NBHFL. Spalding, America's National Game, 181.

[50] Henry Chadwick, "The Purposed New League," New York Clipper, October 25, 1890, 521. Henry Chadwick, "No Conference," New York Clipper, November 1, 1890, 537. For details of meetings between NL owners and Players League backers, see Cleveland Leader and Sporting Life, October 10 and October 11, 1890 and October 18, 1890, Players League File, NBHFL. Also see Henry Chadwick, "A Noted Gathering," New York Clipper, October 18, 1890, 505.

[51] Lowenfish, The Imperfect Diamond, 48-49.

[52] Henry Chadwick, "Stray Sparks From the Diamond," New York Clipper, November 8, 1890, 553.

[53] Henry Chadwick, "The Players' League," New York Clipper, November 22, 1890, 585. See also Henry Chadwick, "A Secret Conference," New York Clipper, November 8, 1890, 569.

[54] Sporting Life, November 29, 1890, 9; New York World, November 13, 1890, Players League File, NBHFL. "Spalding Still Working For A Settlement," Sporting Life, November 22, 1890, 1.

[55] Henry Chadwick, "The Baseball War Ended," New York Clipper, January 24, 1891, 729. For other examples of fan and press discomfort, see also Cleveland Leader, January 1, 1891; New York Herald, January 17, 1891; New York Tribune, March 2, 1891, Players League File.

[56] "End of the Base Ball War," New York Times, December 13, 1890; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 17, 1891; Cleveland Leader, January 17, 1891; New York Tribune, January 18, 1891, Players League File, NBHFL. See also Henry Chadwick, "Stray Sparks From the Diamond," and "An Injunction," New York Clipper, January 18, 1891, 713. Spalding, America's National Game, 181-82; see also Lowenfish, The Imperfect Diamond, 50.

[57] Glenn Moore makes a similar argument in Moore, "The Great Baseball Tour of 1888-89," International Journal of the History of Sport 11, no. 3 (December 1994): 431-456. In a bloody battle between Homestead unionists and owner-hired Pinkerton agents, more than thirty guards and strikers were killed and hundreds wounded.

[58] Spalding, America's National Game, 177.

[59] Butsch, For Fun and Profit, 4, 14.

[60] Spalding, America's National Game, 198. Hidy and Hidy, History of the Standard Oil Company, 217.

[61] Voigt, American Baseball, 197.

[62] Richard Tedlow, Keeping the Corporate Image: Public Relations and Business, 1900-1950 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1979). See also J.A.R. Pimlott who proposed a similar explanation for corporate public relations' development in Pimlott, Public Relations and American Democracy (Princeton University Press, 1951).

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History

Czars, Presidents, Philosophers, and Miscegenation: The Cultural Power of Early Motion Pictures

by

Elaine Walls Reed, Ph.D.
English Department
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania
Kutztown, PA 19530

Office telephone: 610-683-4353, -4354
E-mail: *reed@kutztown.edu*

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Elaine Walls Reed, Ph.D.
English Department
Kutztown University of Pennsylvania
Kutztown, PA 19530

Office telephone: 610-683-4353, -4354
Home telephone: 610-777-5686
Home fax: 610-777-1315

E-mail: reed@kutztown.edu

Czars, Presidents, Philosophers, and Miscegenation:
The Cultural Power of Early Motion Pictures
on the Institutionalization of Racism

The history of the motion picture in the United States is inextricably woven with the history of the social and political forces at work since the first Edison Kinetoscope was available for public viewing in 1894. In little more than a century, the motion picture has evolved from its nickelodeon entertainment days to a medium afforded First Amendment protection. That evolution is marked at various junctures by many of the same fears which loom on the social and political horizon today, including those of cultural pluralism, changing global powers, adjustment of an economy to a major shift in production base, concentration of media ownership, and free speech arguments. Indeed, in surveying the history of the motion picture, one would be hard pressed to find a social or political force particular to one epoch and one epoch only, for the history of the medium, like that of other media, is characterized by the best and worst of human nature—and all points between.

Therefore, to dichotomize when reviewing this history would be to falsely assess the motivations of those who were pioneers in the business of casting shadows upon a wall with the initial purpose of entertaining the viewer. But the constellation of actions of motion picture czar Will Hays, President Woodrow Wilson, and philosopher Mortimer Adler were certainly powerful cultural voices shaping the economic and political future of 20th century American race relations.

Just weeks after the public debut of Thomas Edison's Kinetoscope, the Atlantic City Boardwalk provided the "first recorded protest against a movie… *Dolorita in the Passion Dance*, the rage of the peep-show parlor" (Randall, 1968, p. 11). When the Kinescope frames of *John Rice-May Irvin Kiss* were converted to Vitascope format and projected onto a large screen in 1896, public reaction was vehement:

> When moralists and reformers saw their [Rice and Irvin's] large, projected mouths meet in lascivious embrace, they showered the local newspapers with letters and the local politicians with petitions. Upon seeing *The Kiss* today, the viewer would probably find more obscenity in the dumpy unattractiveness of the two bussers than in their "torrid" kiss, which seems a quarter-second peck. (Mast, 1971, p. 22)

Such a kiss would not have created a public frenzy had it occurred in Rice and Irvin's regular place of employment, the Broadway stage, where different cultural norms prevailed. Theater and literature were the province of the culturally elite. Two privileges—money and education—divided "high brows" from "low brows" of the early twentieth century. With money, one could afford to purchase the experience of good theater and good literature. With education, one could enjoy it. Those who lacked either or both had, in the nineteenth century, been barred from such socially acceptable public displays of human emotion. But the advent of the nickelodeon and Edison's Kinetoscope, followed by the Vitascope and its imitators, had opened the doors to the mass audience, which was developing largely as a result of the Industrial Revolution and its accompanying social phenomena of immigration, improved transportation, urbanization, and increased public education.

For at least two reasons, this mass audience threatened the previous social and cultural hierarchy of "high brows" and "low brows." The first was

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the close and prolonged physical proximity of individuals viewing motion pictures who otherwise would not have shared a common social space. The second was the possibility, already recognized, that the new medium might provide more than entertainment, that it might have the power to mold public attitudes.

The first organized response to these perceived threats was action against exhibitors through the creation of censorship boards charged with the responsibility of previewing motion pictures prior to their exhibition

The motion picture industry, alarmed by the proliferation of censoring boards, had responded in kind in 1908 with the establishment of its own censorship board, a harbinger of things to come:

> To silence its critics, as well as to ensure the commercial health of its products, the infant motion picture industry took the first step of the kind it would take throughout its history when faced with a moral attack that endangered its financial welfare—it established its own censorship board to control film content. The National Board of Film Censorship, founded in 1908 (in 1915 it changed its name to the more tolerant-sounding National Board of Review), did not put an end to troublesome state and local censorship actions, but it greatly reduced their inconsistencies by establishing standards and principles that most of them could (and did) accept. (Mast, 1971, p. 42)

Another factor in its 1908 decision to placate the public may have been the motion picture industry's tenuous position as a growing conglomerate in an era characterized by President Theodore Roosevelt's "Square Deal." Railroad regulation and consumer protection were priorities for Roosevelt. The Panic of 1907 narrowly avoided triggering a Great Depression; citizens were uneasy about the trustworthiness of large corporations and looked to government to protect them. As legal counsel Morris L. Ernst sagely commented in his 1946 book, *The First Freedom*, "Whenever the state is secure, it permits great latitudes of criticism" (p. 21). By extension, when it is not, censorship and other forms of suppression of individual liberties thrive.

Eventually, movie representations advanced beyond questions of immorality and obscenity to those which challenged prevailing social norms regarding race. With this development, federal government intervention by the legislative branch occurred in 1912 under statutes permitting the regulation of interstate commerce. The Congressional action forbade the public exhibition of "any film or other pictorial representation of any prize fight." The occasion was Negro heavyweight Jack Johnson's defeat of Jim Jeffries, who had emerged from boxing retirement to wrest the title from the "dark menace" (Randall, 1968, p. 13); the rationale provided was the fear of civil unrest. Prior to this point, no branch of government at the federal level had been involved publicly in issues of motion picture content. It would not be long, however, until both the judicial branch and the executive branch, in the person of the President himself, would become involved.

The year 1915 was pivotal in motion picture history for two reasons, both having ramifications for decades thereafter. The first was the Supreme Court decision *Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio*. The second was racial unrest surrounding the release of D. W. Griffith's *Birth of a Nation*. The former raised the question of free speech for exhibitors; the latter, the question of free speech for producers.

Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio is a landmark case in the history of movie censorship not only because it was the first motion picture controversy to reach the Supreme Court but also because it was the only decision relative to movie content handed down by that body until *Burstyn v. Wilson* (the *Miracle* case) in 1951. As such, *Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio* governed the industry for nearly 40 years—40 years which also encompassed the tenure of Will H. Hays with the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America.

The case was brought against the state of Ohio by a motion picture distributor challenging its censorship board's licensing law that no movie could be shown without having been deemed by that board to be "of a moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character" (Wagman, 1991, pp. 100-101). The distributor's argument, more than 30 years ahead of its time (it would be advanced again in a 1948 Supreme Court antitrust decision), was that such a restriction violated his First Amendment Rights. The Court did not concur. Its ruling, written by Justice Joseph McKenna, which would hang like the sword of Damocles over the heads of MPPDA executives until 1951, is frequently excerpted as follows:

> The exhibition of motion pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, not intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of the press of this country or as organs of public opinion. They are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments, published and known; vivid, useful, and entertaining, no doubt, but … capable of evil, having power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. (Randall, 1968, p. 19)

It was an argument to which motion picture producers listened closely because it clearly indicated that Constitutional protection for their industry was not in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the statement that motion pictures were "capable of evil" clearly placed the responsibility for producing entertainment of acceptable moral standards upon the producers. A message also to guardians of morality, the ruling increased the authority of state and local censorship boards by raising their visibility and buttressing it with Supreme Court protection.

The second motion picture hallmark of 1915 was the February 8 premiere of D. W. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation*. The picture, albeit silent, capitalized on sentiments which had festered for 50 years, since the end of the Civil War, appealing to the Southern myth of reconstruction and prevailing stereotypes of race relations. Only the Ku Klux Klan could save the Southern way of life, particularly its women, from former slaves bent on rape and vengeance. Based upon the Thomas Dixon novel, *The Clansman*, and the years surrounding the Civil War, its subject matter appealed to Griffith. Like many influential Americans of his day, he was only a generation removed from the War and undoubtedly was influenced by the experiences of his Confederate-soldier father. In agreement with the movie's premise that miscegenation was the goal of Southern Negroes, he crafted a monumental tribute to racism which linked race and sex in a manner which would

> set out the racial imagery of the first fifty years of movies. Blacks were to be mostly invisible; when seen, they would perform for whites. If they made themselves visible, they would become immediately threatening, sexually so if they were male. They were then "primitives." God and the angels would come down on the side of whiteness. In such an agenda, an "acceptance of sexuality" became "characteristic of the black race'" as it was seen on film. (Cameron, 1990, p. 283)

The film won accolades from President Woodrow Wilson, a former Princeton University professor and son of a Presbyterian minister, who termed it "like writing history with lightning, and one of my regrets is that it is so horribly true" (Campbell, 1981, pp. 57-58); it was the first full-length feature film to be viewed in the White House and ran continuously in the

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South for fifteen years. In his autobiography, Will Hays (a Princeton University graduate, Methodist minister's son, and elder in the national Presbyterian Church) praised the man—Jeff McCarthy—who had made its New York premiere possible, at the astounding price of $2 a seat: "It was the vision and daring of this man McCarthy which almost overnight gained recognition for Griffith's genius and new dignity for the screen" (1955, p. 467).

That Wilson would express such sentiment should not surprise students of American history. His "New Freedom" administration, which began in 1913, just three years after W. E. B. DuBois organized the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), was characterized by legislation which promoted segregation. In an exchange with Monroe Trotter, African-American editor of the *Boston Guardian*, Wilson defended segregation as a "benefit" to African Americans:

> The white people of this country, as well as I, wish to see the colored people progress, and admire the progress they have already made, and want to see them continue along independent lines. There is, however, a great prejudice against colored people…it will take one hundred years to eradicate this prejudice, and we must deal with it as practical men. Segregation is not humiliating but a benefit, and ought to be so regarded by you gentlemen. If your organization goes out and tells the colored people of the country that it is a humiliation, they will so regard it, but if you do not tell them so, and regard it rather as a benefit, they will regard it the same. (Steinfeld, 1972, pp. 239-240)

Presidential favor notwithstanding, Griffith's filmic treatment of race provoked outrage in several sectors. The fledgling NAACP fought the stereotypes of the film, but the group's efforts succeeded only in focusing more attention upon the epic. A prolonged box office battle resulted in record-breaking crowds, the damaging stereotypes assimilated with the spectacle.

What the public furor over *The Birth of a Nation* demonstrated was the increasing demarcation between African Americans and Whites in the United States, the emergence of the NAACP as a social and political conscience, the racism which existed at the highest levels of federal government, and the emergence of a public voice, outside the Supreme Courts of Illinois and of the United States, which called for First Amendment protection for the motion picture industry. "Equally as important," writes Edward Guerrero, "the struggle over Birth's racist ideology and its public exhibition signaled how deadly serious the new medium, barely 20 years old, had become as a tool to create and shape public opinion and racial perception" (1993, p. 15).

At this point, the MPPDA realized it needed a respected public relations spokesperson to improve its external image while working internally to convince producers that their fiscal solvency depended upon public accountability. Former Postmaster General Will Hays, a member of President Warren Harding's cabinet, fit the bill; he accepted the $100,000-a-year job on January 14, 1922. One of Hays' first tasks in 1922 was to organize a rebuttal of Massachusetts's impending censorship bill. The measure failed, as would subsequent legislative tests of MPPDA strength.

But the specter of Supreme Court intervention continued to shadow Hays' two decades with the MPPDA. Using a physician/disease analogy, he explained:

> Two of the most serious diseases…were always threatening the industry—censorship and governmental restrictions. Again and again it was my business, as a sort of consulting physician, to warn the patient when I saw dangerous symptoms developing and to urge a stricter diet of self-regulation. To me, self-regulation

> was nothing more nor less than application to responsible industry of the self-government on which our nation was founded. (Hays, 1955, p. 482)

As Hays viewed self-regulation, it was both a formal and informal practice. The formal portion was the establishment of a series of codes which became more complex as motion picture producers attempted to draw a Depression-era population into their theaters. The informal portion was the task of convincing producers that adhering to a moral high road was the best means of accomplishing their economic objectives. From his appointment to the position immediately following the Fatty Arbuckle scandal to his retirement in 1945, Will Hays used his white, midwestern, Republican, Protestant values to shape an industry which had grown from a handful of independent film makers in the late 1800s to a powerful but disorganized force in the 1920s. Riding the tide of European immigration, the film industry had burgeoned from nickelodeon days to extravagant movie palaces hosting a mass audience.

It was the mass audience which both attracted and repelled twentieth-century powerbrokers. Here were heterogeneity, multiculturalism, the opportunity for assimilation of cultural values. Here also were patrons of high and low art, sitting side by side, perhaps touching elbows, sharing visions without sharing language or customs, experiencing, as author Edward S. Van Zyke effused in 1923, the "Esperanto of the Eye, the silent voice that broke down all barriers of language, spoke to all nations and peoples, and eventually would lead to the clearing-up of misunderstanding among nations and thus to the abolition of war" (as cited in Sklar, 1975, p. 83).

In an address to the Harvard Business School, Hays shared "the greatest potential for good possessed by the motion picture": An end to bitterness, hatred and war through the sharing of background, ideas and ambition" (Hays, 1927, p. 52). But beneath all the rhetoric, Richard Maltby suggested, were the seeds of a class struggle rooted in "the cultural power of entertainment and the possession of cultural power" (Maltby, 1993, p. 41).

Producing entertainment for such an undifferentiated group of people—the true mass audience—required appealing to the lowest common denominator of shared experience, which unfortunately meant avoiding "giving offense to any powerful group" (Koppes & Black, 1987, pp. 3-4). For minorities in the first half of this century, the full impact of that statement resided in the adjective "powerful." Rather than being fully-developed characters in film's perceptions and reflections of society, minorities—in particular, the African American—became shadows.

It wasn't until 1927, however, that the MPPDA would codify its position on sensitive issues, including race relations, in a document actually entitled "Don'ts and Be Carefuls." Among the "Don'ts" were prohibitions against display of pointed profanity, nudity, drug trafficking, sexual perversion, white slavery, sex hygiene and venereal diseases, childbirth, children's sex organs, ridicule of the clergy, and, of particular interest to this study, miscegenation (sex relationships between the white and black races) and, somewhat paradoxically, "willful offense to any nation, race or creed."

The "Be Carefuls" cautioned the elimination of vulgarity and suggestiveness and the promulgation of good taste as it related to no less

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than 25 items ranging from flag display and international relations to treatment of criminals and "first-night scenes." Application of the paradigm was explained by Hays in his lecture at the Harvard Business School: "Just as you serve the leisure hours of the masses," he said, "so do you rivet the girders of society" (1927, p. 29). His words were prophetic of the ironclad policy upon which the MPPDA would soon embark.

Arrival of the Great Depression deepened class fears. Instead of sitting side by side in movie palaces, Americans were standing side by side in bread lines and unemployment lines. Hunger and poverty, the great levelers, blurred class distinctions; and race became even more important to some individuals as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "New Deal" strove to emphasize unity. A drop in box office revenues forced filmmakers to become more "daring" in their content. The Hays Office attempted to respond with a policy allowing less judgment calls and providing more specific admonitions.

The "Don'ts and Be Carefuls" evolved into a second codification, "Code to Govern the Making of Talking, Synchronized and Silent Motion Pictures," more commonly known as The Code, in 1930. Its twelve subdivisions included crimes against the law, sex, vulgarity, obscenity, profanity, costume, dances. religion, locations (confined to the treatment of bedrooms), national feelings, film titles, and "repellent subjects" (such as hangings, brutality, the sale of women, and surgical operations). Adherence to the Code, in principle, was universal; but in response to national fiscal chaos in 1933, the film industry determined it necessary to publicly reaffirm its allegiance in 1934 to these middle-class, core values.

The Code did not vary greatly from its paternalistic predecessor, the "Don'ts and Be Carefuls." Once again, miscegenation was included as a subtopic of sex; this time, the words "is forbidden" were added. And once again, the Code admonished its members to demonstrate consideration for the national feelings of the "history, institutions, prominent people and citizenry of other nations," but notably lacking were formerly expressed cautions against "willful offense of any…race." While no criticism or history read for this study to date has addressed this omission, it seems a turning point in institutionalizing the marginalization of the African American in film.

While today's viewers of *Married With Children*, or even "Nick at Night" fans who delight in the separate beds and immaculate conceptions of Rob and Laura Petrie's nuclear family on *The Dick Van Dyke Show* reruns, may have heard of The Code and chuckled at its prohibitions, it is unlikely that many of them are aware that God himself, or at least his legal department, had a hand in its justification.

Appended to The Code was a lengthy explication of the philosophy of art and morals which undergirded it. This document, prepared in 1930 by Martin Quigley, a Catholic layman who edited *Motion Picture Herald*, and Daniel Lord, a Jesuit priest, was the Hays Office's means of placating a host of critics including the powerful Legion of Decency, a Catholic lobby which, in the early 1930s, threatened to cripple the industry by galvanizing supporters in worldwide boycott of the film industry. In a subsection entitled "Reasons Underlying Particular Applications," released to the public in 1934, the authors explain the necessity of respecting the sanctity of marriage and of avoiding those scenes of passion which might arouse "dangerous emotions on the part of the immature, the young or the *criminal classes.*" The authors then embark on the distinctions between pure and impure love, distinctions which deserve close inspection because of their implications for interracial relationships as well as for their excessive use of italics as emphasis type:

> Even within the limits of *pure love*, certain facts have been universally regarded by lawmakers as outside the limits of safe presentation.
>
> In the case of *impure love*, the love which society has always regarded as wrong and which has been banned by divine law, the following are important:
>
> 1. Impure love must *not* be presented as *attractive and beautiful*.
> 2. It must *not* be the subject of *comedy or farce*, or treated as material for *laughter*.
> 3. It must *not* be presented in such a way as to *arouse passion* or morbid curiosity on the part of the audience.
> 4. It must *not* be made to seem *right and permissible*.
> 5. In general, it must *not* be *detailed* in method and manner.

With the authority of both human and divine law, the Code left little doubt as to the reasons for forbidding the depiction of miscegenation. After all, as the Scriptures say, "If God be for us, who can be against us?"

The African-American population's lack of unity, save for occasional NAACP efforts, enabled the motion picture industry to focus its attention on other, more-publicized fronts. One such battle followed the publication of Henry James Forman's *Our Movie-Made Children*, the premature popularization of the 1933 Payne Fund Studies. The book, both anti-industry and pro-censorship, undermined scholarly publication and discussion of the Studies, which were to provide a social science perspective on the influence and effect of films on children and adolescents. One scholar who objected to this use of science for the judgment of the moral and political consequences of an art form was Mortimer Adler.

Adler was only 35 years old and a relatively new Ph.D. member of the Chicago University Committee of Social Thought when he penned *Art and Prudence*, a neo-Aristotelian response to Forman's claims. (In 1965, the book was revised and republished as *Poetry and Politics*.) The academic tone of Adler's argument made the book impractical for public release, so the MPPDA hired Raymond Moley, who later would author a biased but interesting history of the Hays Office, to summarize Adler's remarks in a lengthy pamphlet entitled "Are We Movie Made?" A few years earlier, in 1934, as Adler relates in his autobiography, a representative from the MPPDA (possibly Moley) told him that a book he had co-written with Jerome Michael, entitled *Crime, Law and Social Science*, was regarded as "The Bible" in the Hays Office. In it, Adler and Michael argue that criminologists and sociologists cannot "know" what causes crime; hence, when government and society pointed the finger at movies, the Hays Office would invoke philosophical arguments (Adler, 1977, p. 192).

Sometime between the 1934 compliment and the 1937 publication of *Art and Prudence*, Adler and Hays met in person. Adler termed Hays "a fascinating mixture of political astuteness and naiveté about the arts, the sciences, and philosophy" who was "so delighted with my ability to put his ideas and sentiments into words that made him feel comfortable that he invited me to become a consultant" (1977, pp. 192-194). Adler confessed "yielding to the lure" of New York's St. Regis and Waldorf Astoria Hotels, where he would spend several weeks a year ghostwriting the first drafts of Hays' annual reports. The relationship lasted four or five years, according to Adler, who at 94 years of age in 1995, still maintained office hours and fulfilled speaking engagements as the head of the Institute for Philosophical Research in Chicago.

What may seem to be a drastic digression from this study of the impact of the Hays Office on African-Americans film roles actually is anything but. A student of philosopher John Dewey and teacher of critic Lionel Trilling, Adler had been friend and colleague to several of the most significant names in twentieth-century media studies, including Robert Hutchins, who chaired the Henry Luce-financed national Commission which studied the role of the press and issued an indictment of it; the Van Doren family, prominent literary talents who figured heavily in television's quiz show scandals; and Bill Moyers, who profiled Adler in his PBS study, *Six Great Ideas*. The years that Mortimer Adler worked with Will Hays and the MPPDA– approximately 1937-1946–were years of turmoil as the American film industry attempted to maintain market supremacy in a world divided along ideological lines. Maintaining the facade of movies as purely a medium of family entertainment was no longer possible. When the new decade dawned, enemies at home and abroad forced the MPPDA to defend itself and re-evaluate its practices.

Movie moguls were, by and large, first-generation Americans–Jewish businessmen who saw in Hollywood a means of escaping the East Coast power structure. Their choice of a WASP with powerful political experience (Hays had been Postmaster General for President Warren Harding) as their representative to the American public in general and Washington DC in particular was a brilliant tactic. But even Hays could not save them from the anti-Semitic and isolationist movement which was gaining momentum immediately prior to the United States' forced entry into World War II.

For years, the MPPDA had sought to avoid confrontation: "Always hearing footsteps behind them and worrying about adverse publicity, the industry executives of the 1930s tried to make their products as noncontroversial as possible" (Koppes & Black, 1987, p. 8). Bowing to the demands of the small but vocal Southern film censors, the industry "adopted the region's white supremacist view, typified by the idealized plantation society of *Gone With the Wind*" and relegated African Americans to the stereotypical roles incarnate in Stepin Fetchit (Koppes & Black, 1987, p. 85) and burnt cork-smeared imitations. As Robert Sklar noted, the obvious is that the Code had cut the industry off from contemporary moral and social issues; the not-so-obvious, that it created a "glamorous, appealing, mythical world of satisfying values in life and on the screen" (1975, p. 174). Certainly, the majority of today's media critics would agree with the assessment. But many members of the 77th Congress believed otherwise and focused an uncomfortable spotlight on the industry in the early autumn of 1941.

Beginning September 9, a specially empaneled subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, foreshadowing the dark days to come of the House Un-American Activities Committee, began an investigation of "war propaganda disseminated by the motion picture industry and of any monopoly in the production, distribution, or exhibition of motion pictures" (Koppes & Black, 1987, p. 17). The charges had been brought by an isolationist North Dakota senator named Gerald Nye. It was Hays' worst nightmare. As isolationists who could not beat FDR's magnetic radio presence turned their vengeance on the media, Hays turned to Mortimer Adler for help.

According to Adler, his defense of the industry was "a careful analysis of that slippery word *propaganda*" which culminated in an argument for First Amendment protection of the films (Adler, 1977, p. 193). But Hays never had the chance to deliver Adler's words on the Senate floor. The hearings were cut short by events occurring at a small harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

Eleven days after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a public statement, which said, "I want no censorship of the motion picture. I want no restrictions placed thereon which will impair the usefulness of the film other than those very necessary restrictions which the dictates of safety make imperative" (Hays, 1955, p. 531).

The hearing was a wake-up call to the industry; it marked the beginning of an MPPDA self-assessment which echoed the siege mentality of a world at war. In internal, confidential correspondence circulated in July of 1942, a member of Hays' inner circle remarked, "…like the rest of the world, we have had our own 'Pearl Harbor' and, whether it was justified or not, we must start from there" (The Will Hays Papers, 30:0987). His referent remains unclear despite this writer's extensive study of archival material. Possibly, he was referring to the Senate hearing. Equally possible, because of the amount of time which had elapsed, is that he was referring to more recent events, including difficult bargaining with Walter White and the NAACP over the roles available to African Americans, which resulted in front page *Variety* coverage headlined "Better Breaks for Negroes in Hollywood" (March 25, 1942). In it, White related that movie producers had promised "a more honest portrayal of the Negro henceforth, using them not only as red-cap porters and in other menial roles, but in all the parts they play in the nation's everyday life." The article concluded with a report that one story under consideration was the life of Paul Robeson, Negro baritone, whose disillusionment with America had led him to champion oft-times unpopular causes abroad. Perhaps equally important was what the agreement meant in terms of job opportunity: "The studios agreed to abandon pejorative racial roles, to place Negroes in positions as extras they could reasonably be expected to occupy in society, and to begin the slow task of integrating blacks into the role of studio technicians" (Cripps, 1977, p. 3).

But the industry was not moving fast enough to satisfy its critics in 1942. Segregated American troops were a constant reminder that fighting prejudice abroad was living a lie. Activists began to call for integration of the armed forces and integration of American society. The film industry became whipping boy for both. A Dallas, Texas, *Time-Herald* editorial titled "Poor Hollywood," brought to Hays' attention in a weekly press summary, noted that two organized groups, which the article did not identify, were lobbying for better screen treatment: lawyers and African Americans. Of the latter, it said:

> Negroes have started putting pressure on the producers…In mob scenes, Hollywood has been putting one of ten persons in uniform because that represents the ratio in real life. Negro publicists have insisted that one out of ten persons in crowd shots be Negroes because that ratio approximates actual status…Poor Hollywood, the sow's ear and the silk purse simultaneously for the whole world. (The Will Hays Papers, 30:1035)

On another front, the newly-organized Office of War Information published a guidebook for the film industry on racial content and film, feeding an inspirational column to *Variety* editors which characterized the enemy as racist and declared that America was not. Plans were underway for Frank Capra's *The Negro Soldier* (1944), which was designed to repair deteriorating race relations in Southern military posts and demonstrate that, "when motivated, the white-dominated institutions of the United States could deal, if blandly, with African-American history" (Gomery, 1991, pp. 219-220).

Paul Robeson added pressure on the industry, in August of 1942, by announcing a second much-publicized departure from films following the release of *Tales of Manhattan*, a series of vignettes about a shirt stuffed with money which, through accidents of weather and fate, dropped from the sky and showered sharecroppers with cash. He had sworn off the industry once before, in 1939, stating that until he found "a cast-iron story-the kind that can't be twisted in the making," he would not work for "the biggest aggregate of financial capital in the world"—the film industry (Foner, 1978, p. 120). "It turned out to be the same old thing—the Negro solving his problem by singing his way to glory. This is very offensive to my people," said Robeson, a Stanford All-American football player, Phi Beta Kappa member, concert artist and attorney (Freedomsway, 1978, p. 116).

This time, the American people heard him. Hays Office weekly press summaries included three September 28, 1942, editorials on the topic. The Charleston (West Virginia) *Mail*'s condemned "plantation hallelujah singer" stereotypes and added,

> There are Negroes who can't sing and others who see no occasion to. We do them an injustice and mislead ourselves when, with the aid of Hollywood, we pretend that in his vocal cords the Negro has his only earthly possession of any value and his sole prospect of eternal peace. (The Will Hays Papers, 31:0314)

It is "an amiable fiction, but a misleading one," the editorial concluded.

The *San Francisco Chronicle* extended the analogy, comparing Hollywood's treatment of African Americans to its treatment of all aspects of American life, but defending the practice:

> It does not portray ideological verities, but deals in amusements ….He (Robeson) does not have to appear in films if he does not like the philosophy in their world of illusion. Similarly, if we do not like to look through Hollywood's eyes, we can stay at home and read a book. (The Will Hays Papers, 31:0314)

A newspaper clip from a Connecticut voice of reason, the Waterbury *American*, selected for inclusion in an October 8, 1942, press summary, implored filmmakers to find something to replace Jim Crow but doubted that change would be swift:

> The motion picture industry possibly can be influenced to rationalize its standard conception of the qualities of colored people, if the pressure of the box office comes to be sufficiently strong and persistent…it may be that eventually Hollywood will catch on to the idea of using the "Jim Crow" or "Uncle Tom" caricature of a colored man seldom, and only where he rightly "belongs" in the story, if ever. He [the African-American] will be altogether more interesting when he is presented with intelligent consideration as a human being. (The Will Hays Papers, 31:0314)

With the Senate, The Office of War Information and segments of the American press urging change, African Americans at last had a friend at court.

By autumn of 1942, Hays was obviously deeply concerned about the depiction of race relations by the film industry. Correspondence dated November 1, 1942, from Mortimer Adler summarizes the extent of that concern and bears replication in its near-entirety for the light it casts on the personal beliefs of Will Hays. Adler wrote:

> After a ten day lecture tour, I am home again, and I want to write you at once about the matters we discussed in our conference last Saturday morning in New York.
>
> First of all, there is the immediate problem of the Code in reference to miscegenation. You said that you would send me the relevant materials on this so that I could begin to think

> about the matter, and make tentative suggestions for the reformulation of the Code on this point…I find, in the Code itself, only the words: "Miscegenation is forbidden." This may be too brief, [sic] Furthermore, it occurs in the Code in the context of the prohibition of sex perversions and other types of sexual obscenity, and so it seems to suggest that miscegenation is perverse, or that it is obscene. Perhaps, it would be a good idea to change the context in which miscegenation is mentioned. We both agree that miscegenation is neither perverse nor obscene; but rather that it is, according to the prevailing *mores*, a very unusual practise [sic]. We agree, do we not, that the code should not prohibit it, as if it were an *immoral* practise, but rather on the grounds that it is a very unusual practise, and that it arouses in many quarters an unfavorable, even a violent, social reaction. The screen can distinguish between basic moral principles and prevailing *mores*; but it is obligated not to offen [sic] against either; furthermore, the screen is devoted to entertainment, not to social reform; therefore, it cannot undertake a campaign to rectify the prevailing prejudices against miscegenation, even if you and I and other liberal persons think these prejudices tend to prevent the ideal from being attained - the ideal of man's universal brotherhood, despite differences in race, color, and creed. (The Will Hays Papers, 31:0369)

Adler continued his letter, explaining that the point to keep in mind is the difference between immorality (that which violates natural law) and the unusual (that which deviates from prevailing mores) which may be judged immoral but actually is offensive only because it "merely transgresses deep-seated prejudices." More than 50 years later, Adler's rationale remains remarkable in its prescience:

> The problem is an important one, in view of the fact that the colored races of the world are everywhere throwing off the yoke of white domination, and are beginning to challenge the white man's superiority and his assumption that God made this planet for him primarily. Though the problem at first seems to have a local impact -- in terms of our American negro situation - I think it has wider - in fact, global - aspects which we would do well to consider, especially when we remember that the movie is a global medium of entertainment. (The Will Hays Papers, 31:0369)

Adler concluded this section of the letter to Hays by adding his voice to those of the popular press which were urging that African Americans receive more varied and positive film roles:

> Though it is not directly relevant to miscegenation, the matter of showing negroes as heroes or as important characters in films is also worth considering. I still think it might be possible to do a movie of the life of Booker T. Washington, or of that man Carver, the great Negro scientist…Furthermore, we might even think of the possibility of doing a screen version of Shakespeare's Othello, with an actor like Paul Robeson in the title role. That, of course, would show a black man - albeit a Moor, not a negro - in a leading romantic role; and it would also touch directly on miscegenation. I can readily see, however, that Othello might be too hot a subject to handle. At the moment, I cannot imagine it's [sic] being shown throughout the South. (The Will Hays Papers, 31:0369-0370)

In a telephone interview, Adler remarked that he did not recall the nature of Hays' response to this letter (M. Adler, personal communication, March 10, 1995). Robeson did, of course, go on to play the role of Othello on Broadway to critical acclaim in 1943-44, but the restrictions that applied to the screen had never been codified for the stage, largely because the theater remained the province of high art and therefore its effect on the mass audience was not a concern. No investigation to date has revealed whether or in what manner Hays responded to Adler's race-specific concerns. It remains a topic for future investigation.

Meanwhile, Hays had continued to practice contradictory public and private positions on the issue of free speech and the motion picture industry. The events of 1941 had been a close call; their resurgence might be held in abeyance until after the war's end but would surely resurface. His colleagues were advising him to declare publicly his belief that First Amendment protection should apply to the film, that it was not a medium devoted solely to entertainment, as Hays had characterized the industry's product for so many years. They argued that films had to have the "freedom to treat and express opinion on current and controversial problems," that the screen had established itself as a medium of "information, education, opinion and entertainment" (The Will Hays Papers, 31:01263).

Convinced, Hays introduced to the reading public through the official historian of the Hays Office years, Raymond Moley, a concept that had guided much of his private dealings with the print and broadcast media in the previous years. In 1945, Moley wrote, "Since the issues of the present war have given us new perspectives on the historical freedoms, Will Hays has vigorously sought to bring the motion picture into the protective area hitherto occupied exclusively by the press and other media of expression" (p. 223). Whether the Supreme Court would agree hinged as much on the industry's control of its distributors, its exhibitors, and the public's right to view as it did on the artists' right to create.

The conclusion of World War II in 1945 brought an end to the relatively tranquil domestic relations between federal government and the motion picture industry. Big business, fed by large government contracts during the war years, was squeezing out its smaller competition; the situation in the motion picture industry was no different. By 1948, the Big Five (Loew's, Paramount, Radio Keith Orpheum [RKO], Twentieth Century Fox, and Warner) dominated the industry with control over 95 percent of American theaters, including 80 percent of the first-run theaters (Maltby, 1983, p. 44). This practice of vertical integration, which dominates business and entertainment news even today, concerned men such as Morris Ernst, who saw John Milton's marketplace of ideas becoming no more than a token concept:

> Under the sugar-coating of entertainment, [the motion picture industry] is continually transmitting social, political and economic ideas…. If the market place [sic] were limited solely by the censorship of a few state boards, we would have only a slight tussle to get freedom for the films analogous to our political freedom of the press. But five companies in economic terms so restrict the market that the public is scarcely concerned with the political censorship or with the Hays office's appeasement of all censorial restrictions. (Ernst, 1946, p. 183)

By executive order of President Harry Truman, the armed forces were integrated on July 26, 1948. By then, the movie industry began to relax its official position on the depiction of interracial relationships. How much of that can be credited to Hays is debatable. He retired in 1945, to be replaced by Eric Johnston, former president of the US Chamber of Commerce. Perhaps Hays simply wanted to return to his first love—Indiana politics—or perhaps he read the writing on the wall regarding Congressional intervention in the film industry. American society was changing. One enemy had been defeated; a new one, Communism, was identified. Women who "manned" the factories during World War II stayed there even when their GIs returned. Disposable income increased, but attendance at movie theaters peaked in 1947, never to return to the same heights. Local and state censorship boards saw their powers dissipating as public attention turned to the new technology of television.

His reference to community standards echoed larger questions of censorship on which film historians remain divided. In his introduction to The Will Hays Papers, Douglas Gomery defended Hays on the grounds that he was fulfilling the directives of his employer to assist it in "policing" its own members. He noted, "Will Hays must indeed be credited with preventing the passage of federal government legislation in censorship" (The Will Hays Papers, ix).

Robert Sklar disagreed:

> The self regulation that Hays proclaimed as the one true way to improve the movies was regarded by reformers as a sham; it took an entire new interest group, made up of civil libertarians, intellectuals and artists, to question whether informal internal control were not as pernicious as police censorship. (1975, p. 133)

But, as with other issues, shades of gray exist for persons who search for them. Richard Maltby believed that holding the Code responsible for "the trivialization of American movies and…for Hollywood's timidity and lack of realism…both overestimates and underestimates its influence." He explained that the Code steered Hollywood away from difficult subject matter, but that this was merely the vehicle for an already-established MPPDA policy. Conversely, he termed it "a determining force on the construction of narrative and the delineation of character in every studio-produced film after 1931" (1993, p. 38). He suggested that greater than issues of cultural power and control were issues of economic power and control; he termed the Code a means of producers' defending themselves against distributors who were chafing under the block booking of the period. Because of the power of the box office and the possibility of public backlash against the industry, these issues were masked and "the ideological superstructure of movie content," which posed less danger to producer profit margins, was substituted as the focus of public and media attention (p. 42).

Regardless of the reasons for its existence and focus, the Code successfully codified existing segregated social practices in the United

States and reflected them to its own citizenry and the rest of the world. Those reflections "are refracted through multiple mirrors [censorship and other external forces], each of which distorts and sometimes obliterates certain images" (Koppes & Black, 1987, viii). As an agent of mass entertainment and information, the motion picture industry resists a single hegemonic interpretation. From the vantage point of time, aided by access to the personal documents of men such as Will H. Hays and Mortimer J. Adler, the industry continues to be reconstituted as its historians and critics learn more about the public and private negotiations shaped by a variety of cultural forces at work in its history.

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History

"Pounding Brass" for the Associated Press: A Press Telegrapher Recalls His Craft

J. Steven Smethers, Ph.D.
Director of Graduate Studies
The School of Journalism and Broadcasting
Oklahoma State University
313 Paul Miller Building
Stillwater, OK 74078
(405) 744-8267 **OFFICE**
(405) 744-7104 **FAX**
smether@okstate.edu

This paper is presented in memory of Aubrey E. Keel, the principal subject of this study, who died on June 25, 1999, ten months after completing an interview with the author.

"Pounding Brass" for the Associated Press: A Press Telegrapher Recalls His Craft

Along the smooth and slender wires, the sleepless heralds run.
Fast as the clear and living rays go streaming from the sun.
No peals of flashes, heard or seen, their wondrous flight betray.
And yet their words are quickly caught, in cities far away.

The elderly Morse operator sat down at his telegraph key before a crowd of on-lookers to demonstrate how he so routinely performed the duties of his job nearly 70 years ago, tapping out this long-forgotten verse that was once a part of his profession's lore.[1] The occasion: the 150th anniversary observance of the Associated Press, staged at the Freedom Forum's Newseum in Washington, DC, on January 20, 1998. Several celebrities were there for the AP's sesquicentennial, including Vice-President Al Gore and the organization's president, Lou Boccardi (Barrows, 1998; Quiad, 1998). But no one at this black-tie affair commanded more respect than the 97 year-old telegrapher, Aubrey Keel of Kansas City, Missouri, who, perhaps, amazed the crowd with his spryness as much as his telegraph demonstration.

In his professional life, Aubrey Keel had been a telegraph operator for the Associated Press. Telegraphers like himself had kept the nation's news moving for nearly 90 years, from the mid 1840s through the early 1930s, before automated teletype machines finally took over the task (Barrows, 1988). Press telegraphers (sometimes called "brass pounders" because of the incessant clicks from their apparatus made of brass) were once considered indispensable to the practice of newsgathering. They worked in newspaper offices everywhere, receiving information ranging from late-breaking news to stock market quotations to baseball scores, all sent in a barrage of dots and dashes that were decipherable only to trained ears (Quiad, 1998). In its day, the art of moving news by telegraph was considered the highest form of specialization in electronic communication, and those who mastered the skill were highly respected and well paid. The AP had at one time employed as many as 1,500 telegraph operators, but at the time of his demonstration for the AP's 150th anniversary celebration, Keel's fraternity had dwindled in size to only three known members.[2]

Aubrey Keel died on June 25, 1999, after a short battle with lymphoma. During the year preceding his death, Keel participated in guiding the development of this paper, which provides a first-hand account of newsgathering via telegraph and a rare glimpse of the lifestyle and job duties associated with press telegraphy. Through the use of in-depth interviewing techniques as prescribed by leading oral historians (Marshall & Rossman, 1989; Plummer, 1983; Startt & Sloan, 1989) Keel's recollections have been recorded and are summarized here, an example of what Plummer (1983) calls the "subjective view of the social actor" (p. 14).[3] Additional supporting documentation about press telegraphy was gleaned from a smattering of articles in industry publications from the era. Two rare books were especially helpful in creating an understanding of the professional demands placed on men and women who pursued this line of work. A telegrapher's vocational textbook covering the Morse code technique and the expectations associated with the profession (Meyer, 1902) provided background on the training process for novice operators. A Phillips Code instruction manual (Gerlach, 1945) portrays the difficulties germane to specializing in more advanced code techniques. Finally, news clippings about

Keel's career featured in the newsletter of the Morse Telegraph Club, Inc., a society of telegraph operators formed to preserve the memory of the Morse telegraph professions, lend additional insight into Keel's life and the press telegraphy profession in general.

The telegraph and its impact on society has mostly been told through histories of monolithic companies such as Western Union (cf., Rivise, 1950; Thompson, 1947) and by way of social historical perspectives (cf., Lubrano, 1997; Marvin, 1988). Although the telegraph's influence on the nation's news industry has been documented by various media historians (Blondheim, 1994; Emery & Emery, 1992; Rosewater, 1930), surprisingly little has been written about the profession of press telegraphy itself. Smethers and Jolliffe (1992) shed some light on this vocation in their study of baseball re-creations on radio. But their sports-specific account fails to provide an understanding of the duties associated with this occupation that was once considered the backbone of this nation's burgeoning news industry.

The Lure of Telegraphy

Prior to the arrival of other forms of wire and wireless communication, the telegraph was the only device that could be used confidently by industries dependent on immediacy in message handling. Railroads, Wall Street, maritime operators and newspapers all shared the common need of receiving fast, accurate, reliable reports, and the telegraph was perfectly suited for this need. The basic apparatus was simple, involving nothing more than a key used by the sending operator, who tapped out coded messages, and a "sounder" on the receiving end of the circuit that synchronously relayed the code to a receiving operator. Telegraph equipment required little maintenance since there were no complex moving parts that could malfunction or break down (Coe, 1990, Meyer, 1902).

The technology was also extremely flexible. The telegraph was portable and it ran on battery power instead of electricity, a real advantage in a country where electricity was neither dependable nor widespread in its availability until the late 1940s ("Growth of Residential...", 1975, p. 827). Assuming the availability of connections to main telegraph lines (which was rarely a problem, considering that telegraph companies, from their earliest days, had leased railroad wires as a means of economically providing almost universal service) telegraph communication was possible in even the most remote of locations (Lubrano, 1997). And, considering that the telephone was especially slow to diffuse through the American society (less than 50 percent of the nation's households had telephone service until the post World War II years) the telegraph remained the only dependable form of immediate messaging long after its use would be assumed to be obsolete ("Telephones and Average...", 1975, p. 783).

Just as today's widespread use of computer-mediated communication has made people with HTML and web design skills indispensable, skilled telegraph operators were equally in demand in the day when their technology reigned supreme. Telegraphy was a respected profession for young people entering the job market, and skilled operators commanded better compensation than the going wage for many professions. The local telegraph operator was always the one "in the know" and was usually the first person in the community to be privy to late breaking news, sports scores and commodity information, a factor that undoubtedly gave the telegrapher's profession a certain glimmer matched by few occupations of the day. As Reporter columnist Clyde Brion Davis (1954) wrote, the telegrapher was "an aristocrat among craftsmen" and was an important social icon:

> Protected by a strong union, he (sic) was always sure of a job at good wages...He represented, or so it seemed, the acme of technological advance, and he had no reason to doubt that his trade would be doing business in the same way for a hundred years, or, for that matter, a thousand. (p. 41)

Such occupational status could be quite enticing for young people searching for a rewarding occupation in early 20th century America. So it was that 16-year-old Aubrey Keel decided to explore telegraphy as a possible career in the spring of 1917. The Goldthwaite, Texas, teenager never dreamed that his career ambition would take him into the specialized field of press telegraphy. Instead, he entered the profession in a fashion similar to most of his contemporaries: as a telegraph operator for the railroads.

America was entering into World War I at this time. Most of the male labor force was enlisted in the war effort, so industry turned to the remaining members of the population available for work (who were mostly women and teenagers) to sustain the nation's industrial output (cf., Kennedy, 1980). In Keel's hometown, the agent at the Santa Fe Railroad depot announced his intention to add some teenage apprentices to the staff in an effort to maintain regular operation of the railroad's busy freight and passenger services. So the agent recruited a class of eight interns (Keel was the only male in the group). While baggage handling and selling tickets was not Keel's life ambition, the job did have a special enticement. The depot agent promised to train Keel and his female colleagues in sending and receiving Morse code:

> I hustled baggage, checked it in and loaded it on the passenger trains... unloaded incoming baggage...whatever the agent asked me to do. When he had a few minutes, I would practice on the key learning telegraphy and then at night... he would teach us (telegraphy) when he was off duty in the freight office...we all sat (at) the table and practiced telegraphy.[4]

The telegraph profession used a code that had been developed by Samuel F. B. Morse in 1844. Students who trained for railroad agent work in this era were first required to memorize the correct combination of dots and dashes that represented each letter of the alphabet, the numerals zero through nine and some punctuation marks (Meyer, 1902, p. 34). Apprentices were also taught the basic operation of Morse equipment and the scientific principles that made the apparatus work (pp. 11-31). Novices entering the profession were thus expected to master the skills of proficiently sending and receiving Morse code, translating incoming coded messages into English and being able to understand the equipment well enough to perform some routine maintenance tasks.

Telegraph communication was the method by which railroads tracked the flow of train traffic. And, as previously mentioned, a community's telegraph office was usually located at the local railroad depot, meaning that rail agents often had to handle Western Union or Postal Telegraph messages in addition to making sure than messages vital to safely routing freight and passenger trains were received and passed on. Budding agents, then, were challenged to take telegraphy seriously and to be dedicated to accuracy, a concept reflected in a textbook of the era, "The Twentieth Century Manual of Railway Commercial and Wireless Telegraphy" by Fred Meyer (1902):

> Telegraphy requires careful, methodical drill and study, and great results cannot be expected from little labor... You are entering a profession that recognizes superiority more quickly than any other, and a profession that recognizes only ability....Do not aim to do your work as *well* as anyone else, but a little *better,* and then you will be picked out for promotion before anyone else (p. 11).

Keel interned for a year before he was finally hired by Santa Fe to work full-time at the Goldthwaite depot, selling tickets, handling baggage and—the favorite part of his job—sending and receiving telegraph messages. One day, Keel received an urgent message from a Santa Fe official in Temple, Texas, asking him to fill in for an operator who had taken sick on the job. Keel realized that the Temple office was a telegraph relay center that typically handled a high volume of incoming and outgoing messages. Such a high-pressure atmosphere was rather intimidating for a novice operator. But Keel also realized that orders from top railroad officials were expected to be followed, so, with some trepidation, he reported for work in Temple handling messages that came in from midnight to 8:00 a.m. The supervising wire chief was so impressed with Keel's work that he offered the young telegrapher a job. Keel realized that the position would mean more money and prestige, so he accepted the offer, feeling secure that he had found his niche in life as a specialist in railroad telegraphy.

But while in Temple, Keel had another career-altering experience. An Associated Press telegrapher stationed at the local newspaper, the Temple Telegram, befriended Keel. The senior operator, who realized that Keel was extremely proficient in sending and receiving Morse code, approached the greenhorn telegrapher and offered to give him instruction in press telegraphy. Keel realized that this specialization was considered the pinnacle of all telegraph career options, so he gladly accepted his friend's offer.

Each night for nearly a month, Keel visited the local newspaper office in his off-hours to observe the craft of copying telegraph-delivered news stories. He first observed that sending and receiving press accounts was more stressful than other lines of telegraphy, if nothing else because of the sheer amount of copy dispatched each hour. But another more demanding aspect of this field was the requirement that operators learn another "language," the Phillips Code, a technique developed by Walter P. Phillips, a former Associated Press telegrapher, in 1879. Phillips' system was a list of abbreviations for over 3,500 words, referred to as "telegraphic shorthand" by the industry's training manual (p. 3). While Morse operators spelled out words letter-by-letter, Phillips operators sent and received abridgments of commonly used words. For example, for the sentence "Must have immediate answer to our telegram of yesterday," the Phillips version would be "MST HV IMT AR TO OU TGM O YA" (Gerlach, 1945, p. 6).[5]

Cryptic as it was, the advantage of the Phillips method was its ability to save time. Skilled operators who made the transition from Morse to Phillips code were able to increase their average speed to about 45 words per minute (Morse operators typically averaged about 30). In fact, industry estimates showed that the Phillips system increased operator productivity by as much as 30 percent (Gerlanch, 1945). The task of learning 3,500 abbreviations was rather daunting, but the greater challenge was adjusting to the speed at which the more experienced telegraphers routinely sent their copy. Sending and receiving messages in either Morse or Phillips required great accuracy, but, according to Keel, the process of deciphering up to 45 words per minute created a whole new kind of pressure:

> The sending operators had the edge...(because) they could set the speed (at which the copy was sent), whereas the receiving operators had to adjust (to the speed of the sender)...I probably didn't know all 3,500 abbreviations...If the receiving operator missed a word he could kind of figure it out...from the context of the sentence. Or he could even look it up in the book right quick. Of course, you had to look it up in a hurry because (the sending operator) kept going. And you didn't have much time to go back and doctor your copy. You had to get it right the first time.

Professionally recognized standards of etiquette allowed telegraphers who were receiving copy to occasionally break in on the circuit and ask sending operators to repeat any missed details of incoming stories. But this practice was discouraged, because several newspapers were usually served by the same telegraph circuit. Excessive interruptions in the flow of news copy was both distracting and time-consuming.

After a week of observing his friend at work, Keel was invited to sit at the desk one night and try his hand at copying incoming news sent in Phillips code. Keel timidly began copying and translating the dots and dashes, trying his best to accurately decipher the copy while keeping up with the lighting speed of the AP's sending operator. The pressure on the novice operator was somewhat eased because Keel's friend acted as a safety net, sitting nearby to copy any details that Keel may have missed. This training continued for over three weeks before the senior operator finally declared that Keel was ready to be a full-time press telegrapher.

The Human Teletype Machine

Much as the giant news cooperative does today, the Associated Press maintained state bureaus that were charged with dispatching news copy to member newspapers in each state. Dallas was—and still is—the site of the AP's distribution center in Texas

(Hopkins, 1931). At that office, wire editors routinely examined incoming stories from two major sources: the "A" wire, which delivered continuous national and international news from the New York office, and the "B" wire, which issued regional news. Publishers contracted to receive varying degrees of service, based on the needs of the newspaper and its market size. A newspaper in a larger city such as Dallas or Houston, for example, could elect to receive news from the "collection wire"—or "C" circuit—that was more comprehensive in its scope of service, providing a high volume of national and international stories, state and regional news and feature material. Publishers in smaller cities such as Lubbock, Temple or Beaumont that did not require such a high volume of information usually opted for a lower class of service called the "state wire." This circuit fed subscribers continuous international, national and state and regional news, but on a more abbreviated basis ("Effects of Employment..." 1932; "How the AP..." 1926; Keel, 1998; Rosewater, 1930).

Regardless of market size or service classification, the Associated Press provided all members with on-site telegraph operators who worked in constituent newsrooms copying coded news stories coming from the regional bureau and translating them into English for the newspaper's wire editor (Rosewater, 1930). The editor, in turn, decided if a given story was worthy of being set into type for publication. Although the telegrapher worked side-by-side with the member newspaper's staff, press telegraphers were strictly regarded as AP employees and were obligated only to receive AP wire accounts. If there was an important local story that the newspaper chose to share with other AP members, the telegrapher was authorized to dispatch the account to other newspapers on the circuit and to the state bureau.

Wire service telegraphers were expected to live in the home communities of the newspapers where they were assigned to work. Operators were contracted to work no more than 48 hours per week. Publishers specified the hours that AP copy was to be dispatched to their plant, which was based on each newspaper's publication schedule. The "day wire," for example, ran from 7:00 a. m to 3:00 p.m. to accommodate papers that published late afternoon/evening editions. A telegrapher assigned to accommodate such a publication schedule was expected to report for work to receive the first transmissions at 7:00 a.m. Larger metropolitan newspapers that published several editions each day obviously required 24 hour service and needed several AP operators on duty around the clock ("How the AP...", 1926; Keel, 1998).

In January of 1926, Keel applied for a job with the Associated Press state bureau in Dallas, and within three weeks, he was hired by the AP and sent to a new newspaper in western Texas, the Lubbock Journal, to work provisionally for several months and learn the rigors associated with his new specialization. When his probationary period was completed, the AP transferred Keel back to Temple in 1927 to work for the Temple Telegram in his first full-time assignment. He then worked for the AP as a sending operator in Austin, Houston and Dallas before completing his last stint in press telegraphy at the Fort Worth Star-Telegram from 1928-1933.

Press telegraphy required little more from its professionals than a keen sense of concentration, superb listening skills and a good work ethic. The monotonous nature of receiving and translating a series of dots and dashes for hours upon end, day after day, was perhaps the major downside of the occupation. While completing his on-the-job training in Lubbock, Keel learned the demanding nature of press telegraphy, maintaining a six-day weekly work schedule. This entailed working daytime shifts, Monday through Friday, and then Saturday nights, copying news for the Journal's Sunday edition.

Keel reported for work with the AP's state headquarters each morning by acknowledging the bureau chief operator's roll call of telegraphers stationed at member newspaper offices on the circuit. Keel sat at his key and typed a special coded response, which signaled that he was ready to take dispatches. The eight-hour shift was almost non-stop, but the AP provided operators with routine ten-minute breaks and a 30-minute lunch period. During these intervals, the AP operator in Dallas simply stopped sending copy for the allotted time of the rest period. Receiving operators thus had to be punctual about returning to their equipment after their brief respites. "We didn't dare take eleven minutes at break time because the Dallas operator always started the wire (resumed sending code) right on time (after ten minutes)," Keel recalls. "They had to assume that you were there the rest of the day and that you copied every word that was sent." Compounding the demanding nature of the job was the fact that the AP usually stationed only one telegrapher at smaller newspapers. Relief help was rarely available if the operator was ill, although the AP did assign temporary operators to fill in for family emergencies or extended illnesses.

Deciphering incoming dots and dashes was a difficult task in a noisy newspaper plant. Details of news stories, sports scores and the intricate figures associated with stock market quotations all moved at breakneck speed, sounding like nothing more than a series of ceaseless clicks to the untrained ear. The telegrapher had to listen intently to decipher the code, never losing focus on the task of translating Phillips code into English at the rate of up to 45 words per minute. Keel recalls:

> The AP took great pride in keeping names and numbers correct....we didn't make too many errors. We couldn't afford to....You had to keep your head and not make mistakes because a lot of people depended on you (especially) those people who were dealing in the stock market....We used to copy all those figures every afternoon...all the fractions, high, low, changes and all of that.

Keel recalls that telegraphers were often so absorbed in their rote task of translating code that the actual meaning and importance of the stories they were copying was usually not realized until the completed copy was handed over to the copy editor. Oddly enough, only two stories from Keel's tenure as a press telegrapher stand out today among the thousands that he copied: the 1929 stock market crash and the depression that followed and the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby in 1932. All other news stories from the era remain in Keel's memory as nothing more than millions of indistinguishable clicks on his telegraph sounder.

Older, more experienced telegraphers could sometimes stray from a disciplined work regimen without facing serious consequences. The seasoned ear could often distinguish Morse messages from among other distractions, and some operators were said to be so good that they could carry on full conversations and simultaneously copy incoming news stories (Davis, 1954; Russell, 1943). But novice operators could not be tempted to stray from the task at hand. There were few backup systems available if the operator missed incoming copy, and making major errors in receiving coded stories could soon cost operators their jobs. Keel recalls that he went astray only once in his career while working in Fort Worth:

> There were several other telegraphers working there, all of them considerably older than I. The time was during prohibition, but there were several speakeasies around--if you knew where to find them. Several of the telegraphers would visit one of those nearby places during lunch (each day) and have a home-brewed beer. Well, I thought I was really grown up, so I decided (one day) to have a brew during lunch period. (I) Don't recall that I had any lunch, so the potent home-brew hit me hard. When I got back to the office after the lunch break, the wire started up with a bulletin....I was so woozy from the brew that I had trouble using the typewriter. I could hear and interpret the code, but my fingers didn't respond properly. ...That was the last time I ever had a drink during working hours. Some of the old-timers could handle a few drinks on the job, but it wasn't for me.

As previously mentioned, press telegraphers enjoyed a certain occupational status that ranked above other lines of telegraph work, best evidenced, perhaps, by the fact that press operators' wages were considerably higher than other specializations in this era. For example, Keel recalls that when he joined the Associated Press in 1926, his initial salary was $32.60 per week, which represented a substantial raise over his $25.00 weekly salary as a railroad telegrapher in Temple. Again, the salary compensated a 48-hour work week, and included no fringe benefits.[6]

Skilled operators could always supplant regular income by moonlighting for firms that also depended on telegraph communication, although Keel recalls that the Associated Press usually frowned on such practices (he once got into trouble for moonlighting at a nearby brokerage firm while working at the AP's Austin office). Nonetheless, there was a ready-made market for part-time work for ambitious operators. Western Union, for example, which regularly provided telegraph accounts of college and professional sports events for subscribing newspapers and radio stations, always hired freelance telegraphers on weekends to help the company provide play-by-play accounts from college and professional stadium press boxes (Smethers & Jolliffe, 1992). WU also had part-time work available for operators skilled in sending and receiving commodity information, since brokerage firms were often good customers for the company's special business wire services ("Western Union Telegraph Company," 1949). Keel recalls that larger brokerage companies usually bypassed the Western Union services and, instead, employed their own battalion of telegraph operators to handle stock market trading dispatches.[7]

In addition to the arduous demands and long hours associated with telegraphy, there was another more serious downside to this profession that was feared by operators young and old: "telegrapher's paralysis," or "glass arm," or "carpal tunnel syndrome," as the malady is more commonly known to modern day computer operators. The ailment, a tendentious of the wrist, characterized by pain, numbness, and tingling, was caused by the constant up-and-down motion of the telegrapher's hand and wrist, hour after hour, day after day. Glass arm was an occupational hazard that greatly hampered Morse operators' usefulness. Although they were able to receive and translate incoming copy, their ability to send code with a painful, swollen wrist was all but lost (Russell, 1943).

The "Vibroplex" telegraph key emerged after the turn of the century, and, while it was originally invented to speed up the process of sending code, it had the dual advantage of easing the plight of telegraphers stricken with glass arm. The key—called the "bug," so named because of the lightening bug in the manufacturer's emblem on its base—was a semi-automatic device. Dots were made automatically by pressing the key to the right, while dashes were made by pressing the key to the left. As an example of how the bug speeded up the process, a Morse telegrapher sending the letter "S" would have pressed a manual key down three times quickly (the Morse code for the letter "S" is "dot-dot-dot"). With the bug, the operator only needed to press the key to the right until it had automatically sounded three times (Gerlach, 1945; Meyer 1902). The apparatus thus allowed operators to speed up transmissions with the added advantage of requiring very little wrist movement. Operators suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome could thus maintain their productivity and keep their jobs (Russell, 1943).

The Twilight of Press Telegraphy

Aubrey Keel and any of his contemporaries who pursued telegraphy in the World War I period picked a rather inauspicious time to enter the profession. The news industry had been experimenting with the "teletypewriter," the forerunner to the teletype, since 1915 (sometimes referred to in literature of the day as "teleprinters"). As with most any innovation, early prototypes of this machine were not perfect, nor would the technology be ready for universal service for nearly two decades. But the "men of Morse" understood the grim reality that the encroachment of the teletypewriter was imminent, and that telegraph operators stood little chance of surviving an industry-wide movement towards automation. In 1932, the Associated Press in Dallas announced the company's intention to install the new mechanical devices at all member newspaper offices in Texas, which meant massive layoffs for Keel and his colleagues.

Albeit crude, the basic idea behind the teletypewriter was developed in the latter 1800s. The concept was simple: the sending operator, sitting at a typewriter-like keyboard, pressed a given key representing a letter of the alphabet, creating an electronic impulse that triggered the flywheel at the end of the circuit which printed the corresponding letter (Bloom, 1956; "The Murray Page-Printing Telegraph," 1901). There was one chief reason for the teletypewriter's slow diffusion: its successful operation required synchronous speed for the motors on the transmitting and receiving machines. In order to accomplish this feat, the frequency of the electrical current generated by utility companies furnishing power at both ends of the circuit had to be standardized at the frequency of 60 cycles per second. Any fluctuation of motor speed at either end of the circuit could cause the printer to incorrectly reproduce transmitted copy. Most of the nation's fledgling electric companies did not adopt the 60 cps standard until several years after printer technology was introduced ("Effects of Employment...," 1932; Smethers & Jolliffe, 1992).

Keel recalls that the earliest machine put into service by the AP, the Morkrum Model 12, required regular monitoring to sustain the correct motor speed. Engineers maintained an almost constant vigil over the equipment, checking accuracy almost hourly with a special tuning fork that could signal if and when the velocity began to fluctuate. Another problem: since the teletypewriter's operation depended on several moving parts, the contraption was subject to mechanical breakdown (a common early day occurrence). Such propensity for mechanical failure was enough to promote skepticism about the new technology among members of Keel's telegraphy fraternity. But there was an even greater—and perhaps more unforgivable—sin associated with printer operation: the devices were not really any faster than the telegraph operators the machines had been designed to replace. Keel recalls:

> It wasn't much more than a glorified typewriter with a motor on it. You almost had to stand there (while it operated) with an oil can and a screw driver to keep it going....(It) did just 40 words per minute, which was about the same speed the operators did. I remember we were all very skeptical of these new machines...Morse operators were just as fast...But...(the teletypewriters) didn't take coffee breaks and they didn't get sick.

But the efficiency of the Morse system was also variable at best, depending on the skill levels of the telegraphers at each end of the circuit. Some telegraph operators were able to send and receive messages with unbelievable speed and accuracy. But subsequent improvements in teletypewriter manufacturing resulted in faster models that could reproduce about 60 words per minute, a speed that even the best telegraph operators were unable to match. And the AP wasted no time in investing in the improved models. A report in the Monthly Labor Review (1932) heralded the increasing efficiency of the teletypewriter:

> Except for a very few cases of low-speed printers, it is probable that teleprinter operators transmit twice as rapidly as Morse operators. Certainly the ratio of 60 to 35 is a conservative estimate of the speed of the printer operation as compared with Morse (p. 755).[8]

Undoubtedly, the AP liked the new technology for another reason: gone were the days of recruiting skilled telegraph operators who could command higher salaries for their craft. Instead of requiring proficiency in Morse and Phillips code, the AP only demanded that its new teletypewriter specialists be good typists. No longer would AP corporate officers be forced to deal with telegraphers' escalating salary demands and skilled typists could be readily recruited from secondary and technical schools at wages that were a fraction of the cost of hiring trained Morse and Phillips operators.

As evidence of the AP's penchant toward automation, the number of press telegraphers employed by the company fell from 1,114 in 1915, when the company first installed the machines in the offices of its New York member newspapers, to only 586 in 1931. Likewise, the number of technicians required to service the machines rose from only eleven in 1915 to 335 in 1931 ("Effects of Employment..., 1932, p. 754). Keel remembers that the AP's Texas office fired 30 employees in one day as the state bureau began modernizing its news dissemination services, but the switch to teletypewriters was not wholesale, nor did it happen immediately:

> At Fort Worth [where Keel was assigned when the change to the teletypewriter began] they didn't replace the (Morse) operators overnight. They brought in some teleprinters (to receive copy) on certain wires but retained some of the operators until they got (the machines) going good. I suspect it was about a year before they decided to really go all the way with teletypewriters. We had a period where we used both services...

Displaced AP operators were able to find work in railroad telegraphy, message handling, communication for oil companies (which required telegraph operators to maintain contact with remote drilling sites) and offices of large corporations, many of which had installed private telegraph lines and employed their own staffs of telegraph operators. But the perfection of printer technology at the AP precipitated a gradual convergence—and a purge of telegraph operators—in almost every industry that had relied on the older line of communication. Western Union, the nation's leader in message handling at this time, began phasing in teletypewriters almost simultaneously with the AP ("Displacement of Morse...", 1932). Brokerage firms were ready customers for the teleprinter's improved speed, accuracy and lower operating costs. In almost every industry application the telegrapher's days were numbered, if not over.

As telegraphy was being phased out, Keel remained in Fort Worth for about a year at the request of the AP. Company executives understood that the process of switching to the new teletypewriters would not be easy, and that the new machines would require technical supervision and constant maintenance. Keel, who had received a crash course in printer operation as the Star-Telegram phased in the then-imperfect machines, convinced AP management that he understood how to perform routine maintenance and even repair the machines when they broke down. Consequently, he was one of two operators retained in Fort Worth to deal with the imperfections of the new apparatus.

In 1933, Keel was transferred to the AP's New York office, to work as a technician. While in New York, Keel, who found himself becoming more and more fascinated with the wonders of new technology, had the opportunity to further specialize, this time in the field of wire photo transmission. In 1934, the Associated Press acquired the Western Electric wire photo system, making it possible for news photographs to be "wired" to member newspapers. That year, the AP installed these scanning machines at newspapers in 26 major cities, and Keel was trained in operation and maintenance of this equipment. He recalls that this technology, which was the precursor to today's fax machine, was a bit cumbersome:

> They were huge machines (and we needed) a room full of equipment just to send and receive pictures....It had 96 wet cells [batteries]. Every Sunday,

> I would check the water levels to make sure the wet cells were (able to provide the necessary power)....(The machine) ran about 18 hours a day...

That year, Keel was transferred to Des Moines, Iowa, as a wire photo technician, where he worked for two years, before being summoned back to New York in 1936 to be supervisor of the wire photo division serving the New York member newspapers.

Following World War II, and after a brief stint in the Army Air Corps, Keel returned to work at the Associated Press, this time as Chief of Communications for the AP's Iowa bureau. His office, known in technical jargon as the wire service's "traffic" division, was responsible for installing and maintaining teletype machines for newspapers and broadcast stations in the state and for servicing AP wirephoto machines at member newspaper plants. Keel was transferred to a similar position in Los Angeles in 1952, and in 1958, the AP moved him to the Milwaukee office, where he remained until his retirement in 1966.

Conclusion and Discussion

As communication historian Carolyn Marvin (1988) has written, people with technical literacy have traditionally created their own social currency in American society. Craftsmen skilled in electronic technologies have been able to shape their own destinies and have stood out as social icons of innovation who have essentially fashioned their own definitions of proficiency, established their own work ethics and, in doing so, perpetuated demand for their talents (p. 21). This study illustrates Marvin's hypothesis through the micro-perspective of one man who, as an apprentice in telegraphy, mastered the jargon, skills and standards that defined the expertise of his profession. As an insider, Keel further specialized and, even as his original craft was threatened with extinction, he transferred his expertise to new technologies. His membership in the existing professional order ensured his livelihood, and as one who understood the emerging skill levels of his vocation, he further developed his expert status as a teletype and wirephoto technician.

This study provides an unusual snapshot of press telegraphy as an occupation, which, in spite of its importance to a flourishing news business in America, has received very little treatment from the scholarly community. In fact, even the trade journals and popular press provided surprisingly little coverage of this line of work until it was virtually obsolete as a vocation. Here we learn the rigors associated with achieving competence as a telegrapher, the demands (and downsides) associated with executing the duties of press telegraphy on a daily basis and the methods by which members of this craft defined standards of professionalism. Keel's singular account, while admittedly not wholly generalizable to the occupation at large, is nonetheless one of the few remaining windows through which we may examine a vanished craft that nonetheless built modern news gathering traditions.

This study hints at a topic that deserves further exploration: women in telegraphy. An inquiry by the author has revealed that there are some female members of the Morse Telegraph Clubs of America, and that women did work in railroad, message handling and other industrial applications of the telegraph. The exhaustive search to find living persons who were press telegraphers revealed no women members of this rapidly disappearing fraternity. Nonetheless, it would be beneficial to media historians to examine how women generally contributed to telegraphy as a profession. In line with the work of Beasley and Gibbons (1993) and others, such a slant on telegraphy would further help fill in the gaps in historical scholarship that have excluded the contributions of women professionals.

This study provides the unusual perspective of looking at a communications monolith, the Associated Press, in an entirely different way. Instead of providing a typical "great man, big business" purview, this study focuses, instead, on a priceless firsthand account of an industry immersed in sweeping technological transition, and how those changes impacted the labor force and quickly antiquated a once-proud and seemingly essential profession. Aubrey Keel's life story serves as a subtle reminder that technological revolutions know no boundaries, and the skills associated with any occupation are only as indispensable as the limits of the technology itself. Automation and technological advances have always uprooted the lives of communication professionals and will likely continue to do so. Keel's success at adapting to the very technology that consumed his telegraphy career illustrates the value of flexibility and serves as an exemplar for today's media professionals in an age where computer-mediated communication again threatens some time-honored media production skills with extinction.

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Endnotes

[1] The origin of this verse is unknown. Aubrey Keel, the former telegraph operator whose life story is the focal point of this paper, recalls that the verse was written by a minister in Pennsylvania, but it is not known if the preacher was a telegraph operator. Keel recalls that it was common for telegraphers to tap out such verses either when testing their equipment or during slack hours as a means of alleviating boredom.

[2] Obviously, considering that the AP began phasing out telegraph operators in the 1920s, living persons with primary knowledge of this specialization are indeed a rare find. In fact, while this article was in preparation, another former AP telegrapher living in Phoenix, Arizona died at the age 97. The author was able to trace only two other men who had worked in this capacity for the AP, but both were in ill health and were unable to be interviewed. While it is realized that other news services such as United Press and the International News Service obviously distributed their news to subscribers via telegraph, the author was unable to locate professionals who had worked for these organizations.

[3] Most information about Keel's life is based on his recollections gathered in a personal interview with the author on August 2, 1998. Keel was located through contact with the Morse Telegraph Club of America, an organization of retired telegraph operators who worked for the Associated Press, message handling companies such as Postal and Western Union, railroads and other branches of specialization in telegraphy.

[4] Although most telegraph operators were men, some women also entered this profession, and, as evidenced here, some women took such training at the Goldwaithe depot. The war years certainly created a bigger demand for women who were willing to learn telegraphy, and Keel recalls that two women who were part of his apprentice class did go on to have successful careers as railroad telegraph operators. Some women worked for Western Union in telegraph messaging, but it is not known how many women were employed in press telegraphy for the Associated Press or other news services (see Smethers, 1991).

[5] Even though the Phillips system is categorized by telegraphers as a "code," it is more accurately a system of abbreviations for words. Phillips telegraphers still used the Morse code system of dots and dashes to represent letters, numbers and punctuation.

[6] To put Keel's pay into perspective, his weekly Santa Fe Railroad telegrapher's salary of $25.00 compares to the 1926 national average telegraph operator's wage of $23.37 (apparently the going rate for operators employed by Postal Telegraph and Western Union for message handling). The Associated Press salary of $32.60, then, does seem to be quite attractive when compared to wages for the profession at large ("Average Annual Earnings..." 1975, p. 168).

[7] Brokerage work was considered the highest level of telegraphy because of the arduous demands associated with accurately sending and receiving quotations and trading information. One minor mistake could cost customers thousands of dollars; thus, only the most seasoned telegraphers were hired for this highly demanding work.

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[8] In the literature of the day, the terms "teletypewriter" and "teleprinter" are used interchangeably. The "teletype" was the name of the improved model developed by Western Electric and used by the Associated Press for most of the days when the technology was in use.

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American Press Coverage of Sociologist Herbert Spencer
During His 1882 Visit to America

By Jack Breslin
Graduate Student

School of Journalism and Mass Communication
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455

Tel: O: 612-624-5038
H: 612-617-8860
Fax: 612-626-8012
Email: bresl006@tc.umn.edu

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"American Press Coverage of Sociologist Herbert Spencer During His 1882 Visit to America"

Abstract

Herbert Spencer, the English philosopher and social scientist of evolution, enjoyed remarkable popularity in post-bellum America. This paper describes the newspaper coverage of Spencer's 1882 visit to America in an attempt to discern what views of Spencer's were conveyed to readers which shaped how they perceived him. Through content analysis of relevant news stories, feature stories, dispatches and editorials in nine selected major newspapers, this study of press coverage of Spencer's visit offers an insight into this country's acceptance or rejection of his intellectual contribution.

Herbert Spencer, the English philosopher and social scientist of evolution, enjoyed remarkable popularity in post-bellum America. His teachings were studied in the universities and his books were widely read even outside the scholarly circles. When he arrived in the United States for a brief tour during the Fall of 1882, his popularity had reached a peak (Hofstadter, 1955, 34).

A farewell banquet, generous offers of hospitality and lecture requests during Spencer's American tour all demonstrate his popularity. Managers of great railways vied in offering him first-class accommodations. Hotel proprietors welcomed him as their honored guest. Friends heaped upon him and his traveling companion, Edward Lott, their private favors, guided tours and kindness. Even though weary, Spencer enjoyed this genuine welcome everywhere he went in America (Duncan, 1908, 225).

Spencer, then 60, claimed that he traveled to America hoping for relaxation and amusement, not to give lectures. Since completing his latest writings on sociology, Spencer's health had been failing and he hoped that a trip to America would restore it. Besides refusing to lecture, Spencer, a lifelong bachelor, avoided the usual social obligations and traveled incognito with Lott, his intimate friend, from Derby, England (Spencer, 1904, 451, 481).

This paper describes the newspaper coverage of Spencer's 1882 visit to America in an attempt to discern what views of Spencer's views were conveyed to readers. Spencer's views have been rejected by most social scientists today, but he is acknowledged as a pioneer in sociological analysis. His theories and works enjoyed immense popularity in the late 19th century, particularly in industrial expanding America.

Sales of Spencer's books in America from the early 1860s to December 1903 came to 368,755 volumes, a figure unparalleled in philosophy and sociology (Turner, 1985, 11). In an impressive demonstration of Spencer's controversial influence, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes mentioned him in a famous dissent in *Lochner v. New York*, the disputed landmark decision on substantive due process: "The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics*" (198 U.S. 45, 1905).

Spencer's concept of Social Darwinism appealed to America's growing industrial-business class. Applying the theory of Charles Darwin (*On the Origin of Species*, 1859) to society, Spencer first coined the phrase "survival of the fittest." He argued that human society and its institutions were progressively evolving toward perfection and complete happiness. The wealthy had a proven capacity for survival, while the poor were the least fit. Thus, helping the poor would impede the greater good of progress toward social perfection to benefit humanity, Spencer maintained (Turner, 12).

Spencer's first work, *Social Statics*, published in 1851, championed the doctrine of laissez-faire, free markets, and the need for restrictions on government powers. His later books include *Principles of Psychology* (1854), *First Principles* (1862), which first laid out his "synthetic philosophy," *Principles of Biology* (1867), and *Principles of Ethics* (1875). Considered a pioneer in the development of sociology as a social science, Spencer devoted nearly two decades to sociological analysis, as discussed in *The Study of Sociology* (1873) and *The Principles of Sociology* (1874-1896) (Turner, 10).

Not a "traditional scholar," Spencer did not have an academic degree or academic position, so he never taught any students to carry on his legacy. A private person, he did not enjoy giving public lectures. Instead, he engaged in daily afternoon conversations with the literary and scientific intellectuals of his day in London's social clubs. Until his death in 1903, Spencer confided to others that he had not been truly appreciated, despite his widespread following. That perception seems to have proved true as Spencerian sociology was ignored by most practicing social scientists by the mid-twentieth century. (Turner, 10-11).

When Spencer visited America in 1882, the nation was in the midst of an era of incredible industrial and economic growth. Fortunes were being made by business barons in the rapid expansion of such industries as steel, textiles, railroads and oil. The wave of immigration to America had shifted from Western and Northern Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe, while Congress had suspended the influx from China with the Chinese Exclusion Act. The population was shifting to the cities, causing problems of increased crime and overcrowding.

On the political front, Chester Alan Arthur had become president in 1881, following the assassination of James Garfield. In the 1882 congressional elections, the Democrats would regain control of the House of Representatives. Other major events during Spencer's visit in the fall of 1882 included a yellow fever epidemic raging in the South, floods in the Midwest, and federal troops chasing the renegade Geronimo and the Apaches in the Southwest.

Despite Spencer's popularity, his visit to America did not attract wide press attention that one would expect today for a celebrity figure, but the press did report his movements (Hofstadter, 31-50).

Spencer declined press interviews until right before his departure, but items at intervals in the personal or other columns of newspapers described his journey and physical appearance or offered a jest at his expense. In the absence of interviews, journalists fabricated some items. When he finally did submit to an interview, the interview and other statements by him provoked substantial editorial comment. American press coverage of Spencer during his 1882 visit reflects not only Spencer's popularity, but also gives some insight into reaction to him.

Statement of Purpose and Theoretical Framework

The purpose of the research for this paper was to attempt to ascertain what image of Herbert Spencer and his views were "constructed" in the newspaper coverage of him during his trip to America. Though Spencer's works sold well in late 19th-century America, the majority of daily newspaper readers were probably not familiar with his theories, particularly their application and relevance to their country and times. Thus, the way that the newspaper press covered Spencer shaped how readers perceived him. Since this was Spencer's only visit to America and he did not conduct a lecture tour, giving only one speech during the trip, this press coverage of his visit would constitute the only knowledge that most Americans would ever have of him and his ideas. Thus, readers would take the "reality" of who Spencer was, and what he represented from what they read in the newspapers about him during this visit.

According to the theory of the social construction reality, as explained by James Carey (1992), social objects are not given in this world, but are constructed by the meaning people give to them. That meaning is a product of everyday social activity and expressive forms, such as creating and reading newspapers. Human beings are active agents, not passive agents as consumers of media. Thus, in reading any text, people must interpret the text creators' interpretations, and while they grasp the meaning built into others' words and behavior, they add meaning from their own experiences (Carey, 60). People build their knowledge of reality through interpreting a variety of symbol systems, of which journalism is a part (Carey, 30).

This paper may offer insight about how the 19th-century American press presented a particular set of ideas and their advocates. This can contribute to knowledge about journalism history, especially about a particular kind of press coverage, such as the press role in creating "celebrities." Finally, the daily newspaper can offer insights into intellectual trends in given historical periods. In this case, we may glimpse through press coverage something about acceptance or rejection of the intellectual contribution of Herbert Spencer in America.

Research Questions and Method

To explore newspaper coverage of Spencer's only visit to America, research was guided by these questions: 1) What was the basic news coverage of Spencer's arrival and itinerary in America? 2) What did editorials say about Spencer and his ideas? 3) Were there differences in coverage among newspapers studied? 4) What views did Spencer express toward the press and press treatment of him? 5) How, then, was Spencer and his ideas presented to the readers of American newspapers during his 1882 visit to America?

Newspapers were selected on the basis of geographic location and circulation on the assumption that this would give a broad reflection of coverage of Spencer and allow for any differences to be identified.* Thus prominence and geography were the prime factors in selection. (Availability was also very important.) The *New York Times* (NYT), *New York Tribune* (NY Trib) and *Chicago Tribune* (CT) were established, respected papers with large circulation during this period. The *Boston Evening Transcript* (BET) was competing with several new, growing papers in New England, but was a solid newspaper. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* (St. L P-D), edited by Joseph Pulitzer, and the *Louisville Courier* (LC), edited by Henry Watterson, were both growing in importance. The *New Orleans Picayune* (NOP), *Atlanta Constitution* (AC) and *Washington Post* (WP) (founded in 1877) offered geographical and editorial perspective.

The daily and Sunday editions of each selected newspaper were studied for the period of August 22 to November 30, 1882, from the date of Spencer's arrival in America

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The metropolitan newspapers for this study were selected from those available in the microfilm collection of Wilson Library at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

until his arrival back home in England. Each edition was studied for any items, dispatches, feature stories, editorials and editorial cartoons related to Spencer. The relevant news stories and editorials were studied for details of Spencer's trip and for public reaction to him.

No previous studies of press coverage of Spencer's 1882 American visit were found. Principal biographies of Spencer by Elliott (1917) and Turner (1985) offer details of the trip, while Spencer's autobiography (1904, II, 457-481) gives his reflections on America during his journey.

Findings

Spencer's comments emphasized several real problems that plagued America in 1882, such as political bosses, decay of moral values, and the robber barons of industry. Press response to his visit, especially responses to his criticisms of American life, gives an impression of mixed attitudes toward him. Some editors praised Spencer for his insights and encouraged readers to heed his message of salvation for America. Others found him contradictory, too speculative and irrelevant.

Since Spencer did not grant any press interviews, except for a brief one at departure, and made only one public appearance, the press had to rely on second-hand information from such sources as railway porters, hotel clerks and Spencer's hosts. The most significant stories and editorials were those reporting Spencer's "interview" with Professor Youmans and his banquet speech in New York City, Spencer's only public speech, prior to his departure.

Basic News Coverage of Spencer's Arrival and Itinerary in America

The basic news coverage includes Spencer's arrival, his travels in America, his "interview" with Youmans and his banquet speech, which are described in this section.

Herbert Spencer's arrival in New York on August 22 on the steamer *Servia* out of Liverpool did not make the front pages. The British war in Egypt got more attention in the papers than the arrival of the eminent English philosopher in New York. Other news items indicated that President Chester A. Arthur, in office barely a year, was spending more time in New York, his native state, than in Washington; the public was excited over the upcoming elections; the Star Route Trials were exposing new scandals every week; and, as noted earlier, yellow fever raged in the South (NY Trib, 8-22-1882, 2)

Professor Edward L. Youmans, Spencer's friend and promoter as editor of *Popular Science Monthly*, met Spencer at the dock and carefully avoided the press. With little else to report, the papers merely noted Spencer's arrival. Items in the New York City newspaper coverage discussed his health and travel plans, in stories that appeared in other papers as credited dispatches (Ibid.) Items in the *Louisville Courier* (LC, 8-26-82, 4) and *Chicago Tribune* (CT, 8-22-82, 2) favorably elaborated on Spencer's achievements probably because their western audiences were possibly ignorant of his works. For example, the *Tribune* reported that the trip was "solely for the benefit of his health," since the completion of Spencer's "work on sociology" had "very much enfeebled" the 60-year-old "eminent English scientist." The item said Spencer was expected to visit Chicago and St. Louis (but he did not), but "his future movements will be governed by the length of time required to regain his strength" (CT, 8-22-82, 4).

While Spencer rested from his voyage, the only coverage in newspapers studied offered descriptions such as this one of his physical appearance: "Herbert Spencer is nearly sixty and wears a fringe of dark hair and whiskers streaked with gray. His nose and mouth are prominent, forehead high and his eyes bright blue" (NOP, 8-29-82, 1).

Within a week of his arrival, Spencer headed north to the Catskill mountain resorts. A few items mentioned that "Mr. Lott and friend" were traveling incognito (WP, 9-2-82, 2; CT, 9-5-82, 2; NOP, 9-7-82, 4). While he was passing through northern New York, he declined an invitation to speak at the American Social Science Association convention in Saratoga, New York (St. L P-D, 9-11-82, 4; NOP, 9-7-82, 4).

While Spencer traveled to Montreal, the St. Lawrence resorts and Toronto, and then rested at Niagara Falls, journalists began to create news about him. A woodcut cartoon of him appeared in a few papers (Spencer, 459-65; CT, 9-5-82, 2). In other papers he was compared to other Englishmen traveling to America at the same time. Several papers quoted a slanderous remark from Spencer that playwright-poet Oscar Wilde was "an outlandish person who attempts to reconcile idiocy with art" (WP, 9-26-82, 2, LC, 9-28-82, 4; NOP, 9-29-82, 4). (Spencer later vehemently denied ever making the statement.)

With no other information available except from railway agents, hotel managers and porters, the press played up reports of Spencer's insomnia, and Eastern papers reflected sympathy for his ill health (BET, 9-19-82, 5; WP, 9-20-82, 2). One report from Niagara showed the respect of hotel guests and servants for Spencer and his condition as they honored his wishes for quiet and solitude (NY Trib, 9-20-82, 4; CT, 9-22-82, 4). Items in other papers, especially in the West and South, poked fun at him, as illustrated by this comment in the *New Orleans Picayune* : "The great Spencer, now in America, is unmarried. It is to be hoped that Mr. Spencer's ice cream bills while he is with us will not frighten him away from the girls" (NOP, 9-16-82, 4, LC, 9-25-82, 4, 9-17-82, 7). The *Louisville Courier* editor apparently ignored the general esteem for the distinguished thinker, for he wrote on September 9:

> If anybody suddenly hears a strong British voice that sounds like, ' 'Eaven 'elp this blarsted country, w'at would they say in Hengland?' the probability is that Herbert Spencer is somewhere in the neighborhood (LC, 9-9-82, 4; St. L P-D, 9-11-82, 4).

Although Spencer planned to visit the Far West, he got no further than Cleveland, Ohio, before heading back East. He was the guest of steel magnate Andrew Carnegie in Pittsburgh, and he spent a few days as a guest of Philadelphia millionaire C.W. Childs (Spencer, 467-8). Meanwhile, reports spread that his health was so poor and the annoyances of travel so great that he had given up all plans for traveling to the Far West. He was so sorely disappointed with this trip, according to reports, and the effect on his health that he planned to return England shortly. Although Spencer had become rundown in the hustle-bustle of American life, he considered the American people very kind for respecting his wishes for quiet and seclusion (CT, 10-13-82, 8; BET, 10-12-82, 8).

Items in a few papers speculated that Spencer's disappointment with his trip would lead to negative comments on American life. Sarcastically, some items in western newspapers suggested some cures for his insomnia and meager diet and then recommended that the "dyspeptic" philosopher go West to find out what America was really like (CT, 10-20-82, 5; WP, 10-21-82, 2; St.L PD, 10-18-82, 4, 10-20, 4; NOP, 10-18-82, 2, 10-19, 4, 10-26, 4; LC, 10-17-82, 4, 10-27, 4).

In the nation's capital, the *Washington Post* staff gave him only fine print in a personal column (WP, 9-28,4, 9-30, 4). Leaving Washington (Ibid.), he stopped in Baltimore to visit Johns Hopkins University (BET, 9-29-82, 8; NY Trib, 9-29-82,4; NOP, 10-3-82, 6). Back in New York, only seven weeks after he left there, Spencer agreed to an "interview," which appeared in some form in nearly every paper examined for this paper. Secondary sources show that a few days after the interview, Spencer traveled to New England, where he toured Yale College and the Peabody Museum and met with his American advocate, Professor Orthaniel C. Marsh. Another of Spencer's admirers, Professor William Graham Sumner, stopped to visit, but the Englishman was out. Spencer then traveled to Boston, where he met with Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes and the expositor of Synthetic Philosophy, Professor John Fiske. The *Boston Evening Transcript* ignored Spencer's visit, although it gave extensive coverage to President Arthur's October visit. Spencer's incognito disguise may have been effective, since there is not a single reference in that newspaper to his presence in that Eastern intellectual center of American education (Spencer, 477-8). After a visit to Newport, R.I., Spencer went back to New York to prepare for his return to England (Ibid., BET, 10-23-82, 4; NYT, 10-22-82, 12).

Spencer's American friends and admirers honored him with a formal farewell banquet before his departure for England. Nearly 200 leaders from American letters, science, politics, theology, and business attended the hastily prepared banquet on November 9 at Delmonico's in New York (Hofstadter, 48; Spencer, 478-9). Even though he was extremely nervous about the affair, Spencer delivered a carefully prepared speech. The speech was well received amidst thundering applause. The full text of Spencer's speech and details of the banquet appeared in nearly every paper studied (CT, 11-10-82, 5; NY Trib, 11-10-82, 1; NYT, 11-10-82, 5; BET, 11-9-82, 1; 11-10, 2: LC, 11-10-82, 11-10-82, 2). (The address and editorial comment are considered with the Youmans interview below.)

On November 11, Spencer sailed for England. A sizable crowd attended a reception on the dock. Spencer thanked everyone for their kindness but said he regretted that he would never return to America (Spencer, 479-80; BET, 11-12-82, 5; CT, 11-12-82, 3; WP, 11-12-82, 2; NY Trib, 11-12-82, 4; NOP, 11-12-82, 1).

Despite Spencer's aversion to press interviews, a reporter from the *New York Herald* interviewed him before his departure and asked if the results of the recent election had modified his discouraging views about American political bossism (WP, 11-13-82, 4, quoted dispatch). Spencer replied that he was no more hopeful than previously, since the election "indicated only a passing fit of anger on the part of the people" (Ibid.) and the boss problem was an evil deeply embedded in American society. Americans would have to get a clear perception of the evil and fight it with "true and simple republican principles" (Ibid.). However, Spencer admitted that, even though he thought the election was only a "transient exhibition of anger," (Ibid.) nobody could predict what would happen in a country with so many complex political and social factors.

Soon after Spencer's departure, the *New York Times* quoted an article from the *London Times* commenting on his reception in America. The article stated that Spencer's favorable reception in this country was a new experience to him because he was a prophet without honor in his own land. Spencer was not a national hero but an author for a limited class. Many common people knew nothing of him nor understood his writings (NYT, 11-30-82, 5).

The Youmans' Interview

Before that departure interview, no members of the press actually talked to Spencer during his trip (NYT, 10-20-82, 5; NY Trib, 10-20-82, 2; CT, 10-20-82, 6; St. L P-D, 10-21-82, 3; LC, 10-22-82, 7; NOP, 10-25-82, 10). Spencer was annoyed by some of the statements about him in the papers, especially his supposed remark about Wilde. Professor Youmans offered to interview Spencer to contradict any false statements (Spencer, 474-5). In that interview, after giving his explanation about the Wilde remark, Spencer reflected on America. He recognized the greatness of American achievement, he said, but he claimed that Americans were victims of political power. The "synthetic" interview provoked extensive editorial comment -- both positive and negative -- in newspapers across the nation.

In his "synthetic" press interview with Professor Youmans, Spencer complimented America's great material progress as being without equal. However, he solemnly warned that people and "paper constitutions" did not hold the real power in the nation (NYT, 10-20-82, 5; NY Trib, 10-20-82, 2; CT, 10-20-82, 6; NOP, 10-26-82, 7; WP, 10-21, 2; LC, 10-22, 7; St. L P-D, 10-21-82, 3).

His trip had far exceeded his expectations about America, he said. He was astounded by the magnificence of the cities and development of material civilizations. While he admitted that his short trip did not allow him to form a definite opinion of the great benefits of free institutions in America, he said Americans possessed great natural wealth, determination, inventiveness and foresight; yet, along with material progress, a greater kind of progress had not followed. Comparing America to the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages, Spencer said that, even with material prosperity, the people were losing their freedom.

The political-boss machinery really controlled America, he said. The then political manipulation little resembled the ideal outlined in the U.S. Constitution. The sovereign people were fast becoming puppets led by wire-pullers. Republican institutions were by no means a failure, but America would have to go backwards before it could go forward, he asserted. The people could not manufacture these institutions; they would have to grow into them.

Education, according to Spencer, was not the cure-all panacea for political evils. A lack of moral sentiments, not a lack of information, was the root of the evil. Political purity demanded the public good be placed above private interests. The people needed to develop a character that would not permit "small trespasses," which would lead to decay of free institutions. Watchfulness was necessary to prevent private needs from interfering with personal liberties.

Citing several examples of intrusions on personal liberties, including press interviews, Spencer emphasized that free institutions suffered in America. Republicanism was the highest form of government, he said, but it required the highest type of human nature, "a type nowhere at present existing" (Ibid.). He denied claims by some opponents that he approved of "laissez-faire" government, arguing that equitable relations among citizens should be managed through government action.

Despite his criticism of free institutions in America, Spencer remained optimistic about the future. Even though complex factors would allow only vague and central conclusions, he said that America was a social phenomenon the world had never seen before. With its size and heterogeneity, America would be a "long time in evolving to its ultimate form, but that ultimate [form] would be high" (Ibid.). The mixtures of the Aryan race would produce a powerful type of people needed for a complete social life. He concluded by affirming that "whatever tribulations they may have to pass through, the Americans may reasonably look forward to a time when they will have produced a civilization grander than any the world has known" (Ibid.).

Spencer's Banquet Speech - "The Gospel of Relaxation"

In his speech at the banquet, again Spencer criticized America, claiming that life was not just for work but to be enjoyed. He preached a "gospel of relaxation" to an audience filled with some of America's richest and most powerful businessmen.

Spencer thought that his criticisms about America had been generally well-received, according to his autobiography, especially his remarks to the distinguished audience at the farewell banquet at Delmonico's (Spencer, 475, 479). He thanked everyone "sincerely though too briefly" for their praise and hospitality. His speech continued the theme of criticism. As Americans had diverged from the savages, he said, they lost a certain amount of spontaneity and drowned themselves in the monotony of daily work routine. While they pursued a future good, Americans ignored the good of every passing day. From his impressions, he said, Americans aged quicker, and they overburdened their physical conditions with a high-pressured lifestyle. Excessive work and hurried activity made life weary. Overwork had destroyed the value of leisure. Spencer said he feared that future generations would inherit this trait along with a weak physical constitution and lose all ability to enjoy life. The American spirit of competition compelled people to destroy each other. This combination of competition and overwork had substituted for America's purpose for existence.

The age of progress had yielded great benefits that people were meant to enjoy, he asserted, but America needed a better adjustment of labor and enjoyment. There was "too much gospel of work"; it was "time for the gospel of relaxation" (NYT, 11-10-82, 5). Spencer urged his listeners to slow this intemperance of work lest there be "a dwindling of those working out the great future of free institutions in the American nation" (Ibid).

Once the audience settled down after a lengthy ovation for Spencer's speech, several guests paid tribute to the philosopher. William G. Sumner praised Spencer as the man who opened the way to well-defined sociology. Professor O.C. Marsh said Spencer had realized the law of organic evolution in the law of progress for future generations. Carl Schurz proclaimed Spencer a hero of thought and suggested that the Civil War may have been averted if Southerners had read his *Social Statics*. John Fiske praised Spencer's contributions to religion as leading to a true understanding of philosophy and science. Finally, the Reverend Henry Ward Beecher stated that Spencer's advanced ideas had given him a clearer understanding of and closeness to the Divine presence (Ibid., Hofstadter, 48-9).

Editorials about Spencer and his Ideas

Spencer's interview with Youmans and his banquet remarks produced several editorials in the newspapers studied. Some praised Spencer's views of American life, while others criticized his perspectives.

Two complimentary editorials appeared in the papers studied right after Spencer's arrival in America - one in Boston, the other in Louisville. Since the *Boston Evening Transcript* editors apparently realized that Herbert Spencer was only a name to many readers, they extensively outlined his life and works, calling him a critic of great intellectual ambition whose prolific work covered numerous scientific and philosophical fields (BET, 8-22-82, 4).

The *Louisville Courier* editor welcomed Spencer even though he later made fun of Spencer's insomnia, habits and bachelorhood. The editor wrote that he regretted that Spencer's health would prevent him from lecturing but hoped the trip would re-energize this man's "Titanic mind" and spirits. Compared to Oscar Wilde, another subject of jokes in the paper, Spencer, the editor wrote, loomed like the roof of the world as a man of profound thought. The editorial urged readers to delve deeply into his works, saying there were no better works in English than Spencer's for logic, precise language, and intellectual insights.

Editorial Response to the Youmans Interview

Three *New York Tribune* editorials following the interview praised Spencer's impressions and insights. After summarizing Spencer's opinions on the American political situation, the first editorial invited him to stay and watch the coming change. Americans realized the plague of bossism, the editorial said, but the rule of the bosses was ending (NY Trib, 10-20-82, 4).

Using the philosopher's impressions of America's weakness as a departure point, the second editorial urged readers to accept their personal responsibility and public duty, especially in the upcoming elections. The editorial stressed Spencer's estimates of republican institutions as the best America had ever formed, saying he spoke the wholesome truth of philosophical judgment in weighing America's problems. Only an "undone" American, the editorial said, would not admit that some things were wrong in the country. Spencer's remarks gave plain and practical solutions to intrusions on personal liberties (even press intrusions), and those who had read Spencer's remarks in a "right," unclouded spirit should have felt a sense of personal duty and responsibility (NY Trib, 10-21-82, 4).

The third editorial stressed Spencer's observations concerning Americans' willingness to tolerate small interferences against personal liberties. Americans' refusal to "make a row" against political abuses and moral corruption was causing their free institutions to decay, the editorial said, and urged readers to heed Spencer's assertions and not allow "small trespasses" to infringe on their rights (NY Trib, 10-24-82, 4).

The *New York Times* editor stated that Herbert Spencer was "a profound and instructive critic of [American] social and civil organization," as opposed to the recent lectures of historian ...Freeman, who "disappointed us." One *Times* editorial elaborated on Spencer's sociological insight, saying that his words provoked awe as do those from a prophet's voice. Apprehensive Americans could look to this sage as a source of reassurance (NY Times, 10-21, 4).

> If we examine Mr. Spencer's published opinions carefully, however, we find that they point to a most unexpected and unfailing source of comfort and reassurance - the philosophical books of Mr. Spencer himself, so that, from the sociologist abroad the apprehensive American may appeal to the sociologist at home, and, like a new Boethius, stay the rising of the tide of doubt and fear with the consolations of philosophy (NY Times, 10-21, 4).

Through Spencer's theories of ethics, according to the editorials, the citizens would find solutions to temporary defects in the civil structure resulting from imperfections in laws and conduct. If Spencer remained until the next election day, he would "probably have an opportunity to see the work begun" (NYT,10-21-82, 4).

The *Boston Evening Transcript* editor followed Youmans' interview with an editorial on Spencer's scientific morality. Spencer's ethical morality came from his views about the self-preservation of society. His mixture of individualism and altruism formed a neat, logical system for morality in conduct. Spencer showed America a way out of its moral perplexities that could help prevent a moral interregnum (BET, 11-4-82, 10).

An editorial in the *Washington Post* stated that Spencer's calm, philosophical comments gave a fair mixture of praise and blame about America's problems. Considering Spencer's capacity for correct analysis and his refined temperament, his remarks were more gratifying than those of any other English visitor, said the editorial. Spencer's prophecy for the future paid America one of the highest compliments ever given by a foreign writer of repute (WP, 10-29-82, 4).

A *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* editorial on political bossism called Spencer a venerable philosopher and an acute observer and used his impressions to expose instances of bossism and corruption in America. The editor urged readers to recognize the bossism that Spencer pointed out and to rid America of the disgrace brought by political corruption (St. L P-D, 10-23-82, 4).

The *New Orleans Picayune* editor also praised Spencer as a philosophical observer whose judgment on social and political forces was far beyond that of anyone else of that time. His cautious and wise words said what moralists had been warning for years: People were losing their freedom. Americans had to go backward before going forward, the editorialist wrote, but he disagreed with those who claimed that Spencer had a discouraging view of America. The editorial called Spencer's judgment about America favorable and said there was work to be done, and that good patriots should be glad that a powerful voice like Spencer's was on the side of "immediate advance" (NOP, 11-11-82, 8).

Despite later praise of Spencer's scientific morality, the *Boston Evening Transcript* editor commented on the Youmans interview by attributing Spencer's impressions to those of a sick and nervous old man who saw things through a mist. The editorial claimed that Spencer exaggerated the power of political bosses, saying the real corruption was caused by the destruction of moral restraints and censures (BET, 10-23-

82, 2). A "Letter to the Editor" challenged that editorial a few days later by agreeing with Spencer's assertions, and saying that people should be more receptive to and should profit from, the generous spirit of those who speak for the good of mankind (BET, 10-31-82, 4).

The *Chicago Tribune* editor acknowledged Spencer as a great sociologist and a leading expositor of social evolution, but registered disappointment that Spencer's remarks gave no new insights. So much had been already said about the loss of freedom through bossism and corruption that public indignation had weakened, the editor wrote, and while the people looked for more than just words, Spencer's views were "old, well-thrashed straw" (CT, 10-21-82, 4).

The *Tribune* editor argued that Spencer had not seen the depth of the American character and therefore could not reasonably make assertions that it was lacking. The nation still had the power to strike a decisive blow when needed, as it had done throughout its history. The Constitution had been amended and interpreted to fit Americans' changing needs. Spencer had taken a step backward in looking for the perfect government rather than realizing the strength of America, the editor argued:

> Observer, philosopher and reformer in one, he could fairly be expected, when he should speak on the problems of American life, to give us new light, and at least hint at some way we had not tried of solving them. But he disappoints us all in such expectations. (CT, 10-21,4)

However, the editor did agree with the philosopher on one point -- the problems of journalistic interviews (Ibid.).

> Newspapermen will sympathize fully with what Mr. Spencer says about interviewing. No part of the newspaper business is more harassing than that of dealing with the endless procession of people of all kinds who rush to the newspaper offices and ask, 'Wherefore doth the interview begin?' (CT, 10-21, 4)

Editorial Response to the Banquet Speech

The *New York Times* editor considered Spencer's brief speech "an admirable summary of his philosophy and its application to the highest human problems -- 'complete living.'" According to Spencer, the *Times* editor wrote, "complete living" meant treating oneself and one's neighbor as well as possible, and this required a balanced combination of egotism and altruism. Spencer had cleared up all previous misconceptions by affirming that work is for life, not life for work, the editor wrote. The whole world, including Spencer himself, was "so blind that the point of maximum happiness for self and others passed by unnoticed," the *Times* editorial continued (NYT, 11-11-82, 4). Ten days later, the *Times* editor reaffirmed that editorial stance. In answering two prominent physicians who claimed that they had not known anyone who died from overwork, the *Times* editor said Spencer was again correct for he was speaking of a "life of monomania where the mania was business without taste for else" (NYT, 11-21-82, 4).

Agreeing with Spencer that overwork was the greatest evil threatening America, the *New York Tribune* editor said most people could not help being overworked and that Spencer had discovered no new truth but had reaffirmed an old one plainly. Once Americans substituted work for pleasure, life became dreary for a lack of side interests (NY Trib, 11-10-82, 4).

> What Mr. Spencer meant, we believe, to condemn was a life which practically becomes that of a monomaniac, the mania of being business, and it is that of a great many thousand men in this country. They have no taste whatever for anything else. (NY Times, 11-21, 4)

In contrast to the New York editorials, the *Chicago Tribune* editorials took exception to Spencer's homily concerning Americans' work habits. Spencer's original premise did have some truth, but his application had some faults, the *Chicago Tribune* editor asserted (CT, 11-12-82, 4).

The first editorial agreed that Americans had a heavy burden of work and said work had become an end in itself for many. However, the American temperament was adjusted to work, not play, the *Tribune* editor asserted and portrayed Spencer as an ironic figure for preaching the ill effects of work:

> ...the fact that Mr. Spencer of all men should have made it [such a statement] only shows how eloquently a man may advocate a theory though he himself never practice it. Mr. Spencer had to lie in bed several hours before he could go to this dinner to inform Americans that they work too hard. Mr. Spencer was the hardest worker and the sickest gentleman in attendance (Ibid.).

In the second *Tribune* editorial answering Spencer's remarks about America's problem of overwork, the *Tribune* editor stated that Spencer had not seen "the Great West or the Northwest." He had spent most of his time in America with the businessmen and stock gamblers of the East, mistaking them for America's workers. Before passing judgment, the editor wrote, Spencer should have traveled to the West, which feeds the world.

> ... [he would see] strong, earnest, resolute faces that have stood for types in his theory of evolution and survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence....He has only seen the surface excitements, not the strong undercurrents and deduced a false impression (CT, 11-1-82, 4).

Differences in Newspaper Coverage of Spencer

The northeastern newspapers studied, namely the *New York Times, New York Tribune, Boston Evening Transcript*, and *Washington Post*, offered the most extensive news coverage and editorials of Spencer's visit. All three reported and editorialized on his interview with Youmans and his banquet speech. Two midwestern newspapers, the

Chicago Tribune and St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and one southern newspaper, the *New Orleans Picayune*, editorialized on Spencer, in addition to more limited news coverage. Of the newspapers studied, the *Atlanta Constitution*, did not editorialize on Spencer, and offered the least coverage.

Spencer's Views About the Press

Spencer's writings and comments about the American press were limited. He was critical of newspaper journalists, and resented their intrusion upon his privacy. Spencer did not make any significant statements about the role of the press in an emerging democratic nation, however. Among his comments was this reflection in his autobiography:

> Interviewers when baulked are apt to be disagreeable. Feeling bound to make some report, they pick up such details as they can from servants, and are not particular respecting the trustworthiness of their informants. Indeed, in the accounts they thus gather of sayings and doings, food and habits, anything which admits of having a ludicrous aspect given to it is made the most of (Spencer, 474-5).

In his interview with Youmans, before outlining his reflections on America's present and future, the philosopher criticized the press. Unhappy about the misrepresentations printed about his health, dress, habits and the baseless report of his remarks concerning Wilde, he said he did not agree with the practice of press interviews and believed they were an invasion of privacy. America's newspapers placed personality over ideas, he said.

How Spencer Was Presented to Readers of Newspapers During His 1882 Visit to America.

Newspaper readers were presented two views of Herbert Spencer through the coverage and editorials studied. The first view was of a feeble elderly scholar who relished privacy while privately touring America. Despite his efforts to remain incognito, the rich sought to entertain him, while the learned sought his views. On occasion, the press poked fun at his appearance and personal habits, which disturbed personally Spencer.

The second view of Spencer was that of a distinguished social scientist. His ideas as expressed in the interview with Youmans and in the banquet speech provoked both positive and negative reactions from the newspaper editorials studied. Thus, newspaper readers were left to choose which of Spencer's theories best applied to their everyday lives -- the "gospel of relaxation" or "survival of the fittest" -- depending on the editorial slant of their daily newspaper.

Conclusion

The bulk of press response to Herbert Spencer's trip and comments on America was favorable. The press coverage in the East, West and South, shows some different views about Spencer. Most press coverage in the East praised Spencer as an eminent philosopher, while some coverage in the Western press noted his idiosyncrasies and invited him to the "real America."

The limited exposure and diverse response to Herbert Spencer in America indicates that some were enthusiastic about him, others appalled, and many still didn't know who he was. What kind of "reality" of who was Herbert Spencer was thus likely constructed?

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New York Times

(Newspapers, continued)

New York Tribune

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Washington Post

Strange Bedfellows, or a Marriage Made in Heaven? Advertising, the Federal Government, and the Second World War

Inger L. Stole

Assistant Professor
Department of Advertising
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Address: 126 N. Spooner,
Madison, WI 53705
Phone: 608-238-0763
e-mail: istole@uiuc.edu

Paper Submitted to History Division
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
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Strange Bedfellows, or a Marriage Made in Heaven?

Advertising, the Federal Government, and the Second World War

Much contemporary discussion of advertising, academic and popular, presupposes advertising's natural link to capitalism and to the American experience. James Twitchell argues that advertising may be the most significant U.S. contribution to the world, and provides the cultural glue that holds the nation together.[1] The renowned sociologist Andrew Hacker calls advertising "this country's most characteristic institution."[2] Yet considerable historical research suggests that advertising, far from being deep-seated in the American psyche, is actually a twentieth century phenomenon.[3] Moreover, recent research emphasizes the organized public campaigns against advertising in the 1920s and 1930s, primarily in the form of a feisty consumer movement that sought to have the government sharply regulate and even forbid much of what constituted conventional advertising practices of "puffery" and imagery in advertising content.[4] In short, modern advertising was hardly accepted with open arms by many Americans.[5] Indeed, this quintessentially American institution appears to have been, to no small extent, an acquired taste.

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[1] James B. Twitchell, *AdCult USA: The Triumph of Advertising in American Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.)

[2] From back cover comment, Stephen Fox, *The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertising & Its Creators* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997).

[3] See, for example, William L. Bird, Jr., *Better Living: Advertising, Media, and the New Vocabulary of Business Leadership, 1935-1955* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999); Stuart Ewen, *Captain of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of Consumer Culture* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976); Fox, *The Mirror Makers*; Pamela Walker Laird, *Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998); Jackson Lears, *Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Roland Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); James D. Norris, *Advertising and the Transformation of American Society, 1865-1920* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990); Daniel Pope, *The Making of Modern Advertising* (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Michael Schudson, *Advertising: The Uneasy Persuasion; Its Dubious Impact on American Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Juliann Sivulka, *Soap, Sex, and Cigarettes: A Cultural History of American Advertising* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998).

[4] See Inger L. Stole, "Consumer Protection in Historical Perspective: The Five-year Battle Over Federal Regulation of Advertising," *Mass Communication and Society*, forthcoming, Fall 2000. For a discussion of puffery in advertising, see Ivan L. Preston, *The Tangled Web They Weave: Truth, Falsity & Advertisers* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1994).

It was in reaction to this feisty 1930s consumer movement that the advertising industry developed its first public relations strategies. By the late 1930s, and due in no small part to these efforts, the industry had managed to push the consumer movement's radical wing and its legislative demands to the margins. The crowning victory for the advertising industry came with the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment in 1938, which authorized a relatively weak model for federal advertising regulation to be enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).[6] This in itself did not eliminate the advertising industry's need for PR. On the one hand, with formal FTC regulation of advertising it was incumbent upon the industry to keep both the public and politicians convinced of the industry's social worth. On the other hand, the nature of advertising was such that it seemed to continually generate skepticism on the part of some part of the public.[7] In fact, the greatest direct threat to the role of advertising in the United States came only a few years later during the Second World War. The advertising industry found itself with its back against the wall as its necessity for a wartime economy was a subject of open and vociferous political debate.

This paper examines this watershed moment in the history of the U.S. advertising industry. By the "advertising industry" I refer to the main trade associations -- the Association of National Advertisers (ANA), the Advertising Federation of America (AFA) and the American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA) -- that were organized to protect the political and economic interests of advertisers and advertising agencies. In particular I chronicle how the ANA, AFA, and the AAAA navigated the treacherous political waters of Washington D.C. in the early 1940s, primarily through their newly created PR arm, the Advertising Council. I argue that the advertising industry successfully neutralized the threat of hostile government actions toward advertising, and by war's end had established cordial relations between the federal government and the advertising industry that would not be seriously threatened thereafter. The Second World War, in my view, had the ironic role of solidifying the institution of advertising in the economy, the polity, and American culture.

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[5] For a discussion of how unpopular radio advertising was in the late 1920s and early 1930s, see Robert W. McChesney, *Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy: The Battle for the Control of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Susan Smulyan, *Selling Radio: The Commercialization of American Broadcasting 1920-1934* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press).

[6] See Otis Pease, *The Responsibilities of American Advertising: Private Control and Public Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958).

[7] For public attitudes towards advertising in 1940, see George Gallup, "An Analysis of the Study of Consumer Agitation," Box 76, Folder 11, National Broadcasting Corporation papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison.

The Advertising Industry and Washington

The breakout of war in Europe was anything but a boon to the prospects of the advertising industry. The gradual shift from a consumer to a defense economy posed new questions about advertising's role and function in society. A series of heated debates ensued between influential government officials -- who believed that advertising served a marginal, even a counterproductive purpose -- and representatives of the advertising industry determined to preserve the gains the industry had made in the previous decade as the nation girded for war.

By 1940, war-related production demanded an increasing proportion of the nation's raw materials. As a result, production for the consumer market was suffering, and fears that product shortages would cause inflation forced the government to consider price controls. The advertising industry had traditionally presented its economic function as that of informing consumers about new products and encouraging competition and mass production, thus allowing consumers to buy better and more competitively priced products.[8] In addition, industry spoke of how advertising stimulated consumer demand, and hence provided a vital antidote to the depression. Unfortunately for the industry, however, these arguments rang hollow in the defense-oriented economy. Industry leaders worried that continuous advertising, in a time when raw materials and consumer products were scarce and few new products needed introduction, might lend credence to a view of advertising as wasteful, if not downright unpatriotic.[9] Advertising was in dire need of a new justification. Adding an additional twist to the situation was the government's urgent need for an additional revenues to finance national defense.[10]

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[8] See, for example, Roy S. Durstine, "How Advertising Can End Depression," *Nation's Business*, June 1935, pp. 24-26; James Webb Young, "The Professor Looks at Advertising,' *Good Housekeeping*, May 1935, pp. 86-87; Charles Coolidge Parlin, "Advertising - Master Builder," *Nation's Business*, September 1938, p. 54; Ralph Starr Butler, "The Place of Advertising in the American Scheme," *Advertising and Selling*, February 15, 1940, p. 88.

The advertising industry's relationship with the Roosevelt administration had always been clouded with uncertainty. Fueled by constant alarms and a general mistrust of the New Deal, advertising leaders kept a keen eye on influential politicians and their attitude towards advertising.The advertising community was horrified when the government, in the fall of 1940, considered a repeal of the excess profits tax. As written, this law permitted businesses to declare their advertising as a tax-deductible expenses, similar to the deductions allowed to businesses for the costs of raw materials, labor, and other costs of production. Those in favor of the repeal argued that not only would it increase the government's tax-revenues, it could also curb excessive advertising during a period when such promotions were suspect of leading to hording and price inflation. If advertisers wanted to advertise, they argued, they should pay for it out of their own pockets and not charge it to the government as a tax-deductible business expense [11]. The advertising industry regarded the removal of their tax-deductible status as a direct threat to the very survival of the industry throughout the war. And after a long war, who was to say whether the public and politicians might not think it a good idea to maintain the practice into the future.

As much as advertisers were outraged over the new law proposal, they also worried that an open fight against it could be seen as unpatriotic, reflect negatively on the advertising industry, and leave it open to a new round of public attacks. It was for these reasons that the advertising trade press urged extreme caution. Failure to deal with the tax issue in an appropriate manner, warned *Advertising Age*, could land the advertising industry in a very problematic situation.[12] Instead of launching an all-out attack, advertisers tried to convince Washington of advertising's social utility. They argued that American manufacturers could perform a far more patriotic function if their money were invested in advertising than if the same funds were paid directly to the government in the form of taxes. Advertising, because it flowed through a maze of taxable channels -- advertising agencies, printing houses, lithographers, paper manufacturers, and the mass media -- helped boost the government's tax revenues, argued the industry's spokesmen. Because advertising contributed to increased production and higher employment, it helped broaden the government's tax base and help line its coffers.[13]

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[9] "You May Be Out of a Job," *Industrial Marketing*, September 1941, p. 77; Erik Barnouw, *The Golden Web* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 166.

[10] "Will Heavy Defense Taxes Cut Down Consumer Sales?" *Advertising & Selling*, June 1941, pp. 17-18. For a treatment of the advertising industry's fight against taxation during the Second World War, see Mark Leff, "The Politics of Sacrifice on the American Homefront in World War II, *Journal of American History*, Vol. 77, No. 4, March 1991, pp. 1296-1318.

[11] Barnouw, *The Golden Web*, p. 166.

Adding to the advertising industry's immediate worries, however, was a study of distribution costs undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in early 1940. Although advertising only played a small role in the investigation, advertisers suspected the real purpose behind the study was to attack advertising's role in the distribution system.[14] The FTC, on the other hand, contended it had not singled advertising out for attack. The commission claimed difficulties in figuring out why members of the advertising community feared "a fair survey of the place of advertising in the distributive system."[15] Referring to the more than hundred economic inquiries the FTC had conducted into almost every phase of business activity in the U.S., commissioner Robert E. Freer could not recall an instance where these surveys had been charged with muckraking and smear tactics.[16]

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[12] "Excess Profits and Advertising," *Advertising Age*, November 25, 1940, p. 12; J.K. Lasser, "Advertising and the New Tax Law," *Advertising and Selling*, November 1940, p. 12.

[13] "More Advertising Will Take Sting Out of New Taxes," *Advertising Age*, July 1, 1940, p. 23; "A Statement by the Editors on Advertising and the New Tax Law," *Advertising & Selling*, December 1940, p. 29; "Is It Patriotic To Save Taxes By Advertising?" *Advertising & Selling*, November 1940, p. 34; "500 Advertisers Would be Curbed Under the Voorhis Bill," *Advertising Age*, December 16, 1940, p. 48.

[14] "No Intention to Smear Advertising, FTC Member Says," *Advertising Age*, March 18, 1940, p. 5.

[15] Ibid.

But Freer's reassurance did not change the advertising industry's belief that Washington was on the war-path. To the contrary, its suspicion only intensified when Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold alleged that, in some cases, advertising was used a part of monopoly building schemes, a practice which violated the Sherman anti-trust law. Arnold argued that major manufacturers used massive advertising campaigns in order to build demand for their products. This, in and by itself, was fully legal. The problem occurred when the same manufactures, trading on popular demand for these advertised products, forced merchants to accept their less popular brands in order to prevent competitors from building up stock in the store. Such "full-line forcing," according to the Assistant Attorney General, was illegal because it constituted "unreasonable use of advertising."[17] The advertising industry completely lost its patience when the Justice Department expanded its probe in mid-1941. Arnold, who still suspected that a great deal of full-line forcing was taking place, sent questionnaires to 22 major oil companies calling for complete data on their advertising expenditures and demanded minute details of advertising costs and media placements, samples of actual advertising copy, names of agencies, and amount spent in each media category.[18] "The attitude of this school of thinkers towards advertising strikes far deeper than a mere hate of unethical advertising practices," stated *Printers' Ink*. "At the basis is the belief that advertising itself is uneconomic as well as anti-social."[19] In view of Arnold's well known skepticism toward big business and advertising, such concerns were far from unwarranted.[20]

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[16] "No Intention to Smear."

[17] "Arnold Denies Opposition to Use of Advertising," *Advertising Age*, September 23, 1940, p. 2.

[18] "Advertising Under Fire," *Broadcasting*, July 28, 1941, p. 37; "Arnold Disclaims Any Intention to Hurt Advertising," *Broadcasting*, July 28, 1941, p. 62; "Arnold Denies Opposition."

[19] "War On Advertising As Monopoly Breeder Is More Than Talk," *Printers' Ink*, August 30, 1940, p. 9.

[20] See Thurman W. Arnold, *The Folklore of Capitalism* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1937) and Thurman W. Arnold, *The Bottleneck of Business* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940).

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The Role of Advertising in the Defense Economy

The advertising industry was in dire need of vindication, and industry spokesmen began to take another tack. Trying "frantically to prepare a sound argument" for advertising's usefulness in the new economic environment,[21] they declared that the defense economy, far from diminishing advertising's usefulness, actually elevated its importance. Advertising, they promised, could help guide consumers towards products that did not compete with defense production for supplies and raw material. This would not only retard inflation, but contribute to a high level of business activity and employment as well.[22]

Another, and perhaps even more important, function of advertising, argued industry defenders, was its ability to ensure postwar prosperity. A widespread belief, even before the U.S. had entered the war, was that the nation would fall back into a depression once the economic boom caused by expanded defense production had come to an end. The underlying fear was that the peacetime economy would be unable to immediately absorb the returning citizen-soldiers and the workers who had been employed in wartime production. Business interests advocated extensive use of advertising as a means of alleviating the problem. Advertising, they contended, would maintain the visibility of Ford, Chrysler, General Motors et al. during the emergency and ensure a demand for the old, familiar products once the war had ended.[23] What promised good for business was portrayed as good for all. With proper planning and direction, promised *Advertising Age*, the postwar period could bring prosperity to the whole nation.[24] Wartime, or emergency, advertising, stated a much more forthcoming spokesman for the industry, spokesman, "is primarily to preserve markets, maybe even enlarge them, for the time when Uncle Sam will not be our biggest customer... Then a company will be well off if, by good advertising it finds that it still has loyal dealers and a public that has not forgotten but is waiting to buy again.[25]

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[21] "You May be Out of a Job."

[22] Henry M. Stevens, "New Horizons Now," *Printers' Ink*, December 19, 1941, pp. 51-52; G.A. Nichols, "AAAA sharpens tools for huge defense task," *Printers' Ink*, May 9, 1941, pp. 25-26; "Looking Ahead to Peace," *Advertising Age*, April 28, 1941, p. 12.

[23] Nichols, "AAAA sharpens tools"; Everett R. Smith, "What of 1946," *Printers' Ink*, September 5, 1941, p. 17. See also, George Lipsitz, *Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

[24] "Post-War Planning," *Advertising Age*, August 25, 1941, p. 12.

In blatant attempts at appearing useful to the war effort, manufacturers who contracted their services to the government invested their products and services with an aura of patriotism. This approach, according to one source, was justified because large parts of the nation's factory output formed the adequate preparation to defend America's liberty. The argument was simple and the ad copy was blunt: Automotive assembly lines were now turning out Sherman tanks and B-24 Liberators. Without those tanks and bombers, the Axis might win the war.[26]

Whereas manufacturers of chemicals, airplanes, and machinery could promote the importance of these products in the preparedness program, producers of consumer-oriented products were forced to use war themes for more illustrative purposes.[27] Those who produced items for sale or distribution to soldiers were especially eager to promote this in their advertisements. Gillette and Mennen stressed soldiers' use for their shaving supplies; Wrigley's gum did the same for chewing gum. Camel, Chesterfield, Lucky Strike and Pall Mall advertised the preference of America's soldiers and sailors for their tobacco products. Makers of Alligator rainwear and Fortune shoes as well as pen companies like Parker and Whal also used their army contracts for promotional purposes. Companies that were only indirectly affected by the war preparedness situation also used defense themes as attention-getters. For example, both the bank of Manhattan and Hammermill paper included tanks in their advertisements; Best Foods promoted Nucoa (a new margarine) by depicting a lunching aircraft worker with the caption

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25. Cy Norton, "Advertising in 1942 will be different," *Printers' Ink*, December 5, 1941, pp. 23-27.

26. "Advertising Tunes Up for Defense," *Printers' Ink Monthly*, November 1940, pp. 10-11.

27. Ibid.

"Defense workers eat healthy."[28]

Sporadic ads for rainwear and margarine could only take the advertising industry's cause so far, however. In order to counterbalance the government's attempts at smearing advertising, it needed to renew its PR campaign to "sell" the public on advertising and free enterprise,[29] "If private enterprise is paralyzed and destroyed through widespread destruction of public confidence in efficiency and its motives, it is but a sure stop to the suppression of personal rights," warned one business man.[30]

Hot Springs, November 1941

The advertising industry was by no mans a novice at defending itself. By the early 1940s, it had developed and perfected a series of public relations strategies designed both as a means of defense and to elevate the public's perception of advertising. Changing times and new challenges, however, called for constant reevaluations of these efforts.[31] Calling for "a fight for advertising's survival," Paul West, who was president of the ANA, urged the advertising community to put all petty individual differences aside.[32] Soon, the AAAA and the ANA had formed a joint committee to look into ways of solving some of advertising's problems.[33]

In mid-November 1941, the newly established group hosted a joint meeting which attracted more than 700 advertising, business and media representatives. Their purpose was to discuss national advertising, justify its economic role, and develop strategies for dealing with advertising criticism in general.[34] "[T]he danger lies not so much in what extremist, alarmist elements in the anti-advertising forces are trying to do," explained the ANA-AAAA committee in charge of the summit, "but the fact that the more moderate elements, among those in charge of the nation's machinery and in Congress, simply do not realize what is taking place because they don't fully understand what advertising is and how it functions."[35] Industry leaders urged for the marshaling of all resources in order to fight back the attacks.[36] James Webb Young, a senior consultant at the J. Walter Thompson agency belonged to those who believed that a soft-selling approach would yield the best result. "John D. Rockefeller," he insisted, "did not escape the charges of being a robber baron until he became a philanthropist."[37]

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[28] "Defense in the Ads," *Business Week*, April 5, 1941, p. 35

[29] The advertising industry's PR efforts for this purpose had been an ongoing project since the early 1930s. See, for example, Inger L. Stole, "Selling Advertising: The U.S. Advertising Industry and Its Public Relations Strategies, 1932-1945," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1998).

[30] Ralph K. Strassman, "Time To Fight," *Printers' Ink*, January 31, 1941, p. 129.

[31] Frederick R. Gamble, Address at Annual Meeting, 10th District, Advertising Federation of America, October 18, 1941, Box 7, Folder 8, Thomas D'Arcy Brophy papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison [hereafter: Brophy papers], p. 1.

[32] Harold B. Thomas, *The Background and Beginning of the Advertising Council* (n.d), Box 13, Folder: Background and Beginning of the Advertising Council (1952), Record Group 13/2/203, The Advertising Council papers, The University of Illinois Archives, Urbana [hereafter: Ad Council papers], n.p.

[33] Thomas, *The Background and Beginning*, n.p.

In spite of a very volatile situation during the fall of 1941, talks at the Hot Springs meeting largely ignored world events. Most delegates were concerned about the war only to the extent that it encroached on "business as usual." Both director of the Office of Price Administration (OPA), Leon Henderson and director of Office of Product Management (OPM), William L. Blatt found this upsetting and accused the advertising community of being too preoccupied with its own problems.[38] Delegates were surprised, however, when instead of condemning advertising, Henderson stressed its socially useful potentials. He asked that the advertising industry, instead of distrusting the government, become its allay during the problematic defense period.[39] "If I have a point of view of advertising," stated Henderson, "it is that under the sort of expanding economy I would like to see, *There should be more of it*. That is more of the right kind."[40] The exact meaning of the term was left up to the delegates. Henderson's comments gave plenty of food for thought. "If advertising wants to raise, rather than hurt its professional prestige," reflected *Advertising Age* after the meeting was over, "it would do better to impress the public with efforts in behalf of the country, rather than efforts on behalf of itself."[41]

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[34] "Advertising News and Notes," *The New York Times*, October 1, 1941, p. 30. See also "ANA, Four A's to Scan Attacks on Advertising," *Advertising Age*, October 6, 1941, p. 2; "Most Challenging Problem Subject of 4A's-ANA Meet," *Advertising Age*, November 3, 1941, p. 1; "Advertising Industry Plans War Council," *Broadcasting*, November 3, 1941, p. 16.

[35] "'Most Challenging Problem'," p. 32; "Advertising Industry Plans War Council;" "Advertising News and Notes," *The New York Times*, October 29, 1941, p. 39; "Advertising Pledges Aid to the War Economy," *Broadcasting*, November 17, 1941, p. 8.

[36] "Advertising Industry Plans War Council."

[37] "Young Presents Forward-Looking Plan for Field," *Advertising Age*, November 17, 1941, p. 26; "Advertising Pledges Aid, p. 7.

[38] "Advertising Clinic," *Newsweek*, November 24, p. 47.

If the delegates could have peeked into the near future, they would have realized that Henderson's talk provided the outline for one of the advertising community's most effective public relations campaigns. Many delegates left the meeting eager to transform its ideas into more practical forms. "We have within our hands the greatest aggregate means mass education and persuasion the world has ever seen, namely the channels of advertising communication. stated James W. Young, "We have the masters of the techniques of using these channels. We have power. Why do we not use it?"[42] A follow-up meeting discussing how "the governing group of the Advertising Council or whatever it is to be called" should be organized and funded took place a few weeks after the November conference.[43] Then came the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which effectively advanced the group and forced it to define its purpose.

The (War) Advertising Council

Within a few days after the U.S. entered the Second World War, Donald M. Nelson, who was director of priorities for the OPM, contacted Paul West with a plea for the advertising community's assistance in fighting the war. Washington, according to Nelson, needed both the advertising community's creative talent and access to its channels of communication.[44] The trade press reacted to the proposal with enthusiasm. Advertising would do a great job at stimulating enlistment in the war effort; it would help sell war bonds; it would help build up the nation's morale--all in a generous and selfless spirit. Advertising, assured the industry, would serve "primarily as a public information service."[45] While framing its response in terms of help to the war effort, the advertising industry also hoped that the effort would help its general cause.[46] Close association with the war effort would give advertising a starring role in the greatest endeavor yet undertaken by the United States. It was a heaven-sent opportunity that the industry hoped would translate into improved public relations, not only with the public, but with Washington as well.[47] "The advertising office's greatest skeleton, fear of federal interference, will crumble into dust with Uncle Sam himself turning to advertising to gain defense program results," predicted one industry observer. "Mr. Advertising himself will walk jauntily down main street, publicly recognized as a tried and true defender of the American Way."[48]

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[39] "Henderson Disclaims Fight on Advertising," *Broadcasting*, November 17, 1941, p. 9.

[40] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

[41] "Should Advertising Defend Itself --or the U.S.?" *Advertising & Selling*, December 1941, p. 36.

[42] Thomas, *The Background and Beginning*, n.p.

[43] Thomas, *The Background and Beginning*, n.p.

The advertising community's main concern was now to develop a plan for mobilizing advertising on a national scale, and to locate the industry's proper place in the war effort. A handful of key figures representing national advertisers, ad agencies, and media, moving at a breakneck pace, met on January 5, 1942. They formed a tentative organization, naming Chester LaRoche chairman, Paul West secretary, and Frederick R. Gamble assistant to the chairman. This small group, convened at a defining moment in the nation's history, marked the unofficial founding of the Advertising Council.[49] "By doing everything possible now to help win the war," stressed Chief of the Division of Industrial Operations, James S. Knowlson, "business is serving its own best interests, for the sooner we get the job over with we will thus secure the foundation on which our business and economic structure is based."[50]

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[44] Bethune, *A History of the Advertising Council*, p. 34.

[45] "War Comes to America," *Advertising Age*, December 15, 1941, p. 12; "Advertising for Uncle Sam," *Advertising Age*, December 22, 1941, p. 12.

[46] See, for example, "The Advertising Council U.S.A.," *Advertising Age*, February 23, 1942, p. 12.

[47] "Advertising for Uncle Sam."

[48] This observation was made in late October 1941 at a Pacific convention for the American Association of Advertising Agencies. See, "Sees End to Government Advertising Opposition," *Editor & Publisher*, November 1, 1941, p. 8.

Formally established in March 1942, and officially recognized by the government later that year, the Advertising Council worked closely with the Office of War Information (OWI), to promote the government's home front campaigns.[51] Many government agencies welcomed the Council's help. In fact, several had began to use these services even before the Council was officially announced.[52] Few projects were "typical" of the Council's work, but a basic pattern did emerge. All Council projects were initiated through the OWI's Bureau of Campaigns. The Bureau was the focal point for government drives as well as the agency; it was where various other federal agencies made their promotional needs known. In setting up a typical campaign, head of the Bureau, Ken R. Dyke, first met with representatives from the appropriate government departments and agencies. After a proposed campaign had been analyzed and approved by the Bureau of Campaigns, the Bureau invited the Advertising Council to participate. The next step involved a discussion of the proposal by the Council's executive committee. The committee evaluated the proposal for its usefulness in the overall war effort, and whether it was worthy of advertising support. Upon approval of a project, the Advertising Council's board of directors designated one of its members as project coordinator.[53] This coordinator assumed full responsibility for carrying out the campaign. This person, always a representative of a national advertising agency, in effect assumed the job of advertising manager for that particular campaign.

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[49] "Advertising Council Serves to Coordinate War Activities," *Advertising Age*, December 15, 1941, p. 24; Bethune, *A History of the Advertising Council*, p. 36. For excellent accounts of the Advertising Council see, for example, Frank W. Fox, *Madison Avenue Goes to War: the Strange Military Career of American Advertising, 1941-1945* (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1975); Robert Griffith, "The Selling of America: The Advertising Council and American Politics," *Business History Review*, Vol. 57, No. 1, Autumn 1983, pp. 388-412; Leff, "The Politics of Sacrifice."

[50] "Minutes of Meeting of Advertising Council, February 5, 1942," Box 1, Folder: Advertising Council Minutes January-February 1942, Record Group 13/2/201, Ad Council papers, p. 4. See also Leon Henderson's comment in "Advertising's Wartime Job," *Industrial Marketing*, February 1942, p. 74.

[51] "Planning and Production of Government Information Plans," n.d., Box 4, Folder 1, Brophy papers.

[52] "Advertising Council reports on progress," *Printers' Ink*, April 17, 1942, pp. 53-54.

The job started with selecting one or more of the more than 400 advertising agencies that had volunteered their services to the Council. The next step involved developing campaign plans in cooperation with the designated ad agencies, a project director from the Advertising Council's paid staff, and the government department that had requested the Council's promotional help. Preliminary plans, usually copy suggestions, layouts, and miscellaneous material, were then worked out and submitted to the Advertising Council's board for approval.[54] Advertisers were asked to underwrite the various campaigns, and they used the finished campaign material in their advertising. In other words, the Advertising Council coordinated campaigns for the government in the same manner that the ad industry worked for any large commercial client.[55] Advertisements prepared by McCann-Erickson and paid for by the American Iron and Steel Institute encouraged people to salvage scrap metals. Kenyon & Eckhardt's campaigns asked people to conserve fats and found a willing sponsor in the glycerine-producing industries. Newell-Emmett made posters and pamphlets for the Army, Navy, and FBI; Young & Rubicam promoted the government's war bonds.[56] Advertisers, in turn, incorporated campaign messages into their many advertisements. All of the Advertising Council's services were contributed to the government free of charge.

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[53] Some of the larger projects were assigned more than one project coordinator. The War Bond Drive, for example, had six.

[54] "Advertising Council Serves," p. 28; David Lloyd Jones, *The U.S Office of War Information and Public Opinion During World War II, 1939-1945* (Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Binghamton, 1976), pp. 219-220.

[55] "260 Ad Agencies Volunteer Services for War Effort," *Advertising Age*, June 15, 1942, p. 8.

[56] James Playstead Woods, *The Story of Advertising* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), p. 450.

Washington and the Tax-Issue -- Revisited

In a matter of months, the Council's efforts were starting to pay off. It did not take long, for example, before President Roosevelt praised the advertising industry for its valuable assistance and "splendid spirit of cooperation."[57] Gradually, government agencies once considered hostile to advertising became convinced of advertising's usefulness in promoting the war effort. Even the Office of Price Administration, traditionally considered a hotbed of anti-advertising sentiments, began to recognize the value of advertising as a way of conveying war-related information to consumers in an effective manner.[58] Government agencies such as the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce felt likewise. The latter stressed that advertising was "indispensable to the functioning of free enterprise and the creation of a high standard of living."[59] The Advertising Council, observed the trade press, was well on its way to clarifying in the minds of government regulatory and legislative authorities the proper function of advertising during the war. The attitude of wartime Washington appeared to be vastly different from that of peacetime Washington in the heyday of the New Deal.[60]

Such recognition had been the Advertising Council's goal from the outset; a major aspect of its strategy had been to develop close relationships with government sources. The Council encouraged government officials to attend its meetings and to schedule frequent meetings with its executives and staff. However, the best form of connections, according to the Advertising Council, resulted from informal meetings with people like Dyke and his associates

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57. "President Roosevelt's Message," *Advertising Age*, June 29, 1942, p. 12.

58. "War Record Silences Advertising Critics," *Broadcasting*, August 10, 1942, 1942, p. 44; "Washington Gets Our Story," *Advertising Age*, June 22, 1942, p. 12.

59. C.B. Larrabee, "A thing of peace, advertising is now geared to winning the war," *Printers' Ink*, July 10, 1942, p. 28.

60. "Anti-Advertising Fears Allayed by Government Steps," *Advertising Age*, July 13, 1942, p. 1; "The Advertising Council U.S.A.;"How the Government Recognizes the Information Industry as an Essential Part of Our Free Enterprise System and a Powerful Force for Good in Wartime," June 1942, Box 62, Folder 1, Colston E. Warne papers, Center for the Study of Consumer Movements, Yonkers, NY.

in the Bureau of Campaigns. In July 1942 the Advertising Council directed its chief to prepare plans for an "informal smoker type of gathering" between the Council's board of directors and those engaged in promotional activities for various government departments.[61] The Advertising Council also recommended that three of its associate directors spend several days every week in Washington in order to extend their contacts and widen the scope of the Council's operations. Presumably this would give it a better understanding of the governmental machinery and also provide the government with an opportunity to deepen its appreciation for business and advertising. "We must not only understand the function of government as it relates to business," stressed the Advertising Council. "[W]e must also build an organization that knows not only the temporary personnel in Washington, but also the permanent personnel--the career men who will be in Washington after the war."[62]

Madison Avenue was particularly fortunate to have a strong supporter in Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. Morgenthau was one of the first government officials to ask the Advertising Council for promotional help. By 1942, the Treasury had come to rely almost entirely on the Council's help in promoting its sale of War Bonds and Stamps to the American people. The sale of these securities allowed the government to borrow money for the war effort from its citizens and relieved some of the pressure for new tax revenues. The Advertising Council treated the Treasury's task with utmost consideration. It designed an elaborate campaign plan and instructed individual advertisers on incorporating the Treasury's purchase pleas with their institutional or consumer-oriented advertising. Both the Treasury and the advertising industry knew, however, that a new tax law, prohibiting, or severely restricting, advertisers' ability to deduct promotional expenses from their income taxes, would mean the end to much of their cooperation. The result would be a much smaller venue for the Treasury's campaign.

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[61] "Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Advertising Council, Inc., July 24, 1942," Box 1, Folder: Advertising Council Executive Committee & Board of Directors Minutes July-August 1942, Record Group 13/2/201, Ad Council papers.

[62] "Preliminary Organization Report," n.d., Box 1, Folder: Advertising Council Executive Committee & Board of Directors Minutes July-August 1942, Ad Council papers; "Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Advertising Council, April 6, 1942," Box 1, Folder: Advertising Council & Executive Minutes March-April 1942, Ad Council papers. Council member Charles M. Mortimer Jr.'s appointment to consultant in the Office of Price Administration (OPA) in early 1943 was duly noted by the Council. See "Minutes of the Executive Council of the Advertising Council, Inc., April 30, 1943," p. 3, Box 1, Folder: War Advertising Council Executive Committee and Board of Directors Minutes, March-April 1943, Ad Council papers.

This may have been a decisive factor behind the Treasury Department's final decision to side with advertisers in the debate over advertising as a tax-deductible business expense. Morgenthau, emerging as a driving force, stated that his department as well as the Bureau of Internal Revenue fully appreciated advertising's importance in the national economy and that reasonable and normal advertising would remain a deductible business expense. "The test of whether expenditures for advertising are deductible," he stated, "is whether they are ordinary and necessary and bear a reasonable relationship to the business activities in which the enterprise is engaged." This did not exclude institutional advertising in reasonable amounts or goodwill advertising calculated to influence the buying habits of the public.[63] Advertising filled these criteria so long as it was not carried to an "unreasonable extent" or constituted an obvious attempt at avoiding tax payments.[64] The Treasury Department only objected to expenditures that were seemingly "extravagant" and out of proportion to a company's size or its past advertising budgets. The ANA, congratulated the Treasury on "a fine understanding of the true functions of advertising and its place in business."[65] The advertising industry concluded that not only did the Secretary of the Treasury understand advertisers' need to maintain brand name loyalty and to "keep brand names alive," it also suggested that government officials had become more friendly towards advertising after seeing that "the promotion world" could be put to work to help win the war.[66]

Exactly how the government would come to interpret "reasonable, ordinary, and necessary" was not clear, however. Advertisers, with the more adversarial New Deal days fresh in their memories, were apprehensive. They wanted to know if all advertising, including advertising of products that were being sold through government contracts, would fall within the ruling. A meeting between representatives from the ANA, the Treasury Department, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue clarified the issue. Both the Treasury Department and the Bureau of Internal Revenue recognized advertising's role in the national economy and had no intention of restricting reasonable and normal advertising through taxation. The latter agency was also willing to approve normal expenditures for new types of advertising which had emerged as a result of the war. It recognized that advertising costs had risen and that gasoline and tire restrictions had forced companies to increase their reliance on advertising. All this needed to be taken into consideration when evaluating a company's use of such promotions.[67]

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[63] "Tax Rule Explains Advertising Status," *Broadcasting*, August 31, 1942, p. 52; "Excerpts from Renegotiation Manual," Box 4, Folder: Government Contracts 1943, 1944, Record Group 13/2/305, Ad Council papers.

[64] "Tax Rule Explains." See also, "Advertising expense and corporate income tax returns," *Printers' Ink*, September 4, 1942, p. 19.

[65] "Advertising Tax Status Draws Morgenthau, Henderson Views," *Broadcasting*, June 1, 1942, p. 51. For a celebratory trade-press account of Morgenthau's decision, see "Morgenthau Clears the Air," *Advertising Age*, June 8, 1942, p. 12.

[66] A.P. Mills, "Anti-Advertising Fears Allayed by Government Steps," *Advertising Age*, July 13, 1942, p. 1.

"In clarifying its stand governing the allowability of advertising expense," stated *Advertising Age*, "advertising men agree that the Internal Revenue Bureau of the Treasury Department had made an outstanding and noteworthy contribution to American business."[68] *Printers' Ink* assured readers that the advertising industry had nothing to fear from the government's friendly, cooperative, and helpful attitude and was told to "perk up and become a little more realistic and trusting." Moreover, argued the trade publication, "[w]ith the attitude of government officials so friendly and helpful, it naturally follows that 'reasonable' will be just that and if it is what more can anybody ask?"[69]

Private citizens were harder hit by the Treasury's new tax rules, however. In 1943, most American workers witnessed a sharp tax increase. The progressive personal income tax rose to 94 percent of top income, but most of the new revenue came from lower personal exemptions. Whereas only four million Americans filed any income tax return in 1939, this number had tripled by 1942.[70] Although the advertising industry, only a few months earlier, had fought their own taxes tooth and nail, it now stressed private citizens' obligation to support the war effort through higher taxes. "All have to be sold the idea that war-work, war-taxes, war-self denial, war-giving, and war-spending are the personal business and responsibility of each man and woman in the whole continent," preached an industry observer. "No exceptions can be made, and no omissions in groups allowed."[71] The hypocrisy was carried to an extreme by one advertiser who nominated "tax-day" as "the day of another American Thanksgiving." The Stewart-Warner Corporation argued that rather than using this day as an occasion to grouse over income taxes, American taxpayers should celebrate their patriotic contributions.[72] The advertising industry, on the other hand, argued that *its* sacrificial contribution to the war effort would come through the Advertising Council's work for the government.[73]

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[67] "Advertising Costs Ruled Deductible," *The New York Times*, August 28, 1942, p. 29; "Wartime Uses of Advertising Acknowledged by Treasury," *Advertising Age*, August 31, 1942, pp. 1-2; "Tax Rule Explains Advertising Status," *Broadcasting*, August 31, 1942, pp. 52-53; "Advertising in Wartime," *The New York Times*, August 31, 1942, p. 16; "Tax Deductions Made for Advertising," *The Commercial & Financial Chronicle*, September 3, 1942, p. 810; "Advertising expense an corporate income tax returns," *Printers' Ink*, September 4, 1942, p. 19; "Explanation of Treasury Department Attitude on Advertising Expense," *Advertising & Selling*, September 1942, article is sandwiched between pp. 16 and 17.

[68] "Wartime Uses of Advertising."

[69] "Advertising As Government Sees it; an Interpretation," *Printers' Ink*, October 9, 1942, p. 9.

By mid-1943, the ties between the government and the advertising industry had grown even closer. A reorganization of the Domestic Branch of the OWI result in the appointment of several key individuals, all with strong ties and loyalties to the advertising community.[74] And whereas other divisions in the Domestic Branch witnessed cuts in their staff and appropriations, the Advertising Division started to add new personnel, effectively boosting advertising's presence in the OWI. The Advertising Council responded to the changes by renaming itself the War Advertising Council (WAC) and adopting "A War Message in Every Ad" as its goal and slogan.[75] Advertising, noted *Advertising & Selling*, had now evolved into a semi-official government enterprise.[76]

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[70] Jones, *The U.S Office of War Information*, p. 240.

[71] W.P. Tuttle, "Total Advertising," *Printers' Ink*, November 13, 1942, p. 15.

[72] "Stewart-Warner Sees Tax 'Small Price for Freedom," *Printers' Ink*, March 5, 1943, p. 71.

[73] Leff, "The Politics of Sacrifice."

[74] "Admen Appointed to New Posts in Reorganized OWI," *Advertising Age*, March 15, 1943, p. 1; "Full Text of Statement by OWI and its Operations," *Advertising Age*, March 29, 1943, p. 36; "OWI Tells Its Story," *Advertising Age*, April 5, 1943, p. 12, "OWI Ad Unit Adds Three New Members to Staff," *Advertising Age*, June 7, 1943, p. 6; "OWI 'Advertising Unit Evades Lethal Blows of Congress," *Advertising Age*, July 5, 1943, p. 1. See also, Jones, *The U.S. Office of War Information*

1944 saw an important example of the chummier relationship between the industry and Washington. In March of that year President Roosevelt invited a group of executives from the advertising community to what would later become an annual "off-the-record" meeting between 200 government officials and advertising representatives. During what the White House characterized as "'off-the-record' indoctrination talks," the War Department, Navy Department, and officials from other executive departments and agencies were on hand to meet and chat with delegates who also had an opportunity to meet with President Roosevelt.[77] The conference was sponsored by the Army, Navy, War Production Board (WBI), OWI and the WAC. One hundred advertisers, fifty advertising agency representatives, and twenty-five people from the mass media were asked to attend, as was the entire WAC Board, which was invited to dine at the head table with key people from various government agencies. Council chairman Harold B. Thomas was among the chief speakers.[78]. "The basic reason for this meeting," claimed the organizers, "is to restate the need for continued support of [the WAC's programs] until the war is not thought to be, but *is* won. We hope to show that now, and until victory, there is even greater need for a united public doing those things which will speed victory right down to the last Jap."[79] One of the highlights for the War Advertising Council was a meeting with President Roosevelt, who praised the advertising industry's war contribution and asked that it be continued.[80]

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[75] "War Advertising Council Opening for War Advertising Message in Every Ad," *Broadcasting*, July 5, 1943, p. 18; "'War Advertising Council' New Name for Liaison Group," *Advertising Age*, June 7, 1943, p. 18; "'War Message in Every Ad.' Set Up as Goal of Field," *Advertising Age*, June 14, 1943, p. 8; "War Advertising Council Incorporated Memorandum, July 10, 1943, Box 4, Folder 9, Brophy papers.

[76] "War Dissolves Most Supposed Areas of Disagreement," *Advertising & Selling*, October 1942, p. 21; "The Critics' Showdown," *Advertising & Selling*, February 1943, p. 116.

[77] "Memorandum for General Watson and Grace Tully," February 16, 1944 and "Memorandum for the president," March 6, 1944, Box 196, Folder: Advertising 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt papers, the President's Official Files, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY [hereafter: OF-Roosevelt papers].

[78] "Minutes of Meetings of the Board of Directors -- War Advertising Council, Inc., January 28, 1944" and "Minutes of the Meeting of the War Advertising Council, Inc., February 18, 1944," Box 1, Folder: War Advertising Council - Board of Directors Minutes, January-February 1944, Record Group 13/2/201, Ad Council papers. For an outline of the program, see "Minutes of Meetings of Sponsor Members and Board of Directors of War Advertising Council, March 3, 1944," Box 1, Folder: War Advertising Council -- Minutes March-April 1944, Record Group 13/2/201, Ad Council papers; "Words that Work for Victory," Box 1, Folder: Ad Council Annual Report 1944-45, Record Group 13/2/202, Ad Council papers, p. 5. For a summary of Nelson's speech, see "WPB Warning Given on Civilian Output," *The New York Times*, March 9, 1944, p. 23.

Encouraged by the success, the advertising community decided to continue the Council's operations beyond the war. With the war effort no longer in need of its services, the postwar Advertising Council was free to chart its own course. Whereas the Council's wartime programs had asked people to salvage fats and purchase war bonds to express their patriotism, its postwar campaigns redefined the meaning of this noble sentiment. Patriotism was now pegged to the unconditional acceptance of free enterprise, which some termed "People's Capitalism."[81] The Advertising Council's new intent, Robert Griffith observes, was to "promote an image of advertising as a responsible and civic-spirited industry, of the U.S. economy as a uniquely productive system of free enterprise, and of America as a dynamic, classless and consensual society."[82] Much as during the past decade or so, this strategy was aimed at lessening the chances of anti-advertising legislation or government regulation. And with Washington securely aboard, the advertising industry entered the postwar era with confidence and new enthusiasm.[83]

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[79] "Background information for the White House conference," Box 196, Folder: Advertising 1944, OF-Roosevelt papers. Emphasis in original.

[80] "Words that Work," pp. 4-5.

[81] Eric Johnston, *America Unlimited* (Garden City: Doran and Company Inc., 1944).

[82] Griffith, "The Selling of America," p. 388.

[83] For evidence of Washington's support, see letter to Harold Thomas from Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 7, 1944, Box 5, Folder" The President's Letter 1944, Record Group 13/2/305, Ad Council papers. Even Harry Truman, who during his tenure as Senator had been quite critical of advertising, emerged as an Advertising Council supporter after becoming president in 1945. See letter to James Webb Young from Harry Truman, October 15, 1945, Box 4, Folder: Government Information Set-Up 1945, Record Group 13/2/305, Ad Council papers.

Conclusion

After spending the better part of the 1930s defending itself against a rapidly spreading consumer movement, the economic situation, caused by the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, presented the advertising industry with a new set of challenges. Whereas the industry had viewed the consumer movement as its largest challenge in the 1930s, it now looked toward the federal government with a growing sense of suspicion. Such concerns were heightened by the rhetoric of New Dealers like Thurman Arnold who seemed insufficiently reverential of the advertising industry's function in the economy and society. Due to the general shortage of products for the consumer market, politicians who had formerly been friendly toward the advertising industry had begun to question advertising's economic role and its tax-deductible status.

Much like when it was attacked by the consumer movement in the 1930s, the advertising industry's early response was that of indignation, followed by a recognition that a more well-defined public relations effort had to be orchestrated. Ironically enough, it was the federal government which presented the advertising industry with its biggest public relations opportunity. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the government enlisted the advertising community's help. Officially formed in 1942, the Advertising Council proved to be the advertising industry's most successful PR effort to date. While publicly pitching its promotion of the government's home front campaigns in terms of unselfish patriotism, the seemingly philanthropic effort held a more sinister side. Its main purpose was to serve the advertising industry in a public relations capacity.[84]

By the end of the war, the Council had greatly helped to improve advertising's status in Washington, D.C. The immediate reward for the creation and development of the Advertising

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[84] See, for example, comments by James Webb Young in Minutes of Meeting Board of Directors and Sponsor Members, War Advertising Council Inc., September 28, 1945, Box 2, Folder: War Advertising Council Minutes September-October 1945, Record Group 13/2/201, Ad Council papers, p. 3.

Council was a generous tax-break for advertisers. The long term effect was increased respect and appreciation for advertising in government circles, a trend which was to continue throughout the war and far into the postwar period.

History

Abstract

The U.S. Military and War Correspondents in World War II: Roles and Relationships

Alan Armitage

The relationship between the U.S. military and war correspondents during World War II affected coverage of the war as much as the rules of censorship. Colin Sparks' six roles which the state plays in relation to the media (patron, censor, actor, masseur, ideologue, and conspirator) are the basis for an examination of works by and about World War II war correspondents to explore the impact of the relationship on coverage of the war.

The U.S. Military and War Correspondents in World War II:

Roles and Relationships

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Alan S. Armitage
2045A Cedarwood Drive
Scott AFB, IL 62225-1439
(618) 744-1808
armitage@iess.net

The U.S. Military and War Correspondents in World War II: Roles and Relationships

Introduction

Freedom of the press is widely regarded as one of the most important freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Probably the strongest argument supporting freedom of the press is the belief, first espoused in Milton's *Areopagitica*, that it is only through a free and open exchange of ideas that the truth can emerge.[1] From this has been developed the "marketplace of ideas" theory that holds that the population of a democracy must be afforded such a free and open exchange of ideas in order to arrive at the truth necessary to perform its democratic duties.[2]

But a free press is not seen as merely an informant for the populace -- another aspect, and one that is key to this paper, is the notion that a free press is "a precondition of the exercise of the 'watchdog' role" over the operations of the state.[3] This is not necessarily an adversarial role, although it can be. It is, however, a manifest role in which the press monitors the operations of the state and reports to the populace on any instances of mismanagement or misappropriation within the state.[4]

The state can operate in a number of different ways, but the ultimate exercise of a state's power is when the nation goes to war. Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th century

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[1] Edwin Emery, *The Press and America: An Interpretative History of the Mass Media*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), 10 [it is ironic to note that Milton later served as official censor under Cromwell].

[2] Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919) as quoted in Donald M. Gillmor and Jerome A. Barron, *Mass Communication Law: Cases and Comment*, 3rd ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1979), 15.

[3] Denis McQuail, *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 142.

[4] Herbert J. Gans, *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time* (New York: Pantheon, 1979), 292-3.

Prussian military theorist, said that war is "the continuation of policy carried out by other means."[5] Clausewitz argued that the only course was to "subordinate the military point of view to the political."[6] This lesson has been, and still is, taught to officers in the U.S. military: war is an instrument of policy -- military strategy can not (and should not) be separated from political strategy.[7]

Consequently, if the press is performing its watchdog function, it is during times of war that the reporting should be most vigorous, and the military should receive the most attention. And thus, the work of war correspondents is some of the most important work which journalists can do. They should keep the population informed as to the progress of the war, whether it is being prosecuted successfully and in accordance with the political strategy it is intended to support, and how the troops are faring in their conduct of the war. In other words, it should be informing the population and acting as watchdog over the state, and in particular the military.

Unfortunately, probably the greatest exception in the case of freedom of the press is government censorship in time of war. Robert E. Summers noted that over time "this country . . . has learned that news is a vital instrument of war! The result - Censorship!"[8] The idea that censorship is a necessary evil in wartime has been voiced by members of the military, the press and the public, and has been supported by the Supreme Court.[9]

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[5] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 69.

[6] Ibid, 607.

[7] For example, see U.S. Air Force, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Squadron Officer School, Course 24D, 0024D 02 9403, *Force Employment: War-Fighting Doctrine and History* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1994), 6-17.

[8] Robert E. Summers, *Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio* (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1942), 9.

[9] For example, prior to World War II (October, 1939), Elisha Hanson, counsel for the American Newspaper Publishers Association, advised journalists not to publish information regarding the movements of troops, ships, or planes if it might endanger American lives during a national emergency, (Michael S. Sweeney, "Byron Price and the Office of Censorship's Press and Broadcasting Divisions in World War II" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio University, 1996), 60); and the Supreme Court has supported wartime censorship through such rulings as Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opinion of the court in Schenk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919): "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a

There have also been numerous expressions of the idea that it is even more important to have a vigorous and free press during wartime than it is in peacetime.[10] However, informing the population during wartime necessarily involves some cooperation with the military, and it is this cooperation and the relationship it entails, rather than any blatant censorship, which is the focus of this study.

While the more obvious forms of military censorship are the rules that war correspondents must abide by and the fact that all copy must pass through military censors, coverage can (and is) also be affected by more subtle aspects of the relationship between war correspondents and the military. Colin Sparks delineated six roles that the state (in this case, the military) plays in relation to the media (the war correspondents).[11] Those roles are the patron, the censor, the actor, the masseur (or spin-doctor), the ideologue, and the conspirator. All of these roles affect the relationship between the military and the war correspondents in one way or another, thus affecting the way in which the war correspondents perform their duties.

Statement of Problem

This study will focus on the relationship between American war correspondents and the U.S. military during World War II. How much did the relationship between the

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nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."

[10] For example, in 1941, Harry C. Shriver and Cedric Larson wrote that "in a democracy, censorship need be feared only when it begins to suppress information, not because it is of potential value to the enemy, but because it might serve as the basis for constructive criticism of the manner in which the Government in conducting the war." Harry C. Shriver and Cedric Larson, "Office of Censorship," *Bill of Rights Review* II:1, Fall 1941, (Philadelphia: Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association, 1941), 200.

[11] Colin Sparks, "The Media and the State," in *Media Studies: A Reader*, ed. by Paul Marris and Sue Thornham (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 84-9.

military and the press, specifically war correspondents, affect the coverage of the war in the U.S. media?

This paper will explore this research question through a critical analysis of the relationship between the press and the military. Analysis will be based on the six roles that the state and government play in relation to the media as delineated by Colin Sparks.[12] Each role will be defined and explored through an examination of the literature of war correspondents (both their actual reporting and works such as books written during the war, plus works written after the conflict), as well as some of the studies, articles, papers and related materials which have been written on the subject. Several specific instances and incidents will be used as examples and will be reviewed in relation to the research question just outlined.

Literature Review

Writings about World War II constitute by far the largest category in the literature of war correspondents. This is not surprising when the scope of the war is considered. The vastness of the conflict necessitated an incredible number of correspondents to cover it.[13] Consequently there are an incredible number of works that deal, in one way or another, with war correspondents in World War II. Unfortunately, this depth tends to hide the fact that there has been little analysis of coverage of the war, or of the affects of the relationship between the military and the war correspondents.

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[12] Sparks, 84-9.

[13] Robert W. Desmond, *Tides of War, World News Reporting, 1940-1945* (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1984), 448. Desmond notes that there is no official tally, but that the number of correspondents who covered the war for all countries "certainly totaled several thousand."

The war was generally reported in very romantic and heroic terms, and this has been reflected in the literature on the subject.[14] Also, the focus of research on World War II journalism has been primarily on censorship, how it was applied and how well it worked. While this is understandable (as has been noted, censorship is almost a given in wartime, and is the most obvious abridgement of freedom of the press), it leaves room for a critical investigation of the journalistic coverage of World War II and specifically of the affects of the relationship between the military and the war correspondents on that coverage.

The vast majority (literally hundreds) of works covering World War II war correspondents are biographies and auto-biographies. Because much of the subject matter is of a personal nature, written by correspondents about correspondents, it is very partisan and subjective. While most of these works give a realistic, although at times stylized, version of what the war was like, the vast majority of these works make no effort at all to take a critical look at the reporting that was done, or at the relationship war correspondents had with the military.

The fact that these works do not offer any criticism of the field should almost be expected for several reasons. First, with regard to autobiographies, the authors were war correspondents and were personally involved in the coverage of the war; consequently they had a vested interest in preserving the good reputation they themselves, and their colleagues, gained. Secondly, biographies and autobiographies of war correspondents rarely reported the hard realities of the war, preferring instead to romanticize the conflict and the job, which sold more books. But thirdly, and probably most importantly, the authors of these works are for the most part journalists -- they have been trained to report the facts, not to critically analyze the way in which they were reported, or how the relationship between the press and the military may have affected that reporting.

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[14] Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty, From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero,*

Several war correspondents were well known literary figures before World War II. For example, novelist Erskine Caldwell, of *Tobacco Road* fame, collaborated with his wife, *Life* photographer Margaret Bourke-White, on stories about life in wartime Russia and China.[15] Poet Carl Sandburg, while not an accredited correspondent, wrote about Chinese efforts to fight the Japanese during the early period of the war.[16] Ernest Hemingway had already written *A Farewell to Arms*, *The Sun Also Rises*, and *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, and covered the Spanish Civil War as a correspondent by the time World War II broke out.[17] And John Steinbeck had gained fame for *Of Mice and Men* before he covered the war as a correspondent for the *New York Herald Tribune*.[18]

Of course, a number of war correspondents became very well known during the war and there have been numerous works on some of them. Three of the more prominent were photographer Robert Capa, Edward R. Murrow of radio and Ernie Pyle of print.[19]

Propagandist, and Myth Maker (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 306.

[15] Knightley, 244; Desmond, 166, 189.

[16] Knightley, 276.

[17] Knightley, 170, 193, 316; Desmond, 42, 352.

[18] Knightley, 308, 320; Desmond, 316, 341.

[19] Robert Capa - Robert Capa, *Slightly Out of Focus* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1947); Robert Capa, *Images of War* (New York: Paragraphic Books, 1964); Robert Capa, intro. Jean Lacouture, *Robert Capa* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989); Robert Capa, ed. Cornell Capa and Richard Whelan, *Robert Capa: Photographs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); John Hersey, *Robert Capa* (New York: Paragraphic Books, 1969); Richard Whelan, *Robert Capa: A Biography* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985).

Edward R. Murrow - Alexander Kendrick, *Prime Time: The Life of Edward R. Murrow* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969); Robert Lichello, *Edward R. Murrow, Broadcaster of Courage* (Charlotteville, New York: SamHar Press, 1971); Edward R. Murrow, ed. with Intro. Edward Bliss, Jr., *In Search of Light: The Broadcasts of Edward R. Murrow* (New York: Avon Books, 1974); Edward R. Murrow, ed. with intro., commentary, and footnotes Elmer Davis, *This Is London* (New York: Schocken Book, 1989); Joseph Persico, *Edward R. Murrow: An American Original* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988); Robert F. Smith, *Edward R. Murrow, The War Years* (Kalamazoo, MI: New Issues Press, 1978); Ann M. Sperber, *Murrow, His Life and Times* (New York: Freundlich Books, 1986).

Ernie Pyle - Barbara O'Connor, *The Soldier's Voice: The Story of Ernie Pyle* (Minneapolis, MN: Carolrhoda Books, 1996); Lee G. Miller, *The Story of Ernie Pyle* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1950).

Works on these three range from biographies and auto-biographies to collections of their work, but they are almost exclusively uncritical for the reasons stated above.[20]

The titles of some of the other works by and about war correspondents during and after the war give a good indication as to the subjective angle the authors took. For example, there were many "I-Saw-It" books, such as *I Saw England*, *I Saw the Fall of the Philippines*, and *I Can't Forget*.[21] There were the "I-Participated" books, like *We Landed at Dawn*, *Retreat With Stillwell*, and *Invasion Journal*.[22] And there were books whose titles were based on the terminology of the profession such as *Moscow Dateline*, *Mediterranean Assignment*, and *Useless If Delayed*.[23] Some of the works of women correspondents were obvious from their titles such as *No Woman's World*, *No Facilities for Women*, and *Blind Date With Mars*.[24]

Ernie Pyle, *Here is Your War* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1943); Ernie Pyle, *Ernie Pyle in England* (New York: R. M. McBride & Co., 1945); Ernie Pyle, *2nd Front* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1944); Ernie Pyle, *G. I. Joe in New York* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1944); Ernie Pyle, *Brave Men* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1944); Ernie Pyle, *Last Chapter* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1946); Ernie Pyle, ed. David Nichols, *Ernie's War: The Best of Ernie Pyle's World War II Dispatches* (New York: Random House, 1986); James Tobin, *Ernie Pyle's War: America's Eyewitness to World War II* (New York: Free Press, 1997).

[20] For example, Lee Miller, in *The Story of Ernie Pyle* (1950), admitted that he was a "biased witness," and Joseph Persico, a Murrow biographer, admitted to a lifelong fascination with him, begun as he listened to Murrow's wartime broadcasts from London.

[21] Ben Robertson, *I Saw England* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941); Carlos P. Romulo, *I Saw the Fall of the Phillipines* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1942); Robert J. Casey, *I Can't Forget: Personal Experiences of a War Correspondent in France, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and England* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1941).

[22] A. B. Austin, *We Landed At Dawn: The Story of the Dieppe Raid* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1943); Jack Belden, *Retreat With Stillwell* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943); Richard Tobin, *Invasion Journal* (New York: Dutton, 1944).

[23] Henry C. Cassidy, *Moscow Dateline, 1941-1943* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943); Richard McMillan, *Mediterranean Assignment* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1943); Paul Wyand, *Useless If Delayed* (London: George G. Harrap, 1959). [The term Useless If Delayed refers to special labels which were applied to cans of exposed film from the front which was being sent to the rear for processing.]

[24] Iris Carpenter, *No Woman's World* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946); Charlotte Ebener, *No Facilities for Women* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955); Alice-Leone Moats, *Blind Date With Mars* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Doran & Co., 1943).

Several works by war correspondents chronicled their experiences as prisoners of war, including *Behind Both Lines*, *More Than Meets the Eye*, and *Diary of a Kriegie*.[25] The subjects of many of these works were generally well known during the period, and some were famous for the adventures they had in covering the war.[26] There were also three books written by or with the help of war correspondents that were made into movies -- *Guadalcanal Diary*, *They Were Expendable*, and *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo*.[27]

Most general histories of World War II make little mention if any mention of the press or war correspondents.[28] When they do, it is usually a note on one or two of the best known correspondents, most often Ernie Pyle or Edward R. Murrow, and to use examples of their work as illustrations of combat. Or, more often, they merely make use of photographs by famous cameramen (and women) such as Robert Capa or Margaret Bourke-White, without mentioning them in the text.[29]

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[25] Harold N. Denny, *Behind Both Lines* (New York: Viking Press, 1942); Carl Mydans, *More Than Meets the Eye* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959); Edward W. Beattie Jr., *Diary of a Kriegie* (New York Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1946. [The term "Kriegie" is a German expression for prisoners of war.]

[26] William L. Shirer's *Berlin Diary* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941) chronicles his work as a correspondent in Germany during the rise of the Nazi party and the first years of the war; Leland Stowe's *No Other Road to Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941) chronicles his coverage of the German invasion of Norway; and probably the most well known war correspondent in this department was Robert St. John, whose odyssey in covering the fall of Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941, and his subsequent escape across the Mediterranean to Egypt is chronicled in *From the Land of the Silent People* (Garden City, NY Doubleday, Dorand, 1942).

[27] Richard Tregaskis, *Guadalcanal Diary* (New York: Random House, 1943); William L. White, *They Were Expendable* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1942); Capt. Ted Lawson, ed. Bob Considine, *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo* (New York: Random House, 1943).

[28] For example, there is no mention of war correspondents or the press in Gerhard Weinberg's *A World at Arms* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Francis Miller's *History of World War II* (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1945), or Sir Basil Liddell Hart's *History of the Second World War* (New York: Putnam, 1970).

[29] For example, Sulzberger, et al, eds., *The American Heritage Picture History of World War II*, has citations for only five war correspondents, and contains a mere fifteen paragraphs dealing with war correspondents. [Sulzberger was a correspondent for the *New York Times* during World War II, covering Russia, North Africa, Italy, and Yugoslavia.]

Coverage in journalism histories is naturally better but often inconsistent, and generally not very critical. Edwin Emery, in the second edition of *The Press and America* (1962), focused far more attention on the issues of censorship and propaganda than on the work of war correspondents, and there is not a word of criticism in the three pages he devoted to war correspondents.[30] On the other hand, Frank Luther Mott (1962), devoted an entire chapter (19 pages) to "Coverage of the Second World War," but only seven pages to the issues of censorship and propaganda in his work *American Journalism*. To his credit, Mott did acknowledge that "there were blunders and failures and disappointments; the achievement was by no means perfect," and he pointed out in a footnote that there were those with a different opinion of the overall coverage of the war.[31] However, he did not elaborate on or explore those negative opinions of the coverage of the war, and only briefly mentions the relationship between the military and the war correspondents.

The idea that war correspondents did a good job of reporting the war was the prevalent attitude during and after the war, and it has been supported by the vast majority of works written since the war, especially histories of reporting during wartime. For example, J. C. Oestreicher's *The World is Their Beat* (1945) is very complimentary of the journalism produced by American war correspondents during World War II.[32] Another example is Richard Collier's *Fighting Words* (1989), which makes the romantic claim that "hazy adolescent memories of Tennyson's *Charge of the Light Brigade* and Kipling's *Barrack Room Ballads*, had forged the war correspondent" of the 1940's.[33] M. L. Stein's *Under Fire* (1968), a history of American war correspondents from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam, takes a decidedly uncritical view of the World War II years. Stein sums up coverage of World War II in this way: "Never had a war been reported so thoroughly by so many first-rate and dedicated journalists."[34]

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[30] Edwin Emery, *The Press and America - An Interpretative History of Journalism* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962). Emery included only three pages on coverage of World War II (although there are several lists of correspondents who worked for different press associations during the war period.) On the other hand there are almost 10 pages dealing with the activities of the Office of Censorship and the Office of War Information during the war period.

[31] Frank L. Mott, *American Journalism, A History: 1690-1960* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1962), 741.

[32] J. C. Oestreicher, *The World is their Beat* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945). A prime example is a story written by Frank Conniff which Oestreicher calls "one of the best the war produced." The story began: "The shadow of every storied place in American history where our fighting men have drawn a line and said, 'Thus far and no farther' hovers today over this little town cradled on gently-flowing Belgian hills." The soldiers "were men who battled till the last breath, the last bullet, before the Nazi tide washed over them in those dark moments a week ago." The piece was composed entirely of heroic imagery,

However, there are a few histories of wartime journalism that take a realistic and critical view of the work of war correspondents during World War II. One example is Joseph J. Mathews' *Reporting the Wars* (1957) that takes a critical look at coverage of the war by all sides.[35] He noted that during World War II "the habit became firmly established of evaluating news in terms of its service to the war."[36] He also mentioned the relationship between the press and the military in noting that "of all the perils that threaten to pervert and distort information in modern warfare, the overwhelming determination to force the news to render service in the common cause is seemingly the greatest. The danger is immeasurably enhanced by the fact that the determination is shared by all – by reporters as well as by censors . . ."[37]

John Hohenberg's *Foreign Correspondence* (1964) is another work that blended anecdotes on correspondents with some critical appraisal. He pointed to the *Christian*

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flowery prose, and no real hard facts at all, yet Oestreicher commented that it was "a minor masterpiece. . . There were many such dispatches, and the mere fact that there were so many good ones, is something of a miracle and certainly a tribute to the quality of American journalism."117-8.

[33] Richard Collier, *Fighting Words: The War Correspondents of World War Two* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989), 20. At the end of his book, Collier also includes one paragraph of musing as to whether the truth had been a casualty of the war. "In retrospect, few correspondents thought that it had," he writes, but then backs away from supporting that view by qualifying it with the statement that over the years all of the truths had emerged. 205-6.

[34] M. L. Stein, *Under Fire: The Story of American War Correspondents* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1969), 147.

[35] Joseph J. Mathews, *Reporting the Wars* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).

[36] Ibid, 175.

[37] Ibid, 176.

Science Monitor as an exception to the romantic coverage of the war for its instruction to its correspondents to downplay the "hometown-boy-becomes-hero" stories and instead "keep the long-range meaning in view and write about it."[38] Hohenberg also showed that some correspondents who had a reputation for "feature" type stories could look at the bigger picture and issues that did not reflect well on the military. As an example he used Ernie Pyle's criticism of the Allies for "permitting Facist societies to continue to exist," by not replacing Vichy officials in North Africa after the 1942 invasion.[39] But he also noted of the relationship between the press and the military that the majority of the press was lazy and, for example, was more than willing to buy the explanation that the test of the first atomic bomb in New Mexico on July 16, 1945 was merely "an ammunition dump explosion."[40]

Another impressive examination of war correspondence during World War II is Robert Desmond's *Tides of War* (1984). It is an exhaustive listing of correspondents from all of the major combatant nations, where they were assigned at what times, what actions they covered, what equipment they used, and the conditions and circumstances they had to deal with. Unfortunately, it gets bogged down with too many names (correspondents names and press organization names) becoming more of a list than a narrative, and it suffers from a lack of foot- or end notes. There is also no real critical analysis of the press coverage of the conflict until the conclusion, wherein he notes that criticisms of the coverage have centered on "the use of clichés, emphasis on personal experiences rather than issues or facts, and a softening of adverse aspects of the news, leading to a complacency about the war."[41] As comprehensive as this work is in most other areas, its limited critical analysis is disappointing.

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[38] John Hohenberg, *Foreign Correspondence: The Great Reporters and Their Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 228.

[39] Ibid, 355.

[40] Ibid, 376.

[41] Desmond, 461-2.

Perhaps the finest volume that critically analyzes the war correspondence of World War II is Phillip Knightley's *The First Casualty* (1975), which covers war correspondents from the Crimean War to Vietnam.[42] The World War II chapters examine correspondents from all of the belligerent countries so there is even some critical comparison of different countries' coverage.[43] The work is extensively documented, takes a very critical view of the reporting of the war correspondents, and also notes some of the more objective reporting that was done, using examples from their work as well as from post war assessments and personal interviews.[44] Besides the expected anecdotes and biographical information, the book is filled with examples and critiques of journalistic acquiescence to the official scheme of reporting the war, and sometimes even active support for it.

There have been a number of articles and papers published since the war that deal with war correspondence. The scope of the coverage the war received, and the numbers of correspondents involved made it a ripe field for study. Also important was the difference in coverage between World War I (when the government's censorship and propaganda operations were combined and were extremely powerful) and World War II (when censorship and propaganda were handled by distinctly separate organizations and had far less impact). However, the vast majority of this work has been biographies, studies of censorship regulations, or studies of the process of news gathering by military and war correspondents, and has no real bearing on this paper. Little space has been devoted to analyzing the affects of the relationship between war correspondents and the military on the work of the correspondents.

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[42] Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty, From the Crimea to Vietnam: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975).

[43] Knightley notes that during the Blitz, British censors would have killed any story submitted by a British reporter which attempted to portray the true situation surrounding the bombing of British cities. But despite the much more lax censorship of news which was leaving the country, American and Commonwealth reporters voluntarily chose to focus on the romantic, stiff upper lip, Britain-can-take-it side of the story as opposed to a more objective coverage of the effects of the bombings, although a more honest appraisal probably would have passed the more relaxed censorship they were subject to. Ibid, 238.

[44] Among examples he points to are John Steinbeck's story in the *New York Herald Tribune* about three U. S. soldiers who were arrested for their black-market trade in watches, and Drew Middleton of the Associated Press, who noted, "I covered the Kasserine Pass battle in Tunisia where the U. S. II Corps got its ass kicked, wrote it as a defeat, and the censor passed it." Ibid, 308.

Several articles have been written about the relationship between the military and war correspondents from the military perspective. Max Hastings examines this relationship and concludes that media coverage is an essential part of sustaining the national will of democracies in wartime.[45] J. G. Diehl maintains that the military commander and the correspondent have two separate goals (the military commander aims at achieving his military goal and the correspondent looks for information which will objectively demonstrate the accuracy of the military goal), and that each actor must have a clear understanding of the others goal.[46] And other recent essays have pointedly called on the military to learn to "understand and appreciate the press" and "nurture the honest, open, and professional relationships that are required to deal successfully with media scrutiny."[47] However, none of these papers, being written from the military perspective, explicitly addresses how the relationship between the military and the media may affect the coverage of wars in general (or may have affected coverage of World War II in particular) by war correspondents.

Fletcher Pratt's "How the Censors Rigged the News" (1946), primarily deals with censorship, but also serves as an indictment of the war correspondents for going along with the censors. Pratt, himself a war correspondent, notes that "the official censors pretty well succeeded in putting over the legend that the war was won without a single mistake by a command consisting exclusively of geniuses."[48]

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[45] Max Hastings, "The Media and Modern Warfare" in *Conflict Quarterly* (Vol. 9, Pgs. 5-20, Summer 1989).

[46] J. G. Diehl, "Lights, Camera, Action: The Operational Commander and the Media", presented at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. on May 31, 1989.

[47] Stan Zimmerman, "The Battle of the Lasting Impression", in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 123, no. 5 (May, 1997) : 44; Ensign David Wolynski, "The Challenge of Media Scrutiny", in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 123, no. 7 (July, 1997) : 79.

An enlightening book that came out during the war is *Journalism in Wartime* (1943), edited by Frank Luther Mott.[49] This work is a collection of papers presented during a symposium of the School of Journalism at the University of Missouri. Some of the papers were written by well known figures in the journalism field, such as Byron Price, Director of the Office of Censorship; Palmer Hoyt, Domestic Director of the Office of War Information; Roy Roberts, President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors; Frank Gannett, President of the Gannett Co.; and correspondents Raymond Clapper, and H. V. Kaltenborn. The papers cover everything from censorship during wartime to the role of the press in post-war reconstruction. They are, for the most part, self-congratulatory, but do offer some insight into the attitude of the press at the time toward its relationship with the military.

One article which attempts to explain at least part of the why war correspondents covered the war as they did is John Dimmick's "The Belief Systems of War Correspondents: A Bayesian Analysis".[50] This study was a content analysis of the memoirs of 11 correspondents who covered the European theater during World War II Categories coded for were total war-civilian involvement, democratic processes, censorship and propaganda. The study determined that if the correspondent accepted civilian involvement (e.g., a total war) they would also accept either the need to curtail democratic processes, or the need for censorship and propaganda. This goes a long way toward explaining the mindset of World War II war correspondents and why the covered the war as they did.

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[48] Fletcher Pratt, " How the Censors Rigged the News", in *Harper's Magazine* (February, 1946), pg. 98-104.

[49] Frank Luther Mott, ed., *Journalism in Wartime: A Symposium of the School of Journalism, the University of Missouri* (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943).

[50] John Dimmick, "The Belief Systems of War Correspondents: A Bayesian Analysis." *Journalism Quarterly* 50:3 (1973): 560-2.

The Military and War Correspondents in World War II

World War II is probably the best example of war correspondence available, especially from the American point of view. It was the only true "world war" there has ever been. The conflict was global in scope -- combat took place in four of the five major oceans of the world, and on or in the immediate vicinity of (in the case of naval combat) six of the seven continents. Only the Antarctic Ocean and the continent of Antarctica were untouched by the conflict.[51] Also, this war, unlike previous wars, took place on many different fronts with several major battles going on at the same time on land, at sea, and in the air.[52]

Also, the amount of coverage, especially by the U.S. press, was staggering.[53] The U.S. War Department accredited 1,186 correspondents and the Navy Department accredited 460 more, for a total of 1,646. While this figure does not include correspondents accredited by allied and neutral nations, it still amounts to more than half of the roughly 3,000 officially accredited correspondents worldwide.[54] Thus, the United States had by far the largest number of war correspondents of those nations involved in the conflict.[55] These reporters worked for newspapers, magazines, press associations, and radio networks, and were present with the military in every portion of the globe affected by the conflict.[56]

This is the greatest amount of coverage the U.S. press has ever devoted to any conflict, before or since.[57] It also amounts to the largest cooperative effort between the military and the press ever undertaken in the history of the United States. And that cooperation brings into question the reporting of American war correspondents.

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[51] C. L. Sulzberger and others, eds., *The American Heritage Picture History of World War II* (New York: American HeritagePublishing Co., Inc., 1966);
[52] Stein, 97.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Edwin Emery, (1962), 612; Mott, 742; Mitchel P. Roth, "World War II," in *Historical Dictionary of War Journalism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 352.
[55] Hohenberg, 246.
[56] Desmond, 94
[57] Mott, 741; Desmond, 448-9; Stein, 94.

Media critic Noam Chomsky has noted that the role of the media during the period prior to a nations entry into war is to present all of the relevant information to the populace and then foster a debate on the topic.[58] But this idea is not new, having been expressed prior to World War II. As Shriver and Larson noted in 1941, "in a democracy at war, an enlightened and critical public opinion should have a decided hearing in the formation of policy."[59]

This was certainly the case with the United States prior to its entry into World War II. There was a vocal isolationist movement, featuring such well-known personalities as Charles Lindburgh and the Chicago *Tribune*'s publisher, Colonel Robert McCormick. There was also a strong interventionist movement, led by the likes of William Allen White, editor of the Emporia, Kansas, *Gazette*, who organized the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.[60] These papers and others fueled widespread debate about U.S. involvement.[61]

That all changed on December 7, 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.[62] It may have been a military victory, but it "was a Japanese blunder, for it killed isolationism and replaced it with a single-minded determination to win the war."[63] It is probable that this "single minded determination to win the war" was also prevalent among war correspondents.

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[58] Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media*, prod. Necessary Productions and the National Film Board of Canada,1994, videocassette.

[59] Shriver and Larson, 200.

[60] Sulzberger, 42, 129-30; Michael C. C. Adams, *The Best War Ever: America and World War II* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 25-6.

[61] Sulzberger, 140-1.

[62] Peter Braestrup, Background Paper for *Battle Lines: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media* (New York: Priority Press Publications, 1985), 27.

[63] Sulzberger, 159.

Dimmick's study posited that "modern warfare places severe strains on the journalist who in times of peace attempts to report conflict situations 'objectively' or 'impartially.'"[64] This strain as the result of "role conflict, the conflict between the requirements of being an ardent patriot and an impartial reporter," and "role stress, which refers to the journalist's being prevented from enacting his role by censorship, news suppression or other practices," could result in a change in attitude toward, and perspective on, what he or she is covering.[65] He concluded that the war correspondents he studied (and possibly the majority of war correspondents) believed that World War II was a total war (e.g., it involved every citizen in the effort, including journalists), and consequently some "democratic processes should be curtailed" and "censorship or propaganda were necessary."[66]

This idea is supported by many of the works cited in this study. For example, Knightley noted that "the main bar to this [accurate reporting] was the correspondent's excusable identification with the cause," and that "with what were, no doubt, the best of motives, most Allied correspondents in the Pacific acquiesced in a system that gave the illusion of providing a free and open coverage of the war and its conduct."[67] And Mathews asserted that "reporter, editor, photographer, and broadcaster – no one who touched the news could ignore the fact that he was handling vital materiel of war. There was easy, logical, and patriotic justification for giving the news a push in the direction believed to be the most helpful one. In total war, victory became a necessity that tended to transcend all other considerations."[68]

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[64] Dimmick, 560.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid, 562.
[67] Knightley, 330, 302.
[68] Mathews, 175.

John Steinbeck, in *Once There Was a War*, stated that there were things that were not reported on:

> largely because there was a huge and gassy thing called the War Effort. Anything which interfered with or ran counter to the War Effort was automatically bad. To a large extent judgement about this was in the hands of the correspondent himself . . . Most often he carried his rule book around in his head and even invented restrictions for himself in the interest of the War Effort.[69]

There were also many instances of the press willingly suppressing information that should have been reported. The Patton slapping incidents were a prime example. After several war correspondents witnessed General George S. Patton slap two different enlisted men who were suffering from shell-shock on two different occasions, they made no effort to publicize the incidents. Instead they took it upon themselves to petition General Dwight D. Eisenhower to order Gen. Patton to apologize to the two men as a form of punishment. Eisenhower told the correspondents that they were perfectly free to write about the incident, but he believed it would be helpful to the enemy to have such a story published. The correspondents voluntarily held the story for three months until word leaked back to the United States and a columnist broke it there. This caused embarrassment not only for General Patton and the Army, but for the war correspondents as well for having covered up the story on their own initiative.[70] Today such a story would be a major scoop, and no journalist would sit on it, but obviously there was a different attitude back then.

However, it was not merely the attitudes of the correspondents that resulted in the type of coverage that the war received. As noted in the introduction, once the U.S. entered the conflict, the relationship between the media and the state changed and became more important than prior to the war. While war correspondents are supposed to act as a watchdog over the military, there is also military influence over the war correspondents. Sparks argues that there are six roles that the state and government take in influencing the media: the patron; the censor; the actor; the masseur; the ideologue; and the conspirator.[71] All of these roles were played by the military during World War II.

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[69] John Steinbeck, *Once There Was a War* (New York: Viking Press, 1958), xi-xii.

[70] Desmond, 314; Knightley, 320-1; Mathews, 215-6; Ladislas Farago, *Patton: Ordeal and Triumph* (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1964), 325-359.

Patron

The role of patron is performed when the military "acts as the direct economic benefactor of the media."[72] This was certainly the case in World War II where the military clothed, housed, fed and transported war correspondents as well as handling the transmission of their copy to their home offices.[73] General Dwight D. Eisenhower stated "I have always considered as quasi-staff officers, correspondents accredited to my headquarters."[74] A memo in the private papers of Joseph Pulitzer Jr., publisher of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, notes that in the Pacific theater the "correspondents buy their uniforms, having the status of captains."[75] The same note also states that in the field the military took care of transportation, and special field equipment, while the "only charge was for rations, 70 cents a day."[76]

This naturally led to concerns on the part of the correspondents, and their editors, but these concerns were usually not given voice until after the war was over and the subsidy was no longer needed. In a September, 1945, article in *Editor and Publisher*, James Butler noted that a number of editors, including the Gannett papers' Washington bureau chief, believed the military was seeking to control news policies where it paid part of the correspondents expenses.[77] And after the war, many correspondents argued that "even if they had wanted to challenge the official version of events they were in no position to do so, because they were totally dependent on the military to be able to see the war at all."[78]

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[71] Sparks, 84-9.
[72] Sparks, 85.
[73] Knightley, 295; Mott, 743.
[74] Knightley, 315.
[75] Note from Ralph Coghlan to Joseph Pulitzer Jr. (II), Sept. 30, 1943. Papers of Joseph Pulitzer II, Library of Congress, microfilm reel 45, frame 17.
[76] Ibid.

The military was well aware not only of the power that it held over the flow of information from the theaters of operation, but also the power that the press had in the relationship, and did its best to support the press during the war. For example, after complaints that the briefing schedule left many morning papers in the U.S. without fresh news, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) changed the schedule to a 10 AM, 3 PM and 10 PM schedule which accommodated both morning and afternoon papers.[79] And this attitude trickled down to the lower ranks as well. According to Don Whitehead, an officer of the unit he was assigned to cover during the D-day assault on Normandy told him what assistance he could expect. "'We are ready to help you . . . The people at home won't know what is happening unless you are given information and I want them to know. . . . If you're wounded, we'll take care of you. If you're killed we'll bury you.'"[80]

But most importantly, the commander of SHAEF, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, pledged full support to the press in the European theater, noting that "complete wartime co-ordination and perfect co-operation can never be achieved between the press and military authorities. For the commander secrecy is a defensive weapon, to the press it is anathema. The task is to develop a procedure that takes into account an understanding of both viewpoints."[81]

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[77] James J. Butler, "Dickson Hits Subsidy for Correspondents," *Editor and Publisher*, September 8, 1945, p. 10.

[78] Knightley, 322.

[79] Desmond, 395.

[80] Stein, 119.

[81] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948), 299.

Censor

The secrecy Eisenhower was speaking about brings us to the next role of the military in relation to the war correspondents -- the role of censor. This is probably the best known role the military plays in relation to the war correspondents. The military had been considering how to deal with the flow of information during the war even before the U. S. became involved. While many people think of World War II as beginning in 1939 with the German attack on Poland (and most Americans think only of the United States' entry on December 8, 1941), Japanese expansion in the Pacific began in 1931 with the seizure of Manchuria, and German expansion began in 1936 with the occupation of the Rhineland.[82] These developments had not gone unnoticed in the United States, where military studies were conducted on the need for censorship.[83]

There were certainly high ranking military officers who favored censorship of all military information during hostilities, but they were in the minority.[84] In September, 1941, the appropriate committees requested that the Secretaries of the Navy and of War inform the House of Representatives whether or not censorship of the press existed in their respective departments. Both responded by acknowledging that plans existed for the censorship of international communications, but as Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal wrote there were "no provisions for compulsory censorship of the press."[85]

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[82] Sulzberger, *The American Heritage Picture History of World War II*;

[83] As a result of those studies, Major General Robert Richardson Jr., chief of the Army Bureau of Public Relations announced early in 1941 that, "the present attitude of the War Department toward censorship is that there shall be no censorship, even in time of war." Quoted in "Censorship," *Fortune* 23 (June, 1941), 88+, as quoted in Summers, 20.

[84] Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, is often mentioned as the number one proponent of censorship in the military. It was said of King that if he had his way there was only one story he would release: "it would be disseminated to the press at war's end, and assuming that all went as hoped, it would announce the fact that the Allies had won." Frederick S. Voss, *Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press for the National Portrait Gallery, 1994), 26.

[85] House Committee on Naval Affairs, Adverse Report, to accompany H. Res. 299 -- Directing the Secretary of the Navy to Transmit Certain Information to the House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 1941, Report No. 1201; House Committee on Military Affairs, Adverse Report, to accompany H.

Ironically, the civilian government seemed more fervently in favor of censorship than the military.[86] That does not mean that the military was not concerned about censorship, merely that they were not concerned about censorship of the domestic press. However the relationship between the military and war correspondents was strictly delineated with regard to censorship. "Correspondents were not allowed in the theatres (sic) of war unless they were accredited, and one of the conditions of accreditation was that the correspondent must sign an agreement to submit all his copy to military or naval censorship."[87] And this was the crux of the matter, for the interests of the censors and those of the war correspondents "were diametrically opposed. Correspondents seek to tell as much as possible as soon as possible; the military seeks to tell as little as possible as late as possible."[88]

Some correspondents attempted to circumvent the censors. Helen Kirkpatrick of the *Chicago Daily News*, attempted to slip information past the censors through the use of cryptic messages early in the war. "Later, however, she came to the conclusion that censorship was more significant than just an effort to frustrate reporters, so she stopped trying to sneak messages to the *Daily News*."[89] Unfortunately, there is no explanation as to what changed her mind, or what her rationale was in making this decision.

Res. 300 -- Information as to whether or not Censorship of the Press Exists in the War Department, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 1941, Report No. 1202.

[86] During the 76th Congress, which sat just prior to the United States entry into the war, more than 40 sedition bills were introduced. Out of these came the Smith Act of 1940, Section 2 of which pertained to the press and prohibited the publication of material advocating the violent overthrow of the government (Lofton, 219-20; The Smith Act was invoked only twice during the war, and neither case involved the press.) The Espionage Act of 1917 was still on the books and the military announced that it would be invoked to protect military secrets, but there were only two instances of Post Office action against a publication, and no cases under the Espionage Act reached the Supreme Court. (Harry C. Shriver and Cedric Larson, "Office of Censorship," Bill of Rights Review II:1, Fall 1941, (Philadelphia: Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association, 1941), 190; Lofton, 221 - Lofton also noted that Zechariah Chafee Jr., in his book The Blessings of Liberty (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1956), wrote that there were "only seven reported criminal prosecutions for antiwar speeches and publications.")

[87] Knightley, 275.

[88] Knightley, 275-6.

[89] Ibid, 77

There was, however, one occasion in which the military censors were sidestepped that resulted in a case being initiated by the Justice Department under the Espionage Act. The *Chicago Tribune* was accused of violating the Espionage Act in publishing a story on the Battle of Midway, which took place 3 June through 6 June 1942. The story was written by Stanley Johnston, a correspondent who had just returned from the Pacific, who had gleaned information for the story in talking with Navy personnel during his travels. He wrote the story after he returned to the United States, and so had not felt the need to submit it to military censorship (as would have been required had it been written in the zone of combat). The story had not been submitted to the Office of Censorship for review prior to publication (which was not required). The problem with the story was that it alluded to the fact that the Navy had advance warning of the Japanese attack, and had thus been able to surprise the attacking force. This inferred that the United States Navy had broken the Japanese Naval code, which in fact it had, and the Navy was aghast at the thought that the Japanese might figure this out and change the code. But the military was caught in a "Catch-22" situation: it would have to reveal that it had broken the Japanese code in order to prosecute the *Chicago Tribune* for violating the Espionage Act by revealing that the Navy had broken the Japanese code. Since it was not clear that the Japanese had caught on to the implications of the story, and revealing it in a grand jury hearing would make it part of the public record, the Navy declined to provide the necessary evidence of violation of the Espionage Act, and the grand jury refused to indict the *Tribune*.[90]

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[90] Sweeney, 228-34; Hohenberg, 217; Knightley, 282-3; Gordon W. Prange with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *Miracle at Midway* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982; Penguin Books, 1983), 367; The Japanese apparently did not learn that their code had been broken, and although they made periodic changes to it the Navy continued to read Japanese dispatches. The Navy used intelligence from this source to intercept and shoot down Japanese Navy Commander in Chief Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's plane on April 18, 1943. This story was suppressed by the Navy until after the war for the same reason - so as not to alert the Japanese to the fact that their code had been broken.

Actor

The way in which journalism was practiced during World War II is similar to today's journalism in the focus on dramatic events or developments. This places the state in a position to be a major source of news and increases the press' reliance on official statements.[91] This is where the role of the actor comes into play. As Sparks points out "the more dramatic the development, the more likely it is to be reported; some activities of the state, for example wars, are very dramatic indeed. Thus there is a convergence between the actions of the state and the norms of modern journalism."[92]

In the role of actor, the military were the sole purveyors of the information the war correspondents needed to write their stories, for, as has been pointed out, the war correspondents were totally dependent on the military to cover the war at all. As Leon Sigal notes in *Reporters and Officials*, "the reporter . . . is not in a position to witness many occurrences in person. . . . For the reporter . . . most news is not what happened, but what someone says has happened."[93]

While there were war correspondents who went up to the frontlines to get a first-hand look at the fighting (37 were killed and 112 wounded during the course of the war), there were those who chose to report just what the military said from the safety of the rear.[94] During the fighting in Europe, "correspondents in Brussels were known to take dinner in one of the better restaurants, stroll around the town, return to their deluxe Canterbury Hotel, and begin their stories, 'On the Western Front' . . ."[95]

Ira Wolfert, a correspondent himself, stated of his colleagues "if they wished . . . they could expand communiqués from headquarters and interview survivors of actions and never go near the front."[96] And Barney Oldfield, who was a colonel in the U. S. Army and was responsible for setting up and maintaining the press camps, later wrote that there were correspondents who continually put their lives in danger at the front, and correspondents who preferred to stay in the press camp and write stories from the briefings of military officers.[97] These types of reports, taken from official statements by military spokesmen, or even general officers themselves, carry the weight of authority, but can hardly be considered objective.

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[91] Sparks, 85.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Co., 1973), 69.
[94] Stein, 95.
[95] Barney Oldfield, *Never a Shot in Anger* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956), 186.

Yet, Sparks explains, "a journalist is forced to establish a working relationship with his or her sources and therefore builds up over time a relationship which is hardly likely to be adversarial. . . . Consequently, the official version of events is one which habit, let alone training, teaches the journalist to take seriously."[98]

In fact, the real danger of this reliance on "official statements" is that the journalist will come to accept the statements without question. Sigal highlights this danger when he points out that "in direct daily contact with officials, . . . the reporter on the beat gradually absorbs the perspectives of the senior officials he is covering."[99] John Steinbeck noted this in saying that "we were all a part of the War Effort. We went along with it, and not only that, we abetted it. Gradually it became a part of all of us that the truth about anything was automatically secret and that to trifle with it was to interfere with the War Effort."[100]

A more concrete example is provided by Knightley who cites the bombing of the 1,400-year-old monastery at Monte Cassino in Italy, the parent house of the Benedictine order. The act was justified "on the grounds of military necessity – the lives of soldiers mattered more than monasteries. . . . Most Allied correspondents fell in step with the military line. The bombing, they wrote, was justified as an act of war . . ."[101]

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[96] Desmond, 384.
[97] Wagner, 2.
[98] Sparks, 85-6.
[99] Sigal, 47.
[100] Steinbeck, xiii.

Masseur (Spin Doctors)

The role of masseur (or spin doctor in modern American parlance) is related to the role of actor, for as Sparks points out "the state employs quite a large number of public relations officers."[102] This was as true in World War II as it is today. And Mark Fishman, in *Manufacturing the News* notes that much information gathered in this way is intended "to demonstrate that the agency's administrative work [in this case the military's conduct of the war] is according to the rules and that it is discharging its responsibilities. Of necessity, then, such accounts are idealizations because they are intended to be administratively useful, not objectively descriptive."[103]

At a press conference in Australia early in 1942 General Douglas MacArthur, who during World War I had been chief of the War Department's Bureau of Information, stated his belief in the need for a free and unfettered press, saying that "one cannot wage war under present conditions without the support of public opinion, which is tremendously molded by the press."[104] The military employed a large number of public relations officers in order to "assist" the war correspondents in molding public opinion by keeping the people informed and supportive of the war effort.

Mott notes "the public relations systems of the services were much more fully organized than in any previous war. Public relations officers, especially when they were former newspaper men, afforded not only liaison with top officers, but organization of practical facilities for the living, transportation, and communication of the newsmen."[105] Knightley states that the "Allied system for controlling war correspondents grew steadily . . . and by D-Day and the Normandy battles it was as much a part of military planning as, say, logistics was."[106]

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[101] Knightley, 321.
[102] Sparks, 86.
[103] Mark Fishman, *Manufacturing the News* (Austin, TX: Universtiy of Texas Press, 1980), 136.
[104] Summers, 66, 41.

Knightley also details the efforts of the Navy to highlight its efforts in the Pacific, in which "the United States Pacific Fleet's public relations unit put out a pamphlet addressed to correspondents offering to 'put you on the trail of this story gold mine.'"[107] This is echoed by Mathews observation that "publicity methods, especially those of the United States air forces, were in many respects similar to the ones used in business advertising. A great deal of this publicity can be viewed as the salesmanship of a service competing for public favor against rival services . . ."[108]

This last item also illustrates the fact that while the war effort was unified, the branches of the military were not, and each branch did what it could to make sure that it got the most, and the best coverage. Ernie Pyle, in particular, was in great demand because of his popularity with the public. Knightley noted that the "various branches of the services competed to have him with them, because his fame rubbed off on whomever he joined."[109] Late in 1944 he returned to the U.S. for a rest, but as Knightley tells it "the military needed him, and he came under heavy official pressure to move to the Pacific theatre."[110]

But not all of the spin was intended to support the war effort or the specific branches of the military. There were also numerous instances of military leaders censoring stories, and even doctoring the news, for their own personal benefit.[111] One obvious American example was General MacArthur, who, while professing support for the war correspondents and their work, had a highly efficient censorship office and an even more efficient promotional department. For a time, correspondents were ordered to dateline their material "With General MacArthur's Headquarters," in order to keep the general in the public's eye as much as possible. That order was later countermanded by MacArthur's superiors in Washington.[112]

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[105] Mott, 743.
[106] Knightley, 315.
[107] Ibid, 295.
[108] Mathews, 189.
[109] Knightley, 326-7.
[110] Knightley, 327.
[111] Knightley, 323-4.

Ideologue

The role of ideologue is one of the more important roles the military played in its relationship with the war correspondents. Sparks stated that "those who people the state and those who people the media hold many of the same beliefs."[113] It was the similarity of beliefs between the military and the war correspondents that allowed the military to control the tenor of the coverage, without having to be overt about it. According to Fishman, "newsworkers rely heavily on the bureaucratic definition of the phenomenon they report."[114] This was true of the war correspondents during World War II, as has already been discussed in the section on the military as actor.

For instance, as one correspondent put it, "maybe it was jingoism, chauvinism, and stupidity, but we felt that the Germans were going to wreck this world of ours and that we would have to stop them. The troops were committed to it and I think the correspondents were – I certainly was. . . . It really was a crusade."[115] This is an interesting characterization, in that it is the same idea used by General Eisenhower for the title of his first person account of the war, *Crusade in Europe*.[116]

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[112] Voss, 29-30; Knightley, 281-2.
[113] Sparks, 87.
[114] Fishman, 140.

But the role of ideologue involves more than just "that state definitions are often reproduced in the media." It also is related to the journalistic practice of separating fact from opinion; "that the media rarely offer an independent interpretation of an event: rather they report the opinión of others, very often the spokespeople of the state" (in this case, the military).[117]

One of the more important concerns of the war, even for the military, was the need to maintain unity among the different allied governments on war aims and priorities. Mathews notes that "it appears that General Eisenhower's chief concern with the news sent out from SHAEF was in seeing that it did service, or at least did no harm, to the spirit of Allied unity."[118] "Not only was there ostensible necessity for representing the enemy as the antithesis of any and everything being fought for, but the equal necessity for attempting to reconcile the ideals of the members of the same camp. . . . Forcing Communism and capitalism to consort together proved a perplexing and in some instances an impossible task."[119]

Another important concern stated in the previous quote was the need to portray the enemy as "the bad guys", and the Allies as "the good guys." According to Knightley, "neither side reported its own atrocities" but "both sides emphasized atrocities committed by the enemy."[120] This ideological position has been discussed in a number of works. Braestrup reported of the war correspondents, "few dwelled on the sufferings of German civilians under Allied bombing or the atrocities inflicted by U.S. troops advancing into

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[115] Knightley, 319.
[116] Eisenhower.
[117] Sparks, 88.
[118] Mathews, 178.
[119] Mathews, 179.
[120] Knightley, 294.

Germany."[121] In *Not So Wild a Dream*, Eric Sevareid noted such violations of the rules of war by U.S. troops that he encountered. He wrote that he came upon several American soldiers standing smoking cigarettes near the body of a young German soldier. "'Oh, him?' one of them said in response to a question. 'Son of a bitch kept lagging behind the others when we brought them in. We got tired of hurrying him up all the time.' . . . As weeks went by and this experience was repeated many times, I ceased even to be surprised – only, I could never again bring myself to write or speak with indignation of the German's violations of the 'rules of warfare.'"[122]

As Mathews noted, this was a great dilemma facing war correspondents in covering the conflict. "Great perils continued to operate . . . in the whole ideological framework into which the bits of military fact were fitted. . . . The determination to uphold avowed principles could not always be easily reconciled with the desire to make the news-weapon perform its service in the cause."[123]

Conspirator

In defining the role of conspirator, Sparks pointed to the fact that "those at the top of the media and of the state have a surprisingly high degree of shared experiences . . . the people who call the shots in the state and the media are indistinguishable."[124] This seems to have been the case, at least to some extent, between the military and the war correspondents during World War II. Such social proximity made it easier for the military to penetrate the press with their ideology and public relations campaigns, because the war correspondents were predisposed to receive such information favorably.

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[121] Braestrup, 28.
[122] Eric Sevareid, *Not So Wild a Dream* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 388-9.
[123] Mathews, 177-8.
[124] Sparks, 88-9.

William Kennedy, in *The Military and the Media,* cited the increase in the number of fulltime military journalists in the late 1920's and 1930's as a key to "the generally excellent working relationship between the U.S. military high command and the press during World War II."[125] He notes that there were a significant number of journalists who had served in World War I or had other military qualifications.[126] For example, Hanson Baldwin, of the *New York Times*, was a graduate of the Naval Academy and had served active duty.[127] Stein also points to several instances of war correspondents with prior military service, including Mark Watson of the *Baltimore Sun*, a World War I veteran who received a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of World War II.[128]

Also, a tiny minority of war correspondents actually took an active role in military operations. Ernest Hemingway, for example, is often mentioned for carrying a weapon and actively taking part in combat on a number of occasions; both blatant violations of wartime press rules that prompted heated protests from his colleagues. If not for the intervention of some high ranking officers who admired and supported Hemingway, he would have been disaccredited. After the war, his high ranking officer friends recommended Hemingway for the Bronze Star, which he was awarded in 1947 for "meritorious service as a war correspondent."[129]

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[125] William V. Kennedy, *The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot be Trusted to Cover a War*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Pub., 1993), 16-7.

[126] Ibid, 16.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Stein, 126.

[129] Knightley, 275-6; Mitchel P. Roth, "Ernest Hemingway," in *Historical Dictionary of War Journalism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 138-9; Frederick S. Voss, *Reporting the War: The Journalistic Coverage of World War II* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press for the National Portrait Gallery, 1994), 188-90.

And toward the end of the war there were many instances of war correspondents preceding the troops and accepting the surrender of German troops.[130] Marguerite Higgins of the *New York Herald Tribune* is variously credited with helping to liberate either Dachau or Buchenwald concentration camp.[131]

In fact war correspondents became so much a part of the military that theater ribbons (denoting military service in a given theater of operations) were issued to 519 correspondents at the end of the war, and 36 correspondents also received military decorations for their actions including the Purple Heart, Bronze Star, Silver Star, and Air Medal.[132]

Ironically, this proximity sometimes worked in the other direction. Probably the most striking example of military consideration for a correspondent's work surrounded the death of Jack Singer. Singer, a former sports writer for the *New York Journal-American*, went to the Pacific as a correspondent for the International News Service and covered the U. S. Navy's conduct of the war against the Japanese. He had the distinction of being the first correspondent to fly on a torpedo plane mission against enemy shipping. On September 15, 1942[133], he was killed aboard the aircraft carrier U. S. S. *Wasp* when it was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. Officers on board the *Wasp* completed the story Singer was working on when he was killed and forwarded it to INS, along with a note reading: "Because we found him a very pleasant shipmate, and in order to maintain the traditions of the Fourth Estate, several of us prepared a dispatch to cover his last assignment." One of those officers completing Singer's "last assignment" was Lieutenant Commander William Chambliss, a former *New York Daily Mirror* reporter.[134]

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[130] Hohenberg, 227; Knightley, 316.

[131] Knightley, 329; Desmond, 397.

[132] Desmond, 453.

[133] In the *Historical Dictionary of War Journalism*, Roth lists Singer's death as occurring in 1944, but he was actually killed when the Wasp was torpedoed during the Battle of the Solomons in 1942.

[134] Desmond, 244; Faris, 65-6; Mott, 753-4; Oestreicher, 108 & 207; Roth, 288; Stein, 110.

Conclusion

Following the war, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson stated that "World War II was the most thoroughly reported war in history. . . . It was in the quality of reporting, however, that the coverage of World War II reached the high peak. The reporters and photographers were honest, competent, and patriotic."[135] However, taking the relationship between the military and the media, and the benefits the military derived from that relationship, this statement is not at all surprising.

That relationship benefited the military far more than it did the war correspondents. Through the role of patron, the military supported the war correspondents but also controlled their access to the war news. As censor the military could control what news was forwarded to the U.S. for inclusion in newspapers, magazines and broadcasts. The military was the sole source for information on what was happening, making the role of actor a crucial one. In acting as masseur the military used public relations techniques to present the type of image it wanted to the press and the public. As ideologue the military fostered the idea that it was a total war, that the Allies were the good guys and the Axis were the bad guys, and that the war correspondents and public needed to support the cause. And the role of conspirator was evidenced by the fact that many in military public relations had some experience with the press, while at least some of the war correspondents had some military background, meaning that there was a convergence of ideals about the prosecution of the war and how it should be reported. Public opinion during the war seems to have been reflected by the war correspondents, and that fact aided the military in maintaining its relationship with the war correspondents in those roles.

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[135] Lilya Wagner, *Women War Correspondents of World War II* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 2.

It is apparent from this study that the six roles played by the military with relation to war correspondents during World War II had an impact on the way in which the war was covered. As a result, the ideal of the watchdog role of the press during wartime was not met. Military blunders and violations of the rules of war (such as the shooting of prisoners) committed by American troops, despite being topics of concern for the American people and the press working on their behalf, were unreported or even covered up by war correspondents whose relationship with those troops had affected their ability to perform their jobs objectively and critically.

While the relationship between the military and the press during World War II has been lauded as the finest example of military/press cooperation in the history of the American press, it may very well have contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between the media and the military which has developed through Vietnam and into the smaller conflicts of the past two decades. The military came to expect such unquestioning cooperation from the media in peacetime as well as in time of conflict.

But the press, perhaps realizing its failure to perform the watchdog role over the military during World War II, began to take that role more and more seriously. The press came to view the military's manipulations of information and cover-ups of embarrassing incidents in the same light they viewed such acts by other segments or members of the state, such as politicians. The more those manipulations and cover-ups occurred, the more the press distrusted the information it got from the military and sought its own sources of information. The use of "national security" as an excuse to suppress stories of incidents such as the massacre of civilians at the village of My Lai in Vietnam and the publishing of the Pentagon papers are just two examples. The military lost its halo in the eyes of the press – the attitude grew the while the military may have a vital role to play in society, that role does not exempt it from the scrutiny of the press.

There is certainly room for further study of this issue concerning not only World War II, but also other wars that the U.S. has been involved in through the later part of the 20th century. Studies could be conducted on war correspondents in specific theaters of operation (for example, a comparison of the European and Pacific theaters) or under different military commanders (for example, a comparison of military/media relations under General MacArthur and General Eisenhower). Noting the controversies surrounding the handling of war correspondents by the military during such operations as the invasion of Grenada and the Gulf War, it is easy to see that while the roles which the military plays in relation to war correspondents may not have changed much over the last 60 years, the manner in which those roles are acted out has, to the detriment of both the military and the media. Studies of the relationship across several wars (World War II and Vietnam, for example) might also lead to a deeper understanding of how the relationship has evolved into what it is today, and what can be done by both sides to improve the situation.

As long as the American military exists and is involved in armed conflicts it will continue to be a legitimate and necessary subject of attention of an American press pursuing the watchdog role over the state. The sooner the media and the military can come to an understanding of their respective and vital roles in American society, and how their relationship affects each other's activities and responsibilities, the better off the media, the military and society will be.

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The Creation of the "Free" Press in Japanese American Internment Camps

The War Relocation Authority's Planning and Making of the Camp Newspaper Policy

AEJMC History Division

Takeya Mizuno

Ph.D. Candidate, the School of Journalism,

University of Missouri - Columbia

Mailing Address: 911 Ashland Rd, Apt B, Columbia, MO 65201

Home Phone: 573-817-2493

E-mail: c672827@showme.missouri.edu

The Creation of the "Free" Press in Japanese American Internment Camps

The War Relocation Authority's Planning and Making of the Camp Newspaper Policy

Abstract

This study investigates how the War Relocation Authority (WRA) planned and documented the newspaper publishing policy in Japanese American internment camps during World War II. The WRA allowed internees to publish their own newspapers "freely" without "censorship" but under the authority's "supervision." By using the WRA's primary documents, this study examines in detail the process and content of the WRA's camp press policy. Camp journalism was exempt from institutional "censorship"; however, it enjoyed only reserved editorial independence under the WRA's broad supervising authority. This study also shows that the realization of "free" journalism without "censorship" was a part of the federal government's propaganda tactics to convince the domestic and international public that "democracy" was fully protected in Japanese American camps.

I. Introduction

The sudden outbreak of war between the United States and Japan drastically changed the fate of more than 110,000 Japanese Americans and their press. More than two months after the Pearl Harbor attack, on February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. This forcibly removed West Coast Japanese residents to inland "relocation centers." By this mass evacuation and internment policy, all West Coast Japanese-language papers were forced to close, limiting journalistic activities of most Japanese Americans to newspapers published in internment camps. These camp newspapers were published "freely" without "censorship," but under the camp authority's "supervision." This study attempts to examine how and why the camp authority planned and formulated such an ambivalent "free under supervision" press control policy.[1]

Camp newspapers deserve an in-depth examination because they played a pivotal role for camp residents. They provided internees with various kinds of basic information and instructions necessary for their daily living. In addition, they published entertainment, opinions, and news about events and issues in the outside world. As Lauren Kessler wrote, "for what they both included and excluded, these publications provide important windows through which to view the internment experience."[2]

Despite the subject's grave importance, existing scholarship does not provide details about the press control policy of the War Relocation Authority (WRA), a civilian agency that assumed the task to operate camp facilities. Kessler discussed that the WRA controlled newspapers by selective appointment of staffers, but her study has not uncovered the agency's policy itself. One of the most prominent Japanese American scholars, Michi Weglyn, only stated that "the degree of freedom enjoyed by journalists in the relocation centers was carefully -- if subtly -- controlled by [the WRA]." Even the final report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) fails to provide a comprehensive picture of camp journalism, saying that newspapers "were supervised by the WRA center information officer but the editors and staff were evacuees."[3]

Other studies have not disclosed the WRA's press control policy, either. They only present the casual overview of camp newspapers' general characters, editorial tendencies, and their general relations with the WRA. In addition, sources used in previous literature are largely limited to the recollections and oral interviews of former newspaper staff, brief observations of news articles and editorials, and other secondary materials. To understand Japanese American camp journalism more fully, a close examination of the WRA's newspaper publishing policy is necessary.[4]

This study aims to fill this research gap by extensively using the archival documents of the WRA and other concerned governmental agencies. This study will at first examine the process of how the WRA planned and documented the camp press policy. This study will then analyze the official camp press policy in detail and show how it defined camp journalism's basic characteristics such as its purposes, editorial freedom, and the WRA's supervising authority. Finally, this study will reveal that the government's propaganda tactics had much to do with the WRA's decision to allow internees to have the "free" press under "supervision" without "censorship."

Archival documents used in this study include: the correspondence, reports, surveys, memoranda, policy drafts, and other official records and papers of the WRA, Western Defense Command (WDC), Department of War, Department of Justice, and Office of War Information (OWI). This study will also refer to the documents of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), diaries, letters, and personal documents of camp newspaper staff, in addition to camp newspapers' articles and editorials. Previous studies and other secondary sources will also be used supplementarily. This study's time frame covers one year after March 1942 when the federal government established the WRA. It was this period when the WRA planned and documented the camp press policy.

II. The WRA's Early Decision to Publish Camp Newspapers

As the government established the War Relocation Authority (WRA) in March 1942, camp officials soon decided to permit internees to have their own newspapers. This was one of the WRA's top priorities. Officials needed newspapers immediately as a means to conduct the most basic administrative operations such as to maintain the morale of internees and to keep them fully informed of various announcements and orders. The camp administration valued the establishment of an information channel so highly that evacuees in most camps had read newspapers while the most basic camp facilities were still under construction. Although these publications at first began as official "bulletins," the WRA soon transformed them into camp newspapers made by internees' hands.

From the earliest phrase of mass internment, top WRA officials realized that newspaper publishing was one of their most urgent tasks. They quickly decided that each camp would have one newspaper written and edited by Japanese internees. In a correspondence dated April 9, 1942, the WRA's close partner, the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), requested "that every project have its own newspaper or mimeographed bulletin so that all the people within that community will know what it going on." In response, the WRA Director Milton Eisenhower decided to follow the JACL's suggestion. By the end of the month, he wrote that "[s]o far as I am concerned, the newspaper problem is licked. [Each camp] will issue its own local newspaper, mimeographed." Bill Hosokawa, the managing editor of the Heart Mountain Sentinel in Wyoming, also recollected that the WRA from the earliest stage was sure "that it was okay to have [newspapers in camps]."[5]

How urgently the WRA established mass media in camps can be know from the fact that these publications preceded the establishment of most basic amenities for life. For example, evacuees had newspapers or information bulletins long before their shelter became in full operation. The first quarterly summary report at the Topaz Relocation Center, Utah states that immediately after the first contingent arrived on September 11, "[a] pre-issue of the Topaz Times and a train bulletin were published and distributed to the second contingent on September 17. ... A newspaper staff was recruited and functioning." On the other hand, the same report notes that "[a]s of September 30, the project site was a scene of construction, excavation and dust."[6]

Evacuees at other camps also read papers surrounded by uncompleted camp facilities. One example is the Jerome Relocation Center, Arkansas. Induction of evacuees began on October 6. By the end of the month, on October 23, the first issue of the Jerome Communique (later Denson Tribune) appeared in a two-page bulletin form. In this issue, Project Director Paul A. Taylor somewhat apologetically announced: "Because evacuation from West Coast assembly centers was stepped up a few days ahead of anticipated schedule, arrivals at Jerome are limited to facilities not fully completed." At this point, the Jerome camp lacked most of fundamental facilities and equipment, including houses, toilets, mess halls, laundry machines, and heating stoves, in contrast wtih the quick debut of the Communique.[7]

Situations were quite similar at the Rohwer Relocation Center, Arkansas, where its newspaper, the Rohwer Outpost, made its debut on October 24. About two weeks later on November 9, an editor Jim Doi sent a correspondence to the WRA's Reports Division in Washington, D.C. It read: "During the regular induction of evacuees from the Coast, the situation was more or less in a turmoil. The difficulty of the general induction itself was accentuated by the then existing poor housing facilities. ... It was during all these happenings that the OUTPOST managed to squeeze itself into being." Ironically, the operation of the newspaper itself was hampered by the shortage of basic materials. Doi continued: "The greatest barrier first encountered was the difficulty in obtaining the few necessary equipment. The publishing of the paper started three weeks later than originally anticipated. Today, the OUTPOST is still in need of even bare necessities. It is struggling along with one typewriter where four or five are needed."[8]

Probably the most extreme example is the Manzanar Relocation Center, California. When the first 84 evacuees arrived at Manzanar on March 21, the site was still a temporary assembly center. This group included two former journalists of the largest Japanese-language daily in Los Angeles Rafu Shimpo. They met the Project Director next day and suggested him to set up "an information booth where all incoming evacuees could get instructions and information, and where administrative notices could be posted." The Project Director accepted their idea, and thus Manzanar's Information Section was established on March 23. Meanwhile, the Information Officer after obtaining the Project Director's agreement proposed the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) that a daily mimeograph paper be published. At this point, the WCCA, a civil branch of the Western Defense Command (WDC), owned jurisdiction over the management of assembly centers. Hence, only about 20 days later after the first arrival of evacuees on April 11, the inaugural issue of the Manzanar Free Press appeared earlier than any other camp.[9]

Behind such speedy inaugurations of newspapers, there existed the WRA's strong desire to ease the burdensome process of information dissemination and communication as well as to keep the morale in camps. At every camp, officials were overwhelmed by the duty to inform several thousands internees of administrative and other important information produced in great quantities on a daily basis. A Reports Officer at the Gila River Relocation Center, Arizona lamented that "[d]istribution of material was a time-consuming responsibility for the Reports Office." This task was especially demanding at the early, unorganized stage. Additionally, the overwhelming majority of camp administrators and evacuees were literate in only one language, either English or Japanese. The Project Director of the Colorado River (Poston) Relocation Center, Arizona stated that "the language barrier ... made the free exchange of information and ideas enormously difficult." Officials were concerned about the morale and order in camps, too.[10]

The most practical solution to make this difficult but necessary job easier was to publish a center-wide mass medium. Most camps at first published official information sheets, which were usually called "bulletins." But administrators soon realized that newspapers published by internees themselves would be more effective in keeping the growing camp communities informed and sustaining their morale. After publishing "Press Bulletin" for eight weeks, Norris James, the Reports Officer at the Poston camp, suggested in September that "the community would derive great benefits by supporting their own paper, rather than having the Press Bulletin supported entirely by the government." Most camp papers, therefore, evolved from the WRA's official news "bulletins."[11]

Officials felt that this transformation was successful. A Reports Officer at Heart Mountain stated that the newspaper published by camp residents served "most importantly as a voice for the community, particularly during the hectic, early days of the center, when community thought and action were dulled by confusion and frustration." His counterpart at Poston agreed: "The Press Bulletin, it was represented to me, was mainly an administrative mouthpiece and the need for some news medium for the evacuees was keenly felt by them." The Manzanar Project Director also acknowledged the paper's usefulness, writing that "[the Manzanar Free Press] has been extremely valuable in interpreting to the residents the many rules and regulations that are of necessity a part of administering such an unprecedented wartime village as we have in Manzanar."[12]

III. The Planning of the Camp Newspaper Policy

As the WRA in mid-1942 began to formulate the newspaper publishing policy, officials soon set the most fundamental principle that the WRA would not enforce rigid, institutional "censorship." But this no-censorship scheme did not mean to grant absolute freedom of the press to internees. The policy planners insisted that the WRA would retain a wide authority to "supervise" camp news media.

By the end of May, the WRA began to make an official newspaper publishing policy. Although some newspapers had already started, the most basic concepts and principles were formulated by policy drafts written in this planning stage. One essential principle was that the camp authority would never impose formal "censorship." The WRA's Tentative Policy Statement of May 29 declared: "There will be no censorship by W.R.A. of any written or published materials going into or out of projects, or circulating within the projects." An inside report at the Tule Lake Relocation Center, California dated June 22 affirmed this no-censorship rule: "While the printing of Japanese has been forbidden by the administration, there is to be no censorship of the newspaper." Publication of Japanese-language sections was not permitted at that time yet. Roy Nash, Project Director of Manzanar, announced the same principle in his camp's newspaper, the Manzanar Free Press. In the July 22 issue, he declared:

> The function of a free press is to make a record of the particular section of life which comes within its view, and to comment on that record. The MANZANAR FREE PRESS records the daily development of a fascinating social scene evolving under exceedingly difficult controls. What a pity were that record to be blurred by restriction of editorial freedom! The opinions of intelligent participants in an action may be as significant as the action.[13]

Another important principle, however, was that the WRA would have an authority to "supervise" camp journalism, if not "censor" it. In other words, the no-censorship principle did not mean that the WRA guaranteed the absolute, unlimited freedom of the press. The WRA's Reports Division spelled out this conditional press freedom scheme in a confidential memorandum issued on July 21. The memo suggested the need to modify the May 29 tentative policy and read: "[I]f the evacuees who serve on the newspaper staff are paid from the funds of the WRA, ... the Reports Officer should have the authority, normally vested in any newspaper editor, to choose the type of material that goes into it." The July 21 memo further suggested that the Reports Officer enforce such authority in a way to prevent newspapers from printing anything what he deemed questionable or undesirable:

> Every relocation center will almost certainly have its nonconformists waiting for an opportunity to make trouble. All legitimate complaints and criticisms by evacuees should certainly be aired, but the Reports Officer, with the counsel of the Project Director, should be authorized ... to examine them carefully before they are permitted to appear in print.

The memorandum justified this reserved press freedom system for the sake of maintaining order and discipline in camps: "We should employ ... every reasonable safeguard within the policy of the WRA to avoid unrest or conflict among the Japanese evacuees." The WRA was willing to allow camp residents to publish their own newspapers without "censorship," but under its editorial "supervision."[14]

By mid-June, the WRA documented more systematic and detailed policy drafts that set the basic framework of newspaper making in camps. The June 15 draft defined the job responsibilities of the Director of Information and granted him a power to supervise camp papers. It read: "While the project newspaper is expected to be maintained and operated by the evacuees themselves, the Director of Information will generally provide for its initial establishment and operation and will at all times exercise general supervision over its news and editorial policies."[15]

A couple of days later on June 17, the WRA drafted an even more comprehensive policy outline. This document listed four points which succinctly described the general characters of camp journalism as well as the WRA's authority to control it. First, "the [WRA] will at all times exercise direct supervisory control over the news and editorial policies of such project newspapers, through the project Director of Information." Second, the primary objectives of newspapers are two-fold: to keep internees sufficiently informed of all kinds of activities and developments in the camp, and "to provide a medium through which WRA can direct public opinion within the evacuee group, and stimulate reactions and attitudes desirable for the maintenance of a high morale." Third, the entire newspaper staff must be recruited from evacuees. Finally, camp publications would be different from ordinary newspapers in that they would "have little or no advertising revenue" and the potential subscribers would have low cash income. In addition to these four points, the June 17 outline recommended that camp papers be distributed free to internees and that they be published by mimeograph rather than printed for the time being due to limited facilities, costs, and human resources.[16]

IV. The Establishment of the Official Camp Press Policy: Administrative Instruction No.8

Based on preliminary papers and drafts examined above, the WRA finalized the official camp press policy, "Administrative Instruction No.8," on October 10, 1942. By this document, the WRA formally defined the camp press' primary purposes, boundary of its editorial freedom, and the WRA's supervising authority. The policy spelled out the core "free under supervision" framework by saying that newspapers shall enjoy "maximum freedom," while the WRA may "supervise" them to make sure that their content would not harm "the general welfare." Moreover, the instruction vested the Project Director an authority to suspend newspapers whenever he found the "flagrant disregard of the responsibilities" on the part of newspapers. Because the policy did not provide clear definitions for these phrases, the camp authority could wield a broad supervising power over camp journalism.

The administrative instruction consisted of three sections, which formulated policies concerning camp newspapers, other publications, and public relations respectively. The section of camp papers was divided into two parts. Provisions under the category "A" spelled out the most basic rules about the camp press operations. Provisions under the category "B" provided plans about camp papers' future course and miscellaneous matters including the Project Director's prerogatives.[17]

The administrative instruction at first defined the primary aim of camp journalism. In essence, it was to aid the WRA's camp administration in two aspects. For one, camp papers would help the administration disseminate information to residents. It read: "[E]ach Project Director shall establish and operate a newspaper for the purpose of keeping evacuees informed of administrative decisions affecting their interests and of general activities within the relocation center." While camp papers were to function as an information channel between the WRA and internees, they would also help officials keep the morale and order in camps. "[T]he newspaper will serve a valuable purpose in communicating official information to the evacuees and in maintaining morale in the relocation center ...." To sum up, camp journalism's primary aim was to assist and promote the WRA's camp operations.[18]

The instruction then listed five fundamental principles of camp papers, which collectively ruled that camp journalism would be subjected to the WRA's control both financially and editorially. First, the newspaper staff must be "recruited from qualified persons among the evacuees." This in effect vested the WRA with an almost exclusive power to choose the newspaper personnel. Moreover, the policy held that evacuee staffers shall receive payment from the WRA as its work force. Reporters and editors were employees who were appointed and paid by the WRA.[19]

The second and third principles described the WRA's supervising authority and camp journalism's reserved editorial freedom. The second provision explained: "The Project Reports Officer, under the direction of the Project Director, shall have general supervision of the newspaper but shall delegate as much responsibility as possible to the evacuee staff." This meant that press freedom was not nonexistent; on the contrary, the administration would allow evacuees to make their papers as freely as possible. But they also had to accept some limitations under the administration's "supervision." The third principle specified these limitations by saying that the newspaper shall enjoy "the maximum freedom of expression short of libel, personal attack, and other utterances contrary to the general welfare." The WRA did allow internee journalists to enjoy "maximum" editorial independence, but only within the scope of what officials deemed appropriate in light of "the general welfare."[20]

The last two principles discussed camp newspapers' practical and economical aspects. The fourth rule said that a camp paper "shall be reproduced by the most economical method available." This usually meant mimeograph. The fifth principle added that a paper would not accept advertising.[21]

Provisions under the category B described the future course of camp newspapers. Most notably, the instruction proposed that the Consumers Cooperative Association take over the operation of newspapers from the WRA as soon as possible. If this happened, the WRA would grant such association a wide discretion to manage the newspaper. For example, no sale of subscriptions or of advertising space was permitted as long as a newspapers was financed from governmental funds. But such restrictions would be eliminated if the consumer association managed the paper. The association would be able to decide the paper's editorial content at will, too. The instruction formulated that the consumer association would have an authority to determine the financial policy, set the editorial policy, "determine the news coverage that will meet the needs and interests of the residents of the center," recruit and appoint the staff, and decide the method of reproducing the paper. In fact, newspapers at Manzanar, Minidoka, and Heart Mountain were run by community associations.[22]

What was more significant about the above point, however, was that the consumer association could never exempt the newspaper from the WRA's control. Two points must be noted. Firstly, the creation of the Consumers Cooperative Association did not guarantee the newspaper's complete economical independence. Even under the new policy, the WRA could still provide staffers with compensation and clothing allowance. Moreover, offices, printing facilities, and other necessary means of newspaper publishing were all the WRA's property. The WRA allowed internees to use them with no charge.

They did not have to worry about bills for light, heat, supplies, and other necessities, either. It was virtually impossible for camp newspapers to be totally self-supporting.

In reality, no consumer association could successfully sustain the newspaper business without the WRA's monetary support. For example, even the Heart Mountain Sentinel, one of the largest camp newspapers which had the paid circulation of more than 5,000 copies at its highest and earned some advertising revenue, was "never sufficient to provide salaries for the staff, rent, lights and utilities." The Project Director, however, considered "the value of the publication to the center as a whole" and kept providing financial assistance with the Sentinel. The situation of the Minidoka Irrigator resembled. It was also run by the consumer association and boasted a paid circulation of some 4,000 at its peak. "The operation of the IRRIGATOR was an expensive proposition for the Co-op organization, although there was a fair volume of advertising [from a nearby local city]," noted the Reports Division's final report. As long as the consumer association was unable to pay the wages and all other expenses on its own and remained dependent on the WRA's fund, the newspaper and its staffers could not obtain a bona fide editorial freedom.[23]

Secondly, the policy still imposed some responsibilities on the consumer association regarding the newspaper's editorial content. One provision maintained that "the advice and counsel of the [WRA staff] shall be made available upon request." It also ruled that the consumer association must "assume responsibility for the accuracy and integrity of reporting" and "publish in the newspaper factual information requested by the Project Director to be published." Simply put, as long as newspapers were published behind barbed wire fences, they could never be utterly exempt from the WRA's influence, both financially and editorially.[24]

Finally and most significantly, the administrative instruction granted the Project Director a wide authority to take punitive actions to newspapers, even to terminate them. It provided: "The Project Director may suspend publication and distribution of the newspaper at the relocation center in the event of flagrant disregard of the responsibilities that accompany publication of a newspaper." Because the provision does not define expressiy what would constitute "the event of flagrant disregard of the responsibilities," it was practically at the discretion of the Project Director to decide it. In connection with other provisions, the Project Director in theory could stop publication whenever he judged: the paper refused his request to publish "factual information"; the paper published "libel, personal attack, and other utterances contrary to the general welfare"; the paper printed materials that failed to "meet the needs and interests of the residents of the center"; or the paper ran any item that lacked "accuracy and integrity." With such loosely-defined criteria, the Project Director had wide leeway to interfere with camp journalism.[25]

V. The Camp Press Policy and Its Implications to Domestic and Foreign Propaganda

The creation of the WRA's newspaper publishing policy had a close connection with the federal government's public relations and propaganda programs. Since the federal government decided on mass internment, officials had been anxious about how to refute the undemocratic images of the policy both at home and abroad. They were well aware that forcible encampment of more than 112,000 people on the basis of race was contradictory to its own democratic war cause. The realization of "free" journalism without "censorship" was a part of the federal government's propaganda tactics to convince the domestic and international public that "democracy" was fully protected in Japanese American camps.

From the beginning, the WRA strove to impress the "democratic" aspects of mass internment to American citizens. Noriko Shimada discussed that, in order to convince the public of the policy's democratic undertaking, the WRA endeavored to make camps "model communities" where basic rights and freedoms were fully guaranteed. In February 1943, the Chief of the WRA's Reports Office, John C. Baker, reviewed the WRA's public relations program thus far and listed several items that the WRA must keep emphasizing. One of them was to garner the public understanding of "[d]emocratic principles involved" in the internment program such as "the way evacuees are fed, housed, supervised [and] the freedom they are permitted ...." In his radio address on July 15, 1943, the WRA Director Dillon S. Myer just did it: "[The WRA] is exerting all proper precautions for the national security -- and at the same time is providing the means for loyal American citizens and law-abiding aliens -- to take their place in the national life and enjoy the freedoms which are assured by the Constitution. ... We have faith in the American democratic way of life, with equal rights, privileges, and responsibilities for all, regardless of race, creed, or national origin."[26]

The freedom of the press was one of the most publicized subjects in the WRA's public relations. By allowing internees to edit and publish their own newspapers without censorship, the WRA could claim it as a proof of "democracy" in camps. Roy Nash, the

Project Director of Manzanar, proclaimed that the camp newspaper was evidence of "the desire and the intention of the [WRA] to grant evacuees every freedom consistent with military necessity." In a pamphlet that reviewed various in-camp activities for the outside people, the administration at the Granada Relocation Center, Colorado appealed that its newspaper Granada Pioneer was a genuinely free newspaper. The Pioneer "functions on the theory that Freedom of Speech, like Freedom of Religion, must be preached, practiced, and protected from within, and never abused. ... THE PIONEER is an ultra-democratic institution and its work is very much the thing of 'today.'"[27]

The head of the WRA, Millon S. Myer, also publicized this objective of newspaper publishing. In his 1943 article for the Common Ground, Myer stated that the WRA was making every effort to "democratize" camp administration. Newspaper publishing was one of various methods employed in this regard, together with good maintenance of physical conditions, instructing self-government by internees, encouragement of temporary or permanent release for outside work, sorting out of the "loyal" and "disloyal," and restoration of drafting. The WRA's 1946 final report also stressed that publication of newspapers constituted an integral part of the democratization policy. "[T]he fullest possible freedom of expression [was] guaranteed to the evacuees .... All centers ... had community newspapers published both English and Japanese. [They were] produced by evacuee staffs with a minimum of supervision and no actual exercise of censorship." Thus, the WRA expected that the very presence of "free" newspapers without "censorship" would be a useful public relations message that internment camps were a microcosm of any ordinary community in democratic America where fundamental civil rights and liberties were fully protected.[28]

The scope of the camp authority's public relations campaign crossed national borders. For the same reason that the public support was solicited at home, government officials strove to convince the world of the mass encampment policy's "democratic" character. Washington in particular was anxious about the Axis propaganda that denounced the policy as evidence of hypocrisy of the United States government. The Director of the Office of War Information (OWI), Elmer Davis, wrote to President Roosevelt in October 1942 that how the government would treat Japanese Americans "is of great interest to OWI" in order to combat "Japanese propaganda [which] insists that this is a racial war." Simultaneously, the WRA's documentation section warned that the wholesale encampment of Japanese Americans "on a racial basis has given a good deal of justification to Japan's recent charges that we preach human democracy but practice racial discrimination." Saying that "the policies and practices of WRA may have important repercussions," the WRA documentation officer stressed that if the internment program was to be executed democratically "in the field of Psychological Warfare in Asia we can effectively refute the charges of Japan that we are operating concentration camps for people whose only crime was to have Japanese parents." Camp officials recognized the necessity to publicize the democratic images of mass internment both at home and abroad.[29]

By the same logic for domestic public relations, the WRA officials thought that the presence of "free" journalism in camps would become an effective weapon to counter Axis propaganda. Roy Nash, Project Director of Manzanar, represented this thinking when he delivered an address before the Commonwealth Club of California on July 31, 1942. He said: "The war is world-wide and our treatment of the Japanese in California has world-wide significance. 'It is a token of our good faith; it is a crucial test of the validity of our war objectives.'" Nash then cited the presence of "free" journalism as evidence of the interment policy's compatibility with the nation's democratic cause. He elaborated:

> It is the desire and the intention of the [WRA] to grant evacuees every freedom consistent with military necessity. The first is the right to publish their own newspaper. The MANZANAR FREE PRESS ... has developed into a four-page printed tabloid supported entirely by advertising and subscriptions. ... We intend that it shall be free in fact as well as in name; a press with full editorial freedom to criticise [sic] at will, and subject only to the restraints which all American journalism accepts as a necessity in time of war.

At the end of the address. Nash again highlighted the "humane" aspect of mass internment. He quoted a statement of the former WRA Director Milton Eisenhower: "[W]e intend to demonstrate to the world -- to our friends and to our enemies alike -- that this nation, grim in the fight it is waging, can at the same time to be tolerant, patient and considerate in handling this human problem of wartime migration and resettlement." Camp papers were a symbol of American democracy to be shown to the world.[30]

Camp papers themselves echoed the WRA's propaganda tactics, stressing press freedom while bearing its effect on the domestic and international audience in mind. For example, the inaugural April 11 issue of the Manzanar Free Press read: "We'll be providing the answers that a world and the American public especially are asking. Democracy is being tested of its mettle right here. By our actions and attitudes we shall be responsible to this and future generations of free men. Truth must be the keystone of this community."[31]

VI. Conclusion

The WRA's camp press policy illustrates an intriguing mixture of press freedom and control. This reflected the paradox of the mass internment policy itself that a democratic nation fighting for democracy singled out one particular minority group on the basis of race and forcibly segregated them into inland internment camps. The WRA's policy to control newspapers by "supervision" without "censorship" is a microcosm of this paradoxical wartime measure.

As the camp authority's official policy "Administrative Instruction No.8" of October 10, 1942 as well as its earlier plans stated, the WRA imposed no "censorship" on camp newspapers. At the first glance, it may seem that the Japanese newspaper staff enjoyed the same level of freedom of expression as the outside mainstream press did.

But a close examination of the WRA's policy making reveals that the WRA did not intend to make camp newspapers unconditionally free, open mass media, in which a multitude of opinions and issues would be discussed with no restraint. The camp authority retained an authority to "supervise" newspapers or even to suspend them in case they were judged to have disregarded certain responsibilities enumerated in the policy. Since the administrative instruction worded these responsibilities so broadly and in turn defined the authority's power so loosely, camp administrators could have exerted formidable influence to newspapers.

This "free under supervision" scheme related closely with the federal government's desire to publicize both at home and abroad that mass internment was a "democratic" undertaking. Washington was especially concerned about the Axis propaganda that accused the United States for depriving constitutional rights and liberties of its own citizens. The camp administration hoped that "free" camp journalism without fascist-like "censorship" would prove the internment policy's compatibility with the nation's democratic cause of war.

In 1947, the Commission on Freedom of the Press declared that journalism in a democratic society needs to have two kinds of liberties: negative liberty and positive liberty. The Commission called the former "freedom from," meaning an immunity from external compulsions. The Commission called the latter "freedom for," denoting journalism's responsibility to exercise freedom for the public interest and common good.[32]

In light of the Hutchins Commission's dual press freedom theory, the WRA granted camp newspapers the minimum "freedom from," or immunity from forcible censorship. However, their "freedom for" existed only within the scope of the WRA's supervision. The WRA's "free under supervision" press policy reflects the complexity of the mass encampment program per se.

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[1]. During mass internment, some Japanese American newspapers published out of the West Coast military zones continued publication. These include the Rocky Nippon and Colorado Times in Denver, and the Utah Nippo and Pacific Citizen in Salt Lake City.

Some scholars intentionally use the term "concentration camps," claiming the official name of "relocation centers" is nothing but a governmental euphemism. But the phrase might be wrongly associated with the Nazi holocaust. To avoid unnecessary confusion and criticism by

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inconsistent use of terminology, this study uses more neutral and generic terms such as "evacuation" and "internment." For further discussions about the use of the term "concentration camps" and euphemism, see Raymond Y. Okamura, "The American Concentration Camps: A Cover-Up Through Euphemistic Terminology," Journal of Ethnic Studies Vol.10, No.3 (Fall 1982): 95-109; Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, Research Staff, CWRIC, Memorandum to Paul Bannai, Executive Director, CWRIC, "Use of Term 'Concentration Camps,'" July 9, 1981, Record Group 220, Box 42, File: Baker Lillian, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD (Hereafter, the National Archives and Record Administration is cited "NARA."); The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC), Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (Washington, D.C.: The Government Printing Office, 1982), 27.

[2]. Lauren Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II: Japanese Internment Camps," Journalism History Vol.15, No.2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1988): 71.

[3]. Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms," 78; Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1976), 180n; CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied, 174.

[4]. For other studies about camp journalism, see John Stevens, "From Behind Barbed Wire: Freedom of the Press in World War II Japanese Centers," Journalism Quarterly Vol.48, No.2 (Summer 1971): 279-287; Jay Friedlander, "Journalism Behind Barbed Wire, 1942-44: An Arkansas Relocation Center Newspaper," Journalism Quarterly Vol.62, No.2 (Summer 1985): 243-246, 271; E. J. Friedlander, "Freedom of Press Behind Barbed Wire: Paul Yokota and the Jerome Relocation Center Newspaper," Arkansas Historical Quarterly Vol.44, No.4 (Winter 1985): 303-313; Lauren Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II: Japanese Internment Camps," Journalism History Vol.15, No.2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1988): 70-79; James Omura, "Japanese American Journalism During World War II," in Gail M. Nomura, Russell Endo, Stephen H. Sumida, and Russell C. Leong, eds., Frontiers of Asian American Studies: Writing, Research, and Commentary (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1989), 71-77; Bill Hosokawa, "The Sentinel Story," in Mike Mackey, ed., Remembering Heart Mountain: Essays on Japanese American Internment in Wyoming (Powell, WY: Western History Publications, 1998), 63-73.

[5]. Mike Masaoka, National Secretary, JACL, to Milton Eisenhower, Director, WRA, April 9, 1942, p.6, Record Group 388, Box 1, File: 080, NARA, College Park, MD; Milton Eisenhower, Director, WRA, to John Bird, Director of Information, WRA, "Newspaper Problem," April 27,

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1942, Record Group 210, Entry 16, Box 429, File 69,033, NARA, Washington, D.C.; Hosokawa, "The Sentinel Story," in Mackey, ed., Remembering Heart Mountain, 64.

The JACL is the organization established by some middle-class, educated older Nisei in Seattle in 1930. The JACL was virtually the only nationally recognized Japanese American organization during the war, when the other Japanese organizations were disbanded. This organization, however, had not won wide approval from the general Japanese community both before and after the war, because of its youthful leadership, its poor organization, and its enthusiasm in Americanism which was incompatible with the pro-Japan sentiments of the majority of the Japanese Americans. When the war erupted, the JACL immediately declared their full support to the U.S. government and fiercely denounced Japan as an undemocratic militarist. From the outset, the JACL enthusiastically cooperated with the government's evacuation policy and established a strong alliance with the WRA.

For more details about the JACL, see Bill Hosokawa, Nisei: The Quiet Americans (New York: William Morrow, 1969); Bill Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice (New York: William Morrow, 1982); Jere Takahashi, "Japanese American Responses to Race Relations: The Formation of Nisei Perspectives," Amerasia Journal Vol.9, No.1 (1982): 29-57; Paul R. Spickard, "The Nisei Assume Power: The Japanese Citizens League, 1941-1942," Pacific Historical Review Vol.52, No.2 (May 1983): 147-174; Roger Daniels, "Japanese America, 1930-41: An Ethnic Community in the Great Depression," Journal of the West Vol.24, No.4 (October 1985): 35-49; Jere Takahashi, Nisei/Sansei: Shifting Japanese American Identities and Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997).

[6]. Irvin Hull, Chief, Project Reports Division, to Charles F. Ernst, Project Director, "Quarterly Summary Report, September 30, 1942," October 24, 1942, Records of the War Relocation Authority 1942-1946: Field Basic Documentation Located at the National Archives, Washington, D.C., Reel: 5, File: Miscellaneous Reports. (Hereafter, this collection is cited "Records of the WRA.")

[7]. "Final Report: Jerome Relocation Center," June 30, 1944, III: Induction of Residents, p.3, Records of the WRA, Reel: 69, File: Induction of Residents.

[8]. Jim Doi to M. M. Tozier, Acting Chief, Reports Division, November 9, 1942, n.d., Records of the WRA, Reel: 96, File: Miscellaneous.

[9]. "Final Report: Manzanar Relocation Center," February 15, 1946, Vol.II, Reports Division, p.1, Records of the WRA, Reel: 77, File: Vol.2, Reports Division.

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[10]. Ethel A. Flemming, Reports Officer, Gila River Relocation Center, "Final Report of Reports Officer," n.d., p.11, Records of the WRA, Reel: 42, File: Ethel Flemming; "Project Director's Narrative Report: Period January 1944 to March 1946," n.d., p.9, Records of the WRA, Reel: 33, File: Project Director's Narrative.

[11]. Pauline Bates Brown, Reports Officer, Poston Relocation Center, "Narrative Report," n.d., Exhibit #5 ("History of the 'Press Bulletin' and 'Poston Chronicle,'"), p.1, Records of the WRA, Reel: 32, File: Reports Division.

[12]. Vaughn Mechau, Chief Reports Officer, Heart Mountain Relocation Center, "Reports Division: Final Report," n.d., p.2, Records of the WRA, Reel: 62, File: Reports Division; Pauline Bates Brown, Reports Officer, Poston Relocation Center, "Narrative Report," n.d., p.18, Records of the WRA, Reel: 32, File: Reports Division; Ralph P. Merritt, Project Director, Manzanar Relocation Center, to Galen Fisher, January 14, 1944, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, Reel: 83, File: T5.091, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. (Hereafter, the library is cited "Bancroft, UCB.")

[13]. "The Tule Lake Report," November 30, 1944, p.21, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, Reel: 176, File: R20.65, Bancroft, UCB; "Description of Tule Lake Japanese Colony," June 22, 1942, p.3, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, Reel: 176, File: R20.80, Bancroft, UCB; Roy Nash, "Freedom of the Press," Manzanar Free Press July 22, 1942: 1.

[14]. Frank C. Cross, Chief, Division of Reports, to Joseph H. Smart, Regional Director, "Preview of the Division of Reports -- Its Functions and Services," July 21, 1942, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, Reel: 24, File: E2.31, Bancroft, UCB.

[15]. Oscar J. Buttedahl, WRA, to Colonel Cress, "The Project Director of Information and His Job," June 15, 1942, Record Group 210, Entry 16, Box 429, File 69.033, NARA, Washington, D.C.

[16]. Oscar J. Buttedahl, WRA, to Col. E. F. Cress, Deputy Director, WRA, "Some Observations Toward Evolving a Policy for WRA Project and Regional Newspapers," June 17, 1942, Record Group 210, Entry 16, Box 429, File 69.033, NARA, Washington, D.C.

[17]. WRA, Washington, "Administrative Instruction No.8," October 10, 1942, Record Group 210, Entry 16, Box 429, File 69.033, NARA, Washington, D.C.

[18]. Ibid.

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Vaughn Mechau, Chief Reports Officer, Heart Mountain Relocation Center, "Reports Division: Final Report," n.d., p.7, Records of the WRA, Reel: 62, File: Reports Division; Allan Markley, Reports Officer, WRA Washington Office, "Report of the Reports Division: Minidoka Relocation Center, Hunt, Idaho," n.d., p.17, Records of the WRA, Reel: 90, File: Reports Division Report.

[24] WRA, Washington, "Administrative Instruction No.8," October 10, 1942, Record Group 210, Entry 16, Box 429, File 69,033, NARA, Washington, D.C.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Noriko Shimada, Nikkei Americajin no Taiheiyo Senso (Tokyo: Liber Press, 1995), 57-86; John C. Baker, Chief, Office of Reports, WRA, to Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA, "Public Relations," February 13, 1943, Record Group 210, Entry 16, Box 134, File 20,100#1, NARA, Washington, D.C.; "Text of Address by Dillon S. Myer" July 15, 1943, p.4, National Japanese American Historical Society (NJAHS), Tashi Hori Collection, War Files, Box 1.

[27] Assistant in Charge of Project Report, Manzanar Relocation Center, to Regional Director, San Francisco, "Project Report No.34," August 13, 1942, p.5, Records of the WRA, Reel: 76, File: Project Report No.34; Hi Folks, Granada Relocation Center, n.d., Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, Reel: 292, File: L1.99, Bancroft, UCB.

[28] Dillon S. Myer, "Democracy in Relocation," Common Ground Vol.3, No.2 (Winter 1943): 43-48 [See also, Dillon S. Myer, "Japanese American Relocation: Final Chapter," Common Ground Vol.6, No.1 (Autumn 1945): 61-66]; Department of the Interior and War Relocation Authority, WRA: A Story of Human Conservation (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Interior, 1946), 107.

[29] Elmer Davis, Director, OWI, to President Roosevelt, October 2, 1942, Record Group 220, Box 119, File 9: Protest and Disaffection, NARA, College Park, MD; John F. Embree, Documents Section, Office of Reports, WRA, "Documentation Program of the War Relocation Authority," October 12, 1942, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records, BANC MSS 67/14 c, Reel: 24, File: E2.311, Bancroft, UCB.

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[30]. Roy Nash, Project Director, Manzanar Relocation Center, "Manzanar From the Inside," July 31, 1942, pp.1, 10-11, 13, Records of the WRA, Reel: 75, File: Miscellaneous Reports.

[31]. Manzanar Free Press 11 April, 1942.

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Chicago Newspaper Theater Critics of the Early 20th Century: Mediating Ibsen, the Syndicate and the Little Theaters

By Scott Fosdick, Ph.D.
Missouri School of Journalism
210 Lee Hills Hall
Columbia, MO 65211-1200
573/882-3496
fosdicks@missouri.edu

2000
Association for Education in Journalism
and Mass Communication
History Division
Phoenix, Arizona

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Chicago Newspaper Theater Critics of the Early 20th Century: Mediating Ibsen, the Syndicate and the Little Theaters

Introduction

In 1951, long after he had solidified his reputation as a playwright, screenwriter, and novelist, Ben Hecht wrote an essay for *Theatre Arts* magazine in which he heaped praise on the local working theater critics of his Chicago period, "…from 1910 to 19 twenty something…." The co-author of *The Front Page* based his recollections of the Chicago press of this period upon his experiences as a budding playwright and as a newspaper reporter. Hecht described the Chicago of his salad days as being both dramatically and journalistically backward. "But, oddly enough, we had the finest group of drama critics I have ever known," he wrote. "I am quite certain that I am writing out of fact and not nostalgia."[1]

Hecht's opinion should by no means go unchallenged. It flies in the face of both common intelligent opinion as well as the preponderance of academic research on New York critics of the period in question. If the Chicago critics were so preeminent, wouldn't there be more than a few scholarly works devoted to them, not to mention books? Skim the literature on Chicago theater and its critics and you are likely to come to the conclusion that professional theater didn't really get going in that city (except as a touring stop) until the founding of the Second City comedy troupe in the 1950s, and that local theater criticism began with the influential critic of the *Chicago Tribune* at that time, Claudia Cassidy.

The only significant exceptions to this otherwise deafening silence on the Chicago critics of nearly 100 years ago are two rather old and unpublished dissertations, both of which focused on the theater, using the writings of the critics as source material. *Chicago Theatre as Reflected in the Newspapers 1900 through 1904*, by Wilma June Dryden, and *Art and Commerce: Chicago Theatre 1900 - 1920*, by Jan Charles Czechowski, are fine pieces of scholarship, but they do not attempt to address the contributions of the Chicago critics head on. They make clear that Chicago was a vibrant theatrical center in these pre-film days. They begin to tell us who the critics were and how they lined up on various issues. But that's as far as they go. In any case, two dissertations for theater departments do not suggest a groundswell of interest in Chicago newspaper critics.[2]

For this same period, the theater critics of New York are the subject of a wealth of books and scholarly treatments, far too many to cite here. New York was solidifying its position as the theatrical and cultural capital of the nation. It stands to reason that New York's arbiters of taste be the subject of the greatest attention. Where the theater is most important, so too must be the critics.

So it is with some wonder that one reads Hecht's rosy assessment of the Chicago critics of the 'teens and twenties. Indeed, Hecht seemed to anticipate reader incredulity when he wrote, "I am quite certain that I am writing out of fact and not nostalgia." Why should we believe him?

And yet, the evidence to the contrary is also suspect, based as it is on untested opinion and the preponderance of popular and academic writing that focuses on the nation's cultural capital. In other words, Hecht's words are surprising not because they contradict established scholarship, but because the established scholarship offers no confirmation or rebuttal.

There is no point in trying to ascertain whether Hecht's view was literally true, that these were "the finest group of drama critics I have ever known." The word "finest" is problematic, as is the question of which drama critics Hecht knew and didn't know. But Hecht's words raise two more enduring questions: Just how good were the Chicago critics of that period? And why should we care? That is to say, what lasting difference might these critics have made to newspapering, criticism, dramatic development and the larger culture?

It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer these questions definitively. Its purpose is to make a good start at assessing the theater reviewers working for Chicago newspapers in the early 20th century by chronicling their response to three critical challenges of that time: the new, revolutionary "problem plays" of various European playwrights (Ibsen, Strindberg, Shaw, etc.); the dictates of the powerful, New York-based theatrical Syndicate; and the Little Theater movement.

The greatest obstacle to research in this field is not the paucity of prior research, but the almost complete lack of indexing of reviews and other articles on theater appearing in Chicago newspapers at the beginning of the 20th century. Most of the newspapers are available on microfilm, but finding reviews is a matter of reeling through the haystack of news and advertising. The Sunday arts sections are easy enough to find. Individual reviews in this period, however, are buried midweek among unrelated items, invariably without mention on the front page index.

As this paper was completed, this author discovered that there exists at the Chicago Historical Society a single copy of an index to the *Record Herald* for the years 1904 to 1912, as well as a scrapbook of theatrical clippings for the *Chicago Daily News* from 1898 to 1935. (Neither of these travels.) Finding a review in one newspaper points the way to the likelihood of reviews in competing newspapers on the same day, but until all are indexed this will be a hit-or-miss endeavor. With the help of a research assistant, this author is undertaking just such an index of Chicago theater reviews, beginning with the *Chicago Tribune* in September of 1899. (It will be made available on a website, perhaps as early as summer 2001.)

For the purposes of this paper, however, the survey of issues and critical responses relied on newspaper reviews already identified in the few existing scholarly works and by searching for reviews when the date of an important production was discovered by some other means, most often in a book like Robert Schanke's *Ibsen in America*.[3] This method is less than ideal, but it will have to do until the index is more fully developed.

When to start such an inquiry is a crucial consideration. In 1910, at the beginning of his Chicago period, Hecht observed a critical milieu in mid-stride. To understand what he was looking at, we must begin our analysis 10 years earlier, in 1900. For most of the 19th century, most reviews were printed without bylines. By 1900, every paper gave bylines to its theater critics, save the *Chicago Tribune*, which soon followed suit. The onset of bylines coincided with newly expanded coverage of the arts.

With the circulation wars of the late 19th century came attempts to broaden appeal by introducing new features: columns, comics, and pages devoted to arts and amusements. In 1888, the *Tribune* cut its price to two cents, calling itself a "people's paper." Its successful quest for mass circulation continued in 1895 when it reduced the price to one cent, gaining 25,000 subscribers on the first day. On the Fourth of July, 1900, William Randolph Hearst printed the first edition of his *Chicago American*, introducing Chicago to a free-wheeling style of journalism marked by frequent editions, many illustrations, towering headlines, colors, more comics, serial fiction, signed articles, and trust-busting. All this may have had mixed results for the quality of straight news in Chicago newspapers, but it was a shot in the arm for theater criticism.

Ironically, while the *American* broadened the definition of Chicago journalism and thereby opened the door for improved coverage of the arts, its theater criticism was the worst in town. As Dryden pointed out in her dissertation, the *American* didn't settle on one or two critics, but preferred to use whomever was on hand at the moment, regardless of qualifications.

Despite the example of the *American*, the first years of the 20th century were a golden age for Chicago critics. Their numbers were as great as any period before or since; they worked for growing, competitive newspapers with mass readership (Dryden lists 10 in her survey); the theater was plentiful, varied, and blissfully unencumbered by electronic competition. Most invigorating to the local climate of opinion were the various controversial issues that brought out the best - and the worst - in the corps of critics.

Ibsen and Shaw, *et al*

Perhaps the most interesting controversy dividing turn of the century critics involved the "problem plays" of Ibsen and Shaw, *et al.* In retrospect, it is clear the Chicago theater scene was due for some fresh air, despite its apparent vitality. In the 1899-1900 season, 86 plays, 44 of them new to Chicago, were presented at the four major downtown theaters: the Powers, Grand Opera House, Lyric, and McVickers, according to a report in the *Chicago Tribune* on June 3, 1900. Many of the plays were star vehicles. Many others were machinery plays - that is, plays that built their appeal on the use of spectacular machinery that put on stage such phenomena as storms, heavenly ascensions, sea battles, and eye-catching scene changes. Chicago led the nation in summer productions - perhaps because of the cooling effect of Lake Michigan - meaning it was also preeminent in the musical plays that traditionally dominated summer schedules.[4] The cheaper neighborhood circuit theaters - that is, those theaters that featured lesser-known touring actors and companies performing melodrama, spectacles, vaudeville, and burlesque - outdrew the downtown theaters. In 1902, the *Tribune* reported that the outlying theaters drew 30,000-plus patrons daily, while downtown theaters drew less than 20,000.[5] Coverage of the neighborhood circuit theaters, when there was any, tended to be derisive. The neighborhood stock theaters, however, received generally friendly reviews for their presentations of moral melodramas and the occasional Shakespeare. The calling card of these theaters was suitability for the delicate sensibilities of women and children. Special promotions abounded. For example, the People's Theater, which opened on Labor Day, 1901, at various times gave away sponge cake and coal, and, on one occasion, a man's watch. Added to the mix were Yiddish and assorted foreign language national theater groups (particularly Scandinavian), all of which received limited critical coverage.

The *Tribune* led in circulation and in theater coverage, usually devoting an entire Sunday section titled, "At the Play." Aside from the advantages of space the wealthier papers could afford, Czechowski reported that "coverage in Chicago newspapers was relatively consistent and similar…. Coverage included news, changes of bills, new plays, gossip, reviews, and feature articles. All of the city's papers provided much the same format and coverage."[6] (The *Daily News*, lacking a Sunday edition, printed its big theater section on Saturday, a common practice in features packaging to this day.) Many of the papers also included regular coverage of the New York theater, including personality gossip and news of upcoming tours; Burns Mantle eventually made his way to New York for the *Tribune* to provide such stories.

Of course, theater was in a happy financial position at the turn of the century, as historian Barnard Hewitt points out: "As the 20th century opened, the theatre was a big and prosperous business. On all levels, from serious drama to burlesque and vaudeville, it was the country's chief medium of entertainment."[7] But when it came to drama of lasting artistic merit, the pickings were slim.

Never is the critic's role in establishing a climate of opinion more important than when a new style of theater hits town. Dryden comments that by 1900 all Chicago critics supported realism in sets, costumes, and acting, but disagreed on the realistic themes of Ibsen and Shaw. "At the turn of the century," Dryden writes, "only the dramas were a subject for controversy."[8]

In New York, the moralistic Victorian stand against what was thought of as those gloomy problem plays was led by William Winter, who rallied followers in a group called the Defenders of the Ideality. The club found its Chicago branch in Lyman B. Glover (of the *Times-Herald*, later the *Record-Herald*), Major George McConnel (*Chronicle*), and, most vociferously, Barrett Eastman (*Evening Journal*). Eastman took his stand shortly after arriving at the *Journal*:

> In America, still, we are able to be amused by something else than ... the permutations of pruriency. That does not seem to be the fact as regards London, and it is certainly not the fact

> as regards Paris. But it is yet the fact as regards Chicago.[9]

Eastman was fearless on all fronts. While some others -- especially society gadfly Amy Leslie of the *Daily News* -- paid court to the leading actors of the day, Eastman was unrestrained in his attacks on such stars as Minnie Maddern Fiske, Mrs. Patrick Campbell, and Henry Irving. Of the latter, appearing in *The Bells*, he wrote:

> Surely no healthy adult...was moved to anything but a kind of pitying ridicule by the play's childish futility and the actor's grotesque mouthings, grimaces, and contortions. The play itself is beneath contempt.[10]

In the case of *The Bells*, Eastman was attacking a flagrant melodrama, and thereby escapes the censure of history. Unfortunately, he also attacked plays that have stood the test of time, including those of Ibsen. Of a 1904 double bill of *Ghosts* and *Hedda Gabler*, he wrote:

> Evidently Chicago does not contain very many playgoers so ignorant and uncultivated as to be interested in Ibsen's discussions of the petty problems of a crude, young, immature civilization.[11]

Eastman was not alone in his disgust for Ibsen. When Blanche Bates did *Hedda Gabler* at the Powers' Theatre in 1901, she drew the following responses:

"...a bitter, unwholesome tragedy." -- Amy Leslie, *Daily News*.[12]

"...a nauseous, horrifying affair." -- Winifred Black, *American*.[13]

"...an example of diseased mentality." -- Lyman Glover, *Record Herald*.[14]

"...a drama of pessimism gone mad." -- Major McConnel, *Chronicle*.[15]

"...a dramatic nightmare." -- Barrett Eastman, *Evening Journal*.[16]

E. L. Bickford, of the *Inter Ocean*, was dubious, but wrote, "It must be granted that the performance was dramatic. It was realism, but not uneventful realism. Ibsen is an adroit manipulator of plot even if it leads to overwhelming horror."[17]

The only critic who wholeheartedly supported Ibsen at this time was young (in his 20s) Delancey Halbert, who was as appalled by the small-minded reactions of his fellow critics as he was enthralled by Ibsen. Although he felt the above-mentioned production of *Hedda Gabler* had been performed too melodramatically by the lead actress and her company, Halbert strongly defended the play: "On the whole Miss Bates is to be thanked. The preachers of perpetual sunshine in theater forget *Hamlet* and *Othello* and *Macbeth*."[18]

Late in 1902, Lyman Glover left the *Record-Herald* to become the manager for actor Richard Mansfield. Although Glover was "the dean of Chicago's critics,"[19] writing about the theater apparently didn't pay the rent as readily as working in it. Glover was replaced by James O'Donnell Bennett, a strong supporter of Ibsen. Bennett called a production of *Ghosts* featuring Mary Shaw at the McVickers a "...master work of art and morals."[20] (After seeing the same play, Major McConnel concluded that if it represented any truth about society then it was time for the final purgation of humanity by fire.)[21]

Until Bennett's arrival on the scene, however, Halbert led a lonely crusade for the new drama. In his slim volume, *The Story of a Theater*, Glover called fellow critic Halbert "one of the young and growing critics with a liberal education and a scholarly disposition."[22] That liberal education consisted of a secondary education at Phillips Academy at Andover followed by a very short stint at Harvard. Halbert began as a general staffer on the

Evening Post in 1893 at the age of 19, and within a few years became music and theater critic.

Halbert was continually derisive of other critics' preference for the mindlessly optimistic popular theater of the day, and never stopped championing the new, so-called "pessimistic" plays: "It will require a stretch of time before many will be willing to admit that it is reasonable to expect thought in the theater," Halbert wrote in 1902. "...But the cant about pessimism has become habit."[23]

One of Halbert's most pointed -- and most personal -- attacks on a fellow critic followed a column in which Lyman Glover praised the English for censoring Maeterlinck's *Monna Vanna*. Within the week Halbert fired back that such ignorant commentary (Glover admitted he hadn't even read the play) would, thankfully, only increase the popularity of "Maeterlinck's beautiful play." Halbert wrote that critics who attack Maeterlinck as a "'putrid mess'" (Glover's words) "...are not fit for intelligent controversy. No one above the kindergarten stage of artistic and literary development cares to know what their opinions are. Let the dead bury the dead 'critical' Dogberrys."[24]

When Glover retired three months later, Halbert paid homage in a piece that was cordial on its surface, but managed to point out Glover's shortcomings, for those who cared to read between the lines. Rather than criticizing Glover for not supporting European dramatists, Halbert simply said that he had encouraged American writers. He was equally subtle about Glover's boosterish attitude: "Mr. Glover has been writing about plays for twenty years or more," Halbert wrote, "...characterized by the utmost kindliness of feeling."[25]

In his continued support of realism, Halbert was never as inflexible or as dogmatic as his foes were in attacking it. He realized that realism was not the final apotheosis of theater:

> In the last decade the mode of the real has had its sway. Much has been added to dramatic and histrionic art thereby. But the realistic is only one side of a many sided art. It has not displaced, nor will it ever displace, the poetic, the rhetorical, the ideal.[26]

Halbert continued to rally support for Ibsen, and, with Bennett's help, eventually made headway. A major battle was won with the help of what were apparently supremely successful portrayals by Minnie Maddern Fiske of Nora in *A Doll's House* and the title role in *Hedda Gabler* at the Garrick in May of 1904. Even Eastman approved.[27]

But the raves for Mrs. Fiske often revealed a holdover of contempt for Ibsen, as Amy Leslie's review illustrates:

> She seizes the senses, captivates the intelligence and issues a pardon for Ibsen the nobly tedious, Ibsen the coarsely natural, Ibsen the plenteously real, and Ibsen the limit of dramatic endurance.[28]

Later that year, a production of Shaw's *Candida* was so well received by the public that Halbert proudly claimed victory for his long campaign for a modern, literate theater:

> The day is near at hand when those who admire Ibsen, Maeterlinck, Hauptman, Sudermann, Shaw and the rest will not have to stand epithets; the audience is becoming so large that soon the only way to distinguish oneself will be to proclaim that one does not care for the new school, but prefers to remain true to Sardou, *The Silver King*, and *The Two Orphans*.[29]

Halbert died suddenly of pneumonia two months later, on Christmas Eve, at the age of 30, arguably the best critic Chicago would ever see. Alas, he committed the cardinal sin of any journalist who works for a paper without a Sunday edition: He died on a Saturday. The *Tribune* got the news first.

The Syndicate

Another issue on which Halbert was a crusader involved the New York theatrical Syndicate. This time, he wasn't alone. The *American*, well practiced at trust-busting, took on the Syndicate in its news and editorial pages as well as in its dramatic columns, as did some of the other papers (although usually less bombastically). The critics were split over the issue.

Formed in New York in 1896, the Syndicate took advantage of the nation's transcontinental railway system to mass produce theater in a way that threatened (and eventually largely demolished) local stock companies. Had America not been so totally in thrall to realistic scenery, the Syndicate might not have been so successful. As it was, it was able to construct lavish scenery for each play and transport it to city after city, thereby vastly increasing the return on its initial investment. This gave it both an economic edge, and the ability to improve the quality -- at least visually -- of the product.

Some critics -- Barrett Eastman of the *Evening Journal*, Lyman Glover of the *Record-Herald*, Major McConnel of the *Chronicle*, and Burns Mantle of the *Inter Ocean* (and later the *Tribune*'s New York critic) -- saw nothing wrong with the Syndicate's modernization of the theater business. If they could find a way to produce better theater more cheaply, more power to them. Other critics -- Halbert, Bennett, Percy Hammond and W. L. Hubbard of the *Tribune*, Tiffany Blake (Eastman's predecessor at the *Evening Journal*), and Howbert Billman (an early *Record* critic) -- objected to the Syndicate for a variety of reasons. Some attacked the Syndicate as a purveyor of immoral plays. Others objected to the way the Syndicate reduced the art of the theater to a crass economic equation. In an article headlined, "Trash Usurping Place of the Drama in Chicago," Hubbard wrote:

> We are in the hands of managerial powers who care not a whit for the artistic or the worthy -- who regard the monetary as the sole aim, and who justify themselves with the statement that they give the public whatever it wants.[30]

In the main, displeasure with the Syndicate stemmed from its great power, and how it wielded it. Not content to make its profit and let others make theirs, the Syndicate bought up the best theaters in New York and (to the best of its ability) other cities, and tried to freeze out independent productions. Among those theatrical leaders who dared defy the Syndicate were Minnie Maddern Fiske and Henrietta Crossman, whose editorial comments on the subject were printed by the *Tribune* in 1901.[31] This defiance did not go unpunished. The Syndicate not only had a near-monopoly on theatrical real estate, it also owned a critic or two. Halbert -- never one to mince words with his fellow critics -- lambasted Franklyn Fyles of the New York *Sun* as a "tool of the Syndicate" for making a "cowardly and mendacious attack" on Mrs. Fiske later that same year. Wrote Halbert:

> Nothing published in the dramatic department of the *Sun* should be accepted as fact....Mr. Fyles still collects royalties from the Syndicate. He is a faithful hireling, but his efforts in behalf of his employers are bungling as well as thoroughly disreputable.[32]

New York critics as a group were accused of being under the thumb of the Syndicate when they slammed Frank Daniel's *The Ameer*, a play that had been a critical and popular success in Chicago but had the misfortune of opening at a non-Syndicate theater in New York.

New York's stranglehold on professional theater in Chicago continued and strengthened, unfazed by dissent from journalists and actors. The only successful major attacks on the Syndicate's monopoly came from other New York-based producers, beginning with the Shubert brothers. Early on, the formation of the Syndicate actually served to *encourage* Chicago playwrights: Because it was reluctant to release the rights to plays it had on tour, Chicago's stock companies needed to find their own scripts. In the 1902-'03 season, there were still enough such companies around that the demand for scripts was high. Several of these scripts were successful enough that they could then go head-to-head with Syndicate properties in New York, a situation that gave Chicago critics considerable (if somewhat boosterish) glee. Major McConnel wrote late in the season:

> Only a few days ago one of the New York newspapers was at great pains to insist that "theatrically speaking New York is still the greatest producing center of the country, notwithstanding the Chicago invasion." The invasion referred to was, of course, the presence in Broadway theatres of three or four Chicago-made stage productions at the same time....It is a great change, indeed, from the time, only two or three seasons ago, when New Yorkers calmly rested in the belief that Chicago didn't even

> "know a good thing" to say nothing of being able to create one, to find four Chicago productions at once.[33]

Chicago critics would proclaim similar sentiments at various times in the 1970s and 1980s, in much the same words, when Chicago again would become a source for new scripts. By the second decade of the 20th century, however, Chicago was rapidly ceasing to be a source of origin and becoming a destination, a marketplace for goods from New York theater factories. This made life much less interesting for the Chicago critic. His or her role was gradually reduced to that of a consumer advocate: insisting on original stars, strong companies, and well-maintained production values in shows that toured here; complaining when Chicago was used as a tryout town for properties that were far from ready for Broadway, and, on the other hand, begging for Chicago to be included early in the tour of a Broadway success that everyone was eager to see.

By World War I, Chicago theater had, against its will, become provincialized -- and so had its critics. They resented their reduced role considerably. In an article headlined, "We are Despised by the New York Overlords of the Theater," *Tribune* critic Percy Hammond wrote:

> An experience of 20 years with the Chicago branch of New York's theatrical industry has convinced me that it is viewed with considerable contempt by those who conduct it from afar.[34]

The Little Theater Movement

In the non-commercial arena, however, Chicago theater in the decade preceding World War I had considerable spirit left in it, for those who cared to notice. It was a leader in what was variously called the "Art" or (more often) "Little" Theater Movement. In his valuable dissertation on the rise and fall of the movement in Chicago, Jan Charles Czechowski pays considerable attention to the role of the press in encouraging or discouraging the Little theaters. In Chicago, the movement consisted of the New Theater (begun in 1906), various companies led by Donald Robertson, the Hull House Players, and the Chicago Little Theater. The positions the critics took on the issues mentioned earlier -- realism and the Syndicate -- give some indication of how they lined up on the Little theaters. Burns Mantle -- a staunch supporter of the slick commercialism of the Syndicate -- was, not surprisingly, "skeptical about the essential validity of the Art Theatre movement," Czechowski reports, but his skepticism ceased to be a factor when Mantle left for New York (circa 1908).[35]

W. L. Hubbard was initially cool, but had warmed to the movement by his retirement from the *Tribune* in 1909. Unfortunately, according to Czechowski, Hubbard's replacement inflicted considerable damage:

> Percy Hammond went to the *Tribune*, becoming the undisputed leader of dramatic criticism in Chicago and was to prove unceasingly and predictably vitriolic in his opposition to amateur Art theatre efforts in Chicago.[36]

As these theaters were the only ones consistently presenting classic fare, Hammond's distaste for their work often led him to make insupportable assertions. For example, a Robertson company production of *Tartuffe* gave rise to Hammond's pronouncement that Moliere's work was "utterly without literary charm."[37]

Yet most Chicago critics supported the movement -- although not as persuasively as Halbert might have, had he lived. The *Evening Post*'s Frederick Hatton saw in the movement an opportunity for championing native drama -- which was, according to Hatton's prejudice, preferable to the European orientation of New York theater. Hatton used this argument in support of the formation of the Chicago Theatre Society (a Robertson venture) in 1911. Despite his rationale, the company funded by the Chicago Theatre

Society, called The Drama Players, opened with Ibsen's *Lady from the Sea*. (The opening performance, oddly enough, was in New York, on November 6, 1911.) Despite much critical support, Hammond notwithstanding, audience support was low, and The Drama Players folded within a year.[38]

Maurice Browne and Ellen Van Volkenburg took the leadership of the movement when they founded the Chicago Little Theatre in 1912. Consciously looking to European models and mentors, particularly Gordon Craig, Browne and Volkenburg championed the poetic drama of Yeats, Synge, Gibson, Strindberg, Maeterlinck, and Schnitzler. In an intimate space seating 90, the Chicago Little Theatre produced in six seasons 44 plays, including 18 world premieres and seven American premieres.[39] Like many of the theaters that sprang up in Chicago storefronts 60 years later, it was idealistic, anti-commercial, poor, innocent, and believed in Craig's ideal of unified production values. Unlike the later theaters, however, it was determinedly amateur: It wanted none of what it considered to be the slick tricks and posing of mercenary professionals.

One by one, Chicago's art theaters folded, in part because they were never really designed to support the people who worked in them, and in part for lack of public enthusiasm. The overriding myth of the American theater in the 20th century is that it shrank in response to the technologically seductive onslaught of radio, film, and television. As far as Chicago theater is concerned, however, an alternative thesis bears looking into, and that is that the Syndicate killed the theater with its single-minded pursuit of profit. As early as 1906, the *Tribune*'s W. L. Hubbard was commenting on the falling public regard for the theater, in an article headlined, "Managers and the Star System Ruin American Drama."[40] Hubbard's noted prudishness may have led him to overstate the case somewhat, but a much more perceptive critic, James O'Donnell Bennett of the *Record-Herald*, noted the same trend a few years later in an article headlined, "The Ungrateful Playgoer":

> The public may have thought that it wanted to be amused, but the fact is that there is nothing people tire of so quickly as just being amused.[41]

As downtown fare became mere amusement, crowds turned to neighborhood vaudeville, where it could get a similar level of entertainment much cheaper. Those who wanted more substance "ceased to think about the theatre," Bennett wrote.

One reason the Chicago Little Theatre was able to premiere so many serious plays in the years following Bennett's comments was that the commercial theater was *not* premiering them. When the commercial theater was still in the hands of a diverse group of independent producers and actor-managers, there was a successful mix of art and spectacle, of poetry and fire-eating. By leaving the field of serious drama to amateurs, the Syndicate (and its subsequent partners in crime) made some quick profits, but eventually alienated a large segment of the American public. Rather than defect *en masse* to the amateur art theaters, this segment simply gave up on theater. It was in this already splintered, weakened condition that the American stage found itself when film was born -- an industry designed to go the Syndicate one better in the business of mass producing entertainment.

By World War I the popular theater had given up on dramatic literature and devoted itself to putting stars in front of sumptuous realistic scenery. The easy road to success appeared to lie in steadily increasing the realism of the sets and trying to keep patrons in Chicago and beyond happy when stars took sick or dropped out and had to be replaced. Film solved those problems: its mastery of realism was photographic (literally), and once filmed, its stars were available for viewing everywhere and simultaneously. There are things that theater can do that film cannot, but at a crucial moment in its history, the theater was in no position to take advantage of them.

Whether or not a few more Delancey Halberts in the journalistic ranks might have encouraged the theater to take another path at this vital juncture is ultimately unknowable. The knowable truth is that in 1920, Chicago critics were beginning a period of nearly 40 years in which their main role was to chronicle a gradual decline of the American theater, incrementally, as it reached them by train, bus, and truck from New York.

Conclusion

Clearly, Chicago had an active and varied corps of theater critics working for its many newspapers from 1900 to 1920. At their best, they were literate, responsible, idealistic and even courageous. Of the three main battles they engaged, they seem to have lost two: the one against the Syndicate, and the one for the Little Theaters. The third battle was won, the one for a new social realism in the dramas of Ibsen, Shaw and their European contemporaries.

But this battle was not fought solely by the critics, and Chicago was only one battleground in a larger cultural war. The impact of a writer like Ibsen goes far beyond the world of the theater. When plays like *A Doll's House* and *Hedda Gabler* were first performed in America, women still did not have the vote. Indeed, much of the early critical rejection of Ibsen was really a rejection of the idea of women as intellectual equals to men. The battle for hearts and minds on this issue was national. Hence, the reception for such plays -- and the ideas and debates they set loose -- was of import not just in New York, but in other major cities like Chicago.

One need not agree with Ben Hecht that Chicago had "the finest group of drama critics" to see the value in studying the ways in which those critics responded to and mediated new ideas as they appeared on stage in front of a public not yet distracted by film, television and the internet.

It is remarkable how quickly the Chicago critics changed their tune on Ibsen, transforming over a very few years from near unanimous rejection to general acceptance. The details of how that happened seems to be the most promising avenue for further research, and one this writer plans to navigate next.

Notes:

[1] Ben Hecht, "Wistfully Yours," *Theatre Arts*, July 1951, 13.
[2] Wilma Jane Dryden, "Chicago Theatre as Reflected in the Newspapers, 1900 through 1904" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1960). Jan Charles Czechowski, "Art and Commerce: Chicago theatre 1900-1920" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1982).
[3] Robert A. Schanke, *Ibsen in America: a century of change*, (Metuchen, N.J., and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1988).
[4] Ibid., 33.
[5] *Chicago Tribune*, 16 February 1902, 43.
[6] Czechowski, "Art and Commerce: Chicago theatre 1900-1920," 33.
[7] Barnard W. Hewitt, *Theatre U.S.A.* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959), 280.
[8] Dryden, "Chicago Theatre as Reflected in the Newspapers, 1900 through 1904," 110.
[9] Barrett Eastman, *Chicago Evening Journal* 16 November 1900.
[10] Ibid., 6 December 1901.
[11] Ibid., 5 March 1904.
[12] Amy Leslie, *Chicago Daily News*, 21 September 1901, p. 3.
[13] Winifred Black, *Chicago American*, 21 September 1901, p. 10.
[14] Lyman Glover, *Chicago Record Herald*, 22 September 1901, p. 22.
[15] Major McConnel, *Chicago Chronicle*, 21 September 1901, p. 7.
[16] Barrett Eastman, *Chicago Evening Journal*, 21 September 1901, p. 3.
[17] E.L. Bickford, *Chicago Inter Ocean*, 21 September 1901, p. 6.
[18] Delancey Halbert, *Chicago Evening Post*, 21 September 1901, p. 7.
[19] Dryden, "Chicago Theatre as Reflected in the Newspapers, 1900 through 1904," 29.
[20] James O'Donnell Bennett, *Chicago Record-Herald*, 10 May 1903, p. 8.
[21] Dryden, "Chicago Theatre as Reflected in the Newspapers, 1900 through 1904," 116.
[22] Lyman B. Glover, *The Story of a Theatre* (Chicago: Donnelly, 1898), 96.
[23] Delancey Halbert, *Chicago Evening Post*, 6 January 1902, p. 4.
[24] Ibid., 12 July 1902, p. 7.
[25] Ibid., 4 October 1902, p. 13.
[26] Ibid., 18 October 1901, p. 4.
[27] Barrett Eastman, *Chicago Evening Post*, 18 October 1901, p. 4.
[28] Amy Leslie, *Chicago Daily News*, 17 May 1904, p. 3.
[29] Delancey Halbert, *Chicago Evening Post*, 25 October 1904, p. 4.
[30] W.L. Hubbard, "Trash Usurping Place of the Drama in Chicago," *Chicago Tribune*, 13 October 1907, part II, p. 1.
[31] Editorial, Minnie Maddern Fiske and Henrietta Crossman, *Chicago Tribune*, 19 January 1901, p. 67.
[32] Delancey Halbert, *Chicago Evening Post*, 5 October 1901, p. 7.
[33] Major McConnel, *Chicago Chronicle*, 5 June 1903, p. 6.
[34] Percy Hammond, "We are Despised by the New York Overlords of the Theater," *Chicago Tribune*, 15 October 1916, part VII, p. 1.
[35] Czechowski, "Art and Commerce: Chicago theatre 1900-1920," 76.
[36] Ibid., 76.
[37] Quoted in Czechowski, "Art and Commerce: Chicago theatre 1900-1920," 76.
[38] Ibid., 97.
[39] Ibid., 54.
[40] W.L. Hubbard, "Managers and the Star System Ruin American Drama," *Chicago Tribune*, 15 April 1906, part X, p. 1.

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[41] James O'Donnell Bennett, "The Ungrateful Playgoer," *Chicago Record-Herald,* 5 December 1909, part V, p. 4.